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ABSTRACT 
 
This thesis examines voluntary risk disclosures from 600 firm year annual 
reports in four countries’ (Australia, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore) 
manufacturing listed companies for the 2007-2009 financial years. This is an 
important time span to investigate risk disclosures as it encompasses those 
years most directly impacted by the Global Financial Crisis (GFC). 
Longitudinal and cross country analyses test the veracity of agency theory to 
predict the level of firms’ risk disclosures. A comprehensive risk disclosure 
index (RDI) checklist is created and tested to explain the extent of such 
communication over time. T-tests, ANOVA, correlations and regression 
analysis are used for the statistical testing. 
 
The findings show that overall RDI scores over the economically-challenging 
GFC time period is relative low averaging 33.73%. The RDI rises every year 
ranging from 31.46% in 2007, 34.20% in 2008, and 35.54% in 2009. There is 
a vast disparity of communication across the various risk elements. The RDI 
item “Identifying, evaluating and managing significant risks” has the highest 
level of communication (91.17%), while “Effects of inflation on assets 
quantitative’’ is the lowest RDI item with no disclosure (0 %). The highest 
major sub-category for RDI is business risk (46.55%) while the strategy risk 
category (17.21%) is the lowest communicated.  
 
Multiple regression analysis provides evidence that size, managerial 
ownership, board independence, and profitability are positively associated 
with the extent of voluntary risk disclosure. There are also clear country 
differences, for instance, Indonesian companies have statistically lower 
levels of risk disclosure compared with Malaysia. These findings are useful 
for self-evaluation and benchmarking of risk communication by other 
corporations across the global landscape. The need for mandatory regulation 
regarding key risks elements is advanced.   Overall, varying levels of risk 
disclosure over time and across countries are influenced by key firm 
characteristics and economic drivers consistent with agency theory tenets.  
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Introduction 
This thesis longitudinally examines voluntary risk disclosures within 
annual reports in four countries’ (Australia, Indonesia, Malaysia, and 
Singapore) manufacturing listed companies for the 2007-2009 financial 
years. This is a crucially important time span to investigate risk 
disclosures as it encompasses those years most directly impacted by the 
Global Financial Crisis (GFC). Longitudinal and cross country analysis 
will help test the veracity of agency theory in predicting the level of listed 
firms’ risk disclosures. Agency theory is used to offer insights into 
manufacturing listed companies’ voluntary risk disclosure practices, 
particularly in ascertaining whether enhanced country traits, company 
size, managerial ownership, and board independence variables lead to 
an increased level of voluntary risk disclosure. This thesis will shine more 
light about the level of manufacturing firms’ communication of risk 
disclosures. 
 
1.2 Background 
The entire paradigm of accounting has changed with a broadened sense 
of responsibility to all stakeholders (Mirfazli 2008). Wallage (2000) 
argues that good sustainability reporting should provide information that 
is relevant, reliable, neutral, understandable and complete. Such 
comprehensiveness should thus include the comprehensive 
communication of all key risk factors experienced by the company. CSR 
reporting is an extension of disclosure into non-traditional areas with a 
greater demand for accountability, ethical actions and being transparent 
about externalities (Pratten and Mashat 2009). This thesis examines the 
communication of risk data which fits nicely into these broader 
categories. 
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The perception of risk in contemporary times is changing. In the past, risk 
was generally seen negatively, while now risk is viewed either positively 
or negatively in response to outcomes of a myriad of events and 
perspectives (Linsley and Shrives 2006). Partly because of the dual 
perspectives of risk as both positive and negative, stakeholders need 
more information on risk disclosure to make better business and 
investment decisions. Beretta and Bozzoland (2004) state that the 
increase in complexity of regulations, operations and business strategies, 
makes it harder for investors to clearly understand financial information 
without a good explanation of risk factors.  
 
The level of risk disclosures released by companies is, arguably, 
insufficient (Cabedo and Tirado 2004). Companies are currently only 
rarely obliged to issue risk disclosures (i.e. so-called mandatory risk 
disclosures). This limits the information available to external users for 
economic decision making (Cabedo and Tirado 2004). Beretta and 
Bozzoland (2004, P.266) explain the need of risk information and note 
“investors need to understand the risks a company takes to create value 
and they want to have information on the sustainability of current value-
creation strategies.” This requires effective communication on risks 
affecting a companies’ strategies, and managerial action to capitalize on 
emerging opportunities and to minimize the risk of failure (Beretta and 
Bozzoland 2004). Investors need risk information to let them to effectively 
diversify their portfolios (Solomon et al. 2000; Beretta and Bozzoland 
2004). 
 
Risk reporting and disclosures are becoming a greater concern of 
international accounting standard setters (Cabedo and Tirado 2004; 
Brown et al. 2008; Atan and Maruhun 2009). For example, the 
International Accounting Standards Board (IASB 2008) under IAS No.1: 
Presentation of Financial Statement and IAS 32: Financial Instruments: 
Presentation requires the companies to provide information on principal 
uncertainties faced and disclosures of information for some specific 
3 
 
risks.1 IFRS 7 regulates financial instrument: disclosures. Further, the 
Financial Accounting Standard Board (FASB 1998), under SFAC No. 133 
establishes compulsory disclosures of market risks arising from the use 
of financial assets.  
 
The root of the risk disclosure topic in the literature is located within the 
requirement from Basel committee2 in 1998 to disclose more and better 
risk information in the UK banking sector. Since then, there is emerging 
research on mandatory risk reporting especially in the banking sector 
(Linsley and Shrives 2005b). Nowadays, mandatory risk disclosure is 
primarily concerned about market risk related to financial instruments and 
derivatives. Therefore, investors may not fully recognize the sensitivity of 
the firm’s risk profile and they will be more likely to use voluntary 
disclosures to make interpretations concerning firm-specific risk  
(Jorgensen and Kirschenheiter 2003). However the vast majority of (non-
bank) risk disclosures remain purely voluntary in contemporary times; 
this thesis focuses exclusively on voluntary risk disclosure.  
 
Risk could be defined as the uncertainty related with both potential gain 
and loss (Solomon et al. 2000). Risk is  also defined as the difference 
between the actualities and expected (Remenyi and Heafield 1996). 
These values reflect the magnitude of the risk. Cabedo and Tirado (2004, 
P.184) state “the current environment in which firms are working, 
characterized by a high level of uncertainty, does not make it easy to 
forecast future company behavior. A series of internal and external 
factors are currently conditioning company wealth and are the causal 
factors behind the challenges and threats facing firms today”. Linsley and 
                                               
1 IAS 1 requires companies to disclose: financial risk management objectives and 
policies; management's judgments in determining when considerably all the substantial 
risks and rewards of ownership of financial assets and lease assets are transferred to 
other entities; also firms are required to disclose information about the key assumptions 
relating the future or uncertainty that have a substantial risk of causing a material 
adjustment to the amounts of assets and liabilities in the next financial year (IASB 
2008).  
2 The Basel Committee is an important forum for banking supervisory matters. Its 
objective is to increase the quality of banking supervision worldwide. 
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Shrives (2006, P.388) compare definitions of ‘risk’ in term of finance 
textbooks as “a set of outcomes arising from a decision that can be 
assigned probabilities whereas ‘uncertainty’ arises when probabilities 
cannot be assigned to the set of outcomes”. These definitions of risk are 
adopted in this thesis because they comprehensively embrace ‘risks’ and 
‘uncertainties’. Linsley and Shrives (2006, P.389) more specifically define 
risk disclosures as “if the reader is informed of any opportunity or 
prospect, or of any hazard, danger, harm, threat or exposure, that has 
already impacted upon the company or may impact upon the company in 
the future or of the management of any such opportunity, prospect, 
hazard, harm, threat or exposure”.  This definition of risk is adopted in 
this thesis. 
 
Mirfazli (2008) lists four reasons why companies conduct social 
disclosure: 1) create a good impression, 2) support the continuity of the 
company, 3) increase company legitimacy, and 4) minimization of risk. 
This thesis offers important insights especially about the fourth key 
reason. To measure the level of risk disclosure practices of these four 
countries’ manufacturing listed companies, this thesis creates a 34-item 
benchmark Risk Disclosure Index (RDI), based on an extensive list of 
business, strategy, operating, market and credit voluntary risk disclosure 
items from key past studies (see Chapter 4 for more details). In addition, 
statistical testing is conducted to explore the association between the 
extent to which country, company size, managerial ownership, and board 
independence affect the RDI communication of these four countries’ 
manufacturing listed companies. 
 
Cross-country comparative testing is important. Williams (1999) argues 
that factors that explain differences in disclosure across national 
boundaries provide important guidance for the International Accounting 
Standards Committee (now known as the IASB) in designing accounting 
convergence. The reason to expect that the disclosure across countries 
may be dissimilar is in terms of different business communication even 
between countries with similar cultures for example U.S and Canada 
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(Robb et al. 2001). This thesis is motivated by the fact that the vast 
majority of research into risk disclosures is based on developed 
countries’ data. Cross country analysis in Asian countries, although 
important, is rarely conducted. This thesis uses samples in companies 
based in Australia, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore. These four 
countries have clear differences in many areas (see Chapter 2).   
 
The selected time span using the 2007-2009 financial years is especially 
appropriate due to the variable impact of the ‘global financial crisis’ in 
Australia, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore. Singapore and Malaysia 
experienced a greater drop in economic activity than did Indonesia or 
Australia (see Chapter 2 for details). Thus, the time span of 2007-2009 
has been selected to best understand the extent of risk disclosures 
communication over an economically challenging economic timeframe for 
the sample countries.  
 
The financial crisis of 2007–2009 represents the most serious slowdown 
the world economy has experienced since the Great Depression 1929-
1933 (Loser 2009). The collapse of a global housing bubble, which 
peaked in the United States (U.S.) in 2006, caused the value of securities 
tied to real estate pricing to plummet, thereafter damaging financial 
institutions globally (Kenc and Dibooglu 2010). Mishkin (2011) states that 
the financial crisis of 2007-2009 can be divided into two different phases 
in the U.S. The first phase is from August 2007 to August 2008 with 
major losses in the U.S. financial sub-prime residential mortgages. 
Although this troubled the U.S. financial markets, real GDP in the U.S. 
continued to rise into the second quarter of 2008, but in mid-September 
2008 the financial crisis entered the more serious phase. Key events 
were that the investment bank Lehman Brothers entered bankruptcy on 
15 September 2008, the insurance firm AIG collapsed on 16 September 
2008, there was a run on the Reserve Primary Fund money market fund 
on the same day and the U.S. government began to enact the Troubled 
Asset Relief Program (TARP) (Mishkin 2011). What started as a credit 
crisis in July 2007 in the U.S. spread to other countries and brought the 
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global financial system to a perceived large-scale crisis (Kenc and 
Dibooglu 2010). The crisis resulted in a recession in a number of 
advanced economies, the developing economies and emerging markets 
were also affected, but the impact varied across countries and regions.  
Economies worldwide slowed during this period as credit tightened and 
international trade declined (Claessens et al. 2010).  
 
The Global Financial Crisis (GFC) also had a negative effect on some of 
East Asia’s strongest economies because the decline in demand for East 
Asian goods in world markets, with exports from many East Asian 
economies dropping in value by more than 25% in 2009. Singapore and 
Malaysia, the economies most closely integrated in global production 
networks, were hit hardest by the crisis. Indonesia had less impact of 
GFC because in this country domestic trade-driven is reveals strong 
(Emmers and Ravenhill 2011). Whereas, Australia experienced only a 
modest retraction in the effect of GFC (see Figure 2.6). 
                             
This thesis examines the impact of Global Financial Crisis (GFC) 2007-
2009 on the key sub-categories of risk disclosure via a longitudinal data 
set of listed manufacturing companies 600 annual reports in four 
countries’ (Australia, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore). An 
examination of the manufacturing sector is important as based on the 
data base from World Bank (2011) the value added to the GDP from this 
sector in these four countries are high (Australia 29%, Indonesia 47%, 
Malaysia 55%, and Singapore 26%). Another reason to choose the 
manufacturing sector is that it represents an important nonfinancial 
sector that faces a comprehensive set of risks to be managed (Dobler et 
al. 2011). 
 
This study is important as it helps us judge the impact of the GFC and 
other key factors upon the extent of risk disclosures in this weak 
economic timeframe. The primary research questions of this study are to 
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explain the extent of risk disclosure in five key major categories, and to 
explore the predictors of such communication. 
                         
1.3  Research Questions 
This thesis aims to identify one aspect of ‘corporate social reporting’ that 
of the communication of key risk factors experienced by a company. It 
identifies the level of voluntary risk disclosures (measured and labeled as 
RDI), as well as the five key sub-components (business, strategy, 
operating, market, and credit risk disclosure), for 600 firm years’ annual 
report data consisting of 200 manufacturing listed companies’ annual 
reports for fiscal year-ends ranging from 2007 to 2009. The reports 
include 50 annual reports of manufacturing companies per country, listed 
in the stock exchanges of Australia, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore3 
over the turbulent global financial period of 2007-2009.  
 
The key predictor variables utilized in this research are country, company 
size, managerial ownership and board independence. The primary 
research questions of this study are: 
 
 1) What is the extent of manufacturing listed companies’ risk      
      disclosures in annual  reports? 
 2)  To what extent have such manufacturing listed companies’ risk   
      disclosures changed  over time? 
 3)  What are the factors explaining the level of risk disclosures?  
 
This thesis captures details of disclosure items within the voluntary risk 
disclosure with a comprehensive risk disclosure index (RDI) checklist, 
adapted with several key predictor variables used to predict the extent of 
such communication over time in annual reports of Southern Asia Pacific 
(Australia, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore) manufacturing listed 
                                               
3 Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, and Australia represent countries in the Asia Pacific 
region affected by the economic crisis during 2007-2009. These four countries show 
quite different levels of impact from the global economic crisis (see Figure 2.6 in 
Chapter 2 for details). 
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companies over the period of 2007-2009. This theme dovetails nicely 
with a stream of literature that documents the significant effect of country, 
size, managerial ownership and board independence on disclosure 
practices (Meek et al. 1995; Kanto and Schadewitz 1997; Williams and 
Tower 1998; Tower et al. 1999; Gelb 2000; Chen and Jaggi 2000; 
Marshall and Weetman 2002; Soewarso et al. 2003; Eng and Mak 2003; 
Cheng and Courtenay 2006; Bailey et al. 2006; Linsley and Shrives 
2006; Atan and Maruhun 2009; Baek et al. 2009). 
 
In the agency theory perspective, management in manufacturing 
companies often plays an organizational culture development role to 
mitigate potential agency problem. Agency theory may well fit better in a 
manufacturing company settings because it  is easier to monitor 
performance (Noreen 1988). Agency theory is utilized in this thesis to 
offer insights into manufacturing listed companies’ risk disclosure 
practices; particularly to ascertain whether country, company size, 
managerial ownership and board independence lead to an increased 
Risk Disclosure Index (RDI). The data set is the annual reports from 200 
manufacturing listed companies on the Australian Stock Exchange 
(ASX), Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX)4, Malaysia Exchange (MYX)5, 
Singapore Stock Exchange (SGX)6 over a three year period (2007-2009). 
It is anticipated that the findings of this thesis will shed more light on the 
four countries’ risk disclosure practices. 
 
 
 
 
                                               
4 In 2007, the Surabaya Stock Exchange was merged into the Jakarta Stock Exchange. 
As a result, the Jakarta Stock Exchange (JSX) changed its name to the Indonesia Stock 
Exchange (IDX). 
 
5 The Malaysia Exchange was known as Bursa Malaysia in the previously known Kuala 
Lumpur Stock Exchange (KLSE). The Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange became a 
demutualised exchange and was re-named as Bursa Malaysia in 2004.  
 
6 SGX was formed on December 1, 1999, following the merger of the Stock Exchange 
of Singapore (SES) and the Singapore International Monetary Exchange (SIMEX). 
9 
 
1.4 Corporate Risk Disclosure and Agency Costs 
In the agency relationship between manager (agents) and shareholders 
(principals) there is separation of ownership and control. Principals want 
agents to act to maximize the principal welfare (Jensen and Meckling 
1976). A major issue is the information asymmetry between shareholders 
and managers that some information may be given but some may be 
withheld (Marshall and Weetman 2002). On the others hand, agents are 
assumed to have incentives to disclose information voluntarily, mainly 
driven by rational agents’ self-interest for example regarding their 
reputation and remuneration (Healy and Palepu 2001). Disclosures can 
reduce the cost to analysts of gaining firm information and will increase 
analysts following the firm (Lang and Lundholm 1996). Hill and Short 
(2009) suggest that risk disclosures will reduce asymmetry information 
on firms. In addition, disclosures can reduce estimation risk to better 
avoid market failure and increase market liquidity, leading to more 
efficient capital markets (Healy and Palepu 2001).  
 
Voluntary disclosure studies have received considerable attention in the 
accounting literature in recent years (Gray et al. 1995; Healy and Palepu 
2001; Einhorn 2007; Wang et al. 2008). Voluntary disclosure can change 
the investors’ expectation about the value of the firm (Einhorn 2007). A 
firm’s decision to provide more voluntary disclosure is possibly as a 
reaction to globalization, innovation or changes in business and capital 
market backgrounds (Healy and Palepu 2001). Spence (1973) indicates 
that additional information can be used to lessen information asymmetry 
problems, including moral hazard and factors driving up costs. 
 
A better level of risk communication allows capital market participants to 
be aware of potential material changes and, in doing so, disclosures can 
reduce agency costs. Arguably, the disclosure of information about risk 
will improve stakeholders’ understanding of the company. This higher 
level of transparency will greatly ease the task of interpreting the risks of 
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the company by external users (Marshall and Weetman 2002; Cabedo 
and Tirado 2004; Taylor 2008; Hill and Short 2009). 
 
A company must take responsibility for accountability of not only their 
finance performance but also their social performance (Mirfazli 2008); 
there are clear risk factors for both aspects of the company’s activities. 
This thesis’s selected time span using the 2007-2009 financial years is 
important due to the impact of the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) to better 
understand the extent of risk disclosures communication over an 
economically challenging economic timeframe. 
 
1.5 Significance of the Research 
This thesis is very important in that it contributes to the literature in a 
number of ways. Firstly, it provides insights into the risk disclosure 
practices. It will help stakeholders (especially investors and 
shareholders) to assess the risk disclosures for Australian, Indonesian, 
Malaysian, and Singaporean manufacturing listed companies. Secondly, 
by examining the impact of the variables of country, company size, 
managerial ownership and board independence using the Risk 
Disclosure Index (RDI) within annual reports for the year 2007, 2008, and 
2009, this thesis’s findings will assist stakeholders in obtaining a better 
understanding about risk disclosures. Thirdly, it contributes to the 
accounting literature by testing agency theory’s ability to explain risk 
disclosure. Fourthly, there is lack of risk disclosure studies in 
manufacturing companies, especially in these four sample countries. 
Fifthly, this thesis will be one of the first to examine the impact of the 
global financial crisis 2007-2009 on disclosure via a longitudinal data set. 
Lastly, there is a dearth of research on disclosure risk using sample 
countries with different economic scenarios.  
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1.6 Assumptions and Limitations 
Similar to other quantitative empirical studies of corporate 
communication, this thesis has certain limitations and assumptions. It 
focuses only on voluntary risk disclosures of manufacturing companies. 
Risk disclosure related to the risk of each company's manufacturing 
phase detailed process (specific production details), in this thesis is not 
examined. Very few companies communicate each phase of the process; 
this means it is difficult to obtain detailed data. A second limitation is that 
the manufacturing companies sampled for this research are in different 
sub-fields of manufacturing, which may lead to difficulty in explaining 
differences between corporate business risks. However, the sole focus 
on one industry category (manufacturing) is considered a major strength 
of this thesis research design. A third limitation of this thesis is that some 
upper level companies conducting their operations in the scope of the 
four countries (Australia, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore) are not 
listed on the stock exchange of those countries. For example, Chevron 
has mining operations in Australia, but is not listed on the Australian 
Stock Exchange (Taylor 2008). Chevron also conducts operations in 
Indonesia, but is not listed on the Indonesian Stock Exchange. A fourth 
limitation that possibly can generate potential bias from the from the four 
different country comparative research sample is that due to data gaps 
this thesis does not examine the family controlling shareholder factor in 
the managerial ownership variable. Claessens et al. (2002) argue that 
especially in Indonesia corporations, their managers are usually related 
to the family controlling shareholder. 
 
In conducting research across a number of countries, this thesis does not 
analyze any culture elements such as the Hofstede cultural dimensions. 
Potentially studies could consider cultural influences that may identify 
differences between countries’ risk disclosures in more depth. There are 
numerous previous studies linking cultural influences in accounting 
disclosure studies. For example Williams (1999) and Haniffa and Cooke 
(2002) used culture testing based on Hofstede logic however such 
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approaches are often highly criticized by authors due to measurement 
and conceptual issues. For example Baskerville (2003) criticized 
Hofstede culture variable in cross national studies in accounting research 
arguing such an approach can led to the misleading explanatory factors 
in accounting practices partly because Hofstede approach is at odds with 
ethnographic analyses such as the universalist approach in anthropology 
and sociology.  Finally this thesis does not examine the multitude of other 
macro factors to describe the level of risk disclosure. 
 
1.7 Glosarry of Key Terms 
 
This section highlights the definitions of key concepts that are used 
extensively throughout this thesis. These are summaried below in Table 
1.1. 
Table 1.1 Glossary of Key Terms 
Risk “Risk is defined as the possibility that the actual input 
variables and the outcomes may vary from those originally 
estimated… risk is usually used in the context of a potential 
hazard or the possibility of an unfortunate outcome 
resulting from a given action, intrinsically risk may be either 
positive or negative” (Remenyi and Heafield 1996, P.349) 
  
Risk Disclosure “If the reader is informed of any opportunities or prospect, 
or of any hazard, danger, harm, thread or exposure that 
has already impacted upon the company or may impact 
upon the company in the future or of the management of 
any such opportunity, prospect, hazard, harm, threat or 
exposure” (Linsley and Shrives 2006, P.389). 
 
Risk Disclosure 
Index (RDI) 
The dependent variable in this study is the Risk Disclosure 
Index (RDI). To measure the level of risk disclosure 
practices of these four countries’ manufacturing listed 
companies, this thesis use a 34-item Risk Disclosure Index 
(RDI); a continuous dependent variable. This research 
adopts a researcher-constructed risk disclosure index to 
create an index measuring the extent of risk disclosure by 
listed firms.  This benchmark set is based on an extensive 
list of business, strategy, operating, market and credit 
voluntary risk disclosure items from key past studies. 
Agency Theory  “A contract under which one or more person (the 
principal(s)) engage another person (the agent) to perform 
some service on their behalf which involves delegating 
some decision making authority to the agent” (Jensen and 
Meckling 1976, P.308). 
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1.8 Overview of the Thesis 
This thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 1 provides an overview of 
the study, including the introduction, background, research objectives 
and questions, significance and contribution of the study, assumptions 
and limitations, and the below outline of the entire thesis. Chapter 2 
focuses on the myriad of factors potentially influencing the accounting 
environment in these four countries. Chapter 3 reviews the literature on 
agency theory, and links disclosure with country, company size, 
managerial ownership, board independence, and relevant prior empirical 
research. This leads to the development of hypotheses. Chapter 4 details  
the research methodology and design. This chapter describes data 
sources, the variables (dependent, independent, and control) in the 
research, and specific methods to test the hypotheses - the constructions 
and application of the disclosure index and measurement and testing of 
independent and control variables. Chapter 5 conveys the descriptive 
statistics for key variables. Chapter 6 reports the statistical analysis of the 
independent variable predictors hypothesized to be associated with risk 
disclosure patterns. Chapter 7 documents the additional analysis 
conducted. Chapter 8 concludes the thesis with a summary of key 
findings, limitations and assumptions, implications and suggestions for 
future research. 
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CHAPTER 2 
ACCOUNTING ENVIRONMENT IN AUSTRALIA, INDONESIA, 
MALAYSIA, AND SINGAPORE 
 
2.1  Overview 
Chapter 1 provides an overview of the entire thesis. It offers the 
purpose and offers the research question of this thesis. Chapter 1 also 
states the use of agency theory in explaining voluntary risk disclosure 
practice in manufacturing companies in the four countries (Australia, 
Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore) in the dynamic time span of the 
Global Financial Crisis (GFC) 2007-2009. Chapter 2 focuses on the 
accounting environment and the background of political, economic, 
and social factors in these four countries. The risk issues for these four 
countries and the differing impact of Global Financial Crisis (GFC) 
2007-2009 time period are also discussed.  
 
2.2  Asia Pacific Region 
Asia Pacific is the region where the four countries (Australia, 
Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore) are located. They can be 
regarded as the four major countries in the South East Asian7 region 
including Australia in terms of economic growth, social and political 
development. 
 
Impressive economic performance in the last three decades is 
witnessed in numerous countries in the Asian continent, especially in 
the East Asian region. Rapid GDP growth is observed in China, India 
and also the major East Asian countries economies such as 
Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Singapore, Taiwan and Thailand since 
1960 until now. The standard of life in the East Asian region is moving 
toward the western developed industrial countries’ norms like U.S and 
U.K (Collins et al. 1996). The success of East Asia is associated with 
                                               
7 Australia is part of ‘greater’ Asia geographically (Jupp 1995). 
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government policy in microeconomic activity leading to increased 
productivity and this region is seen to be a market friendly region 
(Collins et al. 1996). Bloom and Findlay (2009) label the growth 
performance as the ‘East Asian Miracle’. Economic factors are 
improved by the trade openness, high saving rates, human capital 
accumulation, micro economic policy and also changes in 
demographics such as increases in the working age and increases in 
women participation.  
 
Asia Pacific is a region worthy of discussion because it has many 
countries with high levels of plurality (see Table 2.1). This region 
greatly affects global worldwide trade (Elek 1992; Higgott and Stubbs 
1995; Dent 2010). In the context of economic globalization, deepening 
of intra firm trade, foreign direct investment, and the exchange of labor 
between head office and branch office is picking up speed in the Asia 
Pacific region. A company’s branch office may be located in others 
countries leading to greater interdependence between developed and 
developing countries in the Asia Pacific region (Harris 1994; Lo and 
Marcotullio 2000). 
 
The World Bank database, using data on GDP per capita, shows that 
the four sample countries have different economic scenarios. Australia 
and Singapore are in a fundamentally different economic level from 
Indonesia and Malaysia. It could be argued that Australia and 
Singapore are developed markets, while Malaysia and Indonesia are 
emerging markets (Saudagaran and Diga 1997b).  
 
There are several organizations established to promote bilateral 
cooperation between countries in the Asia Pacific region. For example 
the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) began in 1989 with 
policies to improve economic sustainability in the Asia Pacific region. 
In terms of globalization, policies on harmonization8 are deemed 
                                               
8 The term harmonization in this thesis is considered to have the same meaning as 
the newer used term convergence. 
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necessary to mediate the problem of radical differences9 in the legal 
and administrative dealing with trade issues (Elek 1992). Further, a 
study by Taplin and McGee (2010) reveal that some countries in the 
Asia Pacific region work well together to face the risk of climate 
change through the Kyoto protocol implementing partnerships for 
common needs among countries. 
 
In the South East Asian region there is also an important regional 
organization namely ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) 
with the original members being Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, 
Singapore and Thailand (three of the four thesis sample countries). 
ASEAN has several major programs such as implementing the 
Preferential Tariff Arrangement (PTA) project for large scale 
production-sharing for the ASEAN market. The industrial 
complementation scheme (improving supply networks), seeks to build  
up sub regional groups, for example the growth triangle involving 
Singapore, Johor state of Malaysia, and Batam island in Indonesia 
(Yamazawa 1992). Another future project is the ASEAN Free Trade 
Area (AFTA) in 2020 is envisioned to attract more investors in this 
region (Ravenhill 2003). ASEAN now has 10 member10 countries with 
a goal of strengthening regional economic integration in this region 
through mutual and beneficial interdependence (Webber 2001; 
Ravenhill 2003; Beeson 2003; Tan 2011).  
 
In Figure 2.1 a framework offered by Aggarwal (1993) discusses  a   
country’s trade in which the principles and norms are connected with 
the rules and procedures of international regimes. 
 
 
 
                                               
9 These differences include investment rules, tax concessions, subsidy rules and so 
on. Regional harmonization or mutual recognition of policies, regulations and 
standards in the APEC region would lead to reduction of these differences (Elek 
1992). 
10 ASEAN member are: Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Indonesia, Lao PDR, 
Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam (ASEAN 2012). 
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Figure 2.1  A Framework to Analyze Economic Trade 
 
Source: Adapted from Aggarwal (1993, P.1031). 
 
For example, the World Trade Organization (WTO) program on 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GAAT) can be implemented  
by domestic politics via unilateral controls and bilateral accords such 
as APEC or ASEAN. Interaction among countries can thus happen if 
there is similar tastes or similar technology or similar organizations 
(Aggarwal 1993). Dent (2010) posits that within the scope of trade 
cooperation in the Asia Pacific region, it is necessary to consider 
convergence / harmonization, and transformation in terms of free trade 
arrangements. Helbe, Shepherd, and Wilson (2009) note the 
importance of transparency in Asia Pacific region. Moreover, 
Saudagaran  and Diga (1997a) state that harmonization (now better 
known as convergence) of accounting rules in the regional area is 
crucially important in order to reduce differences in accounting practice 
and help users better understand companies’ annual report. 
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The macroeconomic framework in Figure 2.1 can be transposed to an 
accounting policies framework to describe and explain the risk 
disclosure practice via a global or regional global perspective. If more 
specifically focused on risk disclosure practices in Australia, Indonesia, 
Malaysia, and Singapore it can be utilized to overview risk information 
communication. Such disclosure practices may be affected by the 
similarity of tastes, technology and organization in the specific 
countries’ environment. 
 
2.3  Selection of Countries, Industry and Years  
2.3.1  Why These Four Countries? 
The major underlying reasons for the specific selection of these four 
nations are as follows: 
1. Each country is a member of the Asian Pacific Economic 
Corporation (APEC) group; the organization with a spirit of 
cooperation (see Williams 1998). This thesis focuses on the 
southern region of the Asia Pacific representing important different 
characteristics (economic levels, language, accounting heritage, 
etc).  
2. These four countries have experienced vastly different economic 
experiences during the 2007-2009 GFC time period.  
3. There is an established stock exchange in each sample country 
requiring listed companies to publish their annual reports. 
4. English version annual reports are available in each country. 
5. There is a healthy comparative element with Australia and 
Singapore considered as developed markets, and Indonesia and 
Malaysia as  emerging markets (Saudagaran and Diga 1997b). 
6. Australia, Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore have implemented or 
are moving quickly towards full IFRS adoption (Astami and Tower 
2006; IASPlus 2012). 
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There are currently 21 countries11 APEC members (APEC 2011). 
APEC is an organization unifying the economic cooperation in the Asia 
Pacific region representing the diversity of political, economical, social 
and culture aspects among its countries’ members. The country 
sample selection would ideally be able to represent differences in 
terms of politics, economics, business environments, organizational 
attributes, social, and cultural factors. Overall, the countries chosen 
are: (1) Australia, (2) Indonesia, (3) Malaysia, (4) Singapore 
representing the APEC countries member which are in the southern 
Asia Pacific region which have clear differences in many areas (see 
Table 2.1).   
  
Table 2.1 highlights the different in these four countries in terms of 
geography, economic development, colonial history and type of legal 
system. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
11 APEC member  are: Australia, Brunei Darussalam, Canada, Chile, People’s 
Republic of China, Hongkong China, Indonesia, Japan, Republic of Korea, Malaysia, 
Mexico, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, Peru, The Philippines, Russia, 
Singapore, Chinese Taipei, Thailand, The United States and Viet Nam (APEC 2011). 
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Table 2.1: Key Country Factors 
Environment factors Year 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Population (million persons) 
Australia 20.87 21.26 21.73 21.95 
Indonesia 222.75 225.64 228.52 231.37 
Malaysia 26.83 27.19 27.54 27.89 
Singapore 4.59 4.84 4.98 5.07 
GDP per capita (current US$) 
Australia 36,203 40,660 48,348 42,131 
Indonesia 1,586 1,859 2,172 2,272 
Malaysia 5,887 6,900 8,066 6,909 
Singapore 33,019 38,645 39,136 36,758 
GDP per capita growth (annual %) 
Australia 1.6 1.9 1.7 -0.8 
Indonesia 4.3 5.2 4.9 3.5 
Malaysia 3.9 4.7 2.3 -3.3 
Singapore 5.6 4.3 -3.8 -3.7 
Inflation, average consumer prices (% change) 
Australia 3.5 2.3 4.4 1.8 
Indonesia 13.1 6.0 9.8 4.8 
Malaysia 3.6 2.0 5.4 0.6 
Singapore 1.0 2.1 6.6 0.6 
Land area (1000 sq.km) 
Australia 7,617 
Indonesia 1,919 
Malaysia 330 
Singapore 1 
Capital market system 
Australia Capital market equity funds 
Indonesia Mixed equity and credit funds 
Malaysia Capital market and equity funds 
Singapore Capital market equity funds 
Number of Companies Listed in Country’s Stock Exchange 
Australia/Australian Stock 
Exchange 2181 
Indonesia/Indonesia Stock 
Exchange 451 
Malaysia/Bursa Malaysia 830 
Singapore/Singapore Stock 
Exchange 809 
Number of Manufacturing Companies Listed in Country’s Stock 
Exchange 
Australia/Australian Stock 
Exchange 309 
Indonesia/Indonesia Stock 
Exchange 101 
Malaysia/Bursa Malaysia 219 
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Singapore/Singapore Stock 
Exchange 106 
Colonial history (period of colonization) 
Australia Britain (1788-1901) 
Indonesia Holland (17th century – 1945) 
Malaysia Britain (18th century – 1957) 
Singapore Britain (1819 – 1965) 
Type of legal system 
Australia Common Law country 
Indonesia Civil Law country 
Malaysia Common Law country 
Singapore Common Law country 
Main relegion 
Australia Christianity 
Indonesia Islam 
Malaysia Islam, Confucianism, Buddhism 
Singapore Confucianism, Buddhism, Taoism, Islam, Christianity, Hinduism 
 
Sources: World Development Indicators database September 2011 (World Bank 2011) are 
accessed from http://worldbank.org (accessed on 28 October 2011). The International 
Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Database April 2010 (IMF 2010) are accessed from 
http://www.imf.org (accesed on 25 October 2011), and other source such as Wikipedia (2011) 
http://www.en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Singapore (accesses on 6 December 2011), Orbis database 
(Orbis 2011) are accessed from http://databases.library.curtin.edu.au (accessed on 28 March 
2011). Tabalujan (2002) and Astami (2005). 
 
From Table 2.1 it can be concluded there are key differences in the 
four sample countries, for example population, Indonesia has a 
massive population base with 231 million people in 2009. This is far 
different from Singapore which has only a small population of 5 million 
people in 2009. While Malaysia has a population of 28 million and 
Australia 22 million people in 2009. 
 
In terms of inflation, in 2008 (compared with 2007 and 2009) seems to 
be the highest year of inflation in the four country sample. In 2008, 
Indonesia has the highest inflation level, followed by Singapore and 
Malaysia and Australia have the lowest inflation level in the four 
country sample. There is a huge geographic size difference in the four 
country sample. Australia is the largest, amounting to 7,617,000 sq.km 
followed by Indonesia, and Malaysia, and Singapore has the smallest 
region in that it only has an area of approximately 1,000 sq.km. The 
primary religion in the four countries also varies. The main religion in 
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Australia is Christian, in Indonesia it is Islam, in Malaysia various 
major religions exist namely Islam, Confucian, and Buddhist with the 
former dominating. Singapore is more diverse, the major religions in 
Singapore are Confucian, Buddhist, Taoism, Islam, Christian and 
Hinduism.  
 
There are also different financial system practices in each of these 
four countries. For instance, Australia, Malaysia, and Singapore have 
an extensive capital market equity fund financial system while 
Indonesia has more of a mixed equity and credit fund system (Astami 
2005). 
 
Nobes (1998), summarizes 17 possible reasons from previous studies 
seeking to explain why accounting practices differs across countries. 
These possible factors are: nature of business ownership and 
financing system; colonial inheritance, invasions, taxations; inflation; 
level of education; age and size accountancy profession; stage of 
economic development; legal systems; culture; history; geography; 
language; influence of theory; political systems, social climate; religion 
and lastly major natural accidents. He admits that not all of these 17 
factors are necessarily strong explanatory variables to explain 
international differences in financial reporting in each specific country.  
 
This thesis argues that four of these 17 factors are the most critically 
important because they better explain accounting differences or are 
likely to have a more direct effect on accounting practices in the four 
sample countries (Indonesia, Australia, Indonesia, Malaysia, and 
Singapore). These four factors are: nature of business ownership and 
financing system; colonial inheritance; legal systems and stage of 
economic development. This thesis also adds a fifth possible factor 
namely corporate governance (board system) practice as governance 
issues are now higher profile in the last ten years (Ryan et al. 2010). 
The board system is an important proxy of corporate government as 
Beiner et al (2004, P.327) state that  “the board of directors is one of 
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the most important corporate governance mechanisms ensuring that 
managers pursue the interests of shareholders. Its task is to monitor, 
discipline, and remove ineffective management teams”.  
 
These five factors are place in two categories in this thesis. These are: 
1). Firm specific characteristics and 2). Country differences (see 
Sections 2.4.1 and 2.4.2 for expanded coverage). 
 
2.3.2  Why the Manufacturing Industry? 
The reason why this thesis chooses manufacturing industry as the 
sole  sample focus is because manufacturing companies are seen as 
implementing an integrated process that convert materials into goods 
(see Drucker 1990). Dobler et al. (2011) in their risk disclosure study 
investigates the manufacturing industry and argues this sector is a 
good choice because it represents a nonfinancial sector that faces a 
comprehensive set of risks to be managed. Manufacturing companies 
have longer processes, more complex activities, and have more 
business risks in the activities than most other firms. Arguably, 
research scrutinizing manufacturing firms effectively tests agency 
theory ability to predict the level of risk disclosures. 
 
2.3.3  Why the 2007-2009 Time Period? 
To enhance the analysis, the years selected in this thesis are the 
2007-2009 financial periods. Those three years encompass the impact 
of the global economic crisis situation faced by most countries in the 
world (Kenc and Dibooglu 2010; Zhang et al. 2010; Mishkin 2011). 
 
The financial crisis of 2007–2009 started as a credit crisis in July 2007 
in the U.S. spread to other countries and brought the global financial 
system to a perceived large-scale crisis (Kenc and Dibooglu 2010). 
The crisis resulted in a recession in a number of advanced economies, 
the developing economies and emerging markets were also affected, 
but the impact varied across countries and regions.  Economies 
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worldwide slowed during this period as credit tightened and 
international trade declined (Claessens et al. 2010).  
 
The four sample countries are affected by the global crisis in various 
ways. This thesis analyses whether there are key differences between 
countries and years for risk disclosure.  
 
 
2.3.4  Accounting Standard Setting in these Four Countries 
Figure 2.2 highlights possible links of a country’s policy and its 
alignment to its accounting rules and its collaboration with other 
countries. These policy options could be unique, or pegged to another 
country or integrated through a bilateral agreement; all of the 
possibilities could lead to the accounting harmonization / convergence  
regionally or globally (Saudagaran and Diga 1997a).  
 
Figure 2.2 Country Influences on Accounting Harmonization / 
Convergence 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                        Maintain Uniqueness 
 
                                                                                                        Pegging to another countries 
  
                                                                                                        Bilateral agreement 
  
                                                                                                        Harmonize regionally 
 
                                                                                                        Harmonize globally 
 
 
 
Source: Adapted from Saudagaran and Diga (1997a, P. 6) 
 
 
In terms of accounting harmonization/convergence, these four 
countries are all member of International Accounting Standard Board 
(IASB) which have implemented or are moving quickly towards full 
IFRS adoption. 
 
 
COUNTRY 
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The principal sources of accounting standards in the four countries 
(Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, and Australia) are virtually identical 
due to the international convergence with International Financial 
Reporting Standards (IFRS) (Astami and Tower 2006; IASPlus 2012). 
Many countries around the world have recently moved to IFRS or are 
in the process of adopting IFRS with the expected benefit that the use 
of IFRS enhance the comparability of financial statements, improves 
corporate transparency and increases the financial reporting quality 
enhancing investors’ benefits. IFRS are more capital-market oriented 
and more comprehensive, especially concerning disclosure than 
GAAP (Daske et al. 2008). IFRS refers to the entire body of 
International Accounting Standard Board (IASB) rules, approved by 
the IASB, IAS, the Standing Interpretation Committee (SIC) and its 
predecessor the International Accounting Standards Committee 
(IASC) (Astami and Tower 2006).  
 
The four countries have historically evolved accounting standards in 
different ways. In Indonesia, the standard setting body is Komite 
Standar Akuntansi Keuangan (Committee on Financial Accounting 
Standards) and there are additional disclosure requirements imposed 
by the Capital Market Supervisory Board (Bapepam) for listed 
companies. In the past, Indonesian accounting standards were 
adopted from U.S. accounting standards issued by the AICPA (Craig 
and Diga 1996). In more recent times Indonesian companies are in the 
process of ongoing convergence. A final decision about the ultimate 
target date for full compliance with IFRS is expected to be made in 
2012 (IFRS 2012).  
 
The Malaysian accounting standards are more centrally-based and 
have traditionally focused far more on accounting pronouncements of 
the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB). Malaysia 
promulgated its Financial Reporting Act in 1997. The Malaysian 
Accounting Standard Board (MASB) now has the authority to develop 
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and publish accounting and financial standards (Astami and Tower 
2006). Since 1978, Malaysia has incorporating the adoption of 
International Accounting Standards (IAS) into Malaysia’s local 
accounting standards. The Financial Reporting Foundation (FRF) and 
Malaysian Accounting Standards Board (MASB) bring Malaysia to full 
convergence with International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) 
by 2012.  As of May 2012, all accounting standards applicable to 
entities other than private entities is converge fully with IFRS and 
apply the IFRS compliant framework or referred as the MFRS 
framework as a part of the IFRS convergence. This convergence is not 
affecting private entities that are currently applying the Private Entity 
Reporting Standards (PERS) (MASB 2008, 2011, 2012).    
 
In Singapore, the Council on Corporate Disclosure and Governance 
(CCDG) is established by Singapore government to replace the 
Institute of Certified Public Accountants of Singapore as the primary 
accounting standard setter (Astami and Tower 2006). From 1 
November 2007, the Accounting Standards Council (ASC) took over 
the task of the Council on Corporate Disclosure and Governance 
(CCDG) in the accounting standards. The creation of the ASC is to 
ensure consistency in accounting standards, comparison of financial 
statements and credibility and transparency of financial reporting in 
Singapore. The ASC authority is only for formulation and promulgation 
of accounting standards. The monitoring and enforcement of 
compliance with accounting standards is the responsibility of the 
respective regulators (ASC 2012b). The Accounting and Corporate 
Regulatory Authority (ACRA) is the respective national regulator for 
business entities and public accountants in Singapore. ACRA was 
formed as a statutory board on 1 April 2004, following the merger of 
the Registry of Companies and Businesses (RCB), and the Public 
Accountants’ Board (PAB) (ACRA 2012). The Singapore accounting 
standards are also centrally-based and focused on accounting 
pronouncements of the International Accounting Standards Board 
(IASB) (Astami and Tower 2006). Most importantly, the Financial 
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Reporting Standards (FRSs) issued by the ASC are based on the 
IFRS (ASC 2012a). 
 
In Australia, The Australian Accounting Standards Board (AASB) is 
responsible for developing and issuing Accounting Standards 
applicable to Australian entities with the Board's functions and powers 
are set out in the Australian Securities and Investments Commission 
Act 2001. Until December 1999, the former Australian Accounting 
Standards Board and the former Public Sector Accounting Standards 
Board (PSASB) developed standards based on the Corporations Law 
(AASB 2012). Australia now has mandated IFRS rules for all reporting 
entities reporting since 2005 (IFRS 2012). Australian accounting 
standards for profit entities are consistent with IFRS, with the 
exclusion of some extra disclosure requirements that are not dealt with 
under IFRS, for example detailed accounting requirements for general 
and life insurance contracts and local issues such as the accounting 
for Petroleum Resource Rent Tax (PWC 2012). 
 
In summary, despite different starting points and different 
combinations of government and professional leadership, each of the 
four sample countries have implemented or are moving quickly 
towards full IFRS adoption. 
 
2.4  Characteristic Influencing Accounting Disclosure  
This thesis position is that there a two key categories to help explain 
risk disclosures. These are: 1) Firm specific characteristics and 2) 
Country differences. Section 2.4.1 details the importance of the first 
set of factors (firm specific characteristics). Section 2.4.2 then 
discusses country characteristics influencing accounting disclosure. 
 
2.4.1  Firm Specific Characteristics  
The three key firm specific characteristic highlighted in this thesis are: 
company size, managerial ownership, and board independence. 
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These three items are posited as important voluntary disclosure 
predictors under agency theory tenets. Each of these three are 
discussed in more depth below. Other firm specific characteristics 
potentially influencing accounting disclosure are treated as control 
variables. These are: leverage, age of business; auditor; and lastly 
profitability (see Section 4.5).  
  
2.4.1.1  Company Size 
Several prior studies document the influential effect of company size 
on disclosure practices (Kanto and Schadewitz 1997; Linsley and 
Shrives 2006; Atan and Maruhun 2009). The level of risk information 
disclosures is thought to be positively associated with company size. 
For example, Linsley and Shrives (2006) explore risk disclosures and 
company size. Their result supports the hypothesis that a positive 
correlation exists between the volume of risk disclosures and company 
size. This thesis adopts company size as a potential factor explaining 
the risk disclosures. 
 
2.4.1.2  Managerial Ownership  
This thesis also examines companies’ managerial ownership in 
Australia, Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore (see Section 3.7.3) 
because managerial ownership is considered as having an important 
influence in determining the nature of the agency problem in which 
both the agent (manager) and the principal (shareholder) are seeking 
to maximize their own self-interest (Jensen and Meckling 1976). 
Consistent with the results of most past agency theory studies which 
note a negative relationship between managerial ownership and the 
level of disclosure (Gelb 2000; Eng and Mak 2003) this thesis 
analyses managerial ownership as a potential factor explaining the 
companies’ risk disclosures. 
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2.4.1.3  Board Independence 
Due to the separation of ownership and control of a firm, an agency 
relationship provides scenarios for firm management to engage in 
opportunistic behavior that enhances their welfare at the expense of 
the firm (Jensen and Meckling 1976). Agency theory suggests that 
governance mechanisms such as monitoring by the board of directors 
can minimize divergences that arise from the separation of ownership 
and decision control (Fama and Jensen 1983). Shareholders, as 
beneficiaries of risk, need representation on the board that is 
independent of management to protect their assets (Cheng and 
Courtenay 2006). 
 
Prior studies document a significant effect of board independence on 
disclosure practices (Chen and Jaggi 2000; Cheng and Courtenay 
2006). This thesis adopts the level of board independence as a 
potential factor explaining risk disclosure 
 
2.4.2  Country Characteristics Influencing Accounting Disclosure 
Prior studies document the effect of country on disclosure practice 
(Dye 1985; Meek et al. 1995; Williams and Tower 1998; Tower et al. 
1999; Jaggi and Low 2000; Marshall and Weetman 2002; Soewarso et 
al. 2003; Bailey et al. 2006; Dobler et al. 2011). This thesis posits 
country as a determinant factor explaining the association between 
risk disclosures (see Section 3.7.1). These country differences may be 
explained by their colonial inheritance, legal system, stage of 
economic development, and board structure as key factors potentially 
changing the relationship between country and disclosure practice. 
 
2.4.2.1  Colonial Inheritance  
The four countries studied in this thesis were colonized by European 
countries in the past centuries. Nobes (1998) argues that colonial 
inheritance factors can explain the differences or similarities between 
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accounting practices. Australia, Malaysia and Singapore are countries 
based upon the British system with their history of the colonialisation. 
In contrast, Indonesia is a former Dutch colony (Taplin et al. 2002; 
Astami and Tower 2006).  As British colonies, Australia, Malaysia and 
Singapore have a good start in the legacy of a basic accounting 
system provided by British leadership in accounting development. 
These countries adopted British accounting values such as true and 
fair, prudence and professional judgment. On the other hand it is 
argued that Dutch failed to provide a good administration model with  
the professions deficient in their legacy of a basic accounting system 
in their ex-colonies such as Indonesia (Astami 2005). 
 
2.4.2.2  Legal Systems 
There are two broad classifications of legal systems applied in the 
nations around the world, there are common law and civil (also 
referred to as code) law systems (La Porta et al. 1997; La Porta et al. 
1999; Jaggi and Low 2000; Ball et al. 2000). The civil law or code law 
or Romano-Germanic is based on statutes, codes, and also opinions 
of legal scholars. While, the common law is taken from English 
traditions which are formed from judges’ opinions on specific issues 
and those decisions become precedents and become the basis of this 
law (La Porta et al. 1997; Jaggi and Low 2000). Accounting in terms of 
civil law systems may be more affected by high political influence 
occurring at the national levels. Governments establish and enforce 
national accounting standards in response to the need of major 
political groups such as labor unions, bank and business associations. 
Whereas in a common law system accounting practices are 
determined primarily in the private sector (Ball et al. 2000).   
 
Jaggi and Low (2000) in their research of 401 companies from six 
countries belonging to common and civil law countries find that 
financial disclosures by companies from common laws countries are 
significantly higher compared to companies from civil law countries. 
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Ball et al (2000) argue that information asymmetry in common law 
countries is better resolved by timely public disclosure and financial 
statements than in civil law countries.  
 
Table 2.2 reveals the differences in the country level classification of 
legal, financial and political economy institution in these four countries 
adopted from Bushman and Piotroski (2006). Australia and Singapore 
have low levels of state ownership, whereas Indonesia and Malaysia 
have high levels of state ownership. Australia ownership concentration 
is in the low level which is different with Indonesia, Malaysia and 
Singapore which have high levels of ownership concentration (see 
Table 2.2). 
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Table 2.2: Country- level Classifications of Legal, Financial and Political Economy Institutions 
  
Legal 
Origin 
Judicial 
impartiality 
Securities 
law 
Sec.Law: 
Public 
enforce 
Sec.Law: 
Private 
enforce 
Risk of 
expropriation 
State-
owned 
enterprises 
Tax 
burden 
Bank 
vs 
market 
Private 
bonds 
Ownership 
concentrate 
Insider 
Trading 
enforce 
Australia AUS Common High High High High High Low High Low High Low 1996 
Indonesia IDN Civil Low High Low High High High Low High n/a High 1996 
Malaysia MYS Common Low High High High High High Low Low High High 1996 
Singapore SGP Common High High High High Low Low Low Low Low High 1978 
Source: Bushman and Piotroski (2006); Tabulated classifications reflect calendar year 2001 country-level attributes; For Indonesia private bond, data is not availbable (n/a). 
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2.4.2.3  Stage of Economic Development 
The nature and level of economic growth and development may also 
affect accounting as a country changes. For example, a shift from 
agriculture to manufacturing will lead to new accounting problems 
(such as machinery depreciation, leasing, and so on). Economic 
growth is a major influence on accounting for instance in cases where 
in hyperinflation has been widespread to the extent that the alternative 
systems is at times needed (Radebaugh et al. 2006). 
 
In terms of the economic conditions for the four sample countries, 
Figure 2.3 shows the GDP per capita from 2006 (before the GFC), to 
2007-2009 (the GFC period). 
 
Figure 2.3: GDP per capita (current US$) 
 
Source: World Development Indicators database. September 2011.,http://worldbank.org 
(accessed on 28 October 2011). 
 
 
 
Figures 2.3 (GDP per capita adapted from World Bank data in the four 
countries during the Global Financial Crisis (GFC)) shows that there 
are vastly different economic scenarios between Australia and 
Singapore as compared to Malaysia and Indonesia. 
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The data highlights that Australia and Singapore are more 
economically developed countries while Malaysia and Indonesia are 
emerging economies. It further reveals that the approximate income 
per person per year for Australian is US$36,203 in 2006 (prior to GFC) 
and the number continue to increase to the amount of US$40,660 and 
US$48,348 in 2007 and 2008 respectively while in the final GFC year 
of 2009 it decreases down to US$42,131. Such trends in income also 
happen in Singapore, although the level of income is a little bit lower 
than GDP per capita in Australia. GDP per capita in Singapore in 2006 
is US$33,019 and increases up to 38,645 and 39,136 in 2007 and 
2008 while in 2009 it decreases down to 36,758.  
 
The GDP per capita in Malaysia in 2006 is far lower at the level of 
US$5,887 and increases to US$6,900 and US$8,006 in 2007 and 
2008 and slightly decreases in 2009 to the level of US$6,909. 
Indonesia is the country with the lowest level of GDP per capita among 
the four sample countries. However, contrary to the trend in the other 
three countries, the GDP per capita in Indonesia continues to increase 
from 2006 to 2009 in the amount of US$1,586, 1,859, 2,172 and 
US$2,272 respectively.  
 
Figures 2.4 and 2.5 (a-d) provide a longer term overview and Figure 
2.4 features the condition of GDP per capita from 1960 until now. The 
trend summarized in Figure 2.4 reveals that in 1960s the GDP per 
capita of Singapore was almost at the same level as Malaysia and 
Indonesia. While since the 1970s it has grown rapidly and it reaches 
its peak in 1993 to 2002 when GDP per capita of Singapore was 
higher than Australia.  
 
The longer trend of income per capita in the four countries from 1960 
to 2009 shows fundamental differences in the economic scenarios 
between Australia and Singapore versus Malaysia and Indonesia (see 
Figures 2.4 and 2.5 (a-d). Figure 2.5a – 2.5d features the condition of 
GDP growth in these four countries from 1960 until 2009. As seen in 
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Figure 2.5 (a-d) in terms of the trend of GDP per capita growth from 
1960 until 2009 indicates that these four countries’ economic condition 
varies from time to time. For example Indonesia, Malaysia, and 
Singapore, economic growth decreases markedly in 1998 as an 
impact of Asian economic crisis. Whereas Australia suffered a 
recession in 1981-1983 as an impact of falling world metal prices (The 
Australian 2009). 
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    Figure 2.4: GDP per capita (current US$) 1960-2009 
 
 
Source: World Development Indicators database. September 2011 accessed from http://worldbank.org (accessed on 28 October 2011)
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Figure 2.5a: Key Australia Economic Indicator               
 
 
 
 
Source: World Development Indicators database. September 
2011 accessed from http://worldbank.org (accessed on 28 
October 2011) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.5b: Key Indonesia Economic Indicator 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: World Development Indicators database. September 
2011 accessed from http://worldbank.org (accessed on 28 
October 2011) 
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Figure 2.5c: Key Malaysia Economic Indicator 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: World Development Indicators database. September 
2011 accessed from http://worldbank.org (accessed on 28 
October 2011) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.5d: Key Singapore Economic Indicator 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: World Development Indicators database. September 
2011 accessed from http://worldbank.org (accessed on 28 
October 2011) 
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Related to the impact of the Global Financial Crisis in the four sample 
countries, Figure 2.6 features the condition of the growth of GDP per 
capita in 2006 to 2009 as reflection of level of economic growth of these 
countries within the thesis sample time frame.  
 
Figure 2.6: GDP Per Capita Growth (annual %) 
 
 
 
Source: World Development Indicators database. September 2011 accessed from 
 http://worldbank.org (accessed on 28 October 2011). 
 
 
Figure 2.6 reveals that Singapore and Malaysia experiences a greater 
drop in economic activity during the GFC period than did Indonesia or 
Australia. Figure 2.6 shows that Indonesian GDP per capita growth 
remains quite robust with figures of 5.18%, 4.89% and 3.49% between 
2007-2009 (World Bank 2011). Australia experiences only a modest 
retraction in growth from 1.93% in 2007 to -0.8% in 2009. Whereas, 
Singapore has significant economic decline for the same periods with a 
large fall of GDP of -3.72% in 2009.  Malaysia starts better at the 
beginning of the crisis, but then falls substantially, with 4.65% growth in 
2007, but this drops to 2.99% and -3.29 % in 2008 and 2009 
respectively12. 
 
                                               
12This information is later used to do extra sensitivity analysis as the economic effect of 
Global Financial Crisis (GFC) which is categorized 0 if country experiences a smaller 
impact of GFC and 1 if country experiences a larger negative impact of GFC (see Section 
6.6).  
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2.4.2.4 Corporate Governance (board system practice) 
A comparison of the corporate governance system in Australia, Indonesia, 
Malaysia, and Singapore reveals fundamental differences for example in 
board system practice. Bebchuk and Roe (1999) suggests that the country 
governance system is linked to other factors. The governance system 
adopted by countries over the world through colonial system (Gevurtz 
2004). The unitary system or one-tier board system is prevalent in Anglo-
Saxon countries such as the US, UK and Commonwealth countries, while 
the two-tier system is commonly observed in the continental European 
economies and their former colonies (Gevurtz 2004). Camfferman and 
Cooke (2002, P.7-8) state that in unitary system “de jure, shareholders 
appoint the auditor, but de facto, it is the board…For other stakeholders, 
there is an impact on the firm, but their influences tend to be marginal.” 
Whereas, the two-tier board system is more complicated, “There are two 
boards - a management board that manages and a second tier, a 
supervisory board that appoints the management board.” (Camfferman 
and Cooke 2002, P.8). Australia, Malaysia and Singapore are common 
law countries and former British colonies are adopt the unitary board 
system, while Indonesia as civil law country and a former Dutch colony 
has a two-tier board system. In Indonesia13 to complement BAPEPAM 
(The Capital Market Supervisory Agency), the Jakarta Stock Exchange 
(JSE) in 2000 issued a set of rules: Decision Letter of PT Bursa Efek 
Jakarta No: Kep-315/BEJ/06-2000, which was later amended by Decision 
Letter No: Kep-339/BEJ/07-2001, stating that publicly listed companies are 
obligated to fulfil the requirements by December 31, 2001 at the latest. 
These rules concerned the independence of the board.In Indonesia, the 
board structure follows a two-tier system: the board of commissioners 
(dewan komisaris) and the board of directors (direksi). The board of 
commissioners provides direction and supervises the board of directors in 
managing the firm (Siregar and Utama 2008). 
                                               
13 The country split between Indonesia versus other three countries is further explored in 
Section 6.6. 
41 
 
2.5  Risk Factors in These Four Countries 
Several international organizations provide reports concerning risk which 
may happen in every country. For example the Economist Intelligence Unit 
(EIU) as an independent business within The Economist Group (media 
company) has been delivering business intelligence to their  clients 
(entrepreneurs, financiers and government) since 1946 (EIU 2012a). 
Table 2.3 provides the four country risk rating analyst by the EIU. 
 
Table 2.3: The Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) Risk County Rating 
RISK RATINGS Australia Indonesia Malaysia Singapore 
Rating Score Rating Score Rating Score Rating Score 
Overall 
assessment 
A 18 C 55 B 32 A 11 
Security risk A 18 C 57 B 29 A 4 
Political 
stability risk A 15 B 30 B 30 A 20 
Government 
effectiveness 
risk 
A 18 D 75 C 54 A 7 
Legal & 
regulatory 
risk 
A 10 D 72 B 40 A 8 
Macroeconomic 
risk B 25 B 30 B 25 B 30 
Foreign trade 
& payments 
risk 
A 11 C 43 B 21 A 4 
Financial risk A 12 D 63 A 17 A 4 
Tax policy risk A 19 C 44 B 25 A 6 
Labour market 
risk 
B 36 D 64 C 50 B 25 
Infrastructure 
risk A 16 D 72 B 34 A 3 
Source:  Economist Intelligence Unit, EIU (2012b)  Note: E=most risky; 100=most risky 
 
Table 2.3 reveals that overall Australia and Singapore are considered to 
have lower risk level than Malaysia and Indonesia. This thesis focuses on 
risk disclosure. Therefore the following section provides an overview about 
potential major risk factors in each of the four sample countries. 
 
 
 
42 
 
2.5.1  Australia 
One major risk in Australia relates to the climate change risk. For example, 
Australia clearly suffers from the negative effects of climate change. The 
Australian average temperature in 2000-2009 is the hottest compared to 
the previous decade (IFRC 2010). Australia is thought to have greater 
risks from climate change than any other developed country. This is 
because Australia has a very large land mass and small population 
(Garnaut 2011) 
 
Climate change effects in Australia is predicted to raise the risk of extreme 
events. The changes include greater occurrence (heatwaves, bushfire 
conditions, floods, droughts), greater strength (heatwaves, bushfire 
conditions, floods, droughts plus cyclones) and changes in distribution 
(average rainfall). Climate change will also affect the seasonal and daily 
patterns of rainfall intensity. The risk of drought is expected to increase in 
the mid-latitudes (southern Australia). A bigger flood risk is also projected 
as rainfall is concentrated into smaller spaces. There are also potential 
influences on agricultural output and ecosystems, and risks of a loss of 
stored carbon (for example, due to fire or drought) (Garnaut 2011). 
Other risks in Australia as reported by the Australian Davos Connection in 
collaboration with KPMG (ADC and KPMG 2010), are: 
• An ageing population, water scarcity; 
• The risk of major Asian trading partners remaining subdued is a core 
economic risk for Australia;  
• Instability in the Asia Pacific region, terrorism risk, security risk, and 
transnational corruption. 
 
2.5.2  Indonesia 
The United Nations Development Program (UNDP) has development 
programs focusing on reducing risk factors in Indonesia (UNDP 2011). 
These UNDP programs’ in Indonesia concentrate on:  
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• Indonesian high unemployment and underemployment and high youth 
unemployment program; 
• Reduction in the rates of poverty; 
• Gender equality;  
• National HIV/AIDS;  
• Tuberculosis and Malaria; and  
• Movement toward democracy.   
 
There are also risks associated with climate change according to the 
report of United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) in Indonesia (UNFPA 
2011) which are: 
• Climate change impacts on agriculture, 
• Risk of drought, 
• Changes in temperature and rainfall which have negative impact on 
rice and other food crops and also dairy cattle production,  
• Incursion of coastal farmlands due to the rising of sea level, 
• The increased risk of forest fires which effect risk of loss of biodiversity 
and possible extinction of some rare species, 
• Risk of food scarcity, 
• Risk of water resources, and 
• Climate change risks to health at sub-national levels. 
 
The International Federation on Red Cross and Red Crescent societies 
note that Indonesia also has a high risk related to natural disasters such 
as earthquakes, tsunamis, volcano eruptions, land slides and floods (IFRC 
2010).  
 
2.5.3  Malaysia 
UNDP program notes the level of risk in Malaysia is often related to land 
drought, and strengthened Malaysia’s energy security policy through a 
variety of project initiatives (UNDP 2011). Others risks in Malaysia 
44 
 
according to the Malaysia Millennium Development Goals (MDG) by 
UNDP (UNDP 2005) are: 
• HIV/AIDS and tuberculosis,  
• The effects of foreign workers in Malaysia, on health patterns,  
• Risk of infant (and maternal) mortality among migrant communities, 
and  
• Poverty and inequality. 
 
2.5.4  Singapore 
The International Federation on Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies 
report that Singapore is worried about the effect of deadly diseases. For 
example, in the recent decade the spread of H5N1 influenza virus, this is 
more commonly as ‘bird flu’ and other diseases such as SARS (severe 
acute respiratory syndrome). Both diseases demonstrated how dense 
urban living conditions provide the ideal breeding ground for new viruses 
in Singapore. Singapore’s economy shrank  two per cent in the first half of 
2003 due to the effect of the H5N1 virus (IFRC 2010). 
 
Other risks in Singapore reported in the Singapore country profile by the 
United Nation (UN 2002) are: 
• The public health risk related with microbiological and chemical 
hazards in food, 
• Health risks of workers unprotected to various hazards, such as silica, 
lead, cadmium, cobalt, tungstencarbide, benzene, trichloroethylene, 
and other organic solvents, and 
• Risk of environmental disasters such as smoke haze and oil spills.  
 
Overall, the above listed four countries risk factors increase the need for 
enhanced risk communication by listed companies in each of the four 
countries.  
 
 
 
45 
 
2.6  Summary 
This chapter describes the accounting environment in the four countries 
and also defends the selection of countries (Australia, Indonesia, 
Malaysia, and Singapore), industry (manufacturing) and years (2007-
2009) selected in this thesis. It also defines two key predictor categories of 
variables that could affect accounting practice in those four countries. 
These are: 1) Firm specific characteristics (company size, managerial 
ownership, and board independence) and 2) Country differences (colonial 
inheritance, legal system, stage of economic development, and board 
systems. This chapter also reviewed important risk factors for these four 
countries. 
 
The next chapter reviews the literature concerning risk communication and 
agency theory tenets to evolve testable hypotheses. 
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CHAPTER 3 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
3.1   Introduction 
Chapter 2 describes the accounting environment in the four countries. This 
chapter presents the literature review of the thesis and outlines findings 
from past empirical research into voluntary risk disclosure practice. 
Chapter 3 also gives an explanation of the use of agency theory as well as 
key aspects of past voluntary disclosure and voluntary risk disclosure 
studies.  
 
The literature review provides a basis for understanding the area of 
research on voluntary risk disclosure. Four hypotheses are formulated to 
test the association between country, company size, board independence, 
managerial ownership and voluntary risk disclosure in a time span of 
2007-2009 financial years, the core years of the global financial crisis.  
 
Section 3.2 explains the adaption of the positivist paradigm in this thesis 
risk disclosure research. Section 3.3 reviews the literature on agency 
theory. Section 3.4 provides the link between voluntary risk disclosure and 
agency theory. Section 3.5 offers the past literature of voluntary 
disclosure. Section 3.6 evaluates the past literature of risk disclosure 
studies. Prior to discussing this past literature, an operational definition of 
voluntary risk disclosure is given for the purpose of this thesis leading to 
hypotheses development. Section 3.7 relates the literature on the 
association between country, company size, board independence, 
managerial ownership and voluntary risk disclosure, to risk disclosures 
and the development of hypotheses. Section 3.8 then summaries this 
chapter’s key points.  
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3.2  Adaption of Positivist Paradigm  
This thesis uses a positivist paradigm strand of agency theory. The 
concept of paradigm is the researcher’s overall guides system (Guba and 
Lincoln 1994). Marková (1982, P.2) defines paradigmatic science as “the 
philosophical view and associated framework of some outstanding 
scientific achievement that determines future progress in that particular 
field.” There are three prominent strands of social science paradigms: 
positivism, interpretative and critical theory. Peile (1994) describes the key 
characteristics of these three strands (see Table 3.1). 
Table 3.1: Social Science Paradigms   
 Positivism Interpretative Critical 
Cosmological  
Assumptions 
(the universe as a 
totality) 
Causal 
determined view 
of reality. The 
world is 
predictable. 
Fragmentary view 
of reality (reality 
can be 
understood as 
separate parts). 
Knowledge is 
contextual and a 
symbolic social 
construction. 
Events can be 
explained and 
their meaning for 
people uncovered. 
Parts can only be 
understood in 
context. 
All things are 
internally 
contradictory and 
are in a constant 
process of 
movement where 
all processes from 
a totality in which 
each process 
determines every 
other.  
Ontological 
Assumptions 
(the essence of 
nature and human 
nature) 
Behavior can be 
explained in 
causal, 
deterministic 
ways. It has a 
mechanic quality. 
People are 
manipulatable and 
controllable 
Behavior is 
intentional and 
creative. It can be 
explained but is 
not predictable. 
People shape 
their own reality. 
Human behavior 
is social and 
historic. People 
shape their own 
world but are 
shaped by it at the 
same time.  
Epistemological  
Assumptions 
(knowing and how 
knowledge is 
generated) 
Knowledge arises 
from 
experimentation 
and observation 
and is grounded in 
the certainty of 
sense experience. 
Knowledge arises 
from interpretation 
and insight and is 
grounded by 
empathetic 
communication 
with the subjects 
of the research. 
Symbols, meaning 
and hidden factors 
are essential to 
understanding.  
Knowledge arises 
through action and 
is rounded in the 
self-conscious 
action. Research 
goes beyond 
appearances to 
what is essential.  
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Ethical  
Assumptions 
A separation 
between 
knowledge  
and values.  
Science produces 
knowledge.  
How it is used is a 
value, ethical, or 
moral question 
and is outside the 
concern of 
science. 
Values are the 
subject of 
research. Moral or 
ethical relativism. 
Leads to 
disinterest in 
ethical issues or 
anarchistic 
individualism. 
Knowledge and 
values cannot be 
separated. 
Committed to 
happiness and the 
emancipation of 
people from 
oppression.  
Spiritual  
Assumption 
Rejection of 
spiritual 
explanation or a 
clear separation 
between science 
and religion.  
Relativism of 
spiritual beliefs. 
Such beliefs are 
important in the 
social construction 
of meaning. 
 
The materialist 
rejects spiritual 
beliefs but they 
are compatible 
with the idealistic 
critical approach. 
Political 
Assumption 
The relationship 
aim between 
science and 
society is control. 
The value-free 
stance implicitly 
support 
domination by the 
established order. 
Mutually 
supportive with 
both high 
technology 
capitalism and 
centralized 
industrial 
socialism. 
The relationship 
aim is empathetic 
communication. 
Implicitly 
conservative since 
there is no 
structural or 
historical analysis 
of society. 
Mutually 
supportive with a 
liberal society 
allowing individual 
freedom and self-
determination. 
The relationship 
aim is 
enlightenment. 
Explicitly change 
focused, seeking 
to challenge the 
present capitalist 
system. Supports 
a socialist or 
communist 
society. 
Source: Adapted from Peile (1994), Suhardjanto (2008) 
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In considering the difference of paradigmatic context use by each research 
approach, Peile (1994, P.20) argues that “paradigms are not hard and fast 
sets of rules, …. They are, more correctly, loose and evolving frameworks 
for the ongoing production and resolution of problems. As such, their 
historical context is important”. 
 
Hovenkamp (1990, P.817) states that a positivism methodology in the 
economics area is “a procedure by which one formulates a hypothesis and 
then tests its reliability by attempting to falsify it through empirical 
observation. To the extent that a hypothesis cannot be falsified, it is said to 
be robust, or predictive”.  
 
Bryman (2012, P.35-36) define quantitative research as “a research 
strategy that emphasizes quantification in the collection and analysis of 
data and that entails a deductive approach to the relationship between 
theory and research, in which the accent is placed on testing of theories; 
has incorporated the practices and norms of the natural scientific model 
and positivism in particular; and embodies a view of social reality as an 
external, objective reality”.  
 
This thesis seeks to provide insights into the voluntary risk disclosure 
practices, therefore the positivist approach is well matched with this kind of 
accounting research. This thesis thus adopts and utilizes the positivism 
research approach as can be seen in the shaded positivism column in 
Table 3.1 that knowledge is best acquired through observation. The key 
research questions in this thesis seek to detail ‘what’ is the level of risk 
disclosure and explain ‘why’ (explanation of prediction factors) in the 
Australian, Indonesian, Malaysian, and Singaporean manufacturing listed 
companies using a quantitative research methodology and statistical 
research methods. Such an approach is consistent with the positivist 
approach (see Table 3.1).  
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In previous agency theory studies with their positivist’s themes, the 
common approach is to identify a policy and behavior in which agents and 
principals interest diverge and then to explore the agency problems. Most 
agency theory-positivist studies focus on the separation of ownership from 
management in companies (Eisenhardt 1989). Such an approach is 
consistent with the themes in this thesis. Accordingly, this thesis adopts 
and utilizes an agency theory-positivist research approach. 
 
3.3  Agency Theory 
Agency theory framework provides an ideal mechanism to assess 
manufacturing listed companies’ voluntary risk disclosure practices. The 
focus is on corporate reporting in different manufacturing listed companies 
in Australia, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore which are likely to be the 
subject of differing impacts of the global financial crisis when deciding to 
communicate risk disclosure policy voluntarily. The motivation of 
companies’ management to disclose risk information has often been 
explained in the accounting literature using agency theory. In this thesis it 
is argued that differing countries, company size, board independence and 
managerial ownership may influence the voluntary risk disclosure 
decision.  
 
Agency theory, derived from positivist accounting theory, is widely 
recognized as providing an important explanation of the relationship 
between principals and agents. Agency theory provides insights whenever 
the principal employs the service of an agent or agent to perform some 
activity on the principal’s behalf. The main belief of agency theory is that 
the interests of the agent (manager) conflict with the interest of the 
principal (owner). The principal seeks to ensure that the agent operates in 
the principal’s best interest (Ross 1973; Jensen and Meckling 1976). 
 
Ross (1973, P.134) states that: 
the relationship of agency is one of the oldest and 
commonest codified modes of social interaction. 
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Jensen and Meckling (1976, P.308) define an agency relationship as: 
a contract under which one or more person (the 
principal(s)) engage another person (the agent) to perform 
some service on their behalf which involves delegating 
some decision making authority to the agent. 
 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) postulate that if both parties to the 
relationship between agents and principals are seeking to maximize their 
own self interest then agents will not always serve in the best interests of 
principals. Agents may become opportunistic in behavior to maximize their 
own welfare. They may not always pursue opportunities in a search of the 
shareholders’ wealth maximization interests. 
 
The principals can limit agency problems by establishing incentives for the 
agents (agency costs) and by creating monitoring costs designed to 
control the behavior of the agents. In addition, in some situations 
principals will pay agents to expend resources (bonding costs, such as 
share options) to better guarantee that agents will not inflict financial loss 
actions or to ensure that the principals will be compensated if agents take 
adverse actions (Jensen and Meckling 1976).  
 
In the context of the agency relationship, the problem of asymmetric 
information between agents (managers) and principals (shareholders) 
occurs because agents have an information advantage. Akerlof  (1970) 
provides a description that information asymmetry is like purchasing  a 
broken used car in a car dealer (in American such cars are called 
‘lemons’) which later referred to as the ‘lemons’ problem. Purchasing a 
used car with minimum information makes the buyer unable to maximize 
their money in deciding to buy a car. Information asymmetry causes a 
moral hazard issue and creates a problem related to unwise decision 
making.  
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Shareholders, may only have limited ability to accurately evaluate 
managerial decision-making. Managers may therefore take advantage of 
their greater information access to increase their personal wealth (Alchian 
and Woodward 1988).  
 
Noreen (1988) states that both parties to a contract between agent and 
principal do not have the same information and agency relationship have a 
greater level of opportunistic behavior. Hill and Jones (1992) note that 
information asymmetry happens between manager and stakeholders. As 
insiders, managers are in the position to filter and sort information 
released to the stakeholders. However, stakeholders will still bear the 
losses caused by the decisions made by the managers. In such cases, 
stakeholders need to collect and analyze information without spending 
high agency cost. Bushman and Smith (2001) suggest that using a 
monitoring system via financial disclosure by the company will help 
alleviate agency problems. Both voluntary and mandatory disclosure will 
help stakeholders reduce the problem of information asymmetry.  
 
Agency theory, as discussed by Jensen and Meckling (1976) offers 
answers and one of them is why accounting reports are provided 
voluntarily for creditors and stakeholders and why independent auditors 
are  assigned by the managers to conduct an independent assessment of 
the company. Mitnick (1975) develops a model of company policy oriented 
towards agency relationships; he explains that within the company there is 
a transfer of resources to improving societal welfare for wider public 
interest purposes.  
 
In the agency theory perspective, the senior management in 
manufacturing companies may seek to facilitate the development of the 
organizational culture in an effort to mitigate potential agency problems. 
Noreen (1988) argues that monitoring performance is much easier in  
manufacturing companies. 
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Further, Fama and Jensen (1983) state that agency problems arise 
because there is a conflicting interests between agent and principal in 
term of agency cost (cost of structuring, monitoring, and bonding) in which 
the contract between them is usually are not written and enforced. 
Effective control procedure is needed to overcome the agency problems    
(Fama and Jensen 1983).  
 
The effects of ownership structure on agency perspective play an 
important attention in the government area as Claessens et al. (2002, 
P..2741) state that “investors with large ownership stakes have strong 
incentives to maximize their firms' value and are able to collect information 
and oversee managers, and so can help overcome one of the principal-
agent problems in the modern corporation-that of conflicts of interest 
between shareholders and managers”. 
Board system is also important in the corporate government area as 
Beiner et al (2004, P..327) state that “the board of directors plays a pivotal 
role in the governance of widely held corporations. It is generally 
acknowledged that the legal and contractual setting as well as the 
structure and activities of the board of directors have a non-negligible 
impact on the agency costs to which firms are exposed. At least in theory, 
the board of directors is one of the most important corporate governance 
mechanisms ensuring that managers pursue the interests of shareholders. 
Its task is to monitor, discipline, and remove ineffective management 
teams”. 
Agency theory is the most widely theory employed by scholars in several 
disciplines including the accounting area. Despite its wide-scale use it 
does have its fair share of controversy and critics.  For example Perrow 
cited in Eisenhardt (1989, P.58)  argues that agency theory  is “hardly 
subject to empirical test since it rarely tries to explain actual events”.  
Perrow also criticizes agency theory for being not realistic and one-sided 
because agency theory fails to explore other key issues such as the 
exploitation of workers (Eisenhardt 1989). Regardless of such controversy, 
there are thought to be many agency theory contributions such as re-
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establishing organizational thinking in terms of the importance of 
incentives and self-interest (Eisenhardt 1989).  
Eisenhardt (1989) divides agency theory studies in two streams of 
theoretical agency research which are the positivist stream and principal-
agent stream. The positivist stream describes behavior in which 
shareholder (principal) and management (agent) interests diverge; the 
focus is on how to solve the agency problem. Whereas, the principal-agent 
stream is more focused on the contract between principal and agents and 
often seeks to point out more effective contract alternatives. 
 
Table 3.2 summarizes the previous research in the area of agency theory 
in several disciplines which mirroring the two key categorical streams of 
theoretical agency research. 
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Table 3.2 Summary of Agency Theory Studies 
Author(s) Research 
Stream 
Agency Variables Sample Results 
Amihud and Lev (1981) 
 
Positivist Manager vs owner 
controlled 
309 Fortune 500 firms Support 
Walking and Long (1984) Positivist Management’s equity and 
options 
105 U.S. firms Support 
Anderson (1985) Principal-Agent Importance of nonsales 
activities, length of selling 
cycle and difficulty 
evaluating sales 
performance 
159 sales districts in 13 electronics firms Mixed 
Eisenhardt (1985) Principal-Agent Information systems, cost of 
outcomes measurement, 
and outcome uncertainty 
54 retail stores Support 
Eccles (1985) Principal-Agent Decentralization 150 interviews in 13 chemical 
electronics heavy machinery and 
machine component firms 
Inductive model 
Wolson (1985) Positivist General partner’s track 
record 
39 oil and gas limited partnerships Support 
Argawal and Mandelker (1987) Positivist Executive stock holdings 209 major corporations Support 
Kosnik (1987) Positivist Proportion of outside 
directors, equity held by 
outside directors and 
outside directors with 
executive experience 
110 major corporations targeted for 
greenmail 
Mixed 
Source: Eisenhardt (1989) 
56 
 
Table 3.2 Summary of Agency Theory Studies (continued) 
Author(s) Research 
Stream 
Agency variables Sample Results 
Chow and Wong-Boren (1987) 
 
 
Positivist Firm size, financial 
leverage, and proportion of 
assets in place. 
52 manufacturing firms in Mexico  
 
Support 
Cooke (1989) 
 
 
Positivist Quotation status, annual 
sales, total assets size, 
number of shareholders, 
parent company 
relationship, and industry 
type. 
90 companies in Swedish 
 
Support 
 
Botosan and Harris (2000) 
 
 
Principal-Agent Information asymmetry, 
analyst following, Industry, 
liquidity, security issuance, 
growth 
107 multi-segment firms in between 
1987 and 1994   
                   
Mixed 
Solomon et al (2000) 
 
 
Principal-Agent Corporate governance 
perceptions, investment 
decisions, demand for 
information  
552 UK institutional investors 
 
Support 
 
Haniffa and Cooke (2002) 
 
 
Positivist Corporate governance, 
culture (race and education) 
167 Company in 1995 
 
Support 
 
Marshall and Weetman (2002) 
 
 
Positivist Disclosure policies, and 
information economics 
Annual report of 30 U.S and  30 U.K 
companies in 1998 
 
Support 
 
Source: Various sources 
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Table 3.2 Summary of Agency Theory Studies (continued) 
Eng and Mak (2003) 
 
 
Positivist Managerial ownership, 
blockholder ownership, 
government ownership, and 
independent directors 
158 Singaporean  companies in 1995 
                   
Support 
 
Lou et al. (2006) 
 
  
Positivist Current annual return, 
contemporaneous annual 
earnings, future earnings, 
ownership structure, and 
proprietary cost. 
172 Singaporean public companies in 
1994 – 2000 
 
 
 
 
Support 
 
Petersen and Plenborg (2006) 
 
 
Principal-Agent Information asymmetry, 
return on invested capital, 
systematic risk, size, 
leverage, solvency, 
ownership concentration. 
36 industrial companies listed on the 
Copenhagen Stock Exchange in 1997                
 – 2000  
 
Support 
 
Cheng and Courtenay (2006) 
 
 
Positivist Board monitoring, corporate 
governance, and regulatory 
regime 
104 companies listed on  the Singapore 
Stock Exchange in 2000  
 
Support 
 
Barako et al. (2006) 
 
 
Positivist Non-executive director, dual 
leadership structure, audit 
committee, ownership 
structure, size, leverage, 
auditor, profitability, liquidity,  
54 companies listed on the Nairobi 
Stock Exchange (Kenya) in 1992 - 2001 
 
Support 
 
Source: Various sources 
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Table 3.2 Summary of Agency Theory Studies (continued) 
Abraham and Cox (2007)  
 
 
Positivist Ownership, governance and 
U.S listing characteristics 
71 firms (removing financial companies 
in FTSE 100 firms) 
 
Support 
.  
 
Akhigbe and Martin (2008)  
 
 
Positivist Governance Examine 768 US financial services firms   
 
Support 
 
Aripin et al. (2009) 
 
 
Positivist Board composition, 
ownership concentration, 
and firm size 
40 companies  listed on the Australia 
Stock Exchange in 2007 
 
Support 
 
Baek et al.(2009) 
 
 
Positivist Managerial ownership, 
executive compensation, 
block ownership, institutional 
ownership, outside director  
The S&P data on 374  companies in 
2000  
 
Support 
 
Ho (2009)  
 
 
Positivist Corporate governance, 
ownership structure,  
100 companies listed on the Malaysia           
Stock Exchange in 1996, 2001 and 2006  
 
Support 
 
Taylor et al (2010)  
 
 
Positivist Adoption of IFRS, corporate 
governance, capital raising, 
and jurisdiction 
111 Australian listed extractive resource 
firms in 2002-2006 
 
Support 
 
Dobler et al. (2011)  
 
 
Positivist Size and country 160 manufacturing companies  in 2005 
 
Support 
. 
Source: Various sources 
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Overall, these studies provide support for the existence of both positivist 
and principal-agent streams of theoretical agency research. However this 
thesis uses the positivist stream of theoretical agency research. This 
matches with arguments from Berle and Means cited by Eisenhardt (1989, 
P. 59)  define positivist agency theory as: 
 
Positivist researchers have focused on identifying situations on 
identifying situations in which the principal and agent are likely to 
have conflicting goals and then describing the governance 
mechanisms that limit the agent’s self-serving behavior….Also, 
positivist researchers have focused almost exclusively on the 
special case of the principal-agent relationship between owners and 
managers of large, public corporations.  
 
The following table reviews agency theory and its contribution to the 
literature. Table 3.3 represents an overview of agency theory summarized 
by Eisenhardt (1989). The table covers the key concepts of the agency 
theory problem.  
 
Table 3.3: Agency Theory Overview 
Key idea 
 
 
Unit of analysis 
 
Human assumptions 
 
 
 
Organizational 
assumptions 
 
 
Contracting  
problems 
 
Problem domain 
Principal-agent relationships should reflect efficient 
organization of information and risk bearing costs. 
 
Contract between principal and agent. 
 
Self-interest. 
Bounded rationality. 
Risk aversion. 
 
Partial goal conflict among participants. 
Efficiency as the effectiveness criterion. 
Information asymmetry between principal and agent. 
 
Agency (moral hazard and adverse selection). 
Risk sharing. 
 
Relationships in which the principal and agent have partly 
differing goals and risk preferences (e.g.,compensation, 
regulation, leadership, impression management, whiste-
blowing, vertical integration, transfer pricing). 
 
Source: Adapted from Eisenhardt (1989, P.59) 
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Table 3.3 shows that the domain of agency theory is about the 
relationships that mirror the basic agency structure. The focus is on the 
principal and agent behavior in a company. However, as the two parties 
have different objective, they develop a different point of view in managing 
risk. 
 
Conflicts of interest emerge when members of the organization meet in a 
situation where a formal act or the effect of that act has the potential of 
generating personal benefit (Demski 2003). Similarly, Gomez-Mejia and 
Wiseman (2007) conclude that the problems of the relationship in agency 
theory comprise: information asymmetry, bounded rationality, and the 
problem of potentially different goal conflicts between agent and principal. 
Geis (2007) states that problems caused by misbehavior of the managers 
in a company include shirking, lavish compensation, entrenchment and 
excessive risk-taking.  
 
Larraza-Kintana et al.(2007) note that in situations where companies are 
facing uncertainty in generating profit, managers tend to anticipate such 
situations by maximizing personal benefits by taking bigger risks. Watts 
and Zimmerman (1990) argue that agency cost attracts accountants as 
accounting play a role in minimizing agency cost. 
 
Despite the criticisms, agency theory provides an important contribution to 
the literature as an empirical valid perspective it offers insights into 
information system, uncertainty, incentives, and risk (Eisenhardt 1989).
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3.4  The Link between Disclosure and Agency Theory 
This section reviews the agency theory literature to offer insights into 
manufacturing listed companies’ risk disclosure practices. Studies on risk 
reporting have adopted various theories. These include: signaling theory 
(Bremer and Pettway 2002; Lee et al. 2003; Sinclair-Desgagné and 
Gozlan 2003; Cheng et al. 2009; Hill and Short 2009), stakeholder theory 
(Atan and Maruhun 2009), attribution theory (Linsley and Shrives 2006)  
and information cost theory (Morrison 1993; Ahmed, Beatty and 
Bettinghaus 2004). However the most widely theory employed by 
accounting researchers is agency theory (Solomon et al. 2000; Marshall 
and Weetman 2002; Cabedo and Tirado 2004; Abraham and Cox 2007; 
Akhigbe and Martin 2008; Dobler et al. 2011). This thesis adopts agency 
theory as the underlying theoretical framework explaining risk disclosure 
as it best highlights the economic drivers of communication. The link 
between disclosure and agency theory tenets is discussed below. 
 
In the agency relationship between manager (agents) and shareholders 
(principals) there is separation of ownership and control. Principals want 
agents to act to maximizing the principal welfare (Jensen and Meckling 
1976). A major issue is the information asymmetry between shareholders 
and managers that some information may be given but some may be 
withheld (Marshall and Weetman 2002). On the others hand, agents are 
assumed to have incentives to disclose information voluntarily, mainly 
driven by rational agents’ self-interest for example regarding their 
reputation and remuneration (Healy and Palepu 2001). Disclosure can 
mitigate information asymmetry problems (Botosan 1997; Hill and Short 
2009). When managers choose not to disclose relevant information in the  
financial report, problems of an information gap between managers and 
users will result in a less than transparent annual reports (Marshall and 
Weetman 2007) or in reference to agency cost the withheld disclosure is 
the consequence of a conflict of interest between managers and 
shareholders (Berger and Hann 2007). The choice to disclose or withheld 
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information may affect investor perceptions and market price (Hirshleifer 
and Teoh 2003). 
 
Greater disclosure levels are related with a lower cost of equity capital 
(Botosan 1997). Disclosure can reduce estimation risk and reduce 
information asymmetry and lower the cost of capital (Lang and Lundholm 
1996; Richardson and Welker 2001) and to better avoid potential market 
failure and increase market liquidity leading to more efficient capital 
markets (Welker 1995; Healy and Palepu 2001).  
 
Verreccia (2001) divides accounting literatures into three taxonomies. 
Those three taxonomies are association-based disclosure, discretionary-
based disclosure, and efficiency-based disclosure. This thesis generally 
employs an association-based disclosure theme which according to 
Verecchia (2001, P.97) is: 
 
work that studies the effect of exogenous disclosure on the 
cumulative change or disruption in investors’ individual actions, 
primarily through the behavior of asset equilibrium prices and trading 
volume. 
 
This thesis focuses on voluntary risk disclosure. Voluntary disclosure has 
received considerable attention in the accounting literature in recent 
decades (Gray et al. 1995; Healy and Palepu 2001; Einhorn 2007; Wang 
et al. 2008). Voluntary disclosure can change the investors’ expectation 
about the value of the firm (Einhorn 2007). A firm’s decision to 
communicate voluntary disclosure is possibly as a reaction to 
globalization, innovation or changes in business and capital market 
backgrounds (Healy and Palepu 2001). In the agency perspective, 
Hossain et al (1995) state that voluntary disclosures could be used as a 
ways to lessen agency costs. Agency costs are incurred by managers 
and, consequently, managers may be motivated to provide voluntary 
information to decrease agency costs. 
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A better level of risk communication allows capital market participants to 
be more aware of potential material changes and in doing so, such 
disclosures can reduce agency costs. Arguably, the disclosure of 
information about risk will also improve broader stakeholders 
understanding: the company (using internal data) can directly 
communicate the levels of various risks it faces. This higher level of 
transparency will potentially ease the task of interpreting the risks of the 
company by external users (Marshall and Weetman 2002; Cabedo and 
Tirado 2004; Taylor 2008; Hill and Short 2009). From an agency 
viewpoint, Solomon et al (2000) argues that risk disclosures represent a 
means of controlling the agency problem. In addition, Abraham and Cox 
(2007, P.229) state that “the relationship between risk disclosure and 
corporate ownership and governance is of interest to regulators because 
institutional owners and independent directors are expected to reduce 
agency problems, and thus lessen the need for regulatory intervention in 
corporate reporting”. 
 
Shareholders and other parties involved need to understand the profile of 
the company and its risks. Hence, they need information on the risks 
encountering the company and how the directors are managing those 
risks. Companies nowadays are disclosing limited information on risks. 
Some of the examples are the cases of extreme accounting irregularities 
exposed to the public like cases of WorldCom, Xerox, Enron etc which 
highlight the importance of risk awareness and risk management. 
Moreover, in the context of corporate governance, revealing risk 
information in financial report is undeniably important (Linsley and Shrives 
2005b). 
 
Latridis (2008) explains that accounting disclosure can reduce uncertainty 
related to company financial target for example method selection, 
accounting policy, prosperity, company growth etc. Reduction of 
uncertainty and information asymmetry as a consequence of disclosure 
will improve the communication between managers and other parties 
including shareholders.  
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In summary, agency theory principles are advanced as the theoretical 
justification for the development of this thesis hypothesis. The following 
section reviews past voluntary disclosure studies and links to voluntary risk 
disclosure.  
 
3.5  Voluntary Disclosure  
This section presents an overview of voluntary disclosures studies to 
explain agency theory tenets in voluntary risk disclosure research. This 
section reviews the literature concerning the motivation of companies to 
provide voluntary disclosure information. Examination of management’s 
motivation to disclose information voluntarily provides insights as to why 
risk information is (or is not) voluntarily disclosed in annual reports. There 
is extensive theoretical and empirical research on the economic 
consequences of voluntary disclosure studies.  
 
Barako, Hancock and Izan (2006) argue that an examination of voluntary 
disclosures is a good way to study agency theory. Given that majority 
shareholders have better access to a firm’s secret information, voluntary 
disclosure can provide reliable and credible communication to build 
minority shareholders trust. 
 
Voluntary disclosures are optional choices by companies.  Indeed, Gray, 
Meek, and Roberts (1995, P.48) state:  
 
companies have incentives to voluntarily disclose relevant 
information to investors. Moreover, certain incentives are 
likely to extend to other stakeholders as well, such as 
employees, customers, and regulatory agencies. 
Companies balance the benefits of increased disclosures 
against such costs as information collection and 
processing costs, litigation costs, political costs, and 
competitive disadvantage costs. Financial reporting is 
influenced by a complex set of supply and demand forces. 
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Tian and Chen (2009) compare and contrast voluntary and compulsory 
(mandatory)14 disclosures as shown in Table 3.4. 
 
Table 3.4: A Comparison of Voluntary Disclosures and Mandatory 
Disclosures 
Item Voluntary Disclosures Mandatory Disclosures 
Definition Except compulsory 
disclosures, the information 
disclosed by listed companies 
for the sake of corporate 
images, relationship with 
investors, and avoidance of 
accusation risks 
The information that is 
required to be disclosed 
according to the  
securities law, accounting 
principles, and regulatory 
agencies’ regulations 
Motive Self-interested information  
communication between 
listed companies and other 
interest-related parties 
Use laws and regulations to 
adjust the information  
communication between 
listed companies and other 
interested  
related parties 
Content Companies’ future strategies, 
R and D plans, prediction 
information, purchase and 
merger information, 
investment  
project analysis, and financial 
information analysis, etc. 
Companies introduction, 
basic financial information, 
information about the board 
and top managers, vital 
related transactions, 
explained for important 
items 
Carrier Annual reports, public 
announcements, booklets, 
websites, roadshows, etc. 
Annual report and certain 
interim reports 
Time   At the ‘right’ time Fixed time in a year and 
season 
Balance  
mechanism   
Corporate governance 
mechanism’s design and 
effectiveness 
Laws, regulations and 
execution 
Root of 
disclosures 
Economic globalization and 
globalization of capital market 
Monopoly of companies on 
self information 
Source: Adapted from Tian and Chen (2009, P. 59). 
 
In comparing mandatory and voluntary on qualitative disclosure, Marshall 
and Wetmann (2002) note that reduction of information asymmetry is often 
due to the monitoring burden between agents and principals. In the case 
where there is a new rule for mandatory disclosure, there will be 
interpretation as to how the regulation should be implemented. In this 
                                               
14 Mandatory disclosures are not the subject of this research. 
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context, there will be confusion from the users of information who may 
observe what the company has disclosed but who have no instrument to 
assess to what extent the company has taken advantage on the 
information disclosed. Similarly, in voluntary disclosure, the user will often 
not understand the causes or the extent of nondisclosure prepared by the 
company (Marshall and Weetman 2002). 
 
Disclosure in company annual report incurs a cost spent by the company 
to make the information available to the users of annual report. Such costs 
include company cost in gathering information, management supervision, 
audit and legal fees and the dissemination of the information (Cooke 
1989). Regarding voluntary disclosure, Cooke (1989) argues that the 
benefits of voluntary disclosure usually overcome the cost spent by the 
company. These benefits include: additional disclosure which helps the 
company invite the interest of new shareholders, ability to help reduce 
informational risk which will can in turn reduce the cost of capital and 
ability to raise capital on the market. Lastly, voluntary disclosure is 
deemed beneficial to gain additional information related to social 
responsibility of the listed company which eventually will increase social 
participation through their social responsibility program (Cooke 1989). 
 
Healy and Palepu (2001) argue that there are potentially three types of 
capital market effects for firms that make extensive voluntary disclosures: 
improve liquidity for their stock in the capital market, reduction of their cost 
of capital, and increased following by financial analysts. Whereas, Botosan 
(1997) and Botosan and Plumlee (2002) conclude that for companies with 
low analyst following there is a negative relation between cost of equity 
capital and the extent of their voluntary disclosures. 
 
Suijs (2007) argues that companies may choose not to disclose private 
information if they think that response from the investor is still uncertain. 
Considering the need of the company to gain capital from the market, 
investors will likely choose to invest in a company with a lower risk level 
(or a higher risk level if there is a potential for higher profit). Based on such 
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considerations, companies may choose to disclose only some information 
and withhold ‘bad” news (Suijs 2007). 
 
The following section highlights key findings from previous voluntary 
disclosure studies. 
 
3.5.1 Voluntary Disclosure Studies 
Table 3.5 summarizes the ongoing research in the area of voluntary 
disclosure. This table shows that research in the areas of voluntary 
disclosure has usually been conducted on a single country basis. Even for 
the rarer comparative countries studies on voluntary disclosure, there is a 
dearth of research using sample countries with different economic 
scenarios and in a specific industry sector. This thesis uses agency theory 
as the theoretical background for analysis manufacturing companies’ 
voluntary risk disclosure in a multi country setting with different economic 
scenarios. 
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Table 3.5 Previous Studies on Voluntary Disclosure 
Author(s), subject, and 
measurement of voluntary 
disclosure 
Explanatory 
variables 
Research approach Results 
Chow and Wong-Boren (1987) 
 
Analyse the voluntary financial disclosure 
practices in Mexican corporation 
(accounting institutions and practice in a 
non-Anglo American nations). 
 
Use weighted and unweighted disclosure 
indices checklist. 
Firm size, financial 
leverage, and 
proportion of assets 
in place. 
Data:           The Mexican federal       
                   government’s 1982 official  
                   gazette (the primary outlet   
                   for exchange-listed firms’  
                   required annual reports) 
Sample:      52 manufacturing firms in   
                   Mexico  
Statistics:    Cross-sectional regression 
Theory:        Agency theory 
Voluntary disclosure is positively related to  
the size of company. 
Cooke (1989) 
 
Analyse factors affecting voluntary 
disclosure in Swedish company. 
 
Use unweighted disclosure indices 
checklist. 
Quotation status, 
annual sales, total 
assets size, number 
of shareholders, 
parent company 
relationship, and 
industry type. 
Data:           Annual reports of  
                   Swedish company both  
                   listed and unlisted in the   
                   year 1985 
Sample:       90 companies in Swedish 
Statistics:    Step-wise regression 
Theory:        Agency theory 
Listing status, size, number of shareholder 
and industry type have a positive effect 
towards voluntary disclosure. 
 
Gray et al. (1995) 
 
Examination of corporate voluntary 
disclosures in the U.S. and U.K. 
multinational corporations. 
 
Use unweighted disclosure indices 
checklist. 
Country and 
international listing 
status 
Data:           Annual report in the U.S  
                   and U.K industrial   
                   companies selected in   
                   The Business Week 1000   
                   in 1990 and Financial  
                   Times UK Top 500 in1989 
Sample:       116 U.S. and 64 U.K   
                   Multinational corporations. 
Statistics:    Anova 
Theory:        Agency and legitimacy  
                   Theory 
There are significant differences between 
internationally listed and domestic listed 
multinational corporations. There is also a 
significant country effect in the non-financial 
information.  
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Table 3.5 Previous Studies on Voluntary Disclosure (continued) 
Williams (1999) 
 
Examines voluntary environmental and 
social accounting disclosure practice in 
the Asia pacific region. 
 
Use content analysis (number of 
sentences). 
Culture, political and 
civil system, legal 
system, level of 
economic 
development, and 
equity market 
Data:          Annual report in the Asia   
                  pacific companies in 1995 
Sample:      356 companies in  
                  Australia, Singapore, Hong  
                  Kong, Philippines,  
                  Thailand, Indonesia, and                 
                  Malaysia) 
Statistics:   Multiple regression 
Theory:       Political economy theory 
Culture (uncertainty avoidance and 
masculinity) and political and civil system 
are significantly correlated with voluntary 
disclosure. 
Botosan and Harris (2000) 
 
Examine factors affecting firms in 
initiating changes to reveal quarterly 
segment disclosure in two different 
periods.  
 
Use (1,0) if firm reports voluntary 
quarterly segment disclosure or not report 
 
Information 
asymmetry, analyst 
following, Industry, 
liquidity, security 
issuance, growth 
Data:          Annual report in U.S firms 
Sample:     107 multi-segment firms in  
                  Between 1987 and 1994   
                  in which 65 companies  
                  are firms providing  
                  information on segment  
                  disclosure and 42 firms  
                  are non-disclosing firms. 
Statistics:   t-test and multiple  
                  regression 
Theory:       Agency theory 
This research discovers that in change firms 
there is a decline in liquidity (measured by 
trading volume) and increase in information 
asymmetry (measured by analyst forecast 
consensus). Meanwhile, in terms of 
competitive environment and shift in access 
of capital market, there is no significant 
difference between change firms and non-
disclosing firms within the two periods. 
Haniffa and Cooke (2002) 
 
Examines voluntary disclosure practice in 
Malaysia 
 
Use unweighted disclosure indices 
Corporate 
governance, culture 
(race and education) 
Data:          Annual report in Malaysia   
                  companies 
Sample:     167 Company in 1995 
Statistics:   multiple regression 
Theory:       Agency theory 
There are significant associations between 
two corporate governance variables (non-
executive directors and domination of family 
members on boards), and culture variable 
(proportion of Malay directors) with the 
extent of voluntary disclosure. Company 
specific characteristics (including assets in 
place (size) and return on equity 
(profitability)) are significant predictors of 
voluntary disclosure. 
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Table 3.5 Previous Studies on Voluntary Disclosure (continued) 
Watson et al. (2002)  
 
Investigate UK companies on the 
relationship between voluntary disclosure 
of accounting ratios in corporate annual 
report and factors affecting 
communication.  
 
Number of voluntary accounting ratios 
disclosure 
Profitability, return on 
investment, gearing, 
efficiency, size, and 
industry. 
Data:         U.K company’s annual  
                 report 
Sample:     313 UK companies in  
                 1989 – 1993 
Statistics:   multiple regression 
Theory:      Legitimacy, signalling and  
                 Agency theory 
Company performance, industry and size 
best explain disclosure.  
 
Eng and Mak (2003) 
 
Investigate the impact of ownership 
structure (managerial ownership, 
blockholder ownership and government 
ownership) and board composition 
(independent directors) on voluntary 
disclosure 
 
Use unweighted disclosure indices 
Managerial 
ownership, 
blockholder 
ownership, 
government 
ownership, and 
independent 
directors 
Data:          Singapore company’s  
                  annual report and  
                  financial highlights of  
                  companies on the stock           
                  exchange of Singapore 
Sample:     158 Singaporean   
                  companies in 1995 
Statistics:   Multiple regression 
Theory:       Agency theory 
                   
There are positive significant associations 
between managerial ownership, 
government ownership, and size with 
voluntary disclosure and also negative 
significant associations between outside 
directors and debt with voluntary disclosure. 
  
Lou et al. (2006) 
 
Analyse and discover effect of voluntary 
disclosure, ownership structure, and 
proprietary cost on the return future 
earning relation. 
 
Using unweighted disclosure index  
Current annual 
return, 
contemporaneous 
annual earnings, 
future earnings, 
ownership structure, 
and proprietary cost. 
Data:          Singaporean company’s  
                  annual report and data     
                  stream database analysis  
                  during 1994 – 2000 
Sample:      172 Singaporean public  
                  companies in 1994 – 2000 
Statistics:    Multiple regression 
Theory:       Agency theory 
 
 
 
 
There is a positive significant relationship 
between return earnings and the levels of 
voluntary disclosure. This positive finding is 
weaker if there are higher managerial and 
government ownership, and proprietary cost 
is present. 
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Table 3.5 Previous Studies on Voluntary Disclosure (continued) 
Petersen and Plenborg (2006) 
 
Examines the level of voluntary 
disclosure affects information asymmetry 
for industrial companies in Denmark. 
 
 
Using a disclosure index 
Information 
asymmetry, return on 
invested capital, 
systematic risk, size, 
leverage, solvency, 
ownership 
concentration. 
Data:           Denmark company’s   
                   annual report and data     
                   stream database analysis  
                   in 1997 – 2000  
Sample:      36 industrial companies  
                    listed on the Copenhagen           
                    Stock Exchange in 1997                
                    – 2000  
Statistics:    Multiple regression 
Theory:        Agency theory 
Voluntary disclosure affects information 
asymmetry shown as a negative coefficient.  
 
Cheng and Courtenay (2006) 
 
Examine the association between board 
monitoring and the level of voluntary 
disclosure 
 
Using a disclosure index 
 
Board monitoring, 
corporate 
governance, and 
regulatory regime 
Data:           Singapore company’s   
                   annual report in 2000  
Sample:      104 companies listed on  
                   the Singapore Stock  
                   Exchange in 2000  
Statistics:    Multiple regression 
Theory:       Agency theory 
There is positive significant association 
between independent directors and 
voluntary disclosure. The presence of an 
external governance mechanism and the 
regulatory environment enhances the 
strength of that association. 
Barako et al. (2006) 
 
Examine voluntary disclosure in Kenya 
which have economic scenario as 
developing country 
 
Using weighted disclosure index method 
Non-executive 
director, dual 
leadership structure, 
audit committee, 
ownership structure, 
size, leverage, 
auditor, profitability, 
liquidity,  
Data:            Kenya company’s   
                    annual report in 1992 –  
                    2001  
Sample:        54 companies listed on  
                    the Nairobi Stock  
                    Exchange (Kenya) in  
                    1992 - 2001 
Statistics:     Multiple regression 
Theory:         Agency theory 
 
Audit committee, is a significant factor 
associated with the level of voluntary 
disclosure. Non-executive directors are 
negatively significant with the extent of 
voluntary disclosure. Institutional and 
foreign owners, size and leverage are 
positively significant associated with 
voluntary disclosure. 
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Table 3.5 Previous Studies on Voluntary Disclosure (continued) 
Aripin et al. (2009) 
 
Investigate Australia companies on the 
relationship between voluntary disclosure 
of accounting ratios in corporate annual 
report and factors affecting 
communication.  
 
Using a disclosure index 
Board composition, 
ownership 
concentration, and 
firm size 
Data:            Australia company  annual  
                    report in 2007 
Sample:       40 companies  listed on the  
                    Australia Stock Exchange in  
                    2007 
Statistics:     Multiple regression 
Theory:         Agency theory 
There is a positive influence between 
company size and independent directors 
with company’s voluntary disclosure. 
Baek et al.(2009) 
 
Examine how managerial ownership and 
corporate governance impact company’s 
voluntary disclosure level and type. 
 
Use S&P survey on company disclosure 
Managerial 
ownership, executive 
compensation, block 
ownership, 
institutional 
ownership, outside 
director  
Data:            The standard and poor’s  
                    (S&P) Transparency and  
                    Disclosure Survey data 
Sample:        The S&P data on 374   
                    companies in 2000  
Statistics:     Multiple regression 
Theory:         Agency theory 
Managerial ownership (negative relation) 
and corporate governance / outside director 
(positive relation) effect the level and type of 
voluntary disclosure. 
Ho (2009)  
 
Employs agency theory framework to 
analyze ownership structures and 
voluntary disclosures. The analysis 
covers three key time periods that are 
considered critical in Malaysia in terms of 
regulatory reforms.  
 
Using unweighted disclosure index 
method 
Corporate 
governance, 
ownership structure,  
Data:            Malaysia company   
                    annual report in 1996,  
                    2001 and 2006  
Sample:       100 companies  
                    listed on the Malaysia           
                    Stock Exchange in 1996,  
                    2001 and 2006  
Statistics:     Multiple regression 
Theory:         Agency theory 
Her results show that ownership 
concentration is positively associated with 
voluntary disclosures. 
Source: Various sources 
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Overall, these studies provide support in this research thesis for the 
position of using agency theory to best examine voluntary disclosure 
practices. Further, the following section reviews the risk disclosure 
definition and previous risk disclosure studies in various countries. 
 
3.6.  Risk Disclosure  
3.6.1  Risk Disclosure Definition 
Remenyi dan Heafild (1996, P.349) define risk as: 
 
Risk is defined as the possibility that the actual input variables and 
the outcomes may vary from those originally estimated… risk is 
usually used in the context of a potential hazard or the possibility of 
an unfortunate outcome resulting from a given action, intrinsically risk 
may be either positive or negative. 
 
Typically, the term “risk” is used interchangeably with terms like hazard, 
threat or harm. While in the finance literature it refers to a result generated 
from a decision in which there is probability of uncertainty in the outcome. 
In the pre-modern era, risk was always used in reference to natural 
hazards. In the modern era, the concept of risk may be seen as positive or 
negative depending on the outcomes of events (Linsley and Shrives 
2006).  
 
Linsley and Shrives (2006, P.389) more specifically define risk disclosures 
as:  
The reader is informed of any opportunities or prospect, or of any 
hazard, danger, harm, thread or exposure that has already impacted 
upon the company or may impact upon the company in the future or 
of the management of any such opportunity, prospect, hazard, harm, 
threat or exposure. 
 
Because of its comprehensive nature, this definition of risk is adopted in 
this thesis. 
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There are five major sub-categories for risk: ‘business’, ‘strategy’, 
‘operating’, ‘market’ and ‘credit’ risks (Dhaliwal et al. 1983; Jorion 2000; 
Cabedo and Tirado 2004). Each of these are defined below. 
 
As Jorion cites in Cabedo and Tirado (2004, P.186) states:  
 
Business risk is that which the company assumes in order to create 
competitive advantages and added value for its shareholders. It is 
therefore considered as an internal company skill employed to deal 
with the competitive environment in which it is located. Hence, this 
risk refers to the possible impact that the loss of these company 
competitive skills might have, with the consequent influence on the 
possible future loss of company wealth.  
 
 
Strategy risk is defined as Cabedo and Tirado (2004, P.187) states: 
 
This risk is associated with basic changes in the economy. The 
evolution of the economic environment generates a high level of 
uncertainty, which affects the performance of the company and 
consequently, the creation of wealth. In this way, any disturbance in 
the economic environment in which the companies are competing will 
affect them according to how sensitive a company is towards each of 
the factors that defines the environment. Companies should therefore 
inform on how they are affected, always unfavourably, by changes in 
certain factors that indicate the evolution of the economy, or, to put it 
another way, how sensitive the company is to changes in these 
factors. 
 
Operating risk arises from the risk inherent in the production of the firm 
(Dhaliwal et al. 1983). Thus, Cabedo and Tirado (2004, P.192) define 
operational risk faced by the firm as:  
 
the risk of direct or indirect losses resulting from internal process 
errors, personnel or systems errors, or from external factors.   
 
Market risks can be defined as risk resulting from a variation in the price of 
particular economic level. Market risk divided into four large categories: 1) 
exchange risk, 2) interest risk, 3) risk of price variations in financial assets 
other than fixed income assets, and 4) risk of commodity price variation 
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(Cabedo and Tirado 2004). Hence, market risk arises from movements in 
the level or volatility of market prices (Jorion 2000).  
 
Credit risk arises because counterparties of firms may be unwilling or 
unable to fulfill contractual obligations (Cabedo and Tirado 2004). Further, 
Cabedo and Tirado (2004, P.190) define credit risk as: 
 
the possibility that over time, a decrease in the real value of a 
company’s client portfolio may occur as a result of credit quality 
deterioration suffered by those making up the portfolio.  
 
These definitions of five key sub-categories of risk are often used and 
adopted in this thesis. 
 
These five sub-categories of risk are important to this thesis, as Beretta 
and Bozzoland (2004) state that the increase in complexity of business 
strategies, operations and regulations makes it harder for investors to 
clearly understand financial information without good explanations of risk 
factors. Thus the provision of these five sub-categories of risk enhance the 
understand of companies’ financial information. These issues are further 
explored in Chapter 7. 
 
3.6.2  Risk disclosure studies 
There are interesting but not wholly consistent empirical results from past 
studies that focus on risk disclosure. Table 3.6 summarizes the ongoing 
research in the area of risk disclosure.
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Table 3.6 Previous Studies on Risk Disclosure 
Author(s), subject, and 
measurement of risk disclosure 
Explanatory 
variables 
Research approach Results 
Solomon et al (2000) 
 
Develop a conceptual framework on 
corporate risk disclosure on the 
companies in England by referring to the 
Turnbull Report. 
 
Questionnaire survey to U.K institutional 
investors’ attitude toward risk disclosure. 
Corporate 
governance 
perceptions, 
investment 
decisions, demand 
for information  
Data:          Questionnaire survey in U.K  
                   institutional investors in 1999  
Sample:      552 UK institutional investors 
Statistics:   Chi-square statistic, Wilcoxon  
                   signed-rank Z statistic, and  
                   Kruskal-Wallis (K-W) statistic 
Theory:       Agency theory 
Institutional investors believe that an 
increase in risk disclosure will help making 
decision for their investment portfolio.  
 
Marshall and Weetman (2002) 
 
Analyse foreign exchange risk 
management disclosure in the two 
countries (U.S and U.K) comparison. 
 
Use categorical basis (1,0)  if firm reports 
risk disclosure or not report 
Disclosure policies, 
and information 
economics 
Data:          U.S and U.K companies in  
                  1998 
Sample:     Annual report of 30 U.S and   
                  30 U.K companies in 1998 
Statistics:   Kruskal-Wallis and Mann- 
                  Whitney tests 
Theory:      Agency theory 
Risk disclosure regulations made at similar 
times can have a different impact in two 
different countries with different regulatory 
environments. 
Sinclair-Desgagné and Gozlan (2003)  
 
Investigate the amount and quality of the 
environment risk disclosure 
 
Use risk disclosure game tested on 
stakeholders.  
Persuasion games, 
and informational 
regulation 
Data:          Some illustrative cases  
Sample:     Case in the environment risk  
                  disclosure that involve  
                  companies’ stakeholders 
Statistics:   Bayesian equilibria 
Theory:      Signalling theory 
They conclude that disclosure plays a 
significant role in influencing the decision 
making of the stakeholders related to their 
confidence in the information and it will also 
affect company’s investment in the provision 
of information.  
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Table 3.6 Previous Studies on Risk Disclosure (continued) 
Beretta and Bozzolan (2004) 
 
Examine the quality of voluntary risk 
disclosure on the Italian Stock Exchange 
listed companies (where there is no 
regulation on risk information)  
 
Use disclosure index and content 
analysis  
Size, industry Data:          Company listed on the Italian  
                   Stock Exchange in 2001  
Sample:      85 annual report of all non-                     
                   financial companies     
Statistics:   Multiple regression 
Theory      : Signalling theory 
One of their findings different from previous 
research is that the quantity of disclosure 
does not influence size and industry. 
 
Cabedo and Tirado (2004)  
 
Design and establish a set of specific risk 
quantification models for risk disclosure. 
 
Use the value of risk (VaR) to calculate 
financial and non financial risks  
Risk quantification 
model 
Data:          Company listed on the  
                   Spanish Stock Exchange in  
                   1991 - 2001  
Sample:      Financial and non financial  
                   data on 1000 companies     
Statistics:   Statistical distribution  
                   methods 
Theory:       Agency theory 
They differentiate risk into financial and non 
financial risk based on risk affecting 
business activities of a company. They use 
the value of risk (VaR) to calculate financial 
and non financial risks which then result in a 
classification of risks which are: business 
risk, strategic risk, market risk, credit risk, 
operational risk and liquidity risk.  
 
Linsley and Shrives (2006)  
 
Explore risk disclosures within a sample 
of 79 UK company annual report  
 
Use content analysis 
 
Company size Data:          U.K companies as at 1   
                   January 2000 
Sample:     79 non-financial firms listed  
                   within the FT-SE 100 Index 
Statistics:   Pearson correlation and  
                   Wilcoxon signed ranks test 
Theory:       Attribution theory 
 
Discover a positive association between risk 
disclosure and company size and a 
negative association between the number of 
risk disclosures and the level of 
environmental risk (measured by Innovest 
EcoValue21tm). Moreover, they also find 
evidence supporting the idea that non-
monetary risk disclosure is much more 
significant than monetary risk disclosure. 
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Table 3.6 Previous Studies on Risk Disclosure (continued) 
Abraham and Cox (2007)  
 
Investigate the quantity of narrative risk 
information which separates into 
business, financial and internal control 
risk  
 
 
Use content analysis 
Ownership, 
governance and U.S 
listing characteristics 
Data:          U.K FTSE 100 in year of  
                   2002 
Sample:      71 firms (removing financial  
                   companies in FTSE 100 firms) 
Statistics:   Ordinary least squares (OLS)  
                   estimations 
Theory:       Agency theory 
Risk reporting is negatively related to share 
ownership. The number of executives and 
the number of independent directors are 
positively related to the level of risk 
reporting in UK listed companies.  
 
Akhigbe and Martin (2008)  
 
Observe change from capital market 
measures of risk of the companies with 
the effect of the enactment of Sabaness-
Oakley (SOX) in 2002. SOX is enacted to 
overcome scandals committed by several 
US companies as SOX is able to increase 
the level of transparency of corporate 
finance by increasing disclosure and 
improving corporate governance.  
 
 
Measure the extent to which information 
is provided in footnote disclosures 
Governance Data:          Annual report of U.S  
                  company in 2002 
Sample:     Examine 768 US financial  
                  services firms   
Statistics:   Regression analysis 
Theory:       Agency theory 
The research shows that over the early 
period of the enactment of SOX, risk 
measurement has a positive correlation with 
mandatory disclosure and governance 
provisions. Whereas, in the longer term, a 
shift in unsystematic risk has a negative 
correlation towards the decrease of investor 
uncertainty as transparency improves. 
Generally, they conclude that changes in 
shorter and longer term risk measures vary 
in reverse with the strength of disclosure 
and governance characteristics. The 
financial market will award companies with 
strong disclosure and governance and 
punish company with weak disclosure and 
governance. 
Atan and Maruhun (2009) 
 
Examine mandatory and voluntary risk 
disclosure in annual report of Malaysian 
listed companies. 
 
Use content analysis and risk disclosure 
index 
Company size, 
leverage, and 
industry type. 
Data:         Annual report of Malaysian  
                  listed companies in 2006 
Sample:    150 companies 
Statistics:   Regression analysis 
Theory:      Stakeholder theory 
The level of risk disclosure is positively 
associated with size and not with leverage. 
They also find mixed results regarding 
industry type. Only the property industry is 
significantly associated with risk disclosure. 
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Table 3.6 Previous Studies on Risk Disclosure (continued) 
Hassan (2009)  
 
Explore the relationship between UEA 
firm characteristics and the level of 
corporate risk disclosure (CRD) 
 
Use un-weighted risk disclosure index 
Size, level of risk,  
industry type   
Data:         Company in United Arab  
                  Emirat (UAE)  
Sample:     49 financial and non financial  
                  companies in UAE 
Statistics:  Multiple regression 
Theory:      Institutional theory 
He concludes that the level of corporate risk 
disclosure (CRD) is not significantly 
associated with corporate size. Corporate 
level of risk and corporate industry type are 
significant in explaining variation in CRD. 
Hill and Short (2009) 
 
Examine the risk warning disclosures of 
initial public offering (IPO) companies and 
factors related to that disclosure 
  
Use content analysis 
Information 
asymmetry, 
monitoring, 
proprietary costs, 
and nominated 
advisor (sponsor) 
reputation capital 
Data:         The Unlisted Securities  
                  Market (USM) and the  
                  Alternative Investment Market  
                  (AIM) companies 
Sample:     420 IPO companies on USM  
                  and AIM in 1991-2003 
Statistics:  Regression, logit, and probit  
                  analysis 
Theory:     Signalling theory 
They find that in IPO companies risk 
disclosure contain a greater proportion of 
forward-looking information but have a 
lower proportion of information on internal 
control and risk management. They find a 
negative relation between director’s 
shareholdings and risk disclosure. 
Taylor et al (2010)  
 
Examine Australian listed resource firm in 
Australia in 2003 – 2006 (the base years 
full of adoption of IFRS in Australia) 
regarding financial risk management 
disclosure  
 
Use disclosure index 
Adoption of IFRS, 
corporate 
governance, capital 
raising, and 
jurisdiction 
Data:         Annual report in Australian  
                  Companies 
Sample:    111 Australian listed extractive  
                  resource firms in 2002-2006 
Statistics:  Ordinary least square (OLS)   
                  Regression 
Theory:      Agency theory 
 
They find that corporate governance, capital 
raising, firm size and leverage of the 
company are positively correlated with 
financial risk management disclosure. They 
conclude that the introduction of IFRS 
motivates the companies to better 
communicate the company’s financial risk 
information.  
 
Dobler et al. (2011)  
 
Investigate multi-country (U.S., Canadian, 
U.K.,(common law countries) and 
German (civil law) risk disclosure in the 
manufacturing companies 
 
Use content analysis 
Size and country Data :        Annual reports of U.S,  
                  Canada, U.K and German  
                  companies in 2005 
Sample:     160 manufacturing companies  
                   in 2005 
Statistics:   Multiple regression 
Theory:      Agency theory 
 
They find that size positively affects the 
association between risk disclosure quantity 
and the level of firm risk and they also find 
that there is negative association between 
risk disclosure quantity and leverage in the 
German financial setting and positive 
association in the North American settings. 
Source: Various sources 
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Overall, the research findings are empirically mixed and scholars have 
suggested that more research is needed in the area of risk disclosure 
study. Risk reporting is becoming a greater concern of companies 
(Cabedo and Tirado 2004). This thesis posits that risk disclosures are 
influenced by four key predictor variables: country, size, board 
independence, and ownership. The next section offers the agency theory-
based hypotheses development. 
 
3.7  Hypotheses Development 
This section sets out the rationale for selection of the testable hypotheses. 
Agency theory is utilized in this thesis to offer insights into manufacturing 
listed companies’ risk disclosure practices; particularly to ascertain 
whether country, company size, managerial ownership and board 
independence lead to increased risk communication (as measured by the 
Risk Disclosure Index (RDI)). Each variable (originally covered in Chapter 
2) is discussed in more detail in the following sub-sections. 
 
3.7.1.  Country of Incorporation 
 
Prior studies document the effect of country on disclosure practice. Dye 
(1985), in his analytical model, suggests that voluntary communication is 
affected by disclosure requirements by the accounting regime. Meek, 
Roberts, and Gray (1995) find that country/region is one of the key factors 
explaining the extent of voluntary disclosure. Williams and Tower (1998) 
examine the preferred level of disclosure regarding the issue of differential 
reporting in Singapore and Australia small business entities and note small 
company managers in those two countries differ in their acceptance of 
international standards requiring more disclosure requirements than 
existing domestic standards. Tower, Hancock, and Taplin (1999) state that 
country of reporting is the main significant factor for the level of IAS 
compliance in the Asia-Pacific region. Soewarso et al. (2003) also 
conclude that country of incorporation is the main determinant of Australia 
and Singapore disclosure practice differences. Australian companies 
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communicate significantly more information relative to their Singaporean 
counterparts. Bailey et al. (2006) examine the increased disclosure for 
non-U.S. firms when listing shares in the U.S. and conclude that the 
country factor is an important determinant of increased disclosure. They 
note the greatest increases are for firms from developed countries. 
Marshall and Weetman (2002) note through a two-countries comparison 
between the U.S and U.K  on the disclosure of foreign exchange risk 
management policies, that risk disclosure regulations made at similar 
times and with similar propulsions, can have a different impact in two 
different countries with different regulatory environments. Based on the 
above literature review, this thesis posits country as a determinant factor 
explaining the association between risk disclosures. Thus, it is 
hypothesized that: 
 
H1: There is an association between country of incorporation and 
risk disclosures in the annual reports in listed manufacturing 
companies. 
 
3.7.2  Company Size 
Numerous prior studies document the significant effect of company size on 
disclosure practices. Atan and Maruhun (2009) predict the association 
between company size as a key independent variable with voluntary 
disclosures of risk information as the dependent variable. The level of risk 
information disclosures is thought to be positively associated with size. 
Kanto and Schadewitz (1997) explore a suitable model for voluntary 
disclosure policy in the firm and find that voluntary disclosure is related 
with firm-size. Similarly, Linsley and Shrives (2006) explore risk 
disclosures within an association between the number of risk disclosures 
and company size. Their result supports the hypothesis that a positive 
correlation exists between the volume of risk disclosures and company 
size. 
 
 Overall, many past studies highlighted a positive relationship between 
company size and the level of disclosure (Kanto and Schadewitz 1997; 
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Linsley and Shrives 2006; Atan and Maruhun 2009). Consistent with 
agency theory principles, this thesis adopts company size as a potential 
factor explaining the positive association between aggregate risk 
disclosures by proposing a directional hypothesis: 
 
H2: There is a positive association between company size and the 
risk disclosures in the annual reports of manufacturing listed 
companies. 
 
3.7.3  Managerial Ownership  
Jensen and Meckling (1976) believed that in an agency relationship both 
agents and principals are seeking to maximize their own self interest and 
that agents will not always behave in the best interests of principals. 
Managerial ownership is considered as having an influence in determining 
the nature of the agency problem. That is, managers have greater 
incentives to take fringe benefit and reduced incentives to maximize job 
performance when the managers have less share ownership in the 
companies. 
 
Several prior studies document the significant effect of managerial 
ownership on disclosure practices. Gelb (2000) examines the effect of 
managerial ownership on firms’ disclosures and finds firms with lower 
levels of managerial ownership are more likely communicators of risk 
disclosures than firms with higher levels of managerial ownership. Eng 
and Mak (2003) also note a negative relationship between managerial 
ownership and increased disclosure. Thus, lower managerial ownership is 
associated with increased voluntary disclosure.  
 
Consistent with the results of most past agency theory studies which note 
a negative relationship between managerial ownership and the level of 
disclosure (Gelb 2000; Eng and Mak 2003), this thesis analyses 
ownership structure as a potential factor explaining the negative 
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association between risk disclosures by proposing a directional 
hypothesis: 
 
H3: There is a negative association between managerial ownership 
and the risk disclosures in the annual reports of manufacturing 
listed companies.  
 
3.7.4  Board Independence 
Due to the separation of ownership and control of a firm, an agency 
relationship provides opportunities for firm management to engage in 
opportunistic behavior that enhances their welfare at the expense of the 
firm (Jensen and Meckling 1976). Agency theory suggests that 
governance mechanisms such as monitoring by the board of directors is 
designed to minimize divergences that arise from the separation of 
ownership and decision control (Fama and Jensen 1983). 
 
Independent directors have incentives to use their decision control to 
preserve reputational capital. The main purpose of the independent 
director is to supply governance protection to the shareholders. In term of 
voting representation on the member of the directors or boards, 
independent directors should take sides and represent their constituencies 
that cannot be protected by either arms-length market transactions or 
other bilateral arrangements. Thus, shareholders, as beneficiaries of risk, 
require representation on the board that is independent of management to 
protect their assets (Cheng and Courtenay 2006). 
 
Prior studies document a significant effect of board independence on 
disclosure practices. For instance Baek, Johnson, and Kim (2009) find a 
positive association between outside directors and company’s disclosures 
in the board and management process information. Moreover, Chen and 
Jaggi (2000) note a positive association between the proportion of 
independent non executive directors (INDs) on corporate boards of Hong 
Kong firms and comprehensiveness of financial disclosures. Most relevant 
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empirical agency theory studies find that INDs on corporate boards have a 
positive influence on the management decision to disclose financial 
information. Cheng and Courtenay (2006) state that boards with a larger 
proportion of independent, non-executive directors (proxy for board-
monitoring effectiveness) are significantly and positively associated with 
higher levels of voluntary disclosure. In summary, the results of most past 
agency theory studies establish a positive relationship between board 
independence and the level of disclosure (Chen and Jaggi 2000; Cheng 
and Courtenay 2006; Baek et al. 2009). Accordingly, this thesis adopts the 
level of board independence as a potential factor explaining the positive 
association between risk disclosures by proposing a directional 
hypothesis: 
 
H4: There is a positive association between higher levels of board 
independence and the risk disclosures in the annual reports of 
manufacturing listed companies. 
 
To assess the impact of the crisis time span on risk disclosure practices, 
this thesis will investigate whether there is significant association between 
risk disclosure across the years 2007-2009. The above four hypotheses 
will be separately tested for each of the 2007, 2008, 2009 financial year 
periods. 
 
3.8  Summary 
This chapter outlined the relevant literature of voluntary risk disclosure 
using both the principles of agency theory and findings of past voluntary 
disclosure studies and voluntary risk disclosure studies. There are four 
hypotheses based on the literature presented in this chapter. Agency 
theory is utilized in this thesis to offer insights into manufacturing listed 
companies’ risk disclosure practices. The findings of this thesis will shed 
more light on four countries’ (Australia, Indonesia, Malaysia, and 
Singapore) risk disclosure practice. 
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The next chapter outlines the research approach by discussing the data 
sample selection, data sources, and variable measurement (dependent, 
independent, and control) utilized in this thesis.    
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CHAPTER 4 
RESEARCH APPROACH 
 
4.1  Introduction 
Chapter 1 provides an overview of the study, including the introduction, 
background, research questions, significance and contribution of the 
study, assumptions and limitations. Chapter 2 outlines the accounting 
environment in the four sample countries (Australia, Indonesia, Malaysia, 
and Singapore). Chapter 3 then reviews the literature on agency theory 
and the links of disclosure with country, company size, managerial 
ownership, and board independence, and the relevant prior empirical 
research leading to the development of four hypotheses.  
 
The purpose of this chapter is to outline the thesis research process in 
more detail, particularly focusing on the methodology and specific 
methods. Chapter 4 also explains the creation of the final voluntary Risk 
Disclosure Index (RDI). This chapter then provides details regarding the 
measurement of the predictor variables. 
 
4.2  The Research Process  
As discussed in Chapter 3, this thesis adopts and utilizes the positivism 
empirical quantitative research approach to describe and explain the risk 
disclosure practices in Australian, Indonesian, Malaysian, and 
Singaporean manufacturing listed companies (see Section 3.2). Crotty 
(1998) reveals there are four basic elements of any research process 
namely epistemology, theoretical perspective, methodology and methods. 
The research process used in this thesis is described in Figure 4.1. 
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Figure 4.1: Thesis Research Process 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
      Source: Adapted from Crotty (1998), Brown (2001), Astami (2005), Suhardjanto (2008) 
 
 
Figure 4.1 shows the four basic element of the research process used in 
this thesis. In term of epistemology, Crotty (1998, P.3) defines 
epistemology as “the theory of knowledge embedded in the theoretical 
perspective and thereby in the methodology”. Crotty (1998, P.8) clarifies  
objectivism epistemology, “In this objectivist view of ‘what it means to 
know’, understanding and values are considered to be objectified in the 
people we are studying and, if we go about it in the right way, we can 
discover the objective truth”. This thesis adopts and utilizes objectivism 
epistemology. Regarding the theoretical perspective, this thesis adopts the 
positivism paradigm. Peile (1994, P.201) argues that “In the positivist 
paradigm, theory, practice, and research are all seen as separate entities 
which may or may not interact. Positivist theory arises from, and is 
reformulated or falsified by, research”. In turn, this positivism theoretical 
perspective validates the research methodology (analysis of companies’ 
annual reports) and leads to specific research method (risk disclosure 
index analysis). 
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4.3  Sample Selection and Data Source 
This thesis adopts and utilizes the positivism empirical quantitative 
research approach (see Section 3.2). To enhance the analysis, the years 
selected in this thesis are in the time span of 2007-2009. These three 
years encompass the impact of the global economic crisis faced by most 
countries in the world (Kenc and Dibooglu 2010; Zhang et al. 2010). This 
thesis analyses whether there are any significant differences between 
these years for risk disclosures. Overall, a total of 600 financial year 
reports are utilized as the sample set; this total is composed of 50 
companies in each of the four countries over this three year time span. 
 
To evolve appropriate data for the three research questions (see Chapter 
1), four countries (Australia, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore) are 
selected as the sample focus. This thesis focuses on the southern region 
of the Asia Pacific as it represents different yet similar characteristics 
(economic levels, language, and accounting heritage,). Each of these 
neighboring countries is a member of the Asian Pacific Economic 
Corporation (APEC) group, an organization formed in a spirit of 
cooperation (see Williams 1998).  Each country had a colonial history. 
Finally, as discussed earlier, these four countries have experienced vastly 
different economic experiences during the years 2007-2009 (see Chapter 
2).  
 
For the purpose of this thesis, manufacturing companies are chosen as 
the sole sample focus. They are seen as implementing an integrated 
process that converts materials into goods (see Drucker 1990). 
Manufacturing companies have longer processes, more complex activities, 
and potentially have more business risks in their activities than many other 
firms. Arguably, manufacturing firms well test agency theory’s ability to 
predict risk disclosures. Manufacturing firms produce goods and separates 
the business society (employees, consumers, and investors) from 
business (the production process converting raw materials into finished 
goods). This separation potentially leads to asymmetry of information 
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between the firms and their key stakeholders (Katz et al. 2009). The sole 
focus on manufacturing in this thesis helps to rule out the industry 
exogenous factors’ problematic in many international accounting studies. 
 
Data for the dependent, independent, and control variables are collected 
from 2007-2009 annual reports. The annual reports are used to obtain 
data on risk disclosure. This thesis only uses annual reports with English 
translations that can be compared between countries, including the risk 
disclosure components in an English version. For the purpose of this 
study, company annual reports are selected on the basis that the 
companies are listed on the four countries’ stock exchanges. The annual 
reports of these companies were downloaded from the Australian, 
Indonesian, Malaysian, and Singaporean stock exchange websites, or 
from the ORBIS database. If they were not available from these sources 
they were downloaded directly from the companies’ websites. Overall, the 
sample selection criteria for annual reports used in this thesis are: 1) listed 
on the four countries’ stock exchanges; 2) in the manufacturing sector; 3) 
English language version; and 4) the annual report is available in all three 
years (2007, 2008, 2009). For the fourth criteria, the annual report 
availability in all three years is important because this research compares 
the companies’ risk disclosure in each of the three key years from 2007-
2009 encompassing the GFC. 
 
A total of 600 firm years data were collected consisting of a random 
sample of 200 manufacturing listed companies’ annual reports for fiscal 
year-ends ranging from 2007 to 2009. The reports include 50 annual 
reports of manufacturing companies per country, listed in the stock 
exchanges of Australia, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore. As with 
many studies, sample firms are not completely representative of the total 
population of manufacturing listed companies in each country. This is 
because cross country analysis is hindered by the context of 
similarity/dissimilarity of firms in term of sample company characteristics 
such as company size, and profitability (Dobler et al. 2011). This study 
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incorporated a large total sample of 600 annual reports manufacturing 
listed companies in the four countries. 
  
The classification of manufacturing listed companies are based on the 
ORBIS database which are categorized based on the NAICS 2007 (North 
American Industry Classification System 2007)15.  
 
4.4  Dependent Variable 
Marston and Shrives (1991) review the use of disclosure indices as a 
measurement technique in accounting researches. They note that 
disclosure indices (which are lists of selected items that may be disclosed 
by companies in their published company reports) are often used by many 
researchers to measure the extent of disclosure. 
 
The dependent variable in this study is the Risk Disclosure Index (RDI). To 
measure the level of risk disclosure practices of these four countries’ 
manufacturing listed companies, this thesis use a 34-item Risk Disclosure 
Index (RDI); a continuous dependent variable. This research adopts a 
researcher-constructed risk disclosure index to create an index measuring 
the extent of risk disclosure by listed firms.  This benchmark set is based 
on an extensive list of business, strategy, operating, market and credit 
voluntary risk disclosure items from key past studies. Statistical testing of 
the association between the extent to which country, company size, 
managerial ownership and board independence is conducted to analyze 
their relationship with the RDI of these four countries’ manufacturing listed 
companies.  
                                               
15 The manufacturing industry in the NAICS 2007 (North American Industry Classification 
System 2007) includes: food manufacturing, beverage and tobacco product 
manufacturing, textile mills, textile product mills, apparel manufacturing, leather and allied 
product manufacturing, wood product manufacturing, paper manufacturing, printing and 
related support activities, petroleum and coal products manufacturing, chemical 
manufacturing, plastics and rubber products manufacturing, non-metallic mineral product 
manufacturing, primary metal manufacturing, fabricated metal product manufacturing, 
machinery manufacturing, computer and electronic product manufacturing, electrical 
equipment, appliance and component manufacturing, transportation equipment 
manufacturing, furniture and related product manufacturing, and also miscellaneous 
manufacturing. 
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The assumptions from the use of Risk Disclosure Index (RDI) used in this 
study are that the RDI is a reliable representation of the dependent 
variable, and the RDI can be applied as a valid measure for manufacturing 
companies used for this thesis.  
 
4.4.1  Development of Disclosure Indices 
As explained in Chapter 1, the purpose of this thesis is to identify the 
communication of all key risk factors experienced by a manufacturing 
listed company in Australia, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore. To 
achieve the research objective, this thesis generates the RDI index 
measuring the extent of risk disclosure by manufacturing listed firms. 
 
This section explains the evolution to create the final Risk Disclosure 
Index (RDI). This evolution consists of three stages as detailed in Table 
4.1. 
Table 4.1: Creation of the Final Risk Disclosure Index (RDI) 
Stage Detailed Explanation 
Stage 1 
(past studies) 
An extensive review of prior studies is undertaken to check 
for commonalities across the studies and initially identify 
items that are linked with risk disclosures. These items are 
utilized in this thesis to derive the preliminary benchmark 
disclosure checklist. A preliminary 42 item checklist is 
created. 
Stage 2 
(mandatory rules) 
The preliminary disclosures checklist is first subject to a 
thorough screening in order to ensure individual items are 
not mandatory. This screening of the voluntary risk 
disclosure checklist is done with reference to International 
Accounting Standards Board (IASB) mandatory risk 
disclosures and any known mandatory risk disclosure 
countries rules in Australia, Indonesia, Malaysia, and 
Singapore. This screening of the voluntary risk disclosure 
checklist is done via a pilot study process. A pilot study is 
conducted by sampling five companies in each country to 
search for any mandatory disclosures from IFRS 7, IFRS 9, 
and IAS 32 which must be removed from the final Risk 
Disclosure Index (RDI).  
Stage 3 
(final RDI) 
The pilot study reveals that eight items from the original 42 
items are mandatory and should be removed from the 
preliminary Risk Disclosure Index (RDI). This procedure 
lead to the final selection of voluntary risk disclosure items. 
The final Risk disclosure Index (RDI) consist of 34 items 
Risk Disclosure Index (RDI) items (42 - 8 = 34). 
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4.4.1.1  Stage 1: Benchmarking from Prior Studies 
The first stage is the extensive review of prior studies to check for 
commonalities across the studies and identify items that are linked with 
risk disclosures. The use of a disclosure index to measure the extent of 
disclosure can be traced to the work of Solomon (2000), Linsley and 
Shrives (2005a), Hill and Short (2009) who use The Turnbull Report16, 
Suhardjanto (2008) who uses The Global Report Initiative (GRI)17, 
Akhigbe and Martin (2008) who use Sarbanes-Oxley Act18, as a 
benchmark to gauge the extent of disclosure. The Voluntary Disclosure 
Instrument (VDIS) of Ho (2009) and Voluntary Disclosure Checklist of 
Gray, Meek, and Roberts (1995) are also utilized in this thesis to derive 
the original preliminary benchmark disclosure checklist. 
 
4.4.1.2  Stage 2:  Mandatory Items Removed 
There are some rules about risk disclosure that have become mandatory 
by 2007 (first thesis sample year). This screening of the voluntary risk 
disclosure checklist is done with reference to International Accounting 
Standards Board (IASB) mandatory risk disclosure, and the mandatory risk 
disclosure countries rules in Australia, Indonesia, Malaysia, and 
Singapore.These mandatory rules need to be excluded from the checklist 
to evolve the final risk disclosure index (RDI).  
 
This thesis has conducted a pilot study sampling five companies in each of 
the four sample countries to detect any mandatory disclosure index in 
IFRS 7, IFRS 9, and IAS 32 (relation to financial instruments disclosures) 
                                               
16 Turnbull report 1999 is a guidance initiated by the Internal Control Working Party of the 
Institute of Chartered Accountants in England & Wales (ICAEW) that is based on the 
adoption by a company’s board of a risk-based approach (Turnbull 1999).  
 
17 The GRI provides a careful framework for the application of sustainable reporting with 
the integrated indicators capturing multiple dimensions and companies widely accepting 
around the world (Suhardjanto 2008).  GRI suggests guidelines for core content for 
reporting and are applicable to all organizations.  The guidelines outline a disclosure 
framework that organizations can voluntarily adopt (GRI 2009). 
 
18 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 is designed to assist investors by bettering the accuracy 
and reliability of corporate disclosures to the securities laws. 
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which must be removed from the final Risk Disclosure Index (RDI). A pilot 
study was conducted. The pilot study reviewed a total of 60 annual reports 
consisting of five companies in each of the four countries over the entire 
three year time span of 2007-2009 (5 x 4 x 3 = 60). The pilot study used a 
benchmark checklist from the initial 42 RDI items and applied them to 
these 60 annual reports. The aim of the pilot study is to better understand 
how companies disclose their risk information as linked to the risk 
mandatory rules in IFRS 7, IFRS 9, and IAS 32. 
 
Further examination reveals that IFRS 9 is not relevant to the RDI, 
because the effective date of IFRS 9 is set in the future (1 January 2013). 
In other words, it is not a mandatory until 1 January 2013. IAS 32 is also 
not relevant for the RDI. The financial instruments disclosures are in IFRS 
7 and no longer in IAS 32. Only IFRS 7 is relevant to the RDI. IFRS 7 
establishes principles for presenting financial instruments as liabilities or 
equity and for offsetting financial assets and financial liabilities. IFRS 7 
mandates certain disclosures of financial instrument information (IAS-Plus 
2009). Therefore, all risk related disclosure items made mandatory via 
IFRS 7 (five items) are removed from this thesis Risk Disclosure Index 
(RDI). 
 
This screening of the voluntary risk disclosure checklist is also done with 
reference to the mandatory risk disclosure countries rules in Australia, 
Indonesia, Malaysia19, and Singapore. Three items from the preliminary 
Risk Disclosure (RDI) are removed because they are mandatory in at least 
one of the sample countries. 
 
Overall, eight items are removed from the preliminary Risk Disclosure 
Index (RDI).  
 
 
                                               
19 The Malaysia regulations regarding mandatory risk disclosure based on the 15.26 and 
15.27 listing requirement issued by Bursa Malaysia: Disclosure in Relation to the 
Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance and the State of Internal Control (Bursa 
Malaysia 2001). 
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4.4.1.3  Stage 3: Final RDI 
The pilot study reveals that eight items from the original 42 items variant of 
the Risk Disclosure Index (RDI) are mandatory and should be removed 
from the final Risk Disclosure Index (RDI).  
 
Eight items are considered mandatory because of mandatory risk 
disclosure countries rules in Australia, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore 
and the IFRS 7 standard. These are: 
 
1. In assessing what constitutes a sound system of internal control, 
deliberation should include the nature and extent of the risks facing 
the organization; 
2. The system of internal control should be capable of responding quickly 
to evolving risks; 
3. Directly or indirectly, including through any subsidiary, to extend or 
maintain credit, to arrange for the extension of credit, or to renew an 
extension of credit, in the form of a personal loan to or for any director 
or executive officer of that issuer; 
4. Effect of foreign currency fluctuations on current result-qualitative;, 
5. Effect of foreign currency fluctuations on future result-qualitative;  
6. Effect of interest rate on current results;  
7. Effect of interest rate on future result; and 
8. Made or provided in the ordinary course of the consumer credit 
business of such issuer; of a type that is generally made available by 
such issuer to the public. 
 
The finding leads to the final selection of disclosure items. The final list is a 
34 item Risk Disclosure Index (RDI) (42 - 8 = 34).  
 
Finally, the RDI for a manufacturing listed company for each year is 
computed based on the checklist. The scores of “1” are assigned to items 
disclosed in each company’s annual reports. They are added and equally 
weighted to derive a final score for each year. The Risk Disclosure Index 
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score (RDI) ranges in percentage from 0-100% as a metric calculation. 
The RDI, calculated for each company in each year, is as follows:   
  
 
RDI =  ∑items disclosed per each company   × 100% 
    34 item RDI20  
 
 
The above RDI calculation is the primary measure of the dependent 
variable used in this thesis. 
 
4.5  Independent and Control Variables 
The measurement techniques adopted in this thesis for the independent 
variables (country, company size, managerial ownership, board 
independence) have been consistently utilized by prior studies. For 
example: country (Soewarso et al. 2003; Astami and Tower 2006), size 
(Haniffa and Cooke 2002; Linsley et al. 2006; Cheng and Courtenay 2006; 
Abraham and Cox 2007; Atan and Maruhun 2009), managerial ownership 
(Chen and Steiner 1999; Gelb 2000; Eng and Mak 2003; Makhija and 
Patton 2004; Baek et al. 2009), and board independence (Chen and Jaggi 
2000; Eng and Mak 2003; Patelli and Prencipe 2007; Akhigbe and Martin 
2008). 
These techniques are detailed in this section as summarized in Table 4.2. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
20 Clear non-applicable items are removed from the computation. 
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Table 4.2: Measurement Techniques for the Independent and Control   
                  Variables 
Independent and 
Control Variables Measurement Type of Data 
Independent Variables: 
Country 1    = Indonesian listed manufacturing    
         companies 
2 = Australian listed manufacturing     
   companies 
3 = Malaysian listed manufacturing   
   companies 
4 = Singaporean listed manufacturing    
   companies 
Categorical 
Company size Total assets (log)21 Continuous 
Managerial 
ownership Percentage of managerial ownership Continuous 
Board independence Percentage of independent directors22 Continuous 
Control Variables: 
Age of business Number of years from inception  Continuous 
Auditor 1 = if big 4 auditor 0 = if non big 4  auditor Categorical 
Leverage Total liabilities divided by total assets Continuous 
Profitability (ROA) Net profit divided by total assets  Continuous 
 
Country is measured by simple nominal categories as 1 if Indonesian, 2 if 
Australian, 3 if Malaysian, and 4 if Singaporean listed manufacturing 
companies. Company size is measured by the companies’ total assets in 
U.S dollars and logged to reduce skewness. Managerial ownership is 
measured by the percentage of managerial ownership. Board 
Independence is calculated by the percentage of board independence. 
This study also examines age of business, auditor, leverage, and 
profitability as control variables to be included in the statistical analysis. 
Those control variables are consistently utilized in prior research. For 
examples: age of business (Hill and Short 2009), auditor (Lee et al. 2003; 
Wang et al. 2008), leverage (Eng and Mak 2003; Abraham and Cox 2007; 
                                               
21 Company size is measured by total assets at the end of the financial year in US$ and 
logged to reduce skewness. 
 
22 In this thesis the board in Indonesia refers to the board of commissioners (dewan 
komisaris) rather than the less important board of directors (direksi). 
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Akhigbe and Martin 2008; Atan and Maruhun 2009), and profitability (Eng 
and Mak 2003; Cheng and Courtenay 2006). 
Age of business is measured by the number of years from inception. 
Auditor is measured by nominal categories as 1 = if big 4 auditor and 0 = if 
non big 4 auditor. Leverage is measured by total liabilities divided by total 
assets. Lastly, profitability (ROA) is measured by net profit divided by total 
assets. 
 
4.6  Statistical Analysis  
4.6.1  Overview 
This thesis employs descriptive statistics, univariate and multivariate 
techniques to analyze the data. T-tests, ANOVA, correlations, and 
regression analysis are all used. Aside from these statistical analyses, this 
thesis also runs a number of tests to ensure that the statistical 
assumptions underpinning regression analysis, such as multicollinearity 
and normality, are met. The results of these assumption tests analyzed 
first, before the analysis of multiple regression results is undertaken. To 
best deal with independence of sample issues23, regressions are run on a 
year-by-year basis (200 companies) and analyzed individually for each of 
the three separate years (2007, 2008, 2009). 
 
4.6.2  Independent T-Test 
Independent t-tests are used in this thesis to determine if there are any 
significant differences between the amount of disclosure on RDI and any 
two item categories. Independent t-test are employed to determine if the 
observed variation between the means of two non-related samples arise 
through chance or is represented by the difference between two data 
                                               
23 The problem of repeated measures in the pooled sample is taken into account. The key 
issue is lack of independence in the full sample. This thesis thus runs the regressions for 
each individual year to avoid the problem. Overall, the hypotheses testing for individual 
years 2007, 2008, 2009 leads to the same statistical conclusions as that of the pooled 
sample (see later chapters).  
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populations. The assumptions in applying the independent t-test are that: 
(a) scores in the populations are applied randomly and independent of 
each other, (b) there is a normal distribution and (c) the variance of the 
scores between two populations is equal (Williams, 1998). Independent t-
tests are used in this thesis to examine the differences of RDI between big 
4 and non big 4 audited firms, between any two countries, from one 
selected year to another, and profit/loss status.  
 
4.6.3  Analysis of Variance 
Analysis of variance (ANOVA) is “a procedure that test to determine 
whether differences exist between two or more population means. The 
name of the technique derives from the way in which the calculations are 
performed. That is, the technique analyzes the variance of the data to 
determine whether we can infer that the population means differ” (Keller 
2005, P.493). ANOVA is used to compare two or more samples to 
determine whether the observed differences are the product of chance or 
systematic events. An ANOVA application is on a comparison of the 
differences within groups to the variance between groups. Formulated, 
one-way ANOVA can be defined as the total variability equal to within 
groups variability plus between group variability (Williams 1998). An 
ANOVA is used in this thesis to compare RDI of all four countries and 
across the three year time period. 
 
4.6.4  Correlations 
This thesis conducts a series of correlation analyses used to provide initial 
analysis of direction and strength of relationship between dependent, 
independent, and control variables. The coefficient correlation can also 
enable diagnosis of the problem of multicollinearity (that occurs when a 
coefficient correlation is greater than or equal to 0.80) (Gujarati 1995). 
This additional scrutiny lessens concerns about multicollinearity in the 
regression analysis. 
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4.6.5  Multiple Regression Model  
Hypothesis testing is used to explain the nature of a particular potential 
relationship, or to prove the function between groups of the independent 
variables to other variables (Keller 2005). The type of relationship between 
two or more variables may be a correlation, comparative, or causal 
relationship. This thesis tests hypotheses by regression analysis to 
evaluate how well the model fits the data (Keller 2005). Williams (1998, 
P.170) notes that the purpose of multiple regression analysis is “to arrive 
at the best set of coefficients for the independent variables that brings the 
dependent values predicted from the equation as close as possible to the 
actual values observed”.  
 
Multiple linear regressions are used in this thesis to model how possible 
explanatory variables forecast the level of risk disclosures of Australian, 
Indonesian, Malaysian, and Singaporean manufacturing companies with 
RDI as the dependent variable and four independent variables (country, 
company size, management ownership and board independence) and 
control variables (age of business, auditor, leverage, and profitability). In 
this thesis, the main statistical method utilized to test hypotheses is the 
Ordinary Least Square (OLS) regression. The full equation is provided 
below: 
RDIjt = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 CTYjt + 𝛽2 Sizejt + 𝛽3 ManOwnjt + 𝛽4 BoardIndjt + 𝛽5 Levjt + 𝛽6 
Profjt + 𝛽7 Audjt + 𝛽8 AgeBusjt + ε jt 
 
Where: 
Dependent variable: 
RDIjt   = risk disclosure index for company j in year t; 
 
Independent variables: 
CTYjt  = country for company j in year t as measured as if 1 = Indonesia listed  
                                manufacturing companies, 2 = Australia listed  manufacturing companies, 
                                3 = Malaysia listed manufacturing companies, 4 = Singapore listed  
                                manufacturing companies; 
Sizejt  = company size for company j in year t as measured by total assets (natural log); 
ManOwnjt = managerial ownership for company j in year t as measured by percentage   
                                of managerial ownership; 
BoardIndjt = board independent for company j in year t as measured by percentage of  
                                independent directors; 
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Control variables: 
Levjt  = leverage for company j in year t as measured by total liabilities divided by   
                             total assets; 
Profjt  = profit for company j in year t as measured by net profit divided by    
                                total assets; 
Audjt  = auditor for company j in year t as measured as if 1 = if big 4 auditor,  0 = if   
                                non big 4 auditor; 
AgeBusjt  = age of business for company j in year t as measured by number of years   
                                from inception; 
𝛽0  = intercept; 
𝛽1-8  = estimated coefficient for each item; 
ε jt  = error term 
 
4.7 Sensitivity Analysis and Additional Analysis 
Sensitivity analysis is conducted in Chapter 6 to provide further testing of 
the data relating to the three research questions and hypotheses. It 
provides additional insights into the dependent variable(s). The purpose of 
this thesis sensitivity analysis is to test if differing proxy measures of the 
variables change the end statistical analysis conclusions. Therefore, 
alternate measures are examined for all four key independent variables 
(country, size, managerial ownership and board independence). Country 
in the sensitivity analysis is re-measured by GDP per capita, as well as 
categorized as an impact of GFC and based on the ex-colonial, country 
law, and board system practice. Size in sensitivity analysis regression is 
then re-measured by log total revenue. Managerial ownership in the 
sensitivity analysis is categorized 0 if it has ≤ 15% managerial ownership 
and 1 if it has > 15% managerial ownership, and categorized 0 if it has ≤ 
50% managerial ownership and 1 if it has > 50% managerial ownership. 
Board independence as a corporate governance proxy is remeasured by 
the number of board meetings. 
 
There are also additional analyses conducted in this thesis to better 
explore the risk disclosure phenomenon. The first additional analysis 
separates the Risk Disclosure Index (RDI) into its key component parts. 
The five key sub-categories are: business, strategy, operating, market, 
and credit risk disclosure (see Section 3.6.1 for definitions). An 
assessment of the extent of disclosures of each of these categories of 
information over the three-year period and four countries through 
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additional descriptive and multiple regressions is then conducted. This 
generates more insights into the communication of corporate risk. Second, 
further additional analysis looks at change over time by examining the 
association in risk disclosure change and the independent and control 
variables change over the different years of the GFC. The third additional 
analysis conveys the association of the change of the five sub-categories 
of RDI with predictor variables change over time.  
 
4.8  Summary 
This thesis longitudinally examines risk disclosures within 600 annual 
reports of manufacturing listed companies in Australia, Indonesia, 
Malaysia, and Singapore for the 2007-2009 financial years. This is an 
important period to investigate risk disclosure as it encompasses the years 
of the impact of the global crisis. Empirical and cross country analysis 
tests the veracity of agency theory to predict disclosure in a positivist 
quantitative approach. A comprehensive RDI checklist is adopted with 
several key predictor variables - country, size, management ownership 
and independent directors - used to predict the extent of such 
communication over time. T-tests, ANOVA, and correlations and 
regression analysis techniques are applied for the statistical testing.  
 
The following chapters present the descriptive statistical analysis for all the 
key variables (Chapter 5); followed by the statistical results from testing of 
hypotheses (Chapter 6) and then additional analysis (Chapter 7).  
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CHAPTER 5 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS AND UNIVARIATE ANALYSIS 
 
5.1 Introduction 
Chapter 5 clarifies the research approach used in this thesis. This chapter 
presents the descriptive statistics analysis of 600 annual reports from the 
sample of manufacturing companies listed in Australian Stock Exchange 
(ASX), Indonesian Stock Exchange (IDX), Malaysian Exchange (MYX), 
and Singaporean Stock Exchange (SGX) for all the thesis variables. The 
chapter is organized as follows: Sections 5.2 describes the descriptive 
statistics of the predictor variables: independent variables (country, 
company size, managerial ownership, board independence) and control 
variables (leverage, profitability, auditor, age of business) respectively; 
Sections 5.3 highlights the key descriptive statistical findings of the overall 
RDI respectively; Section 5.4 provides univariate analysis using t-tests and 
ANOVA with RDI and five major sub-categories of RDI; and Section 5.5 
summaries  the chapter findings.  
 
5.2  Descriptive Statistics (independent variables and control 
variables)  
This session conveys the descriptive statistic of key variables. It highlights 
the predictor variables. Concurrently there are four independent variables 
(country, company size, managerial ownership, board independence) and 
four control variables (leverage, profitability, auditor, age of business) 
analyzed. There are two categorical variables: country (independent 
variable) and auditor (control variable). Country (CTY) is categorized as 1 
if Indonesian listed manufacturing companies, 2 if Australian, 3 if 
Malaysian, and 4 if Singaporean. Auditor (AUD) is categorized as 1 if big 4 
auditor or 0 if non big 4 auditor. The three continuous independent 
variables employed in this thesis are firm size (Size), managerial 
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ownership (ManOwn) and board Independence (BoardInd). Log firm size 
(SIZE) is calculated as the natural log of companies’ total assets. 
Managerial ownership (ManOwn) is measured as the percentage of 
managerial ownership from managerial shares divided by total shares. 
Board independence (BoardInd) is measured as the percentage of board 
independence in companies which is the number of members independent 
board are divided by total board members in the company. There are also 
three continuous control variables; these are leverage, profitability and age 
of business. Leverage (Lev) is calculated as total liabilities divided by total 
assets. Profitability (Prof) is calculated by net profit divided by total assets. 
Age of business (AgeBus) is measured as number of years from inception. 
Table 5.1 provides a summary of the descriptive statistics for the 
explanatory continuous variables for the entire GFC period 2007-2009. 
Each year represents 200 companies, over the three year period of 2007-
2009, with a total sample of 600 annual report firm years. 
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Table 5.1: Descriptive Statistics: 2007, 2008, 2009, and Pooled Data 
Continuous 
Variables Mean Median Min Max St Dev 
Panel A 2007 ( n = 200) 
Size (natural log) 7.77 7.97 2.94 10.04 1.40 
Size  (in US$) 689,310,000 148,140,000 1,944,788 11,000,000,000 1,407,990,000 
ManOwn (%) 12.84 1.67 0.00 78.00 18.81 
BoardInd (%) 40.61 40.00 0.00 100.00 20.13 
Lev (%) 46.10 47.21 0.00 230.00 27.12 
Prof (%) 2.38 5.82 -173.00 58.00 23.69 
AgeBus (years) 30.44 24.00 1.00 144.00 27.82 
Panel B 2008 ( n = 200) 
Size (natural log) 7.82 8.05 3.18 10.07 1.40 
Size (in US$) 813,310,000 154,560,000 1,801,030 11,600,000,000 172,989,000 
ManOwn (%) 11.45 1.40 0.00 78.00 17.74 
BoardInd (%) 42.10 40.00 0.00 90.00 19.86 
Lev (%) 48.29 47.79 1.00 288.00 31.24 
Prof (%) -2.09 3.38 -373.00 55.00 32.99 
AgeBus (years) 31.44 25.00 2.00 145.00 27.82 
Panel C 2009 ( n = 200) 
Size (natural log) 7.84 8.10 3.33 10.09 1.43 
Size (in US$) 867,080,000 168,160,000 861,705 12,300,000,000 176,243,000 
ManOwn (%) 11.54 1.31 0.00 76.00 18.12 
BoardInd (%) 42.93 41.00 0.00 100.00 20.71 
Lev (%) 45.31 41.21 1.00 272.00 31.18 
Prof (%) 0.03 4.22 -125.00 52.00 21.81 
AgeBus (years) 32.44 26.00 3.00 146.00 27.82 
Panel D Pooled ( n = 600) 
Size (natural log) 7.81 8.03 2.94 10.09 1.41 
Size (in US$) 789,900,000 156,100,000 861,705 12,300,000,000 164,020,000 
ManOwn (%) 11.94 1.47 0.00 78.00 18.21 
BoardInd (%) 41.88 40.00 0.00 100.00 20.23 
Lev (%)15 46.56 45.88 0.00 288.00 29.88 
Prof (%)24 0.02 4.28 -373.00 58.00 26.63 
AgeBus (years) 31.44 25.00 1.00 146.00 27.78 
 
According to Table 5.1, the average firm size for the four countries 
(Australia, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore) manufacturing listed 
companies over the years in U.S Dollar is $789,900,000 (see Panel D), 
the average firm size over the three year period is increasing, ranging from 
$689,310,000 in 2007 (Panel A), $813,310,000 in 2008 (Panel B) and 
                                               
24 For profitability, there are three companies: Coretrack in 2007, Jade Technologies in 
2008, Peel exploration in 2009 that are have unusually large loss figures. Similarly, Asia 
Pacific Fiber Company has a leverage figure above 100%. These figures have been 
rechecked and reconfirmed and are correct. 
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$867,080,000 in 2009 (Panel C). However, the median scores are far 
lower and a histogram (see Figure 5.1a-d) shows that size is heavily 
skewed to the left. Consequently, firm size is recomputed as the natural 
log of total assets (see Figure 5.1a-d), ranging between 7.77– 7.84. This is 
consistent with many past financial accounting studies. The lowest level of 
managerial ownership for countries’ manufacturing companies is in 2008 
(11.45%) this has fallen from 2007 whereas the highest board 
independence occurs in 2009 (42.93%) this has risen from 40.61% and 
42.10% in the earlier two years (see Table 5.1) consistent with 
governance principles, the independence of the boards increases over 
time during the GFC crisis period. The control variables also change over 
time. The average company financial leverage is 46.56% ranging from 
45.31% to 48.29%. The highest leverage level in 2008 is a worrying 
development during the GFC crisis period. The profitability variable has 
fallen in 2008 and increases slowly in 2009. The median average year 
profit is 4.28%.  The average age of business is 31.44 years (see Table 
5.1 panel D).  
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Figure 5.1a: Size and log Size Histogram (with normal curves) 2007 
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Figure 5.1b: Size and log Size Histogram (with normal curves) 2008 
 
 
 
108 
 
Figure 5.1c: Size and log Size Histogram (with normal curves) 2009 
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Figure 5.1d: Size and log Size Histogram (with normal curves) Pooled 
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Table 5.2: Predictor Variables by Country: ANOVA  
Predictor 
variables Country N Mean F Sig. 
Size   Indonesia 150 595,770,000 
4.186 .006* 
Australia 150 1,143,400,000 
Malaysia 150 557,920,000 
Singapore 150 862,530,000 
Total 600 789,900,000 
ManOwn Indonesia 150 .0232 
22.205 .000* 
Australia 150 .1584 
Malaysia 150 .1271 
Singapore 150 .1691 
Total 600 .1194 
BoardInd Indonesia 150 .3999 
2.102 .099*** 
Australia 150 .4021 
Malaysia 150 .4514 
Singapore 150 .4219 
Total 600 .4188 
AgeBus   Indonesia 150 42.9400 
12.665 .000* 
Australia 150 29.8800 
Malaysia 150 27.0400 
Singapore 150 25.9000 
Total 600 31.4400 
Lev   Indonesia 150 .5771 
10.256 .000* 
Australia 150 .4037 
Malaysia 150 .4439 
Singapore 150 .4378 
Total 600 .4656 
Prof   Indonesia 150 .0594 
16.230 .000* 
Australia 150 -.1224 
Malaysia 150 .0492 
Singapore 150 .0221 
Total 600 .0021 
*highly significant at 1% level, **significant at 5% level, *** moderately significant at 10% level 
 
 
To obtain a better understanding of the sample firms’ characteristics Table 
5.2 displays the results of one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) between 
continuous predictor variables and the four sample countries. There are 
111 
 
highly significant differences (p < 0.010) for firm size, managerial 
ownership, age of business, leverage, and profitability and a moderately 
significant difference (p < 0.100) for board independence. The findings 
show different characteristics of companies across countries. 
 
Table 5.2 descriptive analysis by country between the predictor variables 
shows that the highest firm size is in Australian manufacturing companies 
(1,143,400,000) and the lowest firm size is for Malaysian companies 
(557,920,000). The highest managerial ownership is in Singaporean 
manufacturing companies (16.91%) then Australian companies (15.84%) 
and then Malaysian companies (12.71%) with the lowest being Indonesian 
companies with a mean of 2.32%.   The highest board independence is in 
Malaysian companies (45.14%) and the lowest board independence is for 
Indonesian companies (39.99%). The age of business mean for 
Indonesian manufacturing companies is 42.94 years, this falls to 
Australian 29.88, Malaysian 27.04 and Singaporean 25.90 years. The 
highest company leverage is in Indonesian companies with a mean of 
57.71% and Australian companies have the lowest company leverage with 
a mean of 40.37%. Australian companies profit has the lowest average 
with a mean of -12.24% as compared with Indonesian companies with a 
higher mean 5.94%, Malaysian 4.92%, and Singaporean 2.21%.  
 
Post hoc Tukey analysis (see Appendix A.1) provides evidence that for 
firm size, Australian manufacturing listed firm size is significantly higher 
than Indonesian and Malaysian. For managerial ownership, Indonesian 
manufacturing listed companies is statistically lower than all three other 
countries’ manufacturing listed companies.  Appendix A.1 also shows that 
Indonesian age of business is significantly higher than the three other 
countries. Indonesian manufacturing listed companies leverage is 
significantly higher than three other countries companies’ leverage. 
Finally, Australian companies’ profit mean is statistically significantly lower 
than all three other sample countries.  
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Table 5.3: Predictor Variables by Year: ANOVA 
Predictor 
variables Year N Mean F Sig. 
Size   2007 200 689,310,000 
.617 .540 
2008 200 813,310,000 
2009 200 867,080,000 
Total 600 789,900,000 
ManOwn  2007 200 .1284 
.366 .694 
2008 200 .1145 
2009 200 .1154 
Total 600 .1194 
BoardInd   2007 200 .4061 
.675 .510 
2008 200 .4210 
2009 200 .4293 
Total 600 .4188 
AgeBus  2007 200 30.4400 
.258 .772 
2008 200 31.4400 
2009 200 32.4400 
Total 600 31.4400 
Lev   2007 200 .4610 
.533 .587 
2008 200 .4829 
2009 200 .4531 
Total 600 .4656 
Prof   2007 200 .0238 
1.401 .247 
2008 200 -.0207 
2009 200 .0030 
Total 600 .0021 
*highly significant at 1% level, **significant at 5% level, *** moderately significant at 10% level 
 
 
Table 5.3 provides the result of ANOVA by year. Comparing the mean of 
firm characteristic predictor variables within a year reveals that none differ 
significantly (p > 0.100). The findings show a similar trend from each 
predictor variables from 2007 to 2009. Table 5.3 also displays that the 
highest leverage level is in 2008 and the lowest level of profit occurs in 
2008. Post hoc Tukey for each year between the predictor variables (see 
Appendix A.2) shows that there is no statistically significant predictor 
variables (size, managerial ownership, board independence, leverage, 
profit, age of business) in 2007, 2008 or 2009. 
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Table 5.4: Predictor Variables by Country and Year: ANOVA 
Panel A 2007 
Predictor 
variables Country N Mean F Sig. 
Size  2007 Indonesia 50 527.860.000 
1.183 .317 
Australia 50 930.220.000 
Malaysia 50 486.670.000 
Singapore 50 812.490.000 
Total 200 689.310.000 
ManOwn 
2007 
Indonesia 50 .0295 
7.945 .000* 
Australia 50 .1809 
Malaysia 50 .1228 
Singapore 50 .1805 
Total 200 .1284 
BoardInd 
2007 
Indonesia 50 .3856 
.875 .455 
Australia 50 .3872 
Malaysia 50 .4428 
Singapore 50 .4088 
Total 200 .4061 
AgeBus  
2007 
Indonesia 50 41.9400 
4.169 .007* 
Australia 50 28.8800 
Malaysia 50 26.0400 
Singapore 50 24.9000 
Total 200 30.4400 
Lev  2007 Indonesia 50 .5706 
4.252 .006* 
Australia 50 .3930 
Malaysia 50 .4262 
Singapore 50 .4541 
Total 200 .4610 
Prof  2007 Indonesia 50 .0564 
4.365 .005* 
Australia 50 -.0772 
Malaysia 50 .0439 
Singapore 50 .0722 
Total 200 .0238 
*highly significant at 1% level, **significant at 5% level, *** moderately significant at 10% level 
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Panel B 2008 
Predictor 
variables Country N Mean F Sig. 
Size  2008 Indonesia 50 521.970.000 2.304 .078*** 
Australia 50 1.314.500.000 
Malaysia 50 554.020.000 
Singapore 50 862.770.000 
Total 200 813.310.000 
ManOwn 
2008 
Indonesia 50 .0134 
8.369 .000* 
Australia 50 .1504 
Malaysia 50 .1296 
Singapore 50 .1644 
Total 200 .1145 
BoardInd 
2008 
Indonesia 50 .3864 
.992 .398 
Australia 50 .4174 
Malaysia 50 .4544 
Singapore 50 .4258 
Total 200 .4210 
AgeBus  
2008 
Indonesia 50 42.9400 
4.169 .007* 
Australia 50 29.8800 
Malaysia 50 27.0400 
Singapore 50 25.9000 
Total 200 31.4400 
Lev  2008 Indonesia 50 .5971 
3.173 .025** 
Australia 50 .4259 
Malaysia 50 .4598 
Singapore 50 .4486 
Total 200 .4829 
Prof  2008 Indonesia 50 .0325 
2.931 .035** 
Australia 50 -.1295 
Malaysia 50 .0417 
Singapore 50 -.0274 
Total 200 -.0207 
*highly significant at 1% level, **significant at 5% level, *** moderately significant at 10% level 
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Panel C 2009 
Predictor 
variables Country N Mean F Sig. 
Size  2009 Indonesia 50 737.490.000 
.938 .423 
Australia 50 1.185.400.000 
Malaysia 50 633.080.000 
Singapore 50 912.320.000 
Total 200 867.080.000 
ManOwn 
2009 
Indonesia 50 .0265 
6.069 .001* 
Australia 50 .1438 
Malaysia 50 .1288 
Singapore 50 .1626 
Total 200 .1154 
BoardInd 
2009 
Indonesia 50 .4276 
.595 .619 
Australia 50 .4016 
Malaysia 50 .4570 
Singapore 50 .4310 
Total 200 .4293 
AgeBus  
2009 
Indonesia 50 43.9400 
4.169 .007* 
Australia 50 30.8800 
Malaysia 50 28.0400 
Singapore 50 26.9000 
Total 200 32.4400 
Lev  2009 Indonesia 50 .5637 
3.147 .026** 
Australia 50 .3922 
Malaysia 50 .4456 
Singapore 50 .4108 
Total 200 .4531 
Prof  2009 Indonesia 50 .0892 
16.401 .000* 
Australia 50 -.1606 
Malaysia 50 .0618 
Singapore 50 .0216 
Total 200 .0030 
*highly significant at 1% level, **significant at 5% level, *** moderately significant at 10% level 
 
 
Table 5.4 (Panels A – C) document the analyses of the descriptive 
statistics and ANOVA testing by country and year between the predictor 
variables. For each year Table 5.4 shows a different trend. In 2007, there 
are statistical significant differences (p < 0.010) for managerial ownership, 
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age of business, leverage, and profitability. In 2008, there are significant 
differences (p < 0.010) for managerial ownership, and age of business; 
significant differences (p < 0.050) for leverage, and profitability; and 
moderate significant differences (p < 0.100) for firm size. In 2009, 
managerial ownership, age of business, and profitability are statistically 
significant different (p < 0.010) and leverage is significantly different (p < 
0.050). Overall, the findings show different characteristics of companies 
across years and countries. 
 
Post hoc Tukey (see Appendix A.3) further reveals that in 2007, 2008, and 
2009 Indonesian manufacturing listed companies managerial ownership is 
significantly lower than all three other countries. The control variable 
analysis shows that Indonesia companies age of business is significantly 
higher than the three other countries in 2007, 2008, and 2009. In 2007, 
Indonesian companies’ leverage is significantly different from Australian 
and Malaysian firms. The higher leverage level in 2007 rests with 
Indonesian companies with a mean 57.06% this is followed by 
Singaporean companies (45.41%) and then Malaysian (42.62%) and 
Australian companies’ 2007 leverage is the lowest level with a mean of 
39.30% (see Table 5.4 panel A). Australian leverage increases in 2008 
and decreases in 2009 with means of 42.59% and 39.22% (Table 5.4 
panels A and B). Respectively Australian companies profit figure is 
statistically significant lower than all three other countries. In 2008 
Australian companies’ profit drop and are significantly lower than 
Malaysian firms. Moreover, in 2009 Australian companies’ profits are 
significantly lower than the three other countries.    
 
5.3  Descriptive statistics (RDI)  
As outlined in previous chapters, the extent of risk disclosure is measured 
in each of the three key GFC years (2007, 2008 and 2009) and pooled 
sample data, from which a voluntary Risk Disclosure Index score (RDI) is 
created for each period. The RDI comprises 34 items categorized into five 
key sub-categories of voluntary risk information disclosure, namely: (i) 
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business; (ii) strategy; (iii) operating; (iv) market; and (v) credit risk 
disclosure.  
The descriptive statistics for the dependent variable by year in Figure 5.2 
shows that overall RDI scores over the economically-challenging GFC 
time period is 33.73%. One third of all key risk items are communicated on 
average. This figure rises every year ranging from 31.46% in 2007, 
34.20% in 2008, and 35.54% in 2009.   
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5.4  Univariate Analysis: T-Test and ANOVA with RDI and Five 
Sub-Categories of RDI 
Table 5.5 displays the different RDI means between the 460 profit 
companies and 140 loss companies in term of companies’ 
communication level of risk disclosure (mean of 28.13 - 31.54% for loss 
companies, and RDI mean of 32.27 - 36.80% for profit companies). Table 
5.5 extends the analysis by presenting the independent sample test 
between profit companies and loss companies in 2007, 2008, 2009 and 
also in the pooled data on RDI disclosure levels. There are significant 
differences on RDI levels between profit companies and loss companies 
in 2007, 2008, 2009 and also in the pooled data. Specifically, the t-test 
for equality of means demonstrates that there are statistically significant 
differences on the level of RDI in 2007 (p-value = 0.020), 2008 (p-value = 
0.000), 2009 (p-value = 0.003), and pooled data (p-value = 0.000). The 
results show a high level of differences between profit companies and 
loss companies on risk disclosure levels throughout the GFC period. 
Profit companies consistently have higher risk communication.    
 
Table 5.5: Profit / Loss T-Test for RDI: 2007, 2008, 2009 and Pooled Data 
Company 
Performance N RDI Std Deviation T-value Sig 
2007 
loss companies 39 .2813 .08591 -2.344 .020** 
profit companies 161 .3227 .10178   
2008 
loss companies 53 .2921 .10199 -4.063 .000* 
profit companies 147 .3600 .10516   
2009 
loss companies 48 .3154 .08958 -3.038 .003* 
profit companies 152 .3680 .10882   
Pooled data 
loss companies 140 .2971 .09390 -5.231 .000* 
profit companies 460 .3496 .10689   
*highly significant at 1% level, **significant at 5% level, *** moderately significant at 10% level 
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Table 5.6: RDI by Country ANOVA 
Dependent 
Variable 
Country N Mean F Sig. 
RDI 
Indonesia 150 .3020 
11.907 .000* 
Australia 150 .3324 
Malaysia 150 .3730 
Singapore 150 .3406 
Total 600 .3370 
*highly significant at 1% level, **significant at 5% level, *** moderately significant at 10% level 
 
The ANOVA test (Table 5.6) provides evidence that there is significant 
difference (p<0.010) in RDI in the annual reports based on country (F = 
11.907). Post hoc Tukey analysis by country between the RDI (see 
Appendix A.4) shows that RDI between Indonesian manufacturing listed 
companies and Malaysian manufacturing listed companies is statistically 
significantly different. Malaysian companies are higher than Indonesian. 
Table 5.6 (descriptive statistic) further reveals that the highest RDI is with 
Malaysian manufacturing listed companies (37.30%) followed by 
Singaporean companies (34.06%), then Australian companies (33.24%) 
with the lowest RDI being Indonesian companies with mean 30.20%. 
 
Table 5.7: RDI by Year ANOVA  
Dependent 
Variable 
Year N Mean F Sig. 
RDI 
2007 200 .3146 
7.832 .000* 
2008 200 .3420 
2009 200 .3554 
Total 600 .3373 
*highly significant at 1% level, **significant at 5% level, *** moderately significant at 10% level 
 
Table 5.7 highlights that in the three sample years, RDI increases. The 
ANOVA test in Table 5.7 reveals that there is significant difference 
(p<0.010) in disclosing RDI risk information over time (2007-2009). The 
analysis of Post hoc Tukey by year between the RDI (see Appendix A.5) 
notes that RDI 2007 is statistically significantly lower than RDI in 2008 
and 2009. 
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Table 5.8: RDI by Country and Year: ANOVA 
Panel A 2007 
Dependent 
Variable Country N Mean F Sig. 
RDI 2007 
Indonesia 50 .2746 
5.411 .001* 
Australia 50 .3112 
Malaysia 50 .3520 
Singapore 50 .3206 
Total 200 .3146 
Panel B 2008 
Dependent 
Variable Country N Mean F Sig. 
RDI 2008 
Indonesia 50 .3030 
4.168 .007* 
Australia 50 .3406 
Malaysia 50 .3774 
Singapore 50 .3470 
Total 200 .3420 
Panel C 2009 
Dependent 
Variable Country N Mean F Sig. 
RDI 2009 
Indonesia 50 .3292 
2.978 .033** 
Australia 50 .3474 
Malaysia 50 .3904 
Singapore 50 .3546 
Total 200 .3554 
*highly significant at 1% level, **significant at 5% level, *** moderately significant at 10% level 
 
 
Table 5.8 shows that there are significant differences (p<0.010 and p< 
0.050) for RDI per year (RDI 2007, 2008 and 2009) and country. Post 
hoc Tukey (see Appendix A.6) reveals that in 2007, 2008, and 2009 RDI 
in Indonesian manufacturing listed companies are statistically 
significantly lower than Malaysian manufacturing listed companies. Whilst 
there is a consistent steady increase over time in all countries 
manufacturing listed companies’ RDI scores that differ in each year (see 
Table 5.8). 
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Table 5.9: Risk Disclosure Index (RDI) (2007-2009) 
Risk Disclosure Items Pooled 2007 2008 2009 Trend 
Total Risk Disclosure Index (RDI) 25 33.73% 31.46% 34.20% 35.54% Rise 
Identifying , evaluating and  managing risksA 91.17% 88.00% 92.50% 93.00% Rises 
Future prospectsE 89.47% 90.00% 88.90% 89.50% Varies 
Major exchange rates used in the accountsE 88.50% 87.00% 89.00% 89.50% Rises 
Impact of strategyE 80.83% 80.00% 81.50% 81.00% Varies 
GAAP risks of the special purpose entityC 79.00% 78.00% 79.50% 79.50% Rises 
Provide consumer credit business C 78.97% 77.50% 78.50% 80.90% Rises 
Impact accounting policy changesE 62.17% 62.50% 62.00% 62.00% Fall 
External factors and  company’s prospectD 62.17% 45.00% 66.00% 75.50% Rises 
Internal control and the extent risk are acceptableA 60.33% 57.00% 64.00% 60.00% Fall 
Effects of disposalsE 58.17% 57.50% 58.50% 58.50% Rises 
Effects of acquisitionE 56.67% 56.00% 56.00% 58.00% Rises 
Impact of strategy on futureE 48.33% 43.00% 49.00% 53.00% Rises 
Safety policyE 46.67% 40.50% 48.50% 51.00% Rises 
Capital project committedE 43.00% 38.50% 39.50% 51.00% Rises 
Major regional economic developmentD 27.17% 23.50% 29.00% 29.00% Rises 
Effects of inflation on results—qualitative E 24.33% 19.00% 26.00% 28.00% Rises 
Internal control, including riskA 22.00% 19.50% 23.50% 23.00% Varies 
Risks and opportunities due to climate changeB 20.83% 16.00% 24.50% 22.00% Varies 
Committed expenditure for capital projectsE 19.50% 17.00% 18.50% 23.00% Rises 
Internal control and risksA 13.33% 11.50% 12.50% 16.00% Rises 
Extensions of creditC 13.00% 10.50% 11.00% 17.50% Rises 
Safety of productsE 12.67% 12.50% 12.50% 13.00% Rises 
Data on accidentsE 11.83% 11.00% 11.00% 13.50% Rises 
Risks related to corruptionB 9.17% 10.50% 7.00% 10.00% Varies 
Effects of inflation on future operation—qualitative E 8.67% 4.50% 12.00% 9.50% Varies 
Freedom of association riskB 8.00% 6.50% 8.00% 9.50% Rises 
Risk-control programs regarding serious diseasesB 6.17% 5.50% 7.00% 6.00% Varies 
Effects of inflation on results—quantitative E 4.50% 2.50% 5.00% 6.00% Rises 
Supplementary inflation adjusted financial statementD 2.00% 1.00% 3.00% 2.00% Varies 
Risk for child labour, and elimination of child labourB 1.17% 1.00% 1.50% 1.00% Varies 
Incidents of forced or compulsory labourB 0.67% 0.50% 1.00% 0.50% Varies 
Cost of safety measuresE 0.50% 0.50% 0.50% 0.50% Stable 
Effects of inflation on assets—qualitative E 0.33% 0.50% 0.00% 0.50% Varies 
Effects of inflation on assets—quantitative E 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% None 
Legend: A  = (Adapted from Turnbull report, 1999), B  = (Adapted from Global report Initiative (GRI) 2006), C  
= (Adapted from Sarbanes-OxleyAct of 2002, SEC 401), D = (Adapted from the voluntary disclosure 
instrument (VDIS), Ho 2009), E  = (Adapted from Voluntary Disclosure Checklist, Gray, Meek, and Roberts, 
1995). 
                                               
25 Eight (8) items are considered mandatory because of mandatory risk disclosure IASB 
and IFRS regulations and the mandatory risk disclosure countries rules in Indonesia, Malaysia, 
Singapore and Australia and removed. 1. A sound system of internal control, deliberation should 
include the nature and extent of the risks A. 2.The system of internal control should be capable of 
responding quickly to evolving risksA. 3.Directly or indirectly, including through any subsidiary, to 
extend or maintain credit, in the form of a personal loan to or for any director or executive officer 
of that issuer C. 4. Effect of foreign currency fluctuations on current result-qualitativeD. 5. Effect of 
foreign currency fluctuations on future result-qualitativeD;.6. Effect of interest rate on current 
resultsD. 7. Effect of interest rate on future resultsD. 8. Made or provided in the ordinary course of 
the consumer credit business of such issuer; of a type that is generally made available by such 
issuer to the public C. See Chapter 4 for more details. 
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Table 5.9 reveals vast disparities of communication across the various 
risk elements. Table 5.9 shows that the highest and the lowest risk 
disclosure are: 
 
• Item “Identifying, evaluating and managing significant risks” has the 
highest level of communication (91.17%); and  
• “Effects of inflation on assets quantitative’’ is the lowest item with no 
disclosure (0 %). 
 
Table 5.9 also notes trends over time:  
These items are rising across three years:  
• Identifying, evaluating and  managing risks; Major exchange rates 
used in the accounts; GAAP risks of the special purpose entity; 
Provide consumer credit business; Specific external factors 
affecting company’s prospect;  Effects of disposals; Effects of 
acquisition; Impact of strategy on future; Safety policy; Capital 
project committed; Major regional economic development; Effects of 
inflation on results—qualitative; Committed expenditure for capital 
projects; Internal control and impact of risks that do materialize; 
Extensions of credit; Safety of products; Data on accidents; 
Freedom of association risk; Effects of inflation on results—
quantitative. 
 
These items are falling across 2007-2009: 
• Impact accounting policy changes ; and Internal control and the 
extant risk are acceptable. 
 
Other trends of RDI items according to Table 5.9 are: 
• The following items vary across the three sample years: Future 
prospects ; Impact of strategy; Internal control, deliberation include 
the likelihood of risk; Risks and opportunities due to climate change; 
Risks related to corruption; Effects of inflation on future operation—
qualitative; Risk-control programs regarding serious diseases;  
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Supplementary inflation adjusted financial; Risk for child labour, and 
elimination of child labour; Incidents of forced or compulsory labour; 
Effects of inflation on assets—qualitative; and 
• Stable across three years are: Cost of safety measures;  and 
Effects of inflation on assets—quantitative with no disclosure across 
three years.  
 
5.4.1  Descriptive Statistics (5 Major subRDI)  
Table 5.10 notes that the overall RDI scores over the economically-
challenging GFC time period is 33.73%. One third of all key risk items are 
communicated on average. This figure rises a bit every year ranging from 
31.46% in 2007, 34.20% in 2008, and 35.54% in 2009.   
 
Table 5.10 reveals sub-categories trends. Operating risk disclosure 
(45.70-48.10%), business risk (44.55-48.73%) and credit risk (44.00-
49.00%) are by far the highest sub-categories of risk disclosed over time, 
while market risk (16.24-19.27%) and strategy risk (13.81-19.50%) are 
consistently far lower. 
 
Table 5.10: Five sub Categories of Risk Disclosure Index  
 Pooled 
(%) 
2007 
(%) 
2008 
(%) 
2009 
(%) 
Trend 
Operating Risk 
 
47.37 
 
45.70 
 
48.30 
 
48.10 
 
Varies 
Business Risk 
 
46.55 
 
44.55 
 
46.38 
 
48.73 
 
Rises 
Credit Risk 
 
45.92 
 
44.00 
 
44.75 
 
49.00 
 
Rises 
Market Risk 
 
18.24 
 
16.24 
 
19.21 
 
19.27 
 
Rises 
Strategy Risk 
 
17.21 
 
13.81 
 
18.32 
 
19.50 
 
Rises 
Risk Disclosure 
Index (RDI) 33.73 31.46 34.20 35.54 Rises 
 
Figure 5.3 illustrates that these risk communication categories change 
over time. The lowest scores for all risk disclosure sub-categories’ is in 
2007; the earliest year of the crisis that affected companies. Business, 
credit, market, and strategy risk increase relatively consistently over the 
three year period, the highest averages are witnessed in 2009. For 
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operating risk sub-categories’ the highest scores are communicated in 
2008. 
 
 
 
5.4.2 Univariate Analysis (Five Major subRDI): Country and Year 
Further sub-category analysis has been conducted. ANOVA of the five 
sub categories of RDI (Table 5.11) by country reveals that ‘business risk’ 
(BRDI), ‘strategy risk’ (SRDI), ‘operating risk’ (ORDI), and ‘market risk’ 
(MRDI) have statistically significant country differences (p<0.010).  
 
Post hoc Tukey Tables (see Appendix A.7) reveals that: 
• Indonesian companies BRDI are significantly lower with all three 
other countries companies’ BRDI score;  
• Australian companies’ BRDI are significantly higher than 
Singaporean companies’ BRDI; 
• Indonesian and Malaysian companies’ SRDI are significantly 
higher than Singaporean and Australian companies’ SRDI; 
• Indonesian companies’ ORDI are significantly lower with all three 
other countries companies’ ORDI; and  
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• Finally, Australian companies MRDI is significantly lower with all 
three other countries companies MRDI. 
 
Then year-by-year analysis of ANOVA (Table 5.12) is conducted with the 
five sub categories of RDI. The findings reveals that ‘strategy risk’ (SRDI) 
and ‘market risk’ (MRDI) are significantly different (p<0.010) across the 
three year sample period and ‘business risk’ (BRDI) is moderately 
significant different over time with p<0.100).   
 
Post hoc Tukey (see Appendix A.8) highlights further details noting that 
BRDI 2007 is significantly lower with BRDI 2009, SRDI 2007 is 
significantly lower than SRDI 2008 and 2009. MRDI 2007 is significantly 
lower with MRDI 2008 and 2009. Finally, ORDI and CRDI scores are not 
statistically different over the three year GFC period. 
 
 
Table.5.11: Descriptive and ANOVA Five sub RDI by Country  
Panel A      Descriptive Statistics (mean)                 
Country BRDI SRDI ORDI MRDI CRDI 
Indonesia .4016 .2148 .2867 .1945 .4800 
Australia .5171 .1176 .4667 .1544 .4100 
Malaysia .4806 .2034 .6160 .1921 .4700 
Singapore .4627 .1525 .5253 .1885 .4767 
Total .4655 .1721 .4737 .1824 .4592 
Panel B  One-way ANOVA 
 BRDI SRDI ORDI MRDI CRDI 
F 11.790 18.152 65.979 4.476 2.022 
Sig .000* .000* .000* .004* .110 
*highly significant at 1% level, **significant at 5% level, *** moderately significant at 10% 
level, N for each country = 150, N total = 600 
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Table 5.12: Descriptive and ANOVA Five sub RDI by Year 
Panel A      Descriptive Statistics (mean)                                           
Year BRDI SRDI ORDI MRDI CRDI 
2007 .4455 .1381 .4570 .1624 .4400 
2008 .4637 .1832 .4830 .1921 .4475 
2009 .4873 .1950 .4810 .1927 .4900 
Total .4655 .1721 .4737 .1824 .4592 
Panel B  One-way ANOVA 
 BRDI SRDI ORDI MRDI CRDI 
F 2.839 10.086 .719 5.053 1.791 
Sig .059*** .000* .488 .007* .168 
 
*highly significant at 1% level, **significant at 5% level, *** moderately significant at  
10 % level, N for each year = 200, N total = 600 
 
 
 
Another layer of analysis is added by looking at ANOVA by country by 
year between the five sub categories of RDI. Table 5.13 shows that there 
are significant differences: 
• (p<0.010)  for BRDI 2007, SRDI 2007, ORDI 2007, SRDI 2008, 
ORDI 2008, SRDI 2009, ORDI 2009;  
• (p<0.050) for BRDI 2008, BRDI 2009, MRDI 2009;  
• and there are also moderate significant differences (p<0.100) for 
MRDI 2007) subcategories of RDI. 
 
Post hoc Tukey analysis (see Appendix A.9) helps to further explain the 
Table 5.13 results by revealing that in 2007 Indonesian companies’ BRDI 
are significantly lower than all three other countries companies’ BRDI. In 
2008 and 2009 Indonesian companies’ BRDI are only significantly  lower 
than Australian companies’ BRDI. In 2007, Indonesian and Malaysian 
companies’ SRDI are significantly higher than Singaporean and 
Australian companies’ SRDI. In 2008 and 2009 only Australian 
companies are significantly lower than Indonesian and Malaysian 
companies’ SRDI. In 2007, 2008, 2009 Indonesian companies’ ORDI are 
significantly lower than all three other countries companies’ ORDI. In 
2007 and 2009 Indonesian companies’ MRDI are significantly higher than 
Australian companies MRDI. 
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Table.5.13: RDI Five Sub Categories by Country by Year: ANOVA 
Panel A      Descriptive Statistics (mean) 
Country BRDI 2007 
SRDI 
2007 
ORDI 
2007 
MRDI 
2007 
CRDI 
2007 
BRDI 
2008 
SRDI 
2008 
ORDI 
2008 
MRDI 
2008 
CRDI 
2008 
BRDI 
2009 
SRDI 
2009 
ORDI 
2009 
MRDI 
2009 
CRDI 
2009 
Indonesia .3584 .1920 .2640 .1908 .4300 .4132 .2126 .2920 .1818 .4600 .4332 .2398 .3040 .2110 .5500 
Australia .5078 .0770 .4280 .1418 .3900 .5136 .1302 .4840 .1710 .4100 .5298 .1456 .4880 .1504 .4300 
Malaysia .4648 .1682 .6160 .1554 .4700 .4736 .2262 .6080 .2108 .4500 .5034 .2158 .6240 .2102 .4900 
Singapore .4508 .1152 .5200 .1614 .4700 .4546 .1636 .5480 .2048 .4700 .4828 .1788 .5080 .1992 .4900 
Total .4455 .1381 .4570 .1623 .4400 .4638 .1832 .4830 .1921 .4475 .4873 .1950 .4810 .1927 .4900 
Panel B  One-way ANOVA 
 BRDI 
2007 
SRDI 
2007 
ORDI 
2007 
MRDI 
2007 
CRDI 
2007 
BRDI 
2008 
SRDI 
2008 
ORDI 
2008 
MRDI 
2008 
CRDI 
2008 
BRDI 
2009 
SRDI 
2009 
ORDI 
2009 
MRDI 
2009 
CRDI 
2009 
F 6.843 10.050 27.147 2.546 .954 2.793 5.393 22.317 1.300 .435 2.907 4.782 17.846 3.154 1.374 
Sig .000* .000* .000* .057*** .415 .042** .001* .000* .276 .728 .036** .003* .000* .026** .252 
*highly significant at 1% level, **significant at 5% level, *** moderately significant at 10 % level, N for each year = 200, N total = 600 
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Table 5.14: Five major sub Risk Disclosure Indices (RDI) (2007-2009) 
Risk Disclosure Items Pooled 2007 2008 2009 
 
 
Total Risk Disclosure Index (RDI) 33.73% 31.46% 34.20% 35.54% 
 
Business Risk 46.55% 44.55% 46.38% 48.73% 
Identifying , evaluating and  managing risksA 91.17% 88.00% 92.50% 93.00% 
Future prospectsE 89.47% 90.00% 88.90% 89.50% 
Impact of strategyE 80.83% 80.00% 81.50% 81.00% 
Effects of disposalsE 58.17% 57.50% 58.50% 58.50% 
Effects of acquisitionE 56.67% 56.00% 56.00% 58.00% 
Impact of strategy on futureE 48.33% 43.00% 49.00% 53.00% 
Safety policyE 46.67% 40.50% 48.50% 51.00% 
Capital project committedE 43.00% 38.50% 39.50% 51.00% 
Committed expenditure for capital projectsE 19.50% 17.00% 18.50% 23.00% 
Safety of productsE 12.67% 12.50% 12.50% 13.00% 
Data on accidentsE 11.83% 11.00% 11.00% 13.50% 
Cost of safety measuresE 0.50% 0.50% 0.50% 0.50% 
 
Strategy Risk 17.21% 13.81% 18.32% 19.50% 
External factors and company’s prospectD 62.17% 45.00% 66.00% 75.50% 
Major regional economic developmentD 27.17% 23.50% 29.00% 29.00% 
Risks and opportunities due to climate changeB 20.83% 16.00% 24.50% 22.00% 
Risks related to corruptionB 9.17% 10.50% 7.00% 10.00% 
Freedom of association riskB 8.00% 6.50% 8.00% 9.50% 
Risk-control programs regarding serious diseasesB 6.17% 5.50% 7.00% 6.00% 
Risk for child labour, and elimination of child labourB 1.17% 1.00% 1.50% 1.00% 
Incidents of forced or compulsory labourB 0.67% 0.50% 1.00% 0.50% 
 
Operating Risk 47.37% 45.70% 48.30% 48.10% 
GAAP risks of the special purpose entityC 79.00% 78.00% 79.50% 79.50% 
Impact accounting policy changesE 62.17% 62.50% 62.00% 62.00% 
Internal control and the extent risk are acceptableA 60.33% 57.00% 64.00% 60.00% 
Internal control  including  riskA 22.00% 19.50% 23.50% 23.00% 
Internal control and risks A 13.33% 11.50% 12.50% 16.00% 
 
Market Risk 18.24% 16.24% 19.21% 19.27% 
Major exchange rates used in the accountsE 88.50% 87.00% 89.00% 89.50% 
Effects of inflation on results—qualitative E 24.33% 19.00% 26.00% 28.00% 
Effects of inflation on future operation—qualitative E 8.67% 4.50% 12.00% 9.50% 
Effects of inflation on results—quantitative E 4.50% 2.50% 5.00% 6.00% 
Supplementary inflation adjusted financial statementD 2.00% 1.00% 3.00% 2.00% 
Effects of inflation on assets—qualitative E 0.33% 0.50% 0.00% 0.50% 
Effects of inflation on assets—quantitative E 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
 
Credit Risk 45.92% 44.00% 44.75% 49.00% 
Provide consumer credit business C 78.97% 77.50% 78.50% 80.90% 
Extensions of creditC 13.00% 10.50% 11.00% 17.50% 
Legend: A  = Adapted from Turnbull Report (1999), B  = Adapted from Global Report 
Initiative (GRI) (2006), C  = Adapted from Sarbanes-OxleyAct of 2002, SEC 401, D = 
Adapted from the Voluntary Disclosure Instrument (VDIS), Ho (2009), and E  = Adapted 
from Voluntary Disclosure Checklist (VDC), Gray, Meek, and Roberts, (1995). 
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Overall, Table 5.14 reveals vast disparities of communication across the 
various risk elements. Table 5.14 shows that the highest and the lowest 
risk disclosure along the five sub major risk categories are: 
 
• The business risk disclosure item “Identifying, evaluating and 
managing significant risks” is the highest level of communication 
(91.17%), while “Cost of safety measures” is the lowest reported item 
(0.50%);  
 
• For the strategy risk category, “Specific external factors affecting 
company’s prospect” is the highest item (62.17%), while “Incidents of 
forced or compulsory labour” is the lowest item (0.67%);  
 
• For the operating risk category, “GAAP risks of the special purpose 
entity” is the highest item (79.0%), while “A sound system of internal 
control, to reduce the incidence and impact of risks that do 
materialize” is the lowest item (13.33%);  
 
• For the market risk category, “Major exchange rates used in the 
accounts” is the highest item (88.50%) and “Effects of inflation on 
assets quantitative’’ is the lowest item with absolutely no (0 %) 
disclosure; and  
 
• For the credit risk category. Index “Provided consumer credit 
business” is most disclosed (78.97%) and “Extensions of 
credit”(13.0%) the least disclosed.      
 
5.5 Summary 
This chapter presents a discussion of descriptive statistics, Independent t-
test, ANOVA and Post hoc Tukey analysis relating to the dependent 
variable and possible predictor variables. The analysis undertaken 
provides evidence that there are rising levels of risk disclosure (31.46%-
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35.54%) in the annual report of manufacturing listed companies in 
Australia, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore over the 2007-2009 GFC 
periods. The risk disclosures do vary across countries. The highest RDI is 
with Malaysian manufacturing listed companies (37.30%) follow by 
Singaporean companies (34.06%), then Australian companies (33.24%) 
with the lowest RDI being Indonesian companies with a mean of 30.20%. 
There is a consistent steady increase over time all countries 
manufacturing listed companies’ RDI scores differ in each year. Five sub-
categories of risk disclosure trends show that operating risk disclosure 
(45.70-48.10%), business risk (44.55-48.73%) and credit risk (44.00-
49.00%) are by far the highest sub-categories of risk disclosed over time, 
while market risk (16.24-19.27%) and strategy risk (13.81-19.50%) are 
consistently far lower. There are also high level differences between profit 
companies and loss companies on risk disclosure levels throughout the 
GFC period. Profit companies disclose more risk information than loss 
companies. 
  
The next chapter reports the statistical analysis and the testing of the 
independent variable predictors hypothesized to be associated with risk 
disclosure patterns (Chapter 6). Chapter 7 then documents the finding of 
the additional analysis conducted. Finally, Chapter 8 concludes the thesis 
with a summary of key findings, limitations and assumptions, implications 
and suggestions for future research. 
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CHAPTER 6 
MULTIVARIATE STATISTICS 
 
6.1  Introduction 
Chapter 6 reports the multivariate testing of hypotheses. The statistical 
analysis focuses on the independent and control predictor variables 
hypothesized to be associated with voluntary risk disclosure patterns. The 
tests involve use of Ordinary Least Square (OLS) regression modeling 
with the risk disclosure index as the dependent variable in relation to the 
possible predictor variables.  
 
This thesis examines the relationship between four independent variables 
(country, company size, managerial ownership, board independence), four 
control variables (profitability, leverage, auditor, age of business), and the 
dependent variable (risk disclosure index). 
 
Multivariate testing helps to better understand the different between the 
associations in three different years: (1) 2007 Global Financial Crisis 
(GFC) year; (2) 2008 GFC year; and (3) 2009 GFC year. 
 
6.2  Multivariate Regression Models 
Multivariate models are constructed to consider the simultaneous effects 
of the independent and control variables on the RDI as the dependent 
variable. The multivariate regression model tests the cross-sectional 
(within each year) associations between RDI and the predictor variables. 
For each year observation, an estimate of the regression equation is as 
follows: 
 
RDIjt = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 CTYjt + 𝛽2 Sizejt + 𝛽3 ManOwnjt + 𝛽4 BoardIndjt + 𝛽5 Levjt + 𝛽6 
Profjt + 𝛽7 Audjt + 𝛽8 AgeBusjt + ε jt 
Where: 
Dependent variable: 
RDIjt   = risk disclosure index for company j in year t; 
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Independent variables: 
CTYjt  = country for company j in year t; 
Sizejt  = company size for company j in year t; 
ManOwnjt = managerial ownership for company j in year t; 
BoardIndjt = board independent for company j in year t; 
Control variables: 
Levjt  = leverage for company j in year t; 
Profjt  = profit for company j in year t; 
Audjt  = auditor for company j in year t; 
Agejt  = age of business for company j in year t; 
𝛽0  = intercept; 
𝛽1-8  = estimated coefficient for each item; 
ε jt  = error term 
 
 
6.3  Correlation Analysis and Model Validity 
Before going on to the regression analysis, the validity of the models is 
assessed. The multicollinearity statistical problem is one of the potential 
issues in multivariate analysis.  Multicollinearity happens when there is a 
high multiple correlations between the independent variables. A correlation 
coefficient between independent variables of 0.8 or higher is often the 
benchmark score for multicollinearity concern (Cooke 1989; Gujarati 
1995). 
 
Table 6.1 (Panels A – D) reveal that the highest correlation is less than 0.8 
in 2007, 2008, 2009 and pooled data. The highest value in 2007 is 0.389, 
2008 is 0.365, 2009 is 0.352 and pooled data is 0.369. Given this ‘low’ 
correlation in each year’s data, concerns about multicollinearity between 
independent and control variables are not significant  for the 2007, 2008, 
2009, and pooled years’ data. 
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Table 6.1: Pearson Correlation RDI Pooled Data 
Panel A Pooled RDI pooled 
CTY 
pooled 
Size 
pooled 
ManOwn 
pooled 
BoardInd 
pooled 
Lev 
pooled 
Prof 
pooled 
Aud 
pooled 
AgeBus 
pooled 
RDI pooled 1.000         
CTY pooled .164* 1.000        
Size pooled .244* -.002 1.000       
ManOwn pooled -.131* .250* -.172* 1.000      
BoardInd pooled .197* .064* .247* -.109* 1.000     
Lev pooled -.012 -.141* .146* -.147* .120* 1.000    
Prof pooled .184* .025 .263* -.020 .052 -.017 1.000   
Aud pooled -.220* -.301* -.321* .114* -.245* .037 -.153* 1.000  
AgeBus pooled .106* -.217* .318* -.369* .117* .257* .134* -.249* 1.000 
*highly significant at 1% level, **significant at 5% level, *** moderately significant at 10% level 
 
 
Table 6.1: Pearson Correlation RDI 2007 
Panel B 2007 RDI 2007 
CTY 
2007 
Size 
2007 
ManOwn 
2007 
BoardInd 
2007 
Lev 
2007 
Prof 
2007 
Aud 
2007 
AgeBus 
2007 
RDI 2007 1.000         
CTY .200* 1.000        
Size 2007 .232* .005 1.000       
ManOwn 2007 -.171* .235* -.198* 1.000      
BoardInd 2007 .234* .070 .232* -.125* 1.000     
Lev 2007 -.013 -.131* .184* -.190* .131* 1.000    
Prof 2007 .180* .080 .364* -.002 .064 -.210* 1.000   
Aud 2007 -.278* -.298* -.339* .161* -.179* .013 -.200* 1.000  
AgeBus 2007 .153* -.217* .328* -.389* .141* .284* .142* -.259* 1.000 
*highly significant at 1% level, **significant at 5% level, *** moderately significant at 10% level 
 
Table 6.1: Pearson Correlation RDI 2008 
Panel C 2008 RDI 2008 
CTY 
2008 
Size 
2008 
ManOwn 
2008 
BoardInd 
2008 
Lev 
2008 
Prof 
2008 
Aud 
2008 
AgeBus 
2008 
RDI 2008 1.000         
CTY .175* 1.000        
Size 2008 .280* .007 1.000       
ManOw 2008 -.135* .273* -.154* 1.000      
BoardIn 2008 .240* .088 .251* -.051 1.000     
Lev 2008 -.016 -.148* .137* -.143* .102** 1.000    
Prof 2008 .189* -.003 .224* -.008 -.007 -.004 1.000   
Aud 2008 -.222* -.312* -.294* .090 -.264* .032 -.086 1.000  
AgeBus 2008 .094** -.217* .308* -.365* .059 .279* .083 -.260* 1.000 
*highly significant at 1% level, **significant at 5% level, *** moderately significant at 10% level 
 
Table 6.1: Pearson Correlation RDI 2009 
Panel D 2009 RDI 2009 
CTY 
2009 
Size 
2009 
ManOwn 
2009 
BoardInd 
2009 
Lev 
2009 
Prof 
2009 
Aud 
2009 
AgeBus 
2009 
RDI 2009 1.000         
CTY .125* 1.000        
Size 2009 .221* -.019 1.000       
ManOw 2009 -.078 .243* -.161* 1.000      
BoardIn 2009 .109** .036 .254* -.143* 1.000     
Lev 2009 -.005 -.146* .124* -.114** .129* 1.000    
Prof 2009 .226* .010 .235* -.068 .137* .154* 1.000   
Aud 2009 -.169* -.294* -.329* .086 -.293* .067 -.217* 1.000  
AgeBus 2009 .063 -.217* .316* -.352* .145* .215* .214* -.230* 1.000 
*highly significant at 1% level, **significant at 5% level, *** moderately significant at 10% level 
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Table 6.1 (Panel A-D) also shows the Pearson Product-moment 
correlation coefficient for the continuous predictor variables including the 
independent and control variables in each year and aggregate data. 
 
The country incorporation is correlated with RDI in 2007, 2008, 2009 and 
pooled years. In all years, there is a positive and statistically significant (p 
< 0.010) correlation between country and the extent of voluntary risk 
disclosure, as measured by RDI. However, the strength of the correlation 
is below 0.2 for all periods.  
 
Log firm size (Size) is positively and statistically significantly (p < 0.010) 
correlated with RDI in all years. The value of the correlation coefficients 
between Size and RDI is below 0.3. The directionality of these correlations 
is consistent with that hypothesized (H2). 
 
There is a negative and statistically significant (p < 0.010) correlation 
between managerial ownership (ManOwn) and RDI in 2007, 2008, and the 
pooled data yet not statistically significant in 2009. The coefficients are all 
under 0.2. The directionality of these correlations is consistent with that 
hypothesized (H3). 
 
Board independence (BoardInd) as a proxy of corporate governance is 
correlated with RDI with positive and statistically significant (p < 0.010 ) in 
2007, 2008 and pooled years and positive and statistically significant (p < 
0.05) in 2009. The coefficients are all under 0.3. The directionality of these 
correlations is consistent with that hypothesized (H4). 
 
Table 6.1 (Panels A-D) then reports the correlation coefficient for the 
control variables. Leverage (Lev) is not correlated with RDI. Correlations 
between profit (Prof) as a control variable and RDI is positive and 
statistically significant (p < 0.010) in all years under study. The coefficients 
for profit are all under 0.3. Auditor (Aud) is a negative and statistically 
significantly (p < 0.010) correlated with RDI in all years with the 
coefficients under 0.3. Age of business (AgeBus) is correlated with RDI 
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with positive and statistically significant (p < 0.010) in 2007 and pooled 
data; positive and statistically significant (p < 0.050) in 2008; yet  AgeBus 
is not significant correlated with RDI in 2009. The AgeBus coefficients are 
all under 0.2. 
 
Table 6.2 looks at other key statistical issues. It shows that skewness ratio 
and kurtosis ratio is between -2 and +2, the distribution of data in 2007 is 
within the normal range (-0.020/0.172 = -0.116 (skewness ratio); 
0.114/0.342 = 0.333 (kurtosis ratio)). The distribution of data in 2008 is 
again in the normal range with the skewness ratio and kurtosis ratio 
between -2 and +2 (0.067/0.172 = 0.389 (skewness ratio); -0.056/0.342 = -
0.163 (kurtosis ratio)). Table 5.5 also reveals that the distribution of data in 
2009 is ‘normal’, skewness ratio and kurtosis ratio is between -2 and +2, (-
0.083/0.172 = -0.483 (skewness ratio); 0.293/0.342 = 0.857 (kurtosis 
ratio). The distribution of data for the entire pooled 600 firm-year data 
range is normal. The skewness ratio and kurtosis ratio is between -2 and 
+2 (0.008/0.100 = 0.080 (skewness ratio); 0.134/0.199 = 0.673 (kurtosis 
ratio). 
 
Table 6.2: Normality Test26 Regressions: 2007, 2008, 2009 and Pooled 
Data Sets 
 Skewness Kurtosis 
Statistic Std.Error Statistic Std.Error 
2007 
Unstardardized Residual 
n = 200 
-0.020 0.172 0.114 0.342 
2008 
Unstardardized Residual 
n = 200 
0.067 0.172 -0.056 0.342 
2009 
Unstardardized Residual 
n = 200 
-0.083 0.172 0.293 0.342 
Pooled year 
Unstardardized Residual 
n = 600 
0.008 0.100 0.134 0.199 
 
                                               
26 Histogram looking at normal curves in Figures 5.1a-d reveals that size is heavily 
skewed to the left. Consequently, firm size is recomputed as the natural log of total 
assets. 
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Overall, the diagnostics exploring the statistical assumptions as illustrated 
above provide evidence that the models are valid. 
 
6.4  RDI Reliability Check 
Independent evaluators, who are two established accounting academics 
based in the Asian Pacific region, have double checked the data set to 
better ensure reliability. Such additional testing helps control for 
subjectivity in the interpretation of the contents of Risk Disclosure Index 
(RDI). The two independent assessors are both knowledgeable 
accounting academics with corporate reporting expertise.  
 
The independent evaluators reviewed the annual reports of a sample of 60 
firm year annual reports data (representing 10% of the total sample size) 
and completed the scoring sheet of the index as a reliability check27.  The 
unweighted risk disclosure index scores of these independent evaluators 
are then compared with the researcher’s to ascertain if there are any 
statistically significant differences. A t-test for differences in mean from 
RDI scores is applied. The results are shown in Table 6.3.  
 
Table 6.3: Reliability Test of RDI Comparison 
 Mean t-test P (T<=t) two-tail 
2007 reports                       
Researcher 
Evaluators 
0.4045 
0.4075 -0.256 0.800 
2008 reports 
Researcher 
Evaluators 
0.4425 
0.4315 1.466 0.159 
2009 reports 
Researcher 
Evaluators 
0.4520 
0.4415 1.677 0.110 
All reports 
Researcher 
Evaluators 
0.4330 
0.4265 1.303 0.208 
Legend: n=60; Comparing the mean risk disclosure index scores (RDI) of both researcher 
and evaluators. The differences in scores are not statistically significant. This 
demonstrates a close agreement in scoring between the researcher and the evaluators. 
                                               
27  Krippendorff (1980) considers it desirable that at least two researchers do the 
analysis independently and compare results, as a reliability check.  
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Results of the Table 6.3 t-tests indicate that mean voluntary disclosure 
scores in each year are virtually the same and do not differ significant (p ≥ 
0.050) between the researcher and the independent evaluators. Based on 
measures undertaken, the subjectivity problem arising from the scoring 
procedure against the disclosure instrument is deemed inconsequential. 
The scores for the risk disclosure index are considered reliable. 
 
6.5  Multiple Regression Results: Hypotheses Testing 
Table 6.4 below illustrates the predictive power of the four OLS regression 
models from the 2007, 2008, 2009 data and also the entire pooled data 
set (2007-2009). 
 
All four models28 are robust (p-value < 0.010). In other words, the models 
suggest that there is enough evidence that the combination of country, 
company size, board independence, leverage, profitability, auditor and age 
of business significantly influence the level of risk disclosure. The value of 
the adjusted R-square score in 2007 is 14.1%, in 2008 it is 14.4%, in 2009 
it is a lower 6.8% and in the pooled model it is 12.8%. Key explanatory 
factors highlighted from the four regression models in Table 6.4 are:  
 
• All regressions except the 2009 regression model reveal that the 
country variable is statistically significant (p-value < 0.050 for 2007 
and 2009 regressions and p-value <0.010 for pooled regression). 
Thus, there is evidence to conclude that country is associated with the 
extent of risk disclosure. H1 is accepted.   
 
                                               
28 The problem of repeated measures in the pooled sample is taken into account. The key 
problem is lack of independence in the full sample. This thesis thus runs the regressions 
for each individual year to avoid the problem. The hypotheses testing for individual year 
2007, 2008, 2009 leads to the same conclusions as that of the pooled sample. Appendix 
H also shows the multiple regression analysis results using the pooled sample and 
control for years using dummy (categorical) variables. The results are almost identical 
with the main regression.  
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• Size is also statistically significant in three of the four regressions 
(except 2007) with positive coefficients throughout. Larger companies 
are communicating a higher level of risk data. Providing support for 
agency theory tenets, H2 is accepted.  
• Managerial ownership is statistically negatively related to risk 
disclosures in three of the four regressions (except 2009). Firms with 
lower levels of managerial ownership disclose more risk information. 
H3 is accepted. 
• Board independence is statistically positively significant in three of the 
four regressions (except 2009), leading to acceptance of H4 
(consistent with agency theory tenets). A higher percentage of 
independent board members seem to positively influence risk 
disclosures. 
• Profitability, as a control variable, is significant in three of the four 
regressions (except 2007). More profitability firms have higher levels 
of risk communication. 
• The others control variables are not significant predictors of the extent 
of risk disclosure during the 2007-2009 GFC time period. 
• Overall, the full pooled 60029 firm-year data consistently provides 
statistical evidence for acceptance of all four hypotheses H1-H4. 
                                               
29 This thesis also runs regression analysis after dropping the seven potential outlier 
using Mahalanobis distance and Cook's distance as diagnostic methods (Velleman and 
Welsch 1981; Ghozali 2005) (see Appendix F). These extra results are almost identical 
with the regression before dropping the outliers. Therefore the full 600 strong sample is 
used in this study.  
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Table 6.4: RDI Primary Multiple Regression Analysis (2007, 2008, 2009, and Pooled) 
 2007 2008 2009 Pooled Data 
Adjusted R2 .141 .144 .068 .128 
Durbin Watson 1.620 1.601 1.519 1.536 
F statistic 5.068 5.201 2.826 11.995 
Significance 0.000* 0.000* 0.006* 0.000* 
n 200 200 200 600 
 Predicted sign Coeff T Stat P-value Coeff T Stat P-value Coeff T Stat P-value Coeff T Stat P-value 
Intercept  .231 3.934 .000 .186 2.999 .003 .246 3.789 .000 .217 6.045 .000 
Country (+) .017 2.584 .011** .017 2.409 .017** .012 1.607 .110 .016 3.827 .000* 
Company Size (+) .006 1.137 .257 .013 2.338 .020** .012 2.157 .032** .011 3.318 .001* 
Managerial 
Ownership (-) -.079 -2.007 .046** -.091 -2.051 .042** -.046 -1.041 .299 -.074 -2.983 .003* 
Board 
Independence (+) .077 2.260 .025** .091 2.397 .017** .014 .373 .710 .063 2.986 .003* 
Leverage (+) -.019 -.716 .475 -.018 -.739 .461 -.014 -.554 .580 -.015 -1.049 .295 
Profitability (+) .034 1.075 .284 .048 2.172 .031** .090 2.535 .012** .049 3.067 .002* 
Auditor (+) -.022 -1.359 .176 -.009 -.532 .596 -.006 -.341 .733 -.012 -1.240 .216 
Age of Business (+) .000 .782 .435 .00003 .094 .925 .000 -.386 .700 .00006 .344 .731 
*highly significant at 1% level, **significant at 5% level, *** moderately significant at 10% level 
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6.6  Sensitivity Analysis 
 
Extra sensitivity analysis is conducted to check the robustness of the 
Table 6.4 main findings in the model presented in Section 6.5. 
Sensitivity analysis is also applied to determine the extent to which the 
independent variables used in the main multiple regression analysis 
are sensitive to different measurements on the same variables. All 
four key independent variables are re-measured (country, size, 
managerial ownership and corporate governance). 
 
The country variable is re-measured in several different ways. First, 
country is initially measured by simple nominal categories as 1 if 
Indonesian listed manufacturing companies, 2 if Australian, 3 if 
Malaysian, and 4 if Singaporean in the main regression (see Table 
6.4). In the sensitivity analysis, as discussed in Chapter 2, country is 
re-measured by: a) GDP per capita; b) economic effect of Global 
Financial Crisis (GFC) categorized 0 if country experiences a smaller 
impact of GFC and 1 if country experiences a larger negative impact 
of GFC (the basis for measure economic effect of GFC as can be 
seen in Figure 2.6); c) categorized 1 if ex British colonial with its 
common law also applies one-tier board system and categorized 0 if 
ex Dutch colonial with its civil law approach this exact re-
measurement also applies two-tier board system. The extra 
regression comparisons between the main and sensitivity analysis 
reveals that: 
• Country in the main regression (categorized as nominal 
categories) is statistically significant in three of the four 
regressions (except 2009) with positive coefficients (see Table 
6.4). The highest RDI is Malaysian manufacturing listed 
companies follow by Singaporean and Australian companies with 
the lowest RDI being Indonesian companies (see Table 5.6).  
• Country in the sensitivity analysis which is re-measured by GDP 
per capita is not significant in all four regressions (see Table 6.5). 
The adjusted R2 falls compared with the main regressions. 
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• Country in the sensitivity analysis (categorized as 0 if country 
smaller impact of GFC (Australia and Indonesia) and 1 if country 
larger impact of GFC (Malaysia and Singapore)) is statistically 
significant in three of the four regressions (except 2009) with 
positive coefficients (see Table 6.6). The adjusted R2 falls in 2007 
and 2008 yet rises in 2009 and is similar in pooled data compare 
with the main regressions. 
• Country in the sensitivity analysis (categorized 1 if ex British 
colonial with applies common law and one-tier board system 
(Australia, Malaysia, and Singapore) and categorized 0 if ex Dutch 
colonial with applies civil law and two-tier board system 
(Indonesia)) is statistically significant in all of the four regressions 
but with negative coefficients (see Table 6.7). The adjusted R2 
rises compared with the main regressions. 
 
In summary, different measure of country proxies does seem to make 
a difference in the hypotheses testing 
 
Second, in the Table 6.4 main regression company size is measured 
by the companies’ total assets in U.S dollars and logged to reduce 
skewness. Size is then re-calculated in Table 6.5 using a different 
measurement for sensitivity analysis purposes using log total revenue. 
The text below summarizes the results comparison between the main 
and sensitivity analysis measurements for the company size effect on 
RDI: 
•   Size in the Table 6.4 main regression measured by log total 
assets is statistically significant in three of the four regressions 
(except 2007) with positive coefficients (Table 6.4). 
• Size in sensitivity analysis regression is then re-measured by log 
total revenue. Table 6.8 notes that this size measure is again 
highly significant this time in all four regressions (2007, 2008, 
2009, and pooled) again with positive coefficients (see Table 6.8). 
The adjusted R2 rises compared with the main regressions. 
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In summary, size is statistically significant regardless of measurement 
technique and consistent with agency theory tenets. 
 
Third, in the main regression managerial ownership is measured by 
the percentage of managerial ownership (see Table 6.4). In the 
sensitivity analysis, managerial ownership is re-measured by: a) 
categorized as 0 if not present managerial ownership and 1 if present; 
b) categorized 0 if have ≤ 5% managerial ownership and 1 if have  > 
5% managerial ownership; c) categorized 0 if have ≤ 10% managerial 
ownership and 1 if > 10% managerial ownership ; d) categorized 0 if 
have ≤ 15% managerial ownership and 1 if have > 15% managerial 
ownership; e) categorized 0 if have ≤ 20% managerial ownership and 
1 if have > 20% managerial ownership; f) categorized 0 if have ≤ 25% 
managerial ownership and 1 if have > 25% managerial ownership; g) 
categorized 0 if have ≤ 50% managerial ownership and 1 if have > 
50% managerial ownership.  The comparison between main and 
sensitivity analysis reveals that: 
• Managerial ownership in the Table 6.4 main regression measured 
by the percentage of managerial ownership is statistically 
significant in three of the four regressions (except 2009) with 
negative coefficients (Table 6.4). 
• Managerial ownership in the sensitivity analysis (categorized 0 if 
not present managerial ownership and 1 if present) is not 
significant in all of the four regressions (see Appendix G.1). 
Managerial ownership in the sensitivity analysis (categorized 0 if 
have ≤ 5% managerial ownership and 1 if have > 5% managerial 
ownership) is not significant in all of the four regressions (see 
Appendix G.2). Managerial ownership in the sensitivity analysis 
(categorized 0 if have ≤ 10% managerial ownership and 1 if have 
> 10% managerial ownership) is moderate significant only in 
pooled data with negative coefficients (see Appendix G.3). 
Managerial ownership in the sensitivity analysis (categorized 0 if 
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have ≤ 20% managerial ownership and 1 if have > 20% 
managerial ownership) is significant only in pooled data with 
negative coefficients (see Appendix G.4). Managerial ownership in 
the sensitivity analysis (categorized 0 if have ≤ 25% managerial 
ownership and 1 if have > 25% managerial ownership) is 
moderate significant in 2007 and significant in pooled data with 
negative coefficients (see Appendix G.5). The adjusted R2 falls in 
comparison with the main regressions. 
• Managerial ownership in the sensitivity analysis (categorized 0 if 
have ≤ 15% managerial ownership and 1 if have > 15% 
managerial ownership) is significant in 2007 and pooled data and 
moderately significant in 2008 with negative coefficients (see 
Table 6.9). This is very similar to the main regression results in 
Table 6.4. The adjusted R2 rise in 2007, fall in 2008 and are 
similar in 2009 and pooled data does compare with the main 
regressions. 
• Managerial ownership in the sensitivity analysis (categorized 0 if 
have ≤ 50% managerial ownership and 1 if have > 50% 
managerial ownership) is significant in 2008 and pooled data and 
moderately significant in 2007 with negative coefficients (see 
Table 6.10). This is also similar with the main regression results in 
Table 6.4. The adjusted R2 falls compared with the main 
regressions. 
 
In summary, in the sample companies which differ between those less 
than or equal to 15% versus those above this 15% cut-off figure  
managerial ownership most dramatically influences risk disclosure 
(there is the same strong statistical difference for those ≤ 50% versus 
those > 50%). However, companies which have managerial ownership 
that are in other benchmark dichotomous percentage categories (such 
as ≤ 5% versus > 5% or ≤ 10% versus > 10% or ≤ 20% versus > 20% 
or ≤ 25% versus > 25% less influences risk disclosure (see 
Appendices G.2 – G.5 for more details) 
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Fourth, corporate governance proxies are compared and contrasted 
with the main analysis that calculates corporate governance as the 
percentage of board independence whereas the sensitivity analysis 
recalculates the corporate governance proxy with board meetings. 
The comparison reveals that: 
• Board independence is positively statistically significant in three of 
the four main Table 6.4 regressions.  
• Board meetings, as a re-measured corporate governance proxy in 
the Table 6.11 sensitivity analysis is positively significant only in 
the pooled data set (Table 6.11). The adjusted R2 rises in 2007, 
2009, and pooled data and falls in 2008 as compared with the 
main regressions. 
 
In summary, different measure of corporate governance proxies does 
seem to make some difference in the hypotheses testing. This may be 
due to the fact that there is a huge diversity of corporate governance 
mechanisms that may well influence risk disclosures in various ways. 
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Table 6.5: Sensitivity Analysis: RDI Multiple Regression Analysis (Country = GDP per Capita) 
 2007 2008 2009 Pooled year 
Adjusted R2 .114 .123 .058 .109 
Durbin Watson 1.573 1.557 1.509 1.508 
F statistic 4.206 4.499 2.525 10.185 
Significance .000 .000 .012 .000 
n 200 200 200 600 
 Predicted sign Coeff T Stat P-value Coeff T Stat P-value Coeff T Stat P-value Coeff T Stat P-value 
Intercept  .287 5.192 .000 .239 4.116 .000 .282 4.637 .000 .266 7.946 .000 
Country 
(GDP per Capita) (+) .0000004 .889 .375 .0000004 1.026 .306 .0000003 .633 .527 .0000003 1.373 .170 
Company Size (+) .006 1.003 .317 .013 2.285 .023** .012 2.090 .038** .011 3.179 .002* 
Managerial 
Ownership (-) -.068 -1.680 .095*** -.077 -1.723 .086*** -.038 -.854 .394 -.062 -2.475 .014** 
Board 
Independence (+) .084 2.431 .016** .094 2.435 .016** .016 .409 .683 .067 3.122 .002* 
Leverage (+) -.017 -.611 .542 -.018 -.727 .468 -.015 -.592 .554 -.015 -1.040 .299 
Profitability (+) .043 1.324 .187 .052 2.275 .024** .100 2.575 .011** .055 3.303 .001* 
Auditor (+) -.034 -2.138 .034** -.021 -1.246 .214 -.013 -.720 .472 -.023 -2.357 .019** 
Age of Business (+) .00007 .239 .812 .000 -.357 .721 .000 -.705 .481 -.00007 -.402 .688 
*highly significant at 1% level, **significant at 5% level, *** moderately significant at 10% level 
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Table 6.6: Sensitivity Analysis: RDI Multiple Regression Analysis (Country = Effect GFC) 
 2007 2008 2009 Pooled year 
Adjusted R2 .139 .141 .069 .128 
Durbin Watson 1.635 1.589 1.521 1.538 
F statistic 5.030 5.084 2.837 11.958 
Significance .000 .000 .005 .000 
n 200 200 200 600 
 Predicted sign Coeff T Stat P-value Coeff T Stat P-value Coeff T Stat P-value Coeff T Stat P-value 
Intercept  .261 4.756 .000 .219 3.795 .000 .267 4.455 .000 .244 7.347 .000 
Country 
(Effect GFC) (+) .036 2.534 .012** .035 2.239 .026** .026 1.634 .104 .033 3.793 .000* 
Company Size (+) .007 1.178 .240 .014 2.367 .019** .012 2.160 .032** .011 3.356 .001* 
Managerial 
Ownership (-) -.066 -1.709 .089*** -.080 -1.824 .070*** -.041 -.936 .351 -.064 -2.639 .009* 
Board 
Independence (+) .076 2.212 .028** .089 2.338 .020** .012 .322 .748 .061 2.885 .004* 
Leverage (+) -.023 -.856 .393 -.020 -.838 .403 -.015 -.592 .555 -.018 -1.223 .222 
Profitability (+) .026 .829 .408 .043 1.929 .055*** .079 2.192 .030** .042 2.597 .010* 
Auditor (+) -.026 -1.649 .101 -.014 -.820 .413 -.009 -.519 .604 -.016 -1.644 .101 
Age of Business (+) .000 .780 .436 .000003 .010 .992 .000 -.376 .707 .00005 .306 .760 
*highly significant at 1% level, **significant at 5% level, *** moderately significant at 10% level 
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Table 6.7: Sensitivity Analysis: RDI Multiple Regression Analysis (Country = Ex-Colonial, Legal system, Board System) 
 2007 2008 2009 Pooled year 
Adjusted R2 .175 .171 .096 .154 
Durbin Watson 1.639 1.668 1.570 1.584 
F statistic 6.276 6.141 3.632 14.654 
Significance .000 .000 .001 .000 
n 200 200 200 600 
 Predicted 
sign Coeff T Stat P-value Coeff T Stat P-value Coeff T Stat P-value Coeff T Stat P-value 
Intercept  .356 6.636 .000 .309 5.433 .000 .333 5.723 .000 .327 10.047 .000 
Country 
(Ex-Colonial, 
Legal System, 
Board System) 
(+) -.067 -3.864 .000* -.066 -3.489 .001* -.056 -2.903 .004* -.062 -5.780 .000* 
Company Size (+) .005 .966 .335 .013 2.326 .021** .012 2.197 .029** .011 3.281 .001* 
Managerial 
Ownership (-) 
-.101 -2.563 .011** -.111 -2.504 .013** -.063 -1.431 .154 -.092 -3.736 .000* 
Board  
Independence (+) .071 2.128 .035** .086 2.295 .023** .014 .362 .718 .060 2.871 .004* 
Leverage (+) -.001 -.019 .985 -.010 -.418 .676 -.009 -.388 .699 -.006 -.425 .671 
Profitability (+) .059 1.885 .061*** .056 2.568 .011** .117 3.235 .001* .064 4.045 .000* 
Auditor (+) -.017 -1.094 .275 -.005 -.320 .750 .002 .101 .920 -.008 -.787 .431 
Age of Business (+) .000 .824 .411 .00007 .216 .829 -.00007 -.249 .804 .00009 .533 .594 
*highly significant at 1% level, **significant at 5% level, *** moderately significant at 10% level 
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Table 6.8: Sensitivity Analysis: RDI Multiple Regression Analysis (Size = LogRevenue) 
 2007 2008 2009 Pooled year 
Adjusted R2 .174 .161 .126 .165 
Durbin Watson 1.700 1.613 1.613 1.579 
F statistic 6.070 5.664 4.508 15.393 
Significance .000* .000* .000* .000* 
n 194 195 196 585 
 Predicted 
sign Coeff T Stat P-value Coeff T Stat P-value Coeff T Stat P-value Coeff T Stat P-value 
Intercept  .006 .066 .947 .028 .315 .753 -.016 -.163 .870 .011 .214 .830 
Country  (+) .016 2.388 .018* .015 2.117 .036** .013 1.801 .073 .015 3.613 .000* 
Size 
(LogRevenue) (+) .036 3.728 .000* .033 3.556 .000* .041 4.184 .000* .036 6.717 .000* 
Managerial 
Ownership (-) -.056 -1.437 .152 -.065 -1.465 .145 -.015 -.352 .725 -.047 -1.933 .054*** 
Board 
Independence (+) .075 2.168 .031** .084 2.165 .032** .024 .647 .519 .062 2.913 .004* 
Leverage (+) -.069 -2.216 .028** -.035 -1.411 .160 -.024 -.966 .335 -.037 -2.531 .012** 
Profitability (+) -.031 -.762 .447 .028 1.196 .233 .007 .149 .882 .011 .636 .525 
Auditor (+) -.007 -.452 .652 -.002 -.128 .898 .008 .440 .661 .000 -.018 .986 
Age of Business (+) .00007 .263 .793 .000 -.325 .745 .000 -.830 .408 -.00009 -.547 .584 
*highly significant at 1% level, **significant at 5% level, *** moderately significant at 10% level, some revenue data is missing n 2007 = 194, n 2008 = 195, n 
2009 = 196, n pooled = 585 
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Table 6.9: Sensitivity Analysis: RDI Multiple Regression Analysis (Managerial Ownership ≤15% and >15%) 
 2007 2008 2009 Pooled year 
Adjusted R2 .143 .140 .068 .128 
Durbin Watson 1.623 1.603 1.519 1.540 
F statistic 5.157 5.047 2.811 12.021 
Significance .000 .000 .006 .000 
n 200 200 200 600 
 Predicted 
sign Coeff T Stat P-value Coeff T Stat P-value Coeff T Stat P-value Coeff T Stat P-value 
Intercept  .233 3.964 .000 .181 2.903 .004 .243 3.754 .000 .216 6.023 .000 
Country (+) .018 2.682 .008* .018 2.388 .018** .012 1.590 .114 .016 3.825 .000* 
Company Size (+) .007 1.185 .237 .014 2.404 .017** .013 2.188 .030** .011 3.389 .001* 
Managerial 
Ownership 
(≤15% and >15%) 
(-) -.035 -2.151 .033** -.032 -1.781 .076*** -.018 -.991 .323 -.030 -3.014 .003* 
Board  
Independence (+) .072 2.108 .036** .091 2.371 .019** .014 .378 .705 .062 2.914 .004* 
Leverage (+) -.022 -.796 .427 -.017 -.723 .470 -.015 -.601 .549 -.016 -1.115 .265 
Profitability (+) .034 1.078 .282 .049 2.185 .030** .091 2.558 .011** .050 3.121 .002* 
Auditor (+) -.023 -1.414 .159 -.009 -.520 .604 -.005 -.287 .775 -.012 -1.222 .222 
Age of Business (+) .000 .712 .477 .00005 .163 .871 .000 -.353 .724 .00006 .326 .745 
*highly significant at 1% level, **significant at 5% level, *** moderately significant at 10% level 
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Table 6.10: Sensitivity Analysis: RDI Multiple Regression Analysis (Managerial Ownership ≤50% and >50%) 
 2007 2008 2009 Pooled year 
Adjusted R2 .135 .156 .069 .127 
Durbin Watson 1.650 1.618 1.536 1.553 
F statistic 4.877 .5855 2.834 11.880 
Significance .000 .000 .005 .000 
n 200 200 200 600 
 Predicted 
sign Coeff T Stat P-value Coeff T Stat P-value Coeff T Stat P-value Coeff T Stat P-value 
Intercept  .228 3.865 .000 .191 3.083 .002 .244 3.773 .000 .215 5.990 .000 
Country (+) .015 2.337 .020** .016 2.203 .029** .011 1.523 .129 .014 3.502 .000* 
Company Size (+) .006 1.090 .277 .013 2.285 .023** .013 2.173 .031** .011 3.301 .001* 
Managerial 
Ownership 
(≤50% and >50%) 
(-) -.047 -1.656 .099*** -.076 -2.604 .010** -.030 -1.068 .287 -.047 -2.845 .005* 
Board  
Independence (+) .083 2.429 .016** .095 2.514 .013** .016 .424 .672 .067 3.177 .002* 
Leverage (+) -.015 -.569 .570 -.013 -.547 .585 -.011 -.456 .649 -.012 -.818 .414 
Profitability (+) .036 1.132 .259 .047 2.142 .033** .090 2.527 .012** .048 3.050 .002* 
Auditor (+) -.025 -1.545 .124 -.014 -.810 .419 -.008 -.450 .653 -.015 -1.546 .123 
Age of Business (+) .000 1.096 .274 .00006 .195 .846 -.00009 -.318 .751 .000 .674 .500 
*highly significant at 1% level, **significant at 5% level, *** moderately significant at 10% level 
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Table 6.11 Sensitivity Analysis: RDI Multiple Regression Analysis (Board Meetings) 
 2007 2008 2009 Pooled year 
Adjusted R2 .145 .140 .107 .142 
Durbin Watson 1.466 1.562 1.640 1.502 
F statistic 4.851 4.697 3.684 12.268 
Significance .000* .000* .001* .000* 
n 182 182 181 545 
 Predicted sign Coeff T Stat P-value Coeff T Stat P-value Coeff T Stat P-value Coeff T Stat P-value 
Intercept  .222 3.733 .000 .191 2.921 .004 .225 3.500 .001 .212 5.824 .000 
Country (+) .015 2.035 .043** .015 1.882 .061*** .007 .889 .375 .012 2.783 .006* 
Company Size (+) .012 1.987 .048** .018 3.121 .002* .014 2.529 .012** .014 4.394 .000* 
Managerial 
Ownership (-) -.094 -2.445 .015* -.100 -2.253 .026** -.061 -1.456 .147 -.087 -3.616 .000* 
Board Meeting (+) .003 1.502 .135 .002 1.009 .315 .002 1.600 .111 .002 2.383 .018** 
Leverage (+) -.022 -.733 .465 -.022 -.769 .443 -.015 -.545 .586 -.016 -.947 .344 
Profitability (+) .029 .887 .376 .057 2.331 .021** .113 3.235 .001* .059 3.609 .000* 
Auditor (+) -.022 -1.373 .171 -.010 -.564 .574 .005 .306 .760 -.010 -.992 .322 
Age of Business (+) .000 .901 .369 .00009 .282 .778 .00003 .119 .905 .000 .860 .390 
*highly significant at 1% level, **significant at 5% level, *** moderately significant at 10% level, some board meeting data is missing  n 2007 = 182, n 2008 = 
182, n 2009 = 181, n pooled = 545
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6.7  Summary 
 
This chapter provides evidence of the predictors of the extent of voluntary 
risk disclosure over the turbulent Global Financial Crisis time period. The 
four main hypotheses are tested. The Table 6.4 main regression model 
provides evidence for accepting all four hypotheses. H1: There is an 
association between country of incorporation and risk disclosures in the 
annual reports in listed manufacturing companies. H2: There is a positive 
association between company size and the risk disclosures in the annual 
reports of manufacturing listed companies. H3: There is a negative 
association between managerial ownership and the risk disclosures in the 
annual reports of manufacturing listed companies.  H4: There is a positive 
association between higher levels of board independence and the risk 
disclosures in the annual reports of manufacturing listed companies. 
Profitability, as a control variable, is statistically significant in three of the 
four regressions (except 2007). The others control variables are not 
significant predictors of the extent of risk disclosure during the 2007-2009 
GFC time period. 
 
In the sensitivity analysis, the country re-measurement: impact of GFC, 
colonial history, legal system, and board system make a difference in the 
regression model. Size is statistically significant regardless of 
measurement technique and consistent with agency theory tenets. Sample 
companies which have ≤ 15% and > 15% also ≤ 50% and > 50% 
managerial ownership are most influence risk disclosure. A different 
measure of corporate governance proxies does seem to make a difference 
in the hypotheses testing. 
 
The following chapter reports the finding of the additional analysis 
conducted (Chapter 7). Further detailed analysis of the element of risk 
disclosure is provided. Finally, Chapter 8 then concludes the thesis with a 
summary of key findings, limitations and assumptions, implications and 
suggestions for future research.  
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CHAPTER 7 
ADDITIONAL ANALYSIS 
 
7.1 Introduction 
The previous chapters (Chapters 5 and 6) discuss the pattern of risk 
disclosure practices and association between the extent of risk disclosure 
and firm characteristics over the GFC period. This chapter reports the 
results on additional analysis30 in this thesis. This chapter is organized as 
follows:  
(a) Section 7.2 provides additional analysis of the independent and control 
predictor variables hypothesized to be associated with five major sub 
categories of risk disclosure (business risk, strategy risk, operational 
risk, market risk, and credit risk). The tests involve further use of the 
Ordinary Least Square (OLS) regression model with the five 
categories of risk disclosure index as the dependent variable in 
relation to the possible predictor variables. 
(b) Section 7.3 uses the additional analysis to look at the association in 
risk disclosures change over time to the independent and control 
variables change31 as the impact of the change between the GFC 
years 2007-2009, 2007-2008, and 2008-2009.  
(c) Section 7.4 then conveys the association of the change over time of 
the predictor variables with the change of the sub-categories of RDI 
between the GFC years. 
(d) Section 7.5 summaries the new insights derived from the Chapter 7 
additional analyses.  
 
                                               
30 This thesis also examines sensitivity analysis in the additional analysis presented in 
Appendix D. 
31 Section 7.3 and 7.4 results are virtually the same if the predictor variables are 
calculated as the average figure across the years (see Appendix C1 – C8). 
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7.2 Additional analysis: Five sub categories of RDI 
This section provides more analysis of the independent and control 
predictor variables hypothesized to be associated with the five major sub 
categories of risk disclosure (business risk, strategy risk, operational risk, 
market risk, and credit risk).  
 
The new multivariate regression models test the cross-sectional (within 
each year) associations between the five key sub categories of risk 
disclosure (business risk, strategy risk, operational risk, market risk, credit 
risk) and the predictor variables. An estimate of the (varying) regression 
equation is as follows: 
 
SUBRDIjt = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 CTYjt + 𝛽2 Sizejt + 𝛽3 ManOwnjt + 𝛽4 BoardIndjt + 𝛽5 
Levjt + 𝛽6 Profjt + 𝛽7 Auditjt + 𝛽8 Agejt + ε jt 
 
Where: 
Dependent variable: 
SUBRDIjt              = business risk, or strategy risk, or operational risk, or  
                           market risk, or credit risk disclosure index for company j in  
                           year t; 
Independent variables: 
CTYjt  = country for company j in year t; 
Sizejt  = company size for company j in year t; 
ManOwnjt = managerial ownership for company j in year t; 
BoardIndjt = board independence for company j in year t; 
 
Control variables: 
Levjt  = leverage for company j in year t; 
Profjt  = profit for company j in year t; 
Audjt  = auditor for company j in year t; 
AgeBusjt = age of business for company j in year t; 
𝛽0  = intercept; 
𝛽1-8  = estimated coefficient for each item; 
ε jt  = error term 
 
 
20 new regressions are presented to better explain variance in the five risk 
disclosure key sub categories. There are the 2007-2009 and pooled data 
regressions for: 1) Business Risk Disclosure (BRDI), 2) Strategy Risk 
Disclosure (SRDI), 3) Operating Risk Disclosure (ORDI), 4) Market Risk 
Disclosure (MRDI) and 5) Credit Risk Disclosure (CRDI). 
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The highest correlation for BRDI, SRDI, ORDI, MRDI, CRDI in 2007, 2008, 
2009 and pooled data remains less than 0.8 (see Appendix B.1 - B.20). 
There is again no perceived problem of multicollinearity between 
independent and control variables in these models. 
 
Tables 7.1 - 7.6 below illustrate the predictive power of the model from the 
regression in the 2007, 2008 and 2009 and pooled data for the 
relationship between the independent (country, company size, managerial 
ownership, board independence), and control variables (profitability, 
leverage, auditor, age of business), with each of the five sub-category 
dependent variable (BRDI, SRDI, ORDI, MRDI, CRDI). Table 7.1 is the 
summary from Tables 7.2 – 7.6. Key explanatory factors for the risk 
disclosure categories highlighted from Tables 7.1 - 7.6 are:  
 
• The ‘country’ variable is statistically significant for ‘operating risk’ 
(ORDI) 2007, 2008, 2009, and pooled data, and also significant for 
‘market risk’ (MRDI) in 2008 (Tables 7.1 – 7.6). For ‘operating risk’ 
(ORDI), Indonesia companies are statistically lower than the three 
other countries’ companies ORDI, and for ‘market risk’ (MRDI), in 
2007 and 2009, Indonesian companies’ MRDI are significantly higher 
than Australian companies MRDI (see Table 5.13 and Appendix A.9).  
• Size is a consistent positive predictor for “business risk’ (BRDI) for all 
years. Bigger firms provide more ‘’business’ risk data. This is also true 
for ‘market’ risk in 2007. 
• Managerial ownership is negatively significant for ‘strategy risk’ (SRDI) 
in 2007, 2008 and pooled data and also statistically significant for 
‘business risk’ (ORDI) in the pooled data set. 
• Board independence is positively significant for ‘strategy risk’ (SRDI) in 
2007, 2008 and the pooled sample; and ‘market risk’ (MRDI) in the 
pooled data. For the GFC 2009 period only, board independence does 
not influence any aspect of risk communication. 
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• As the first control variable, Leverage is negatively significant for 
‘business risk’ (BRDI) and ‘operating risk’ (ORDI) in the full pooled 
sample; but positively significant for ‘market risk’ (MRDI) in the pooled 
data. 
• Profitability is positively significant for ‘strategy risk’ (SRDI) in 2007, 
2008, 2009 and the pooled sample; More profitable firms clearly 
disclose more information on strategy issues. There is also a positive 
link for ‘market risk’ (MRDI) and ‘credit risk’ (CRDI) in the pooled data 
set. 
• Auditor is negatively significant for ‘business risk’ (BRDI) in the pooled 
year data (see Table 7.2). Independent t-test analysis reveals that 
companies which have a big 4 auditor more highly communicate 
‘business risk’ (BRDI) with a mean of 49.74% compared with 
companies which have a non big 4 auditor that have only 40.68% of 
BRDI disclosure (table not shown for brevity).   
• Age of business is positively significant for ‘market risk’ (MRDI) in 
2008 and pooled data. 
 
These Tables 7.1 – 7.6 regression results for risk disclosure categories 
provide some support for the agency theory tenets (H1, H2, H3 and H4 
are partially accepted). Table 7.1 highlights the summary points that: 
 
• For ‘business’ risk (BRDI): H1 (country) and H4 (board independence) 
are rejected for all years. H2 (size) is accepted for all years. H3 
(managerial ownership) is accepted for 2009 and the pooled data. 
• For ‘strategy’ risk (SRDI): H1 (country) and H2 (size) are rejected in all 
years. H3 (managerial ownership) and H4 (board independence) is 
accepted in all data sets except for 2009. 
• For ‘operating’ risk (ORDI): H1 (country) is accepted in all data sets 
• For ‘market’ risk (MRDI): HI (country) is accepted only in 2008, and H2 
(size) is only accepted in 2007. 
• For ‘credit’ risk (CRDI): H1 (country), H2 (size), H3 (managerial 
ownership), H4 (board independence) are rejected in all data sets. 
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• For control variables: leverage is accepted for ‘business risk’ (BRDI), 
‘operating risk’ (ORDI), ‘market risk’ (MRDI) in the pooled data; 
Profitability is accepted for ‘strategy risk’ (SRDI) in all data sets, 
‘market risk’ (MRDI) in all data sets except 2007, and ‘credit risk’ 
(CRDI) in the pooled data; Auditor is only accepted in ‘business risk’ 
(BRDI) in the pooled data; Age of business is only accepted in ‘market 
risk ‘ (MRDI) 2008 and pooled data.  
 
Table 7.1: Sub-RDI Multiple Regression Analysis: Summary 
Panel A 
Sub-RDI Model CTY Size 
Man
Own 
Board 
Ind Lev Prof Aud 
Age 
Bus 
2007 (N = 200) 
BRDI 
SRDI 
ORDI 
MRDI 
CRDI 
 
MS 
X 
HS 
X 
X 
 
S 
X 
X 
HS 
X 
 
X 
HS 
X 
X 
X 
 
X 
S 
X 
X 
X 
 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
 
 
X 
HS 
X 
X 
MS 
 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
 
 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
 
2008 (N = 200) 
BRDI 
SRDI 
ORDI 
MRDI 
CRDI 
 
X 
X 
HS 
S 
X 
 
 
HS 
MS 
X 
X 
X 
 
X 
HS 
X 
X 
X 
 
 
MS 
HS 
X 
MS 
X 
 
 
X 
X 
X 
MS 
X 
 
 
X 
HS 
MS 
HS 
X 
 
 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
 
 
X 
X 
X 
S 
X 
 
2009 (N = 200) 
BRDI 
SRDI 
ORDI 
MRDI 
CRDI 
 
X 
X 
HS 
X 
X 
 
HS 
X 
X 
X 
MS 
 
S 
X 
X 
X 
X 
 
 
X 
X 
X 
MS 
X 
 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
 
 
X 
S 
X 
HS 
MS 
 
 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
 
 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
 
Pooled (N =600) 
BRDI 
SRDI 
ORDI 
MRDI 
CRDI 
 
X 
X 
HS 
X 
X 
 
HS 
X 
X 
X 
MS 
 
HS 
HS 
   X 
X 
X 
 
 
X 
HS 
X 
HS 
X 
 
S 
X 
S 
HS 
X 
 
 
X 
HS 
X 
HS 
S 
 
 
S 
X 
X 
X 
X 
 
 
X 
X 
X 
HS 
X 
 
Legend: CTY = country; Size = natural log of total assets; ManOwn = managerial 
ownership; BoardInd = board independence; Lev = leverage; Prof = profitability; Aud = 
auditor; AgeBus= age of business; BRDI = business risk disclosure index; SRDI = 
strategic risk disclosure index; ORDI = operating risk disclosure index; MRDI = market 
risk disclosure index;  CRDI = credit risk disclosure index; HS denotes statistically 
highly significant at 1%; S denotes statistically significant at 5%: MS denotes statistically 
moderately significant at 10%,  and X means not statistical significant. 
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Table 7.2: Business Risk Disclosure Index (BRDI) Multiple Regression Analysis 
 2007 2008 2009 Pooled data 
Adjusted R2 .111 .115 .090 .119 
Durbin Watson 1.480 1.773 1.599 1.605 
F statistic 4.091 4.223 3.446 11.152 
Significance .000 .000 .001 .000 
n 200 200 200 600 
 Predicted sign Coeff T Stat P-value Coeff T Stat P-value Coeff T Stat P-value Coeff T Stat P-value 
Intercept  .261 2.465 .015 .277 2.650 .009 .354 3.426 .001 .292 4.877 .000 
Country (+) .021 1.714 .088*** .003 .286 .775 .011 .917 .360 .012 1.750 .081*** 
Company Size (+) .024 2.371 .019** .029 2.977 .003* .029 3.144 .002* .027 4.947 .000* 
Managerial 
Ownership (-) -.088 -1.245 .215 -.121 -1.631 .105 -.149 -2.113 .036** -.120 -2.906 .004* 
Board 
Independence (+) .088 1.425 .156 .124 1.928 .055*** -.044 -.726 .469 .058 1.645 .100 
Leverage (+) -.067 -1.371 .172 -.049 -1.218 .225 -.047 -1.184 .238 -.052 -2.166 .031** 
Profitability (+) -.027 -.480 .632 -.006 -.152 .879 .038 .672 .502 -.004 -.150 .881 
Auditor (+) -.046 -1.589 .114 -.046 -1.538 .126 -.041 -1.405 .162 -.043 -2.566 .011** 
Age of Business (+) .000 .899 .370 .00002 .033 .974 .000 -.473 .637 .00009 .319 .750 
*highly significant at 1% level, **significant at 5% level, *** moderately significant at 10% level
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Table 7.3: Strategy Risk Disclosure Index (SRDI) Multiple Regression Analysis 
 2007 2008 2009 Pooled data 
Adjusted R2 .095 .121 .052 .094 
Durbin Watson 1.708 1.840 1.872 1.745 
F statistic 3.607 4.438 2.375 8.755 
Significance .001 .000 .018 .000 
n 200 200 200 600 
 Predicted sign Coeff T Stat P-value Coeff T Stat P-value Coeff T Stat P-value Coeff T Stat P-value 
Intercept  .197 2.649 .009 .065 .797 .426 .121 1.434 .153 .117 2.500 .013 
Country (+) -.009 -1.032 .303 -.003 -.288 .774 -.010 -1.018 .310 -.007 -1.280 .201 
Company Size (+) -.011 -1.563 .120 .013 1.714 .088*** .009 1.140 .256 .005 1.053 .293 
Managerial 
Ownership (-) -.144 -2.891 .004* -.152 -2.623 .009* -.046 -.800 .425 -.113 -3.536 .000* 
Board 
Independence (+) .086 1.985 .049** .133 2.673 .008* .074 1.507 .133 .104 3.781 .000* 
Leverage (+) .036 1.037 .301 .005 .162 .871 .021 .654 .514 .016 .835 .404 
Profitability (+) .125 3.138 .002* .087 2.995 .003* .105 2.277 .024** .090 4.332 .000* 
Auditor (+) .009 .423 .673 -.002 -.105 .916 -.003 -.127 .899 .001 .114 .910 
Age of Business (+) .00008 .231 .818 .000 -.902 .368 -.00004 -.091 .927 -.00007 -.329 .742 
*highly significant at 1% level, **significant at 5% level, *** moderately significant at 10% level  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
160 
 
Table 7.4: Operating Risk Disclosure Index (ORDI) Multiple Regression Analysis 
 2007 2008 2009 Pooled data 
Adjusted R2 .191 .171 .102 .164 
Durbin Watson 1.419 1.288 1.251 1.288 
F statistic 6.862 6.142 3.827 15.657 
Significance .000 .000 .000 .000 
n 200 200 200 600 
 Predicted sign Coeff T Stat P-value Coeff T Stat P-value Coeff T Stat P-value Coeff T Stat P-value 
Intercept  .400 2.918 .004 .228 1.713 .088 .337 2.276 .024 .320 4.021 .000 
Country (+) .091 5.888 .000* .091 5.863 .000* .066 3.934 .000* .083 9.048 .000* 
Company Size (+) -.018 -1.400 .163 .000 .015 .988 .000 .033 .974 -.006 -.843 .400 
Managerial 
Ownership (-) -.036 -.391 .696 -.032 -.339 .735 .100 .997 .320 .007 .133 .894 
Board 
Independence (+) .102 1.290 .199 .049 .594 .553 .010 .120 .905 .053 1.126 .261 
Leverage (+) -.082 -1.293 .198 -.072 -1.386 .167 -.074 -1.319 .189 -.068 -2.141 .033** 
Profitability (+) -.017 -.228 .820 .079 1.661 .098*** .097 1.199 .232 .053 1.508 .132 
Auditor (+) -.021 -.556 .579 .037 .965 .336 .007 .171 .864 .007 .324 .746 
Age of Business (+) .00008 .114 .909 .000 -.195 .845 .000 -.719 .473 .000 -.507 .613 
*highly significant at 1% level, **significant at 5% level, *** moderately significant at 10% level 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
161 
 
Table 7.5: Market Risk Disclosure Index (MRDI) Multiple Regression Analysis 
 2007 2008 2009 Pooled data 
Adjusted R2 .152 .092 .083 .090 
Durbin Watson 2.354 1.935 1.534 1.783 
F statistic 5.469 3.508 3.260 8.449 
Significance .000 .001 .002 .000 
n 200 200 200 600 
 Predicted sign Coeff T Stat P-value Coeff T Stat P-value Coeff T Stat P-value Coeff T Stat P-value 
Intercept  .047 .869 .386 .082 1.190 .235 .131 1.865 .064 .091 2.406 .016 
Country (+) -.007 -1.130 .260 .019 2.312 .022** .009 1.096 .274 .007 1.584 .114 
Company Size (+) .014 2.772 .006* -.005 -.725 .469 -.008 -1.288 .199 .000 .049 .961 
Managerial 
Ownership (-) -.015 -.404 .687 -.013 -.266 .790 .011 .241 .810 -.010 -.379 .705 
Board 
Independence (+) .030 .947 .345 .078 1.845 .067*** .069 1.692 .092*** .058 2.591 .010* 
Leverage (+) .038 1.517 .131 .051 1.899 .059*** .038 1.432 .154 .049 3.207 .001* 
Profitability (+) .047 1.629 .105 .072 2.930 .004* .141 3.678 .000* .078 4.662 .000* 
Auditor (+) -.014 -.922 .358 .015 .760 .448 .030 1.515 .131 .008 .735 .463 
Age of Business (+) .000 1.255 .211 .001 2.301 .022** .000 1.278 .203 .001 2.842 .005* 
*highly significant at 1% level, **significant at 5% level, *** moderately significant at 10% level 
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Table 7.6: Credit Risk Disclosure Index (CRDI) Multiple Regression Analysis 
 2007 2008 2009 Pooled data 
Adjusted R2 .002 -.018 -.003 .008 
Durbin Watson 1.709 1.803 1.685 1.738 
F statistic 1.050 .551 .918 1.570 
Significance .400a .817 .503 .131 
n 200 200 200 600 
 Predicted sign Coeff T Stat P-value Coeff T Stat P-value Coeff T Stat P-value Coeff T Stat P-value 
Intercept  .404 2.302 .022 .431 2.449 .015 .325 1.739 .084 .369 3.593 .000 
Country (+) .014 .695 .488 .004 .182 .856 -.013 -.617 .538 .003 .214 .830 
Company Size (+) .001 .080 .936 .018 1.081 .281 .028 1.698 .091*** .017 1.808 .071*** 
Managerial 
Ownership (-) -.105 -.893 .373 -.077 -.616 .538 .013 .099 .922 -.060 -.849 .396 
Board 
Independence (+) .101 .994 .322 -.117 -1.086 .279 -.071 -.653 .515 -.022 -.367 .714 
Leverage (+) .045 .558 .577 -.020 -.300 .765 .002 .029 .977 .001 .032 .974 
Profitability (+) .165 1.748 .082*** .052 .825 .410 .175 1.709 .089*** .099 2.186 .029** 
Auditor (+) -.028 -.591 .556 -.030 -.606 .545 .021 .398 .691 -.011 -.372 .710 
Age of Business (+) .000 -.884 .378 .000 -.733 .465 .000 -.843 .400 .000 -1.230 .219 
*highly significant at 1% level, **significant at 5% level, *** moderately significant at 10% level 
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7.3  RDI Change between GFC Years32  
 
This section provides more analysis using additional multivariate 
regression model to examine the association between the change in the 
risk disclosure and the change of predictor variables between the sample 
years. The equation regression model is as follow: 
 
∆RDIjt and t-1 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 CTYjt and t-1 + 𝛽2 ∆Sizejt and t-1 + 𝛽3 ∆ManOwnjt and t-1 + 
𝛽4 ∆BoardIndjt and t-1 + 𝛽5 ∆Levjt and t-1+ 𝛽6 ∆Profjt and t-1+ ε jt 
 
Where: 
Dependent variable: 
RDIjt and t-1  = Change in risk disclosure index for company j in year t and t-1; 
Independent variables: 
∆CTYjt and t-1  = Country for company j in year t and t-1; 
∆Sizejt and t-1  = Change in company size for company j in year t and t-1; 
∆ManOwnjt and t-1 = Change in managerial ownership for company j in year t and t-1; 
∆BoardIndjt and t-1 = Change in board independent for company j in year t and t-1; 
Control variables: 
∆Levjt and t-1  = Change in leverage for company j in year t and t-1; 
∆Profjt and t-1  = Change in profit for company j in year t and t-1; 
𝛽0   = intercept; 
𝛽1-6   = estimated coefficient for each item; 
ε jt   = error term 
 
 
The multiple regression results based on this new model  are used to 
predict the association between the change in the Risk Disclosure Index 
(∆RDI) and the change in the value of the independent (country, company 
size, managerial ownership and board independence) and control 
variables (leverage and profitability) between years. Other control 
variables (auditor and age of business) are excluded in this model 
because they have only negligible change over time. 
 
Appendix B.21 – B.23 reveal that the highest correlation for ∆RDI change 
regressions is still less than 0.8. The problem of multicollinearity between 
independent and control variables is thus deemed minimal in this model 
(change in 2007-2009; 2007-2008; 2008-2009). 
                                               
32 This thesis also examines sensitivity analysis in the additional change regression 
analysis presented in Appendix E. 
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The association between ∆RDI and change in managerial ownership 
between the year 2007-2008 is the only predictor which has a statistically 
significant finding and a negative coefficient, therefore ∆H3 is accepted 
(see Tables 7.7 and 7.8). The other independent and control variables are 
not statistically significant between any of the years (2007-2009; 2007-
2008; 2008-2009).  
 
. 
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   Table 7.7: RDI ∆ Multiple Regression Analysis 
 ∆2007-2009 ∆2007-2008 ∆2008-2009 
Adjusted R2 -.006 .000 -.012 
Durbin Watson 2.097 2.026 1.892 
F statistic .807 .991 .608 
Significance .566a .433a .724a 
 Predicted sign Coeff T Stat P-value Coeff T Stat P-value Coeff T Stat P-value 
Intercept  .059 3.981 .000 .026 1.966 .051 .024 1.808 .072 
∆Country (+) -.007 -1.298 .196 .000 -.146 .884 -.005 -.968 .334 
∆Company Size (+) -.017 -.563 .574 .000 -.005 .996 .006 .136 .892 
∆Managerial 
Ownership (-) -.033 -.526 .600 -.115 -2.142 .033** .046 .621 .535 
∆Board 
Independence (+) -.004 -.112 .911 .021 .457 .648 .00007 .002 .999 
∆Leverage (+) .038 .845 .399 .031 .601 .549 -.046 -.852 .395 
∆Profitability (+) -.033 -1.384 .168 -.014 -.809 .420 -.025 -1.124 .262 
                 *highly significant at 1% level, **significant at 5% level, *** moderately significant at 10% level, n = 200 
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In summary, ∆RDI is not easily predicted perhaps because there is only a 
relatively small change in RDI over the GFC period. The finding is robust if 
∆ predictor variables are replaced by an average of end of year measure 
for the continuous predictor variables (see Appendix C1 – C8)  
 
Table 7.8: RDI ∆ Multiple Regression Analysis: Summary 
Panel A 
RDI Model ∆CTY ∆Size 
∆Man 
Own 
∆Board 
  Ind ∆Lev ∆Prof 
RDI ∆2007-2009 
(N = 200) X X X X X X 
RDI ∆2007-2008 
(N = 200) X X S X X X 
RDI ∆2008-2009 
(N = 200) X X X X X X 
Legend: CTY = country; Size = natural log of total assets; ManOwn = managerial 
ownership; BoardInd = board independence; Lev = leverage; Prof = profitability; Aud = 
auditor; others control variables (auditor and age of business) are exclude in this model 
because there is only negligible change. HS denotes statistically highly significant at 1%; 
S denotes statistically significant at 5%: MS denotes statistically moderately significant at 
10%, and X means not statistically significant. 
 
7.4.  Additional analysis: Five Sub Categories of Risk Change  
This section details the additional analysis using multivariate regression 
model to test the association between the change in the five sub 
categories of risk disclosure (business risk, strategy risk, operational risk, 
market risk, and credit risk) and the change of predictor variables between 
years. This model tests if there are changes in five sub-category of risk 
variables and the predictor variables in the two reporting years are 
associated. The equation regression for this varying models is as follow: 
 
∆SubRDIjt and t-1 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 CTYjt and t-1 + 𝛽2 ∆Sizejt and t-1 + 𝛽3 ∆ManOwnjt and 
t-1 + 𝛽4 ∆BoardIndjt and t-1 + 𝛽5 ∆Levjt and t-1+ 𝛽6 ∆Profjt and t-1+ ε jt 
 
Where: 
Dependent variable: 
SubRDIjt and t-1  = Change in business risk, strategy risk, operational risk,  
                                       market risk, and credit risk disclosure index for company j   
                                       in year t and t-1; 
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Independent variables: 
∆CTYjt and t-1  = Country for company j in year t and t-1; 
∆Sizejt and t-1  = Change in company size for company j in year t and t-1; 
∆ManOwnjt and t-1 = Change in managerial ownership for company j in year t and t-1; 
∆BoardIndjt and t-1 = Change in board independent for company j in year t and t-1; 
Control variables: 
∆Levjt and t-1  = Change in leverage for company j in year t and t-1; 
∆Profjt and t-1  = Change in profit for company j in year t and t-1; 
𝛽0   = intercept; 
𝛽1-6   = estimated coefficient for each item; 
ε jt   = error term 
 
This section provides analysis for the model of the five sub categories of 
risk disclosure change. The multivariate analysis using ordinary least 
square regressions (OLS) is performed to test if there are predictors that 
influence risk disclosure categories’ change over time.  
 
The predictors in this model are the change in the value of the 
independent (country, company size, managerial ownership and board 
independence) and control variables (leverage and profitability) between 
years. Others control variables (auditor and age of business) are excluded 
in this model because they have only a negligible change over time. 
 
Appendix  B.24-B.38 reveal that the highest correlations for BRDI change, 
SRDI change, ORDI change, MRDI change, CRDI change in 2007, 2008, 
2009 and pooled data again are less than 0.8. Thus, there is no problem 
of multicollinearity between independent and control variables in this 
model. 
 
Tables 7.9 - 7.14 illustrate the predictive power of the model from the 
regression in the 2007, 2008 and 2009 and pooled data for risk disclosure 
categories’ change. Table 7.9 summarizes the results from Tables 7.10 – 
7.14. Key explanatory factors for risk disclosure categories highlighted 
from Tables 7.9 - 7.14 are:  
 
• The ‘Country’ variable is highly significant in the change between  
2007-2008 for ‘market risk’ (MRDI) regression (see Table 7.13). 
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• Change of Size is not significant in all the regression. 
• Managerial ownership change is negatively significant for ‘credit risk’ 
(CRDI) in the change between 2007-2008 and negatively significant 
for ‘market risk’ (MRDI) in the change between 2007-2008. 
• Board independence change is not significant in all the regressions. 
• Leverage change is positively significant for ‘market risk’ (MRDI) in 
the change between 2007-2009. 
• Profitability change is negatively significant for ‘operating risk’ (ORDI) 
in the change between 2007-2008 and ‘credit risk’ (CRDI) in the 
change between 2008-2009. 
 
Table 7.9: Sub-RDI ∆ Multiple Regression Analysis: Summary 
Panel A 
RDI Model 
(N = 200) 
∆CTY ∆Size ∆Man      Own 
∆Board 
   Ind ∆Lev ∆Prof 
∆2007-2009 
BRDI 
SRDI 
ORDI 
MRDI 
CRDI 
 
X 
X 
MS 
X 
MS 
 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
 
X 
X 
X 
X 
MS 
 
X 
X 
X 
S 
X 
 
X 
X 
MS 
X 
X 
∆2007-2008  
BRDI 
SRDI 
ORDI 
MRDI 
CRDI 
 
MS 
X 
X 
HS 
X 
 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
 
X 
MS 
X 
S 
S 
 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
 
X 
X 
MS 
X 
X 
 
X 
X 
S 
X 
X 
∆2008-2009  
BRDI 
SRDI 
ORDI 
MRDI 
CRDI 
 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
 
X 
X 
X 
X 
S 
Legend: CTY = country; Size = natural log of total assets; ManOwn = managerial 
ownership; BoardInd = board independence; Lev = leverage; Prof = profitability; 
others control variables (auditor and age of business) are exclude in this model 
because there is only negligible change. BRDI = business risk disclosure index; 
SRDI = strategic risk disclosure index; ORDI = operating risk disclosure index; MRDI 
= market risk disclosure index; CRDI = credit risk disclosure index; HS denotes 
statistically highly significant at 1%; S denotes statistically significant at 5%: MS 
denotes statistically moderately significant at 10%, and X means not statistical 
significant. 
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Table 7.10: BRDI ∆ Multiple Regression Analysis 
 ∆2009-2007 ∆2007-2008 ∆2008-2009 
Adjusted R2 -.007 .002 .028 
Durbin Watson 1.975 1.822 2.080 
F statistic .773 1.070 1.955 
Significance .592 .382a .074a 
 Predicted sign Coeff T Stat P-value Coeff T Stat P-value Coeff T Stat P-value 
Intercept  .069 3.081 .002 .047 1.941 .054 .012 .642 .522 
Country (+) -.011 -1.416 .158 -.014 -1.661 .098*** .005 .669 .504 
Company Size (+) -.002 -.045 .964 .044 .753 .452 -.038 -.434 .665 
Managerial 
Ownership (-) -.128 -1.355 .177 -.056 -.603 .548 .115 1.026 .306 
Board 
Independence (+) -.024 -.408 .684 .105 1.291 .198 .003 .049 .961 
Leverage (+) .006 .084 .933 -.024 -.268 .789 -.084 -.948 .344 
Profitability (+) -.026 -.748 .455 -.025 -.839 .402 -.101 -2.865 .005* 
*highly significant at 1% level, **significant at 5% level,  *** moderately significant at 10% level, n = 200 
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Table 7.11: SRDI ∆ Multiple Regression Analysis 
 ∆2009-2007 ∆2007-2008 ∆2008-2009 
Adjusted R2 -.009 .006 -.011 
Durbin Watson 2.007 2.198 1.944 
F statistic .699 1.199 .624 
Significance .651 .308 .711 
 Predicted sign Coeff T Stat P-value Coeff T Stat P-value Coeff T Stat P-value 
Intercept  .056 2.619 .010 .029 1.413 .159 .026 1.351 .178 
Country (+) .001 .144 .885 .008 1.103 .272 -.007 -.968 .334 
Company Size (+) -.040 -.911 .364 -.043 -.869 .386 -.050 -.566 .572 
Managerial 
Ownership (-) -.092 -1.030 .304 -.130 -1.672 .096*** -.025 -.219 .827 
Board 
Independence (+) .007 .128 .898 .054 .791 .430 .026 .417 .677 
Leverage (+) .022 .349 .727 -.065 -.860 .391 -.065 -.723 .471 
Profitability (+) -.045 -1.340 .182 .022 .882 .379 .039 1.084 .280 
*highly significant at 1% level, **significant at 5% level,  *** moderately significant at 10% level, n = 200 
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Table 7.12: ORDI ∆ Multiple Regression Analysis 
 ∆2009-2007 ∆2007-2008 ∆2008-2009 
Adjusted R2 .001 .009 -.013 
Durbin Watson 2.069 2.061 1.865 
F statistic 1.033 1.308 .575 
Significance .405 .256 .750 
 Predicted sign Coeff T Stat P-value Coeff T Stat P-value Coeff T Stat P-value 
Intercept  .074 2.174 .031 .025 .868 .387 .037 1.314 .191 
Country (+) -.021 -1.745 .083*** -.004 -.393 .695 -.015 -1.432 .154 
Company Size (+) .018 .262 .793 .045 .658 .511 .057 .435 .664 
Managerial 
Ownership (-) .054 .375 .708 -.080 -.735 .463 .000 .002 .998 
Board 
Independence (+) .018 .203 .840 -.049 -.512 .609 -.061 -.667 .505 
Leverage (+) .032 .321 .749 .198 1.868 .063*** .038 .289 .773 
Profitability (+) -.091 -1.700 .091*** -.070 -2.009 .046** -.041 -.790 .431 
*highly significant at 1% level, **significant at 5% level,  *** moderately significant at 10% level, n = 200 
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Table 7.13: MRDI ∆ Multiple Regression Analysis 
 ∆2009-2007 ∆2007-2008 ∆2008-2009 
Adjusted R2 .019 .041 -.018 
Durbin Watson 1.500 1.991 1.901 
F statistic 1.640 2.428 .401 
Significance .138 .028 .878 
 Predicted sign Coeff T Stat P-value Coeff T Stat P-value Coeff T Stat P-value 
Intercept  .014 .647 .518 -.018 -.880 .380 .021 1.036 .302 
Country (+) .009 1.165 .245 .019 2.646 .009* -.008 -1.124 .262 
Company Size (+) -.058 -1.255 .211 -.042 -.849 .397 -.002 -.017 .987 
Managerial 
Ownership (-) .094 .991 .323 -.154 -1.978 .049** .037 .313 .755 
Board 
Independence (+) -.058 -.995 .321 -.098 -1.438 .152 -.002 -.033 .974 
Leverage (+) .152 2.268 .024** .117 1.543 .125 .019 .205 .838 
Profitability (+) -.015 -.419 .676 -.004 -.150 .881 .036 .960 .338 
*highly significant at 1% level, **significant at 5% level,  *** moderately significant at 10% level, n = 200 
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Table 7.14: CRDI ∆ Multiple Regression Analysis 
 ∆2009-2007 ∆2007-2008 ∆2008-2009 
Adjusted R2 .008 .000 -.015 
Durbin Watson 1.956 1.879 1.742 
F statistic 1.257 1.015 .499 
Significance .279 .417 .808 
 Predicted sign Coeff T Stat P-value Coeff T Stat P-value Coeff T Stat P-value 
Intercept  .125 2.736 .007 .034 .776 .439 .083 2.157 .032 
Country (+) -.031 -1.927 .055*** -.012 -.805 .422 -.018 -1.291 .198 
Company Size (+) -.012 -.131 .896 -.027 -.257 .798 .118 .663 .508 
Managerial 
Ownership (-) .096 .500 .618 -.378 -2.276 .024** .088 .386 .700 
Board 
Independence (+) .211 1.776 .077*** .019 .130 .896 .056 .447 .656 
Leverage (+) .023 .166 .868 .023 .141 .888 -.136 -.753 .452 
Profitability (+) -.019 -.256 .798 .005 .098 .922 -.023 -.323 .747 
*highly significant at 1% level, **significant at 5% level,  *** moderately significant at 10% level, n = 200 
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7.5     Summary 
 
Additional regressions are calculated in this chapter to better explain 
variance in the five risk disclosure key sub categories. There are 2007-
2009 and pooled data regressions for: 1) Business Risk Disclosure 
(BRDI), 2) Credit Risk Disclosure (CRDI), 3) Operating Risk Disclosure 
(ORDI), 4) Market Risk Disclosure (MRDI) and 5) Strategy Risk Disclosure 
(SRDI). This chapter also details the additional analysis to look at the 
association in risk disclosures change over time to the independent and 
control variables change and also the association of the change over time 
of the predictor variables with the change of the sub-categories of risk over 
the turbulent Global Financial Crisis (GFC) time period.  
 
Regression results for risk disclosure categories partially support agency 
theory tenets (H1, H2, H3 and H4 are partially accepted). Change RDI and 
the sub-categories of RDI is not easily predicted perhaps because only 
small changes in RDI occur over GFC period. 
 
The final chapter concludes the thesis with a summary of key findings, 
implications, contributions, limitations, assumptions, and final remarks. 
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CHAPTER 8 
INSIGHTS ON RISK COMMUNICATION 
 
8.1 Thesis Objective 
This thesis provides a longitudinal evaluation of the extent of voluntary risk 
disclosures in four key South-East Asian countries’ (Australia, Indonesia, 
Malaysia, and Singapore) manufacturing listed companies for the 2007-
2009 financial years. This is an important time span to investigate risk 
disclosures as it encompasses those years most directly impacted by the 
Global Financial Crisis (GFC). The sole focus on manufacturing listed 
companies is operationalized using the ORBIS data base which classifies 
industry via the North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) 
2007. The 200 sample firms are stratified randomly selected from 
manufacturing listed companies’ annual reports for fiscal year-ends 
ranging from 2007 to 2009. The reports include 50 annual reports of 
manufacturing companies per country, listed in the stock exchanges of 
Australia, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore. Thus, this doctoral study 
incorporates a total sample of 600 firm-year annual reports manufacturing 
listed companies in the four countries. An examination of the 
manufacturing sector is important as based on the data base from World 
Bank (2011) the value added to the GDP from this sector in these four 
countries are high (Australia 29%, Indonesia 47%, Malaysia 55%  and 
Singapore 26%).  
 
Agency theory is used to provide insights into manufacturing listed 
companies’ voluntary risk disclosure practices. The examination of the 
extent of Risk Disclosure Index (RDI) and its five key sub-categories is 
based on a comprehensive 34-item disclosure checklist weighting each 
equally. This thesis relates the extent of voluntary risk disclosures to four 
key factors: country, company size, managerial ownership and board 
independence.  
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This thesis is important as it helps us judge the impact of the GFC and 
other key factors upon the extent of risk disclosures in this weak economic 
2007- 2009 global financial crisis timeframe.  Changes were internally 
generated by the different impact of GFC in the four countries and 
externally driven through corporate collapses globally caused by the GFC. 
This final chapter reviews the hypotheses testing and main findings, 
additional analysis findings, implications, contributions, recommendations 
and key conclusions. 
 
8.2 Summary of Key Findings 
In the agency relationship between managers (agents) and shareholders 
(principals) there is separation of ownership and control. Principals want 
agents to act to maximize the principal welfare (Jensen and Meckling 
1976). A major issue is the information asymmetry between shareholders 
and managers in that some information may be given but some may be 
withheld (Marshall and Weetman 2002). On the other hand, agents are 
assumed to have incentives to disclose information voluntarily, mainly 
driven by rational agents’ self-interest for example regarding their 
reputation and remuneration (Healy and Palepu 2001). Disclosure can 
mitigate the information asymmetry problem (Botosan 1997; Hill and Short 
2009). 
 
A better level of risk communication allows capital market participants to 
be more aware of potential material changes and in doing so, disclosures 
may well reduce agency costs. Arguably, the disclosure of information 
about risk will improve stakeholder understanding (Marshall and Weetman 
2002; Cabedo and Tirado 2004; Taylor 2008; Hill and Short 2009). 
 
The entire paradigm of accounting has changed with a broadened sense 
of responsibility to all stakeholders (Mirfazli 2008). Wallage (2000) argues 
that good sustainability and social responsibility reporting should provide 
information that is relevant, reliable, neutral, understandable and 
complete. For instance, such completeness should include the 
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comprehensive communication of all key risk factors experienced by the 
company. CSR reporting is an extension of disclosure into non-traditional 
areas (such as risk) with a greater demand for accountability, ethical 
actions and being transparent about externalities (Pratten and Mashat 
2009). This study examined the communication of risk data which adds 
important insights into these broader categories. 
 
This thesis aims to identify one important aspect of ‘corporate social 
reporting’ that of the communication of all key risk factors experienced by 
a company. It identifies the level of voluntary risk disclosures (measured 
and labeled as RDI), as well as the five key sub-components of risks 
(business, strategy, operating, market, and credit disclosure). The 
research questions and the key findings are presented in Table 8.1, while 
Table 8.2 summaries the hypotheses testing. 
 
Table 8.1: Key Research Questions and Findings 
Research questions Findings 
1. What is the extent of listed 
manufacturing companies’ 
risk disclosures in annual 
reports? 
The findings show that overall RDI scores 
over the economically-challenging GFC 
time period averages only 33.73% 
(Section 5.3).  
2. To what extent have such 
listed manufacturing 
companies’ risk disclosures 
changed over time? 
The RDI rises every year ranging from 
31.46% in 2007, 34.20% in 2008, and 
35.54% in 2009 (Section 5.3). 
3. What are the factors 
explaining the level of risk 
disclosures? 
Multiple regression analysis provides 
evidence that country impacts on the level 
of RDI. Size, board independence, and 
profitability are positively associated and 
managerial ownership is negatively 
associated with the extent of voluntary risk 
disclosure (Section 6.5). 
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Table 8.2: Summary of Statistical Hypotheses Testing 
 
 
Independent 
Variables 
Accepted / 
Rejected Pooled 2007 2008 2009 
H1 
There is an association between country of incorporation and risk disclosures in 
the annual reports in listed manufacturing companies 
 COUNTRY ACCEPTED Highly Significant Significant Significant 
Not 
Significant 
H2 There is a positive association between company size and the risk disclosures in the annual reports of manufacturing listed companies. 
 COMPANY SIZE ACCEPTED Highly Significant 
Not 
Significant Significant Significant 
H3 There is a negative association between managerial ownership and the risk disclosures in the annual reports of manufacturing listed companies 
 MANAGERIAL OWNERSHIP ACCEPTED 
Highly 
Significant Significant Significant 
Not 
Significant 
H4 There is a positive association between higher levels of board independence and the risk disclosures in the annual reports of manufacturing listed companies 
 BOARD INDEPENDENCE ACCEPTED 
Highly 
Significant Significant Significant 
Not 
Significant 
Highly significant at 1% level, Significant at 5% level, Moderately significant at 10% level findings 
(see Table 6.4). 
 
In answering research question 3, Hypotheses 1 to 4 are advanced and 
tested. These hypotheses investigate the association between RDI and 
predictor variables: country, company size, managerial ownership and 
board independence. Statistical testing leads to the acceptance of all four 
hypotheses: H1, H2, H3 and H4 within the agency theory framework. 
 
The multiple regression primary model results (Table 6.4) support a 
positive association between the Risk Disclosures Index (RDI) and country 
of incorporation (CTY) for all years of the GFC observation period. The 
association between risk disclosures and country of incorporation is 
statistically significant at the 5% levels in years of 2007, 2008 and not 
statistically significant in 2009. Thus, Hypothesis 1 is supported for the 
2007 and 2008 observation periods. The highest RDI is Malaysian 
manufacturing listed companies (37.30%) follow by Singaporean 
companies (34.06%), then Australian companies (33.24%) with the lowest 
RDI being Indonesian companies with a mean 30.20% (see Table 5.6).  
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The hypotheses testing findings in Table 8.2 are robust given the extra 
analysis of other country measures which are: 1) categorized as 0 if 
country smaller impact of GFC (Australia and Indonesia) and 1 if country 
larger impact of GFC (Malaysia and Singapore); 2) categorized 1 if ex 
British colonial with applies common law and one-tier board system 
(Australia, Malaysia, and Singapore) and categorized 0 if ex Dutch colonial 
with applies civil law and two-tier board system (Indonesia) (see Tables 
6.6 and 6.7). 
 
A positive and statistically significant association between risk disclosures 
and firm size (Size) is found in 2008 and 2009 (Table 6.4). Thus, 
Hypothesis 2 is supported in 2008 and 2009. Size in the sensitivity 
analysis regression re-measured by log total revenue is again highly 
significant this time in all four regressions (2007, 2008, 2009, and pooled) 
again with positive coefficients (see Table 6.8).  
 
Hypothesis 3 is supported in 2007 and 2008 as there is a negative and 
statistical significant association (at the 5% level) between risk disclosures 
and managerial ownership (ManOwn) (Table 6.4). Managerial ownership 
in the sensitivity analysis (categorized 0 if have ≤ 15% managerial 
ownership and 1 if have > 15% managerial ownership is very similar to 
main regression results (see Table 6.9). Managerial ownership in the 
sensitivity analysis (categorized 0 if have ≤ 50% managerial ownership 
and 1 if have > 50% managerial ownership) is also similar with main 
regression Table 6.4 results (see Table 6.10).  
 
There is a positive and statistically significant association (at the 5 % level) 
between risk disclosure and board independence (BoardInd) in 2007 and 
2008 leading to the acceptance of Hypothesis 4 (see Table 6.4). Board 
meeting as the sensitivity analysis of corporate governance proxy does 
seem to make a difference in the hypotheses testing.  
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Further analysis was also conducted using the pooled data33. Statistically 
significant associations (at the 1% level) between RDI and the 
independent variables are noted for the pooled regression results. These 
results are consistent with the year-by-year regression results for each 
individual year (2007, 2008, and 2009). H1, H2, H3, H4 are supported for 
the pooled regression results. RDI is consistently and positively associated 
with CTY, Size, and BoardInd. The association between RDI and ManOwn 
has a negative and statistically significant association (Table 6.4). 
 
8.2.1 Extent of Risk Disclosure Index (RDI) Patterns 
There are several possible reasons to explain the relatively low level of 
RDI scores over the economically-challenging GFC time period (average 
score is 33.73%) (see Section 5.3).  Firstly, company management may 
feel that communicating risk information in annual reports is not essential 
for stakeholders in the four sample countries. Secondly, risk data could be 
considered ‘too confidential’ for the company to communicate such 
information to stakeholders. Thirdly, managers may feel there are already 
sufficient other public outlets for risk information. For instance, risk 
analysis could be prepared and communicated by individuals with 
professional risk management knowledge. Independent professional risk 
analysts have the potential to provide other sources of risk information to 
the stakeholders through their published or dissemination review on 
companies’ performance. Thus, companies may become less interested in 
disclosing risk information in their annual reports. This argument is 
consistent with the agency theory viewpoint suggested by Fama and 
Jensen (1983, P. 304) that “the decision  of managers  who  initiate  and  
implement  important  decisions  are  not  the major residual claimants 
and, therefore, do not bear a major share of the wealth effects of  their 
decisions. Without effective control procedures, such decision managers 
are more likely to take actions that deviate from the interests of residual 
claimants”.  
 
                                               
33 The limitation of analyzing pooled data is because of the repeated measure problem. 
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Probohudono et al. (2012b) argues that the relatively low level of risk 
disclosure by companies over the entire GFC crisis period may led to more 
uncertainty regarding social responsibility and long term sustainability 
development. 
 
The slowly rising level of RDI in every year ranging from 31.46% in 2007, 
34.20% in 2008, and 35.54% in 2009 (see Section 5.3) may be explained 
via several possible reasons. Firstly, firm management may feel that risk 
information is increasingly needed in the crisis years to reduces estimation 
of risk to better avoid market failure and encourage market liquidity leading 
to more efficient capital markets (Healy and Palepu 2001).  
 
Secondly, higher levels of risk communication over time could be caused 
by the natural increase in complexity of, regulations, operations and 
business strategies which then makes it harder for investors to clearly 
understand financial information without good explanations of risk factors 
(Beretta and Bozzoland 2004). Given this scenario, annual report 
preparers may chose to communicate additional risk information every 
year.  
 
Thirdly, the increase in risk disclosure in the later years suggests 
companies’ efforts to release information is an effective way to 
communicate and increase investors’ confidence during this globally weak 
economic time period. The new accounting ‘social responsibility’ era 
places more demand for comprehensive reporting and greater disclosure 
including risk information. This may have made company management 
more aware of their responsibilities to provide adequate risk information to 
stakeholders.    
 
Overall, the thesis findings reveal that managements’ decision in four 
countries in the GFC period is to communicate risk information at a 
generally low level in the annual reports but also reveal that risk 
communication slowly rises over the GFC crisis years. This may be due to 
the companies’ willingness to provide better risk information to enhance 
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stakeholders’ need for more comprehensive risk disclosure in the annual 
report.  
 
The overall RDI scores reveal vast disparities of communication across the 
various individual risk elements. Table 5.9 shows that the highest and the 
lowest risk disclosure are: 1) “Identifying, evaluating and managing 
significant risks” has the highest level of communication (91.17%), while 
2) “Effects of inflation on assets quantitative’’ is the lowest item with no 
disclosure (0 %) by any company for any of the three sample years. One 
possible reason for the highest disclosed item (91.17%) is that it well 
conveys a summary of the risks faced by the company. Whereas the 
lowest disclosed item (0 % for all years) may be too specific and may be 
deemed to portray a negative company image to the stakeholders.  
 
Table 5.9 notes the following individual items with rising communication 
across the three GFC years: 
• Identifying, evaluating and  managing risks; Major exchange rates 
used in the accounts; GAAP risks of the special purpose entity; 
Provide consumer credit business; Specific external factors affecting 
company’s prospect;  Effects of disposals; Effects of acquisition; 
Impact of strategy on future; Safety policy; Capital project committed; 
Major regional economic development; Effects of inflation on results—
qualitative; Committed expenditure for capital projects; Internal control 
and impact of risks that do materialize; Extensions of credit; Safety of 
products; Data on accidents; Freedom of association risk; Freedom of 
association risk;  Effects of inflation on results—quantitative. 
 
One possible reason for the rises of disclosure for these items is that they 
may be more directly perceived to benefit stakeholders. Companies may 
want to show stakeholders that they are concerned about the impact of the 
GFC and use increased communication to enhance their reputation.  
 
Table 5.9 then reveals that certain other items have falling levels of 
disclosure across the 2007-2009 sample period: 
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• These include data about the impact of accounting policy changes; 
internal control and the extant risks are acceptable. 
 
One probable reason for the decreasing disclosure level in these items is 
that company management may worry about the cost of disclosing this 
information. 
 
8.2.2 Discussion on Five Key of  sub Risk Disclosure Index (RDI) 
Patterns 
 
Five key sub-categories of RDI are analysed in this thesis. There are 
‘business risk’ (BRDI), ‘strategy risk’ (SRDI), ‘operating risk’ (ORDI), 
‘market risk’ (MRDI), and ‘credit risk’ (CRDI). 
The thesis findings highlight that business, credit, market, and strategy risk 
disclosure rise over the three GFC years. However, operating risk 
disclosures show a different trend by increasing in the 2008 period but 
then falling slightly in 2009 (see Section 5.4.1).  
 
For operating risk, the highest disclosure levels occur in 2008. Yet for the 
other four risk categories, the highest level of communication is in 2009. 
This implies that most companies increase their risk disclosure in the later 
years of the crisis in 2008 and 2009 possibly to reduce estimation risk to 
better avoid market failure and increase market liquidity. Such an 
approach could lead to more efficient capital markets (Healy and Palepu 
2001).  
Overall, operating risk disclosure is the highest sub-category of risk over 
time, while strategy risk is consistently far lower. Operating risk disclosure 
(45.70-48.10%), business risk (44.55-48.73%) and credit risk (44.00-
49.00%) are by far the highest sub-categories of risk disclosed over time, 
while market risk (16.24-19.27%) and strategy risk (13.81-19.50%) are 
consistently far lower (see Section 5.4.1). 
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It is surmised that the reason that operating, business and credit risk are 
more communicated is because these issues are seen to be critically vital 
to the organization’s success and are thus highlighted more during the 
economic crisis period. Whereas, the lower level of communication on the 
market and strategy risks may be a result of a perception that these items 
are more 'competitor-sensitive' and thus extra communication of these 
issues may be more contingent on senior manager's worries about the 
depth of the crisis and concern about maintaining market share. As these 
economic concerns begin to ease in 2009, the level of transparency 
perhaps approaches (more comfortably) the manager's equilibrium range 
(Probohudono et al. 2012a). 
 
8.3 Association of Risk Disclosure with Predictor Variables 
This section provides some explanations of the association between RDI 
with all the predictor variables under investigation. Univariate test ( t-tests, 
ANOVA and Post hoc Tukey) are discussed as well as correlation 
analyses and Ordinary Least Square (OLS) multiple regression. In 
aggregate these statistical techniques are used to test the four 
hypotheses. 
 
As discussed below, the multiple regression results shows that country, 
size, managerial ownership and board independence variables are 
statistically significantly and their associations help explain the extent of 
risk disclosures. 
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8.3.1  Country 
Country34 is statistically significant (p-value < 0.050) in three of the four 
regressions (except 2009) based on the OLS regression result (refer Table 
6.4). Thus, there is evidence to conclude that country is associated with 
the extent of risk disclosure. H1 is accepted.   
 
This thesis result is consistent with Marshall and Weetman (2002) which 
suggest that risk disclosure regulations drawn up at same times and with 
the same driving forces, may have a different impact in different regulatory 
environments. One plausible explanation is that the different response is 
based on varying levels of economic development and thus there is 
varying acceptance of risk information by stakeholders in each country 
(Marshall and Weetman 2002). 
 
The highest Risk Disclosure Index (RDI) occurs in Malaysian 
manufacturing listed companies (37.30%) followed by Singaporean 
companies (34.06%), then Australian companies (33.24%) with the lowest 
RDI being Indonesian companies with mean 30.20% (see Table 5.6). 
 
Other ways of looking at country differences discussed in this thesis are 
colonial inheritance, legal system, board system, and lastly stage of 
economic development. These may be key factors in the relationship 
between country and disclosure practice (see Chapter Two). 
                                               
34 Country in the main regression (categorized as nominal categories) is statistically 
significant in three of the four regressions (except 2009) with positive coefficients (see 
Table 6.4). Country in the sensitivity analysis is re-measured in three different ways: 
country re-measured by GDP per capita is not significant in all four regressions (see 
Table 6.5).Country in the sensitivity analysis (categorized as 0 if country has a smaller 
impact of GFC (Australia and Indonesia) and 1 if country has a larger impact of GFC 
(Malaysia and Singapore)) is statistically significant in three of the four regressions 
(except 2009) with positive coefficients (see Table 6.6). Country in the sensitivity analysis 
(categorized 1 if it is a ex British colonial (which applies common law) and a one-tier 
board system (Australia, Malaysia, and Singapore) and categorized 0 if the country is a 
ex Dutch colonial jurisdiction which applies civil law and two-tier board system 
(Indonesia)) is statistically significant in all of the four regressions but with negative 
coefficients (see Table 6.7).  
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Australia, Malaysia and Singapore are countries using the British system 
of law with their history of colonialisation. In contrast, Indonesia is a former 
Dutch colony. Australia, Malaysia and Singapore are common law 
countries, while Indonesia is a civil law country. Australia, Malaysia, and 
Singapore have a one-tier board of director system, while Indonesia has a 
two-tier system. Australia and Singapore are more economically 
developed while Malaysia and Indonesia are emerging economies. 
Extra sensitivity analysis in Section 6.6 country was re-measured by: a) 
GDP per capita; b) economic effect of Global Financial Crisis (GFC) 
categorized 0 if country experiences a smaller impact of the GFC 
(Australia and Indonesia) and 1 if country experiences a larger negative 
impact of the GFC (Malaysia and Singapore); c) categorized 1 if ex British 
colonial with its common law and have a one-tier board system (Australia, 
Malaysia, Singapore) and categorized 0 if ex Dutch colonial with its civil 
law approach and have a two-tier board system (Indonesia). The 
sensitivity analysis results show that in the country re-measurement: 
impact of GFC, colonial history, legal system, and board system do make 
a difference in the regression model. These results support Ball et al 
(2000).  which suggest that information asymmetry in common law 
countries is better resolved by timely public disclosure and financial 
statements than in civil law countries and this finding is consistent with the 
Jaggi and Low (2000) conclusion that financial disclosures by companies 
from common laws countries are significantly higher compared to 
companies from civil law countries.  
 
Another factor that can explain variances across countries relates to the 
different overall risk factors in each country. Several international 
organizations provide overview risk reports and ratings (see Section 2.5). 
For example, country risk rating analyst by the Economist Intelligence Unit 
(EIU) (EIU 2012a) reveals that overall Australia and Singapore have lower 
risk levels than Malaysia and Indonesia. 
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8.3.2  Company Size 
Size35 is statistically significant in three of the four regressions (except 
2007) with positive coefficients (Table 6.4). Larger companies are 
communicating a higher level of risk data. This clearly provides support for 
agency theory tenets, H2 is accepted.  
 
The association between size and the extent of disclosure has been well 
documented in previous studies (Kanto and Schadewitz 1997; Atan and 
Maruhun 2009; Linsley and Shrives 2009). This is usually attributed to 
bigger companies having stronger financial resources with more complex 
operations to gather more information including risk disclosure. 
Consequently, company size is an important motivating factor of voluntary 
risk disclosure. Moreover, from an agency theory perspective, larger 
companies communicate more due to their higher political visibility. 
 
Disclosure can reduce monitoring cost as part of agency cost by 
minimizing the capacity of managers’ ability to adjust disclosure data 
(Marshall and Weetman 2002). Therefore, large manufacturing firms that 
have more complex operations will better ensure monitoring activities to 
reduce asymmetry of information. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
35 In the main statistical test, company size is measured by the companies’ total asset in 
U.S dollar and logged to reduce skewness. This proxy is recalculated by using a different 
measurement for sensitivity analysis by analyzing log total revenue. A comparison 
between main and sensitivity analysis measurements for the company size shows that 
the effect on RDI is very similar. Size in main regression measured by log total asset is 
statistically significant in three of the four regressions (except 2007) with positive 
coefficients (Table 6.4). Whereas, size in the sensitivity analysis regression measured by 
log total revenue is highly significant in all four regressions (2007, 2008, 2009, and 
pooled) with positive coefficients (see Table 6.8). 
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8.3.3 Managerial Ownership 
Managerial ownership36 is negatively related to risk disclosures in three of 
the four regressions (except 2009). Firms with lower levels of managerial 
ownership disclose more risk information. Therefore, H3 is accepted. 
 
This is consistent with the results of the majority of past studies which note 
a negative relationship between managerial ownership and the level of 
disclosure (Gelb 2000; Eng and Mak 2003). Lower managerial ownership 
is associated with increased voluntary disclosure.  
 
Managerial ownership in sample companies falls throughout the early to 
mid GFC period from 2007 to 2008 (Table 5.1) and seems to also 
influence the level of risk disclosure (Table 6.4). Companies with lower 
levels of managerial ownership are more likely to communicate voluntary 
risk disclosure. Eng and Mak (2003) state that lower levels of managerial 
ownership will need higher levels of monitoring in the scenario that is 
associated with increased companies’ voluntary disclosure. Gelb (2000) 
examines the effect of managerial ownership on firms’ disclosures and 
finds firms with lower levels of managerial ownership are more likely 
communicators of risk disclosures than firms with higher levels of 
managerial ownership. That is, based on agency theory, managers have 
greater incentives to consume perks and reduced incentives to maximize 
job performance. Managers with more influence may seek to downplay 
                                               
36 Managerial ownership in the main regression measured by the percentage of 
managerial ownership is statistically significant in three of the four regressions (except 
2009) with negative coefficients (Table 6.4). In the sensitivity analysis, managerial 
ownership is re-measured by: categorized as present or have > 5% or >10% or > 15% or 
> 20% or > 25% or > 50% managerial ownership. Managerial ownership in the sensitivity 
analysis (categorized 0 if have ≤ 15% managerial ownership and 1 if have > 15% 
managerial ownership) is significant in 2007 and pooled data and moderate significant in 
2008 with negative coefficients (see Table 6.9). This is very similar to the main regression 
in Table 6.4 results. Managerial ownership in the sensitivity analysis (categorized 0 if 
have ≤ 50% managerial ownership and 1 if have > 50% managerial ownership) is 
significant in 2008 and pooled data and moderate significant in 2007 with negative 
coefficients (see Table 6.10). This is also similar with the Table 6.4 main regression 
results.  
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social responsibility issues. Thus, lower managerial ownership is 
associated with increased voluntary disclosure. 
 
8.3.4 Board Independence 
Board independence37 is positively significant in three of the four 
regressions (except 2009), leading to acceptance of H4 (consistent with 
agency theory tenets). A higher percentage of independent board 
members seem to positively influence risk disclosures (refer Table 6.4). 
 
Prior studies document a significant effect of board independence on 
disclosure practices (Chen and Jaggi 2000; Cheng and Courtenay 2006; 
Baek et al. 2009). The results of most past agency theory studies establish 
a positive relationship between board independence and the level of 
disclosure. This is consistent with the thesis result. 
 
The evidence from this thesis is that firms with better corporate 
governance systems communicate more risk information. Greater 
presence of independent directors within the company positively affects 
the risk disclosure levels. Arguably, independent directors have less 
personal interest which allows them to feel more free to inform the 
shareholders about risk information. In addition, independent directors 
have incentives to use their decision controls to preserve reputational 
capital. The main function of the board is to supply governance protection 
to the shareholders. Shareholders and broader stakeholder classes, as 
beneficiaries of risk, need representation on the board that is independent 
of management to protect their assets (Cheng and Courtenay 2006).  
 
 
                                               
37 Alternate corporate governance proxies were also examined. The main analysis 
calculates the percentage of board independence compared to the sensitivity analysis 
which calculates the number of the board meetings. The comparison between the results 
of main and sensitivity analysis reveal that the regression result is quite different. Board 
independence is positively significant in three of the four regressions (Table 6.4). Board 
meetings proxy however is positively significant only in pooled year (Table 6.11).  
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8.3.5 Control Variables 
In order to ascertain the effect of other variables in determining the extent 
of RDI, several control variables are examined in this thesis. Leverage is 
derived as total liabilities divided by total assets, profitability is measured 
by net profit divided by total assets, Auditor is classified as Big4 and non 
Big4 audit firm and age of business is calculated as the number of years 
from inception. 
 
OLS regression results indicate that profitability, as a control variable is 
positively significant in three of the four regressions (except 2007). More 
profitability firms have higher levels of risk communication (refer Table 
6.4). This may be because they want to show that they communicate more 
comprehensively and are more transparent to attract potential investors in 
order to gain additional capital. 
  
The others control variables are not statistically significant predictors of the 
extent of risk disclosure during the 2007-2009 GFC time period. 
 
8.4 Additional analysis 
This study also predicts the association between the change in the overall 
Risk Disclosure Index (RDI) and the change in the value of the 
independent (country, company size, managerial ownership and board 
independence) and control variables38 (leverage and profitability) between 
years. The association between the change in RDI and change in 
managerial ownership between the year 2007-2008 is the only predictor 
which is statistically significant with a negative coefficient (see Table 7.7). 
The others independent and control variables changes are not statistically 
significant between any of the years (2007-2009; 2007-2008; 2008-2009). 
This implies that in general there is no significant change for companies in 
the three GFC years except the managerial ownership change in 2007-
                                               
38 Auditor and age of business are excluded from these models as they effectively did not 
change over the sample period. 
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2008. Despite the importance for companies to disclose risk information, 
RDI only rose slightly over time in the three GFC years perhaps as 
concerns about the future increases a company’s willingness to provide 
better risk information. 
 
This thesis also conducted several additional analyses. 20 new 
regressions were presented to better explain variance in the five risk 
disclosure key sub categories (business, strategy, operating, market and 
credit risk). OLS regression results for risk disclosure categories 
somewhat support agency theory tenets (H1, H2, H3 and H4 are partially 
accepted). (see Section 7.2).  Additional analysis was also conducted 
regarding the change of the value of the predictor variables39 to the 
change of five key sub-categories of RDI. The result implies that there is 
significant change for companies’ managerial ownership change in 2007-
2008 which is associated with ‘credit risk’ (CRDI) and ‘market risk’ (MRDI) 
change in 2007-2008. The change in companies’ leverage between 2007-
2009 is positively associated with ‘market risk’ (MRDI) change in 2007-
2009. The change in profitability in 2007-2008 is negatively associated 
with ‘operating risk’ (ORDI) in the change between 2007-2008. Yet for 
these additional analysis models, leverage and profitability change have 
unexpected correlation directions and differ from the RDI model (main 
analysis model) direction.  
 
8.5 Implications 
The findings from this thesis have several important theoretical and 
practical implications. The findings are largely consistent with agency 
theory. For example, board independence as a proxy of corporate 
governance mechanism is positively significant to predict the extent of risk 
disclosure. Corporate governance is a set of control and monitoring 
systems to mitigate agents from exploiting company information to gain a 
comparative advantage over principals (Jensen and Meckling 1976). 
                                               
39 Auditor and age of business are again excluded in this model because there is only 
negligible change.  
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Corporate governance can reduce agency problems such as information 
asymmetry and agency costs. Disclosures can reduce agency costs by 
minimizing the capacity of managers to adjust disclosure data (Marshall 
and Weetman 2002). Disclosures can also reduce estimation risk to better 
avoid market failure and increase market liquidity leading to more efficient 
capital markets (Healy and Palepu 2001). However, agency problems can 
arise when there are a large force of managerial shareholders as they can 
disadvantage outsider shareholders. This thesis reveals that managerial 
ownership is negatively significantly related with the extent of risk 
disclosure suggesting that managerial ownership provides a monitoring 
mechanism for a company’s risk disclosure policy. This finding is 
consistent with the mainstream agency theory literature.  
 
Overall, this study finds that there are varying levels of risk disclosure over 
time, across countries and these are influenced by key firm characteristics 
as well as country of listing.  These findings are useful for self-evaluation 
and benchmarking of risk communication by other corporations across the 
global landscape. This thesis specific focus is on manufacturing 
companies. Manufacturing companies are seen as implementing 
integrated processes that convert materials into goods (see Drucker 
1990). Manufacturing companies have longer processes, more complex 
activities, and may well have more business risks in these activities over 
most other firms. Arguably, a sole focus on manufacturing firms does 
better test the agency theory ability to predict disclosures. 
 
Communication laggards are potentially at a disadvantage if they are not 
more transparent about their risk status to their stakeholders from the 
perspective of both social reporting and future economic evaluations.  For 
stakeholders, the inclusion of extensive risk disclosures in the annual 
reports is useful for decision making. Stakeholders may reward companies 
that include greater communication of potential firm risks. Higher risk 
disclosure can also lead to a better understanding of a company’s social 
responsibility stance.  
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8.6 Thesis Contributions and Suggestions for Future Research 
This thesis is very important as it contributes to the literature in a number 
of ways. Firstly, it provides insights into risk disclosure practices. It helps 
stakeholders (including domestic and foreign investors) to better assess 
the risk profile for Australia, Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore 
manufacturing listed companies. Secondly, by examining the impact of 
country, company size, managerial ownership and board independence on 
a literature-based Risk Disclosure Index (RDI) within annual reports for the 
year 2007, 2008, and 2009, these thesis findings assist stakeholders in 
obtaining a better understanding of the possible influences upon risk 
communication. Thirdly, it contributes to the accounting literature by 
testing agency theory’s ability to explain risk disclosure. Fourthly, there is a 
lack of risk disclosure studies in manufacturing companies especially in 
these four countries. Fifthly, this study is one of the first to examine the 
impact of financial crisis 2007-2009 on disclosure via a longitudinal data 
set. Lastly, research on disclosure risk using sample countries different 
economic scenarios is rarely done.  
 
A limitation of this study is that the sample is solely based on 
manufacturing companies in key South-East Asian countries. However, for 
the purposes of generalization, the findings should and could be tested in 
other countries and across other industry sectors. Future research is 
recommended to expand the number and types of countries studied and 
expand the longitudinal analysis as countries recover from the Global 
Financial Crisis and move on to other economic paradigms.  Lastly, 
qualitative research techniques could be employed to further examine how 
risk disclosures enhance our understanding of economic and social 
reporting. 
 
Overall, the study findings are useful for self-evaluation and benchmarking 
of risk communication by researchers, regulators, stakeholders and other 
corporations across countries. 
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8.7 Final Remarks 
This thesis sheds light on the voluntary risk  reporting practices in four key 
South-East Asian countries (Australia, Indonesia, Malaysia, and 
Singapore,) manufacturing listed companies. This study’s selected time 
span using the 2007-2009 financial years is important due to the impact of 
the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) to better understand the extent of risk 
disclosure communication over an economically challenging economic 
timeframe. Despite the importance for companies to disclose risk 
information, the findings reveal that four countries manufacturing listed 
companies mostly communicate relative low levels of risk (31.46% in 
2007, 34.20% in 2008, and 35.54% in 2009); however risk communication 
does slowly rise over the three GFC years perhaps as a future portent 
concerning company’s willingness to provide better risk information. This 
longitudinal and cross countries examination of the extent of voluntary risk 
disclosure enhances our understanding and knowledge of the key South-
East Asian countries’ manufacturing listed companies voluntary risk 
disclosure pattern.  
 
Mirfazli (2008) offers a very important categorization of the depth of 
disclosure that could be provided by companies to their stakeholders. The 
three categories are ‘adequate’, ‘fair’ and ‘full’. Adequate disclosures cover 
the bare minimum, fair disclosure includes ethical targets whereas full 
disclosure represents communication of all relevant information (including 
a wide swath of social responsibility issues). Dissemination of risk 
information in its idealized form well fits into this comprehensive third 
category.  However, the actual level of risk communication does not obtain 
this high benchmark criteria, greater risk communication is thus advocated 
to increase stakeholder understanding of all aspects of company’s 
activities: economic, social and environmental.  
 
Overall, this thesis finds that there are varying levels of risk disclosure over 
time, across countries and these are influenced by key firm characteristics 
and economic drivers. Future research is recommended to increase the 
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number of countries studied, further examine how risk disclosure enhance 
our understanding of social reporting and expand the longitudinal analysis 
as countries recover from the Global Financial Crisis.  
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APPENDIX A:  Post hoc Turkey Analysis 
 
 
Appendix A.1 provides evidence for the Post hoc Tukey analysis in the 
continuous independent variables and control variables by country. 
 
 Appendix A.1 Post Hoc Tukey P value IV+CV: By Country  
Country Country FSize ManOwn BoardInd AgeBus Lev Prof 
Indonesia 
Australia .019** .000* 1.000 .000* .000* .000* 
Malaysia .997 .000* .121 .000* .001* .986 
Singapore .488 .000* .781 .000* .000* .592 
Australia 
Indonesia .019** .000* 1.000 .000* .000* .000* 
Malaysia .010** .399 .149 .799 .632 .000* 
Singapore .441 .950 .830 .578 .742 .000* 
Malaysia 
Indonesia .997 .000* .121 .000* .001* .986 
Australia .010** .399 .149 .799 .632 .000* 
Singapore .367 .153 .584 .983 .998 .799 
Singapore 
Indonesia .488 .000* .781 .000* .000* .592 
Australia .441 .950 .830 .578 .742 .000* 
Malaysia .367 .153 .584 .983 .998 .799 
IV = Independent Variable, CV = Control variable, *highly significant at 1% level, 
**significant at 5% level, *** moderately significant at 10% level 
 
Appendix A.2 presents the Post hoc Tukey analysis in the continuous 
independent variables and control variables by year. 
 
Appendix A.2 Post Hoc Tukey P value IV+CV: By Year  
Year Year FSize ManOwn BoardInd AgeBus Lev Prof 
2007 
2008 .730 .724 .742 .931 .745 .217 
2009 .525 .756 .486 .752 .962 .714 
2008 
2007 .730 .724 .742 .931 .745 .217 
2009 .943 .998 .911 .931 .580 .646 
2009 
2007 .525 .756 .486 .752 .962 .714 
2008 .943 .998 .911 .931 .580 .646 
IV = Independent Variable, CV = Control variable, *highly significant at 1% level, 
**significant at 5% level, *** moderately significant at 10% level 
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Appendix A.3 shows evidence for the Post hoc Tukey analysis in the continuous independent variables and control variables by 
country and year. 
 
 
Appendix A.3 Tukey RDI: By Country and Year 
Country Country 
FSize 
 
 
2007 
Man 
Own 
 
2007 
Board 
Ind 
 
2007 
Age 
Bus 
 
2007 
Lev 
 
 
2007 
Prof 
 
 
2007 
FSize 
 
 
2008 
Man 
Own 
 
2008 
Board 
Ind 
 
2008 
Age 
Bus 
 
2008 
Lev 
 
 
2008 
Prof 
 
 
2008 
FSize 
 
 
2009 
Man 
Own 
 
2009 
Board 
Ind 
 
2009 
Age 
Bus 
 
2009 
Lev 
 
 
2009 
Prof 
 
 
2009 
Indonesia 
Australia .482 .000* 1.000 .080*** .005* .022** .099*** .000* .863 .080*** .030** .065*** .583 .005* .924 .080*** .029** .000* 
Malaysia .999 .048** .489 .020** .035** .993 1.000 .004* .320 .020** .118 .999 .991 .020** .894 .020** .222 .899 
Singapore .743 .000* .939 .011** .127 .986 .753 .000* .754 .011** .078*** .794 .960 .001* 1.000 .011** .065*** .317 
Australia 
Indonesia .482 .000* 1.000 .080*** .005* .022** .099*** .000* .863 .080*** .030** .065*** .583 .005* .924 .080*** .029** .000* 
Malaysia .394 .369 .514 .954 .923 .046** .122 .926 .788 .954 .946 .045** .400 .973 .543 .954 .820 .000* 
Singapore .975 1.000 .950 .884 .656 .008* .552 .976 .997 .884 .983 .398 .866 .950 .894 .884 .990 .000* 
Malaysia 
Indonesia .999 .048** .489 .020** .035** .993 1.000 .004* .320 .020** .118 .999 .991 .020** .894 .020** .222 .899 
Australia .394 .369 .514 .954 .923 .046** .122 .926 .788 .954 .946 .045** .400 .973 .543 .954 .820 .000* 
Singapore .654 .375 .834 .997 .953 .929 .804 .729 .889 .997 .998 .713 .858 .768 .924 .997 .942 .736 
Singapore 
Indonesia .743 .000* .939 .011** .127 .986 .753 .000* .754 .011** .078*** .794 .960 .001* 1.000 .011** .065*** .317 
Australia .975 1.000 .950 .884 .656 .008* .552 .976 .997 .884 .983 .398 .866 .950 .894 .884 .990 .000* 
Malaysia .654 .375 .834 .997 .953 .929 .804 .729 .889 .997 .998 .713 .858 .768 .924 .997 .942 .736 
*highly significant at 1% level, **significant at 5% level, *** moderately significant at 10% level 
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Appendix A.4 displays the Post hoc the Tukey analysis in the Risk 
Disclosure Index (RDI) as dependent variable by country. 
 
Appendix A.4 Tukey RDI: By Country  
Dependent 
Variable Country Country Sig 
RDI 
Indonesia 
Australia .364 
Malaysia .001* 
Singapore .167 
Australia 
Indonesia .364 
Malaysia .133 
Singapore .972 
Malaysia 
Indonesia .001* 
Australia .133 
Singapore .307 
Singapore 
Indonesia .167 
Australia .972 
Singapore .307 
*highly significant at 1% level, **significant at 5% level, *** moderately significant at 10% 
level 
 
 
Appendix A.5 gives evidence for the Post hoc Tukey analysis in the Risk 
Disclosure Index (RDI) as dependent variable by year. 
 
Appendix A.5 Tukey RDI: By Year  
Dependent 
Variable Year Year Sig 
RDI 
2007 
2008 .025** 
2009 .000* 
2008 
2007 .025** 
2009 .410 
2009 
2007 .000* 
2008 .410 
*highly significant at 1% level, **significant at 5% level, *** moderately significant at 10% 
level 
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Appendix A.6 illustrates the Post hoc Tukey analysis results in the Risk 
Disclosure Index (RDI) as dependent variable by country and year. 
 
Appendix A.6   Tukey RDI: By Country and Year 
Country Country RDI 2007 RDI 2008 RDI 2009 
Indonesia 
Australia .236 .288 .823 
Malaysia .001* .003* .021** 
Singapore .085 .164 .623 
Australia 
Indonesia .236 .288 .823 
Malaysia .155 .307 .175 
Singapore .962 .990 .986 
Malaysia 
Indonesia .001* .003* .021** 
Australia .155 .307 .175 
Singapore .369 .478 .325 
Singapore 
Indonesia .085*** .164 .623 
Australia .962 .990 .986 
Malaysia .369 .478 .325 
*highly significant at 1% level, **significant at 5% level, *** moderately significant at 10% 
level 
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Appendix A.7 provides evidence for the Post hoc Tukey analysis in the five 
sub-categories of Risk Disclosure Index (RDI) as dependent variable by 
country. 
 
 Appendix A.7   Tukey Five sub RDI: By Country  
Country Country BRDI SRDI ORDI MRDI CRDI 
Indonesia 
Australia .000* .000* .000* .008** .145 
Malaysia .000* .873 .000* .998 .990 
Singapore .012** .000* .000* .963 1.000 
Australia 
Indonesia .000* .000* .000* .008** .145 
Malaysia .258 .000* .000* .015** .262 
Singapore .032** .094*** .074*** .035** .178 
Malaysia 
Indonesia .000* .873 .000* .998 .990 
Australia .258 .000* .000* .015** .262 
Singapore .805 .004* .001* .991 .997 
Singapore 
Indonesia .012** .000* .000* .963 1.000 
Australia .032** .094*** .074*** .035** .178 
Malaysia .805 .004* .001* .991 .997 
*highly significant at 1% level, **significant at 5% level, *** moderately significant at 10% 
level 
 
 
 
Appendix A.8 displays the Post hoc Tukey analysis results in the five sub-
categories of Risk Disclosure Index (RDI) as dependent variable by year. 
 
Appendix A.8   Tukey Five sub RDI: By year  
Year Year BRDI SRDI ORDI MRDI CRDI 
2007 2008 .552 .002* .529 .018** .963 
2009 .047 .000* .581 .015** .186 
2008 2007 .552 .002* .529 .018** .963 
2009 .375 .649 .996 .998 .296 
2009 2007 .047** .000* .581 .015** .186 
2008 .375 .649 .996 .998 .296 
*highly significant at 1% level, **significant at 5% level, *** moderately significant at 10% 
level 
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Appendix A.9 provides evidence for the Post hoc Tukey analysis in the five sub-categories of Risk Disclosure Index (RDI) as 
dependent variable by country and year. 
 
Appendix A.9  Tukey 5 sub RDI:  By Country and Year 
Country Country 
BRDI 
 
2007 
SRDI 
 
2007 
ORDI 
 
2007 
MRDI 
 
2007 
CRDI 
 
2007 
BRDI 
 
2008 
SRDI 
 
2008 
ORDI 
 
2008 
MRDI 
 
2008 
CRDI 
 
2008 
BRDI 
 
2009 
SRDI 
 
2009 
ORDI 
 
2009 
MRDI 
 
2009 
CRDI 
 
2009 
Indonesia 
Australia .000* .000* .000* .040** .888 .025** .014** .000* .967 .812 .025** .003* .000* .043** .180 
Malaysia .011** .733 .000* .218 .888 .321 .958 .000* .601 .998 .166 .807 .000* 1.000 .741 
Singapore .036** .006** .000* .378 .888 .645 .270 .000* .758 .998 .462 .107 .000* .955 .741 
Australia 
Indonesia .000* .000* .000* .040** .888 .025** .014** .000* .967 .812 .025** .003* .000* .043** .180 
Malaysia .587 .001* .000* .880 .474 .669 .003* .015** .324 .893 .864 .046** .013** .047** .741 
Singapore .339 .353 .111 .708 .474 .342 .605 .404 .471 .712 .509 .602 .969 .146 .741 
Malaysia 
Indonesia .011** .733 .000* .218 .888 .321 .958 .000* .601 .998 .166 .807 .000* 1.000 .741 
Australia .587 .001* .000* .880 .474 .669 .003* .015** .324 .893 .864 .046** .013** .047** .741 
Singapore .976 .104 .088*** .988 1.000 .950 .098*** .462 .994 .985 .930 .512 .047** .963 1.000 
Singapore 
Indonesia .036** .006* .000* .378 .888 .645 .270 .000* .758 .998 .462 .107 .000* .955 .741 
Australia .339 .353 .111 .708 .474 .342 .605 .404 .471 .712 .509 .602 .969 .146 .741 
Malaysia .976 .104 .088*** .988 1.000 .950 .098*** .462 .994 .985 .930 .512 .047** .963 1.000 
*highly significant at 1% level, **significant at 5% level, *** moderately significant at 10% level 
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From Appendix A (1-9) Post hoc Tukey analysis there are clear 
conclusion for this thesis which are: 
• Appendix A.1 provides evidence that for firm size, Australian 
manufacturing listed firm size is significantly higher than Indonesian 
and Singaporean. For managerial ownership, Indonesian 
manufacturing listed companies is statistically lower than all three 
other countries manufacturing listed companies.  Appendix A.1 also 
shows that Indonesian age of business is significantly higher than 
the three others counties. Indonesian manufacturing listed 
companies leverage is significantly higher than three other countries 
companies’ leverage. Also, the Australian companies profit mean is 
statistically significantly lower than all three other countries. 
• Appendix A.2 reveals that there is no statistically significant predictor 
variables (size, managerial ownership, board independent, leverage, 
profit, age of business) in 2007, 2008 or 2009. 
• Appendix A.3 further reveals that in 2007, 2008, and 2009 
Indonesian manufacturing listed companies managerial ownership is 
significantly lower than all three other countries. The control variable 
analysis shows that Indonesia companies’ age of business is 
significantly higher than the three other countries in 2007, 2008, and 
2009. In 2007, Indonesian companies’ leverage is significantly 
different with Australian and Malaysian firms. Australian companies’ 
profit figure is statistically significant lower than all three other 
countries. Moreover, in 2009 Australian companies’ profits are 
significantly lower than the three other countries.    
• Appendix A.4 shows that RDI between Indonesian manufacturing 
listed companies and Malaysian manufacturing listed companies is 
statistically significantly different.  
• Appendix A.5 reveals that RDI 2007 is statistically significantly lower 
than RDI 2008 and 2009. 
• Appendix A.6 illustrates that in 2007, 2008, and 2009 RDI in 
Indonesian manufacturing listed companies are statistically 
significantly lower than Malaysian manufacturing listed companies. 
• Appendix A.7 notes that Indonesian companies BRDI are 
significantly lower with all three other countries companies’ BRDI 
score. Australian companies’ BRDI are significantly higher than 
Singaporean companies’ BRDI. Indonesian and Malaysian 
companies’ SRDI are significantly higher than Singaporean and 
Australian companies’ SRDI. Indonesian companies’ ORDI are 
significantly lower with all three other countries companies’ ORDI. 
Finally, Australian companies MRDI is significantly lower with all 
three other countries companies MRDI. 
• Appendix A.8 highlights further details noting that BRDI 2007 is 
significantly lower with BRDI 2009, SRDI 2007 is significantly lower 
than SRDI 2008 and 2009. MRDI 2007 is significantly lower with 
MRDI 2008 and 2009. Finally, ORDI and CRDI scores are not 
statistically different over the three year GFC period. 
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• Appendix A.9 reveals that in 2007 Indonesian companies’ BRDI are 
significantly lower than all three other countries companies’ BRDI. In 
2008 and 2009 Indonesian companies’ BRDI are only significant 
lower than Australian companies’ BRDI. In 2007, Indonesian and 
Malaysian companies’ SRDI are significantly higher than 
Singaporean and Australian companies’ SRDI. In 2008 and 2009 
only Australian companies are significantly lower than Indonesian 
and Malaysian companies’ SRDI. In 2007, 2008, 2009 Indonesian 
companies’ ORDI are significantly lower than all three other 
countries companies’ ORDI. In 2007 and 2009 Indonesian 
companies’ MRDI are significantly higher than Australian companies 
MRDI. 
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APPENDIX B: Pearson Correlation in Additional Analysis 
 
Appendix B1- B38 provides evidence on the Pearson Correlation for the 
additional analysis (five sub-categories of RDI, RDI change and five sub-
categories of RDI change) regression model over the different years and 
pooled data. 
 
Appendix B.1 Pearson Correlation BRDI 2007 
 BRDI 2007 CTY 
FSIZE 
2007 
Man 
Own 
2007 
Board 
Ind 
2007 
Lev 
2007 
Prof 
2007 
Aud 
2007 
AgeBus 
2007 
BRDI2007 1.000         
CTY .148** 1.000        
FSIZE2007 .268* .005 1.000       
ManOwn2007 -.142** .235* -.198* 1.000      
BoardInd2007 .182* .070 .232* -.125** 1.000     
Lev2007 -.027 -.131** .184* -.190* .131** 1.000    
Prof2007 .107*** .080 .364* -.002 .064 -.210* 1.000   
Aud2007 -.275* -.298* -.339* .161** -.179* .013 -.200* 1.000  
AgeBus2007 .155** -.217* .328* -.389* .141** .284* .142** -.259* 1.000 
*highly significant at 1% level, **significant at 5% level, *** moderately significant at 10% level 
 
Appendix B.2 Pearson Correlation BRDI 2008 
 BRDI 
2008 CTY 
FSIZE 
2008 
Man 
Own 
2008 
Board 
Ind 
2008 
Lev 
2008 
Prof 
2008 
Aud 
2008 
AgeBus 
2008 
BRDI2008 1.000         
CTY .053 1.000        
FSIZE2008 .300* .007 1.000       
ManOwn2008 -.155** .273* -.154* 1.000      
BoardInd2008 .225* .088 .251* -.051 1.000     
Lev2008 -.030 -.148** .137** -.143** .102*** 1.000    
Prof2008 .051 -.003 .224 -.008 -.007 -.004 1.000   
Aud2008 -.244* -.312* -.294* .090 -.264* .032 -.086 1.000  
AgeBus2008 .126** -.217* .308* -.365* .059 .279* .083 -.260* 1.000 
*highly significant at 1% level, **significant at 5% level, *** moderately significant at 10% level 
 
Appendix B.3 Pearson Correlation BRDI 2009 
 BRDI 
2009 CTY 
FSIZE 
2009 
Man 
Own 
2009 
Board 
Ind 
2009 
Lev 
2009 
Prof 
2009 
Aud 
2009 
AgeBus 
2009 
BRDI2009 1.000         
CTY .080 1.000        
SIZE2009 .276* -.019 1.000       
ManOwn2009 -.161** .243* -.161* 1.000      
BoardInd2009 .056 .036 .254* -.143** 1.000     
Lev2009 -.062 -.146** .124** -.114*** .129** 1.000    
Prof2009 .112*** .010 .235*** -.068 .137** .154** 1.000   
Aud2009 -.219* -.294* -.329* .086 -.293* .067 -.217* 1.000  
AgeBus2009 .089 -.217* .316* -.352* .145** .215* .214* -.230* 1.000 
*highly significant at 1% level, **significant at 5% level, *** moderately significant at 10% level 
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Appendix B.4 Pearson Correlation BRDI Pooled 
 BRDI 
pooled CTY 
SIZE 
pooled 
Man 
Own 
pooled 
Board 
Ind 
pooled 
Lev 
pooled 
Prof 
pooled 
Aud 
pooled 
AgeBus 
pooled 
BRDI pooled 1.000         
CTY .093** 1.000        
SIZE pooled .282* -.002 1.000       
ManOwn 
pooled -.154* .250* -.172* 1.000      
BoardInd 
pooled .158* .064** .247* -.109* 1.000     
Lev pooled -.041 -.141* .146* -.147* .120* 1.000    
Prof pooled .080** .025 .263* -.020 .052 -.017 1.000   
Aud pooled -.245* -.301* -.321* .114* -.245* .037 -.153* 1.000  
AgeBus pooled .126* -.217* .318* -.369* .117* .257* .134* -.249* 1.000 
*highly significant at 1% level, **significant at 5% level, *** moderately significant at 10% level 
 
Appendix B.5 Pearson Correlation SRDI 2007 
 SRDI 2007 CTY 
SIZE 
2007 
Man 
Own 
2007 
Board 
Ind 
2007 
Lev 
2007 
Prof 
2007 
Aud 
2007 
AgeBus 
2007 
SRDI 2007 1.000         
CTY -.127** 1.000        
SIZE 2007 .045 .005 1.000       
ManOwn 2007 -.247* .235* -.198* 1.000      
BoardInd 2007 .154** .070 .232* -.125** 1.000     
Lev  2007 .080 -.131** .184* -.190* .131** 1.000    
Prof  2007 .177* .080 .364* -.002 .064 -.210* 1.000   
Aud  2007 -.012 -.298* -.339* .161** -.179* .013 -.200* 1.000  
AgeBus  2007 .147** -.217* .328* -.389* .141** .284* .142** -.259* 1.000 
*highly significant at 1% level, **significant at 5% level, *** moderately significant at 10% level 
 
Appendix B.6 Pearson Correlation SRDI 2008 
 SRDI 2008 CTY 
SIZE 
2008 
Man 
Own 
2008 
Board 
Ind 
2008 
Lev 
2008 
Prof 
2008 
Aud 
2008 
AgeBus 
2008 
SRDI 2008 1.000         
CTY -.041 1.000        
SIZE 2008 .234* .007 1.000       
ManOwn 2008 -.206* .273* -.154* 1.000      
BoardInd 2008 .227* .088 .251* -.051 1.000     
Lev  2008 .058 -.148** .137** -.143** .102*** 1.000    
Prof  2008 .229* -.003 .224 -.008 -.007 -.004 1.000   
Aud  2008 -.105*** -.312* -.294* .090 -.264* .032 -.086 1.000  
AgeBus  2008 .076 -.217* .308* -.365* .059 .279* .083 -.260* 1.000 
*highly significant at 1% level, **significant at 5% level, *** moderately significant at 10% level 
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Appendix B.7 Pearson Correlation SRDI 2009 
 SRDI 2009 CTY 
SIZE 
2009 
Man 
Own 
2009 
Board 
Ind 
2009 
Lev 
2009 
Prof 
2009 
Aud 
2009 
AgeBus 
2009 
SRDI 2009 1.000         
CTY -.092*** 1.000        
SIZE 2009 .174* -.019 1.000       
ManOwn 2009 -.125** .243* -.161* 1.000      
BoardInd 2009 .171* .036 .254* -.143** 1.000     
Lev  2009 .115*** -.146** .124** -.114*** .129** 1.000    
Prof  2009 .214* .010 .235*** -.068 .137** .154** 1.000   
Aud  2009 -.086 -.294* -.329* .086 -.293* .067 -.217* 1.000  
AgeBus  2009 .124** -.217* .316* -.352* .145** .215* .214* -.230* 1.000 
*highly significant at 1% level, **significant at 5% level, *** moderately significant at 10% level 
 
 
Appendix B.8 Pearson Correlation SRDI Pooled 
 
SRDI 
pooled CTY 
SIZE 
pooled 
Man 
Own 
pooled 
Board 
Ind 
pooled 
Lev 
pooled 
Prof 
pooled 
Aud 
pooled 
AgeBus 
pooled 
SRDI pooled 1.000         
CTY -.083** 1.000        
SIZE pooled .156* -.002 1.000       
ManOwn pooled -.194* .250* -.172* 1.000      
BoardInd pooled .190* .064** .247* -.109* 1.000     
Lev  pooled .084** -.141* .146* -.147* .120* 1.000    
Prof  pooled .194* .025 .263* -.020 .052 -.017 1.000   
Aud  pooled -.070** -.301* -.321* .114* -.245* .037 -.153* 1.000  
AgeBus  pooled .117* -.217* .318* -.369* .117* .257* .134* -.249* 1.000 
*highly significant at 1% level, **significant at 5% level, *** moderately significant at 10% level 
 
 
 
Appendix B.9 Pearson Correlation ORDI 2007 
 ORDI 2007 CTY 
SIZE 
2007 
Man 
Own 
2007 
Board 
Ind 
2007 
Lev 
2007 
Prof 
2007 
Aud 
2007 
AgeBus 
2007 
ORDI 2007 1.000         
CTY .446* 1.000        
SIZE 2007 -.086 .005 1.000       
ManOwn 2007 .090 .235* -.198* 1.000      
BoardInd 2007 .090 .070 .232* -.125** 1.000     
Lev 2007 -.146** -.131** .184* -.190* .131** 1.000    
Prof 2007 .013 .080 .364* -.002 .064 -.210* 1.000   
Aud  2007 -.152** -.298* -.339* .161** -.179* .013 -.200* 1.000  
AgeBus  2007 -.114*** -.217* .328* -.389* .141** .284* .142** -.259* 1.000 
*highly significant at 1% level, **significant at 5% level, *** moderately significant at 10% level 
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Appendix B.10 Pearson Correlation ORDI 2008 
 
ORDI 
2008 CTY 
SIZE 
2008 
Man 
Own 
2008 
Board 
Ind 
2008 
Lev 
2008 
Prof 
2008 
Aud 
2008 
AgeBus 
2008 
ORDI 2008 1.000         
CTY .424* 1.000        
SIZE 2008 .004 .007 1.000       
ManOwn 2008 .117** .273* -.154* 1.000      
BoardInd 2008 .050 .088 .251* -.051 1.000     
Lev 2008 -.153** -.148** .137** -.143** .102*** 1.000    
Prof 2008 .102*** -.003 .224 -.008 -.007 -.004 1.000   
Aud  2008 -.083 -.312* -.294* .090 -.264* .032 -.086 1.000  
AgeBus  2008 -.134** -.217* .308* -.365* .059 .279* .083 -.260* 1.000 
*highly significant at 1% level, **significant at 5% level, *** moderately significant at 10% level 
 
 
Appendix B.11 Pearson Correlation ORDI 2009 
 
ORDI 
2009 CTY 
SIZE 
2009 
Man 
Own 
2009 
Board 
Ind 
2009 
Lev 
2009 
Prof 
2009 
Aud 
2009 
AgeBus 
2009 
ORDI 2009 1.000         
CTY .338* 1.000        
SIZE 2009 -.027 -.019 1.000       
ManOwn 2009 .170* .243* -.161* 1.000      
BoardInd 2009 -.003 .036 .254* -.143** 1.000     
Lev 2009 -.142** -.146** .124** -.114*** .129** 1.000    
Prof 2009 .056 .010 .235*** -.068 .137** .154** 1.000   
Aud  2009 -.082 -.294* -.329* .086 -.293* .067 -.217* 1.000  
AgeBus  2009 -.150** -.217* .316* -.352* .145** .215* .214* -.230* 1.000 
*highly significant at 1% level, **significant at 5% level, *** moderately significant at 10% level 
 
 
Appendix B.12 Pearson Correlation ORDI Pooled 
 
ORDI 
pooled CTY 
SIZE 
pooled 
Man 
Own 
pooled 
Board 
Ind 
pooled 
Lev 
pooled 
Prof 
pooled 
Aud 
pooled 
AgeBus 
pooled 
ORDI pooled 1.000         
CTY .401* 1.000        
SIZE pooled -.035 -.002 1.000       
ManOwn pooled .124* .250* -.172* 1.000      
BoardInd pooled .046 .064** .247* -.109* 1.000     
Lev pooled -.146* -.141* .146* -.147* .120* 1.000    
Prof pooled .057*** .025 .263* -.020 .052 -.017 1.000   
Aud pooled -.106* -.301* -.321* .114* -.245* .037 -.153* 1.000  
AgeBus  pooled -.131* -.217* .318* -.369* .117* .257* .134* -.249* 1.000 
*highly significant at 1% level, **significant at 5% level, *** moderately significant at 10% level 
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Appendix B.13 Pearson Correlation MRDI 2007 
 MRDI 2007 CTY 
SIZE 
2007 
Man 
Own 
2007 
Board 
Ind 
2007 
Lev 
2007 
Prof 
2007 
Aud 
2007 
AgeBus 
2007 
MRDI 2007 1.000         
CTY -.090 1.000        
SIZE 2007 .360* .005 1.000       
ManOwn 2007 -.172* .235* -.198* 1.000      
BoardInd 2007 .162** .070 .242* -.125** 1.000     
Lev 2007 .178* -.131** .184* -.190* .131** 1.000    
Prof 2007 .203* .080 .364* -.002 .064 -.210* 1.000   
Aud  2007 -.185* -.298* -.339* .161** -.179* .013 -.200* 1.000  
AgeBus  2007 .276* -.217* .328* -.389* .141** .284* .142** -.259* 1.000 
*highly significant at 1% level, **significant at 5% level, *** moderately significant at 10% level 
 
 
 
Appendix B.14 Pearson Correlation MRDI 2008 
 
MRDI 
2008 CTY 
SIZE 
2008 
Man 
Own 
2008 
Board 
Ind 
2008 
Lev 
2008 
Prof 
2008 
Aud 
2008 
AgeBus 
2008 
MRDI 2008 1.000         
CTY .104*** 1.000        
SIZE 2008 .086* .007 1.000       
ManOwn 2008 -.053 .273* -.154* 1.000      
BoardInd 2008 .143** .088 .251* -.051 1.000     
Lev 2008 .172* -.148** .137** -.143** .102*** 1.000    
Prof 2008 .200* -.003 .224 -.008 -.007 -.004 1.000   
Aud  2008 -.077 -.312* -.294* .090 -.264* .032 -.086 1.000  
AgeBus  2008 .185* -.217* .308* -.365* .059 .279* .083 -.260* 1.000 
*highly significant at 1% level, **significant at 5% level, *** moderately significant at 10% level 
 
 
Appendix B.15 Pearson Correlation MRDI 2009 
 MRDI 2009 CTY 
SIZE 
2009 
Man 
Own 
2009 
Board 
Ind 
2009 
Lev 
2009 
Prof 
2009 
Aud 
2009 
AgeBus 
2009 
MRDI 2009 1.000         
CTY .024 1.000        
SIZE 2009 -.005*** -.019 1.000       
ManOwn 2009 -.018 .243* -.161* 1.000      
BoardInd 2009 .127** .036 .254* -.143** 1.000     
Lev 2009 .163** -.146** .124** -.114*** .129** 1.000    
Prof 2009 .269* .010 .235*** -.068 .137** .154** 1.000   
Aud  2009 .022 -.294* -.329* .086 -.293* .067 -.217* 1.000  
AgeBus  2009 .115*** -.217* .316* -.352* .145** .215* .214* -.230* 1.000 
*highly significant at 1% level, **significant at 5% level, *** moderately significant at 10% level 
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Appendix B.16 Pearson Correlation MRDI Pooled 
 
MRDI 
pooled CTY 
SIZE 
pooled 
Man 
Own 
pooled 
Board 
Ind 
pooled 
Lev 
pooled 
Prof 
pooled 
Aud 
pooled 
AgeBus 
pooled 
MRDI pooled 1.000         
CTY .020 1.000        
SIZE pooled .276* .003 1.000       
ManOwn pooled -.079** .250* -.308* 1.000      
BoardInd pooled .146* .064** .236* -.109* 1.000     
Lev pooled .170* -.144** .240* -.146* .119* 1.000    
Prof pooled .208* .027 .376* -.019 .053 -.009 1.000   
Aud  pooled -.073** -.301* -.400* .114* -.245* .034 -.153* 1.000  
AgeBus  pooled .187* -.217* .437* -.369* .117* .257* .134* -.249* 1.000 
*highly significant at 1% level, **significant at 5% level, *** moderately significant at 10% level 
 
 
 
Appendix B.17 Pearson Correlation CRDI 2007 
 
CRDI 
2007 CTY 
SIZE 
2007 
Man 
Own 
2007 
Board 
Ind 
2007 
Lev 
2007 
Prof 
2007 
Aud 
2007 
AgeBus 
2007 
CRDI 2007 1.000         
CTY .081 1.000        
SIZE 2007 .090 .005 1.000       
ManOwn 2007 -.056 .235* -.198* 1.000      
BoardInd 2007 .101*** .070 .232* -.125** 1.000     
Lev 2007 .010 -.131** .184* -.190* .131** 1.000    
Prof 2007 .143** .080 .364* -.002 .064 -.210* 1.000   
Aud  2007 -.101*** -.298** -.339* .161** -.179* .013 -.200* 1.000  
AgeBus  2007 -.002 -.217* .328* -.389* .141** .284* .142** -.259* 1.000 
*highly significant at 1% level, **significant at 5% level, *** moderately significant at 10% level 
 
 
 
Appendix B.18 Pearson Correlation CRDI 2008 
 
CRDI 
2008 CTY 
SIZE 
2008 
Man 
Own 
2008 
Board 
Ind 
2008 
Lev 
2008 
Prof 
2008 
Aud 
2008 
AgeBus 
2008 
CRDI 2008 1.000         
CTY .028 1.000        
SIZE 2008 .080 .007 1.000       
ManOwn 2008 -.033 .273* -.154* 1.000      
BoardInd 2008 -.050 .088 .251* -.051 1.000     
Lev 2008 -.034 -.148** .137** -.143** .102*** 1.000    
Prof 2008 .081 -.003* .224 -.008 -.007 -.004 1.000   
Aud  2008 -.054 -.312* -.294* .090 -.264* .032 -.086 1.000  
AgeBus  2008 -.014 -.217* .308* -.365* .059 .279* .083 -.260* 1.000 
*highly significant at 1% level, **significant at 5% level, *** moderately significant at 10% level 
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Appendix B.19 Pearson Correlation CRDI 2009 
 
CRDI 
2009 CTY 
SIZE 
2009 
Man 
Own 
2009 
Board 
Ind 
2009 
Lev 
2009 
Prof 
2009 
Aud 
2009 
AgeBus 
2009 
CRDI 2009 1.000         
CTY -.045 1.000        
SIZE 2009 .120 -.019 1.000       
ManOwn 2009 .000 .243* -.161* 1.000      
BoardInd 2009 -.021 .036 .254* -.143** 1.000     
Lev 2009 .026 -.146** .124** -.114*** .129** 1.000    
Prof 2009 .130** .010 .235*** -.068 .137** .154** 1.000   
Aud  2009 .007 -.294* -.329* .086 -.293* .067 -.217* 1.000  
AgeBus  2009 -.006 -.217* .316* -.352* .145** .215* .214* -.230* 1.000 
*highly significant at 1% level, **significant at 5% level, *** moderately significant at 10% level 
 
 
Appendix B.20 Pearson Correlation CRDI Pooled 
 
CRDI 
pooled CTY 
SIZE 
pooled 
Man 
Own 
pooled 
Board 
Ind 
pooled 
Lev 
pooled 
Prof 
pooled 
Aud 
pooled 
AgeBus 
pooled 
CRDI pooled 1.000         
CTY .020 1.000        
SIZE pooled .098* -.002 1.000       
ManOwn pooled -.031 .250* -.172* 1.000      
BoardInd pooled .012 .064** .247* -.109* 1.000     
Lev pooled -.002 -.141* .146* -.147* .120* 1.000    
Prof pooled .110* .025 .263* -.020 .052 -.017 1.000   
Aud  pooled -.048 -.301* -.321* .114* -.245* .037 -.153* 1.000  
AgeBus  pooled -.006 -.217* .318* -.369* .117* .257* .134* -.249* 1.000 
*highly significant at 1% level, **significant at 5% level, *** moderately significant at 10% level 
 
 
Appendix B.21 Pearson Correlation Change RDI 20072009 
 
 Change RDI 
20072009 
CTY 
Change 
Size 
20072009 
Change 
ManOwn 
20072009 
Change 
BoarInd 
20072009 
Change 
Lev 
20072009 
Change 
Prof 
20072009 
ChangeRDI 
20072009 1.000       
CTY -.084 1.000      
ChangeSize 
20072009 -.025 -.171* 1.000     
ChangeManOwn 
20072009 -.041 -.002 -.055 1.000    
ChangeBoarInd 
20072009 -.008 -.046 -.007 -.041 1.000   
ChangeLev 
20072009 .062 -.077 .140** .009 .039 1.000  
ChangeProf 
20072009 -.101*** -.068 .108*** .066 .081 -.005 1.000 
*highly significant at 1% level, **significant at 5% level, *** moderately significant at 10% level 
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Appendix B.22 Pearson Correlation Change RDI 20072008 
 
 
Change 
RDI 
20072008 
CTY 
Change 
Size 
20072008 
Change 
ManOwn 
20072008 
Change 
BoarInd 
20072008 
Change 
Lev 
20072008 
Change 
Prof 
20072008 
ChangeRDI 
20072008 1.000       
CTY -.017 1.000      
ChangeSize 
20072008 -.002 .019 1.000     
ChangeManOwn 
20072008 -.153** .042 -.064 1.000    
ChangeBoarInd 
20072008 .050 .029 -.060 -.066 1.000   
ChangeLev 
20072008 .035 -.103*** .073 .041 .076 1.000  
ChangeProf 
20072008  -.054 -.061 .215* -.019 -.076 .099*** 1.000 
*highly significant at 1% level, **significant at 5% level, *** moderately significant at 10% level 
 
 
Appendix B.23 Pearson Correlation Change RDI 20082009 
 
 
Change 
RDI 
20082009 CTY 
ChangeLS
ize 
20082009 
Change 
ManOwn 
20082009 
Change 
BoarInd 
20082009 
Change 
Lev 
20082009 
Change 
Prof 
20082009 
ChangeRDI 
20082009 1.000       
CTY -.081 1.000      
ChangeSize 
20082009 .003 -.296* 1.000     
ChangeManOwn 
20082009 .050 -.063 .041 1.000    
ChangeBoarInd 
20082009 .015 -.083 .090 .041 1.000   
ChangeLev 
20082009 -.061 .008 .218* -.038 .006 1.000  
ChangeProf 
20082009 -.080 .013 .216* .025 -.080 -.017 1.000 
*highly significant at 1% level, **significant at 5% level, *** moderately significant at 10% level 
 
 
Appendix B.24 Pearson Correlation Change ORDI 20072009 
 Change 
ORDI 
20092007 
CTY 
Change 
Size 
20072009 
Change 
ManOwn 
20072009 
Change 
BoarInd 
20072009 
Change 
Leverage 
20072009 
Change 
Profit 
20072009 
ChangeORDI 
20092007 1.000       
COUNTRY -.126** 1.000      
ChangeSize 
20092007 .031 -.181* 1.000     
ChangeManOwn 
20092007 .017 -.002 -.060 1.000    
ChangeBoarInd 
20092007 .011 -.046 -.012 -.041 1.000   
ChangeLeverage 
20092007 .033 -.095 .170** .005 .047 1.000  
ChangeProfit 
20092007 -.109*** -.056 .105*** .066 .077 .049 1.000 
*highly significant at 1% level, **significant at 5% level, *** moderately significant at 10% level 
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Appendix B.25 Pearson Correlation Change BRDI 20072009 
 Change 
BRDI 
20072009 
CTY 
Change 
Size 
20072009 
Change 
ManOwn 
20072009 
Change 
BoarInd 
20072009 
Change 
Leverage 
20072009 
Change 
Profit 
20072009 
ChangeBRDI 
20092007 1.000       
COUNTRY -.098*** 1.000      
ChangeSize 
20092007 .017 -.181* 1.000     
ChangeManOwn 
20092007 -.099*** -.002 -.060 1.000    
ChangeBoarInd 
20092007 -.024 -.046 -.012 -.041 1.000   
ChangeLeverage 
20092007 .011 -.095 .170** .005 .047 1.000  
ChangeProfit 
20092007 -.057 -.056 .105*** .066 .077 .049 1.000 
*highly significant at 1% level, **significant at 5% level, *** moderately significant at 10% level 
 
 
Appendix B.26 Pearson Correlation Change CRDI 20072009 
 Change 
CRDI 
20072009 CTY 
Change 
Size 
20072009 
Change 
ManOwn 
20072009 
Change 
BoarInd 
20072009 
Change 
Leverage 
20072009 
Change 
Profit 
20072009 
ChangeCRDI 
20092007 1.000       
COUNTRY -.143** 1.000      
ChangeSize 
20092007 .012 -.181* 1.000     
ChangeManOwn 
20092007 .030 -.002 -.060 1.000    
ChangeBoarInd 
20092007 .130** -.046 -.012 -.041 1.000   
ChangeLeverage 
20092007 .029 -.095 .170** .005 .047 1.000  
ChangeProfit 
20092007 .001 -.056 .105*** .066 .077 .049 1.000 
*highly significant at 1% level, **significant at 5% level, *** moderately significant at 10% level 
 
 
Appendix B.27 Pearson Correlation Change MRDI 20072009 
 Change 
MRDI 
20072009 
CTY 
Change 
Size 
20072009 
Change 
ManOwn 
20072009 
Change 
BoarInd 
20072009 
Change 
Leverage 
20072009 
Change 
Profit 
20072009 
ChangeMRDI 
20092007 1.000       
COUNTRY .089 1.000      
ChangeSize 
20092007 -.085 -.181* 1.000     
ChangeManOwn 
20092007 .077 -.002 -.060 1.000    
ChangeBoarInd 
20092007 -.071 -.046 -.012 -.041 1.000   
ChangeLeverage 
20092007 .134** -.095 .170** .005 .047 1.000  
ChangeProfit 
20092007 -.037 -.056 .105 .066 .077 .049 1.000 
*highly significant at 1% level, **significant at 5% level, *** moderately significant at 10% level 
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Appendix B.28 Pearson Correlation Change SRDI 20072009 
 Change 
SRDI 
20072009 
CTY 
Change 
Size 
20072009 
Change 
ManOwn 
20072009 
Change 
BoarInd 
20072009 
Change 
Leverage 
20072009 
Change 
Profit 
20072009 
ChangeSRDI 
20092007 1.000       
COUNTRY .025 1.000      
ChangeSize 
20092007 -.071 -.181* 1.000     
ChangeManOwn 
20092007 -.076 -.002 -.060 1.000    
ChangeBoarInd 
20092007 .006 -.046 -.012 -.041 1.000   
ChangeLeverage 
20092007 .008 -.095 .170** .005 .047 1.000  
ChangeProfit 
20092007 -.107*** -.056 .105 .066 .077 .049 1.000 
*highly significant at 1% level, **significant at 5% level, *** moderately significant at 10% level 
 
 
Appendix B.29 Pearson Correlation Change ORDI 20072008 
 Change 
ORDI 
20072008 
CTY 
Change 
Size 
20072008 
Change 
ManOwn 
20072008 
Change 
BoarInd 
20072008 
Change 
Leverage 
20072008 
Change 
Profit 
20072008 
ChangeORDI  
20082007 1.000       
COUNTRY -.047 1.000      
ChangeSize  
20082007 .031 -.198 1.000     
ChangeManOwn 
20082007 -.045 .042 -.054 1.000    
ChangeBoarInd 
20082007 -.017 .029 -.091 -.066 1.000   
ChangeLeverage 
20082007 .120** -.104*** .060 .041 .077 1.000  
ChangeProfit 
 20082007 -.116** -.057 .260* -.019 -.078 .099*** 1.000 
*highly significant at 1% level, **significant at 5% level, *** moderately significant at 10% level 
 
 
Appendix B.30 Pearson Correlation Change BRDI 20072008 
 Change 
BRDI 
20072008 
CTY 
Change 
Size 
20072008 
Change 
ManOwn 
20072008 
Change 
BoarInd 
20072008 
Change 
Leverage 
20072008 
Change 
Profit 
20072008 
ChangeBRDI  
20082007 1.000       
COUNTRY -.125** 1.000      
ChangeSize  
20082007 .057 -.198 1.000     
ChangeManOwn 
20082007 -.057 .042 -.054 1.000    
ChangeBoarInd  
20082007 .090 .029 -.091 -.066 1.000   
ChangeLeverage 
20082007 -.004 -.104*** .060 .041 .077 1.000  
ChangeProfit  
20082007 -.049 -.057 .260* -.019 -.078 .099*** 1.000 
*highly significant at 1% level, **significant at 5% level, *** moderately significant at 10% level 
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Appendix B.31Pearson Correlation Change CRDI 20072008 
 Change 
CRDI 
20072008 
CTY 
Change 
Size 
20072008 
Change 
ManOwn 
20072008 
Change 
BoarInd 
20072008 
Change 
Leverage 
20072008 
Change 
Profit 
20072008 
ChangeCRDI  
20082007 1.000       
COUNTRY -.063 1.000      
ChangeSize  
20082007 .003 -.198 1.000     
ChangeManOwn  
20082007 -.164* .042 -.054 1.000    
ChangeBoarInd  
20082007 .020 .029 -.091 -.066 1.000   
ChangeLeverage 
20082007 .010 -.104*** .060 .041 .077 1.000  
ChangeProfit  
20082007 .009 -.057 .260* -.019 -.078 .099*** 1.000 
*highly significant at 1% level, **significant at 5% level, *** moderately significant at 10% level 
 
Appendix B.32 Pearson Correlation Change MRDI 20072008 
 Change 
MRDI 
20072008 
CTY 
Change 
Size 
20072008 
Change 
ManOwn 
20072008 
Change 
BoarInd 
20072008 
Change 
Leverage 
20072008 
Change 
Profit 
20072008 
ChangeMRDI  
20082007 1.000       
COUNTRY .181* 1.000      
ChangeSize 
 20082007 -.079 -.198 1.000     
ChangeManOwn 
20082007 -.116** .042 -.054 1.000    
ChangeBoarInd  
20082007 -.072 .029 -.091 -.066 1.000   
ChangeLeverage 
20082007 .071 -.104*** .060 .041 .077 1.000  
ChangeProfit  
20082007 -.017 -.057 .260* -.019 -.078 .099*** 1.000 
*highly significant at 1% level, **significant at 5% level, *** moderately significant at 10% level 
 
Appendix B.33 Pearson Correlation Change SRDI 20072008 
 Change 
SRDI 
20072008 CTY 
Change 
Size 
20072008 
Change 
ManOwn 
20072008 
Change 
BoarInd 
20072008 
Change 
Leverage 
20072008 
Change 
Profit 
20072008 
ChangeSRDI  
20082007 1.000       
COUNTRY .092*** 1.000      
ChangeSize  
20082007 -.066 -.198 1.000     
ChangeManOwn  
20082007 -.120** .042 -.054 1.000    
ChangeBoarInd  
20082007 .063 .029 -.091 -.066 1.000   
ChangeLeverage  
20082007 -.068 -.104*** .060 .041 .077 1.000  
ChangeProfit  
20082007 .035 -.057 .260* -.019 -.078 .099*** 1.000 
*highly significant at 1% level, **significant at 5% level, *** moderately significant at 10% level 
 
B-12 
 
Appendix B.34 Pearson Correlation Change ORDI 20082009 
 Change 
ORDI 
20082009 
CTY 
Change 
Size 
20082009 
Change 
ManOwn 
20082009 
Change 
BoarInd 
20082009 
Change 
Leverage 
20082009 
Change 
Profit 
20082009 
ChangeORDI  
20092008 1.000       
COUNTRY -.101*** 1.000      
ChangeSize 
 20092008 .031 -.028* 1.000     
ChangeManOwn 
20092008 .001 -.063 -.040 1.000    
ChangeBoarInd  
20092008 -.033 -.083 .020 .041 1.000   
ChangeLeverage 
20092008 .047 -.020 .310* -.043 .032 1.000  
ChangeProfit  
20092008 -.057 .020 .208* .029 -.080 -.216 1.000 
*highly significant at 1% level, **significant at 5% level, *** moderately significant at 10% level 
 
 
Appendix B.35 Pearson Correlation Change BRDI 20082009 
 Change 
BRDI 
20082009 
CTY 
Change 
Size 
20082009 
Change 
ManOwn 
20082009 
Change 
BoarInd 
20082009 
Change 
Leverage 
20082009 
Change 
Profit 
20082009 
ChangeBRDI  
20092008 1.000       
COUNTRY .040 1.000      
ChangeSize 
 20092008 -.105 -.028* 1.000     
ChangeManOwn  
20092008 .067 -.063 -.040 1.000    
ChangeBoarInd  
20092008 .017 -.083 .020 .041 1.000   
ChangeLeverage  
20092008 -.041 -.020 .310* -.043 .032 1.000  
ChangeProfit  
20092008 -.204* .020 .208* .029 -.080 -.216 1.000 
*highly significant at 1% level, **significant at 5% level, *** moderately significant at 10% level 
 
 
Appendix B.36 Pearson Correlation Change CRDI 20082009 
 Change 
CRDI 
20082009 
CTY 
Change 
Size 
20082009 
Change 
ManOwn 
20082009 
Change 
BoarInd 
20082009 
Change 
Leverage 
20082009 
Change 
Profit 
20082009 
ChangeCRDI 
 20092008 1.000       
COUNTRY -.098*** 1.000      
ChangeSize  
20092008 .031 -.028* 1.000     
ChangeManOwn 
20092008 .035 -.063 -.040 1.000    
ChangeBoarInd 
20092008 .042 -.083 .020 .041 1.000   
ChangeLeverage 
20092008 -.036 -.020 .310* -.043 .032 1.000  
ChangeProfit  
20092008 -.005 .020 .208* .029 -.080 -.216 1.000 
*highly significant at 1% level, **significant at 5% level, *** moderately significant at 10% level 
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Appendix B.37 Pearson Correlation Change MRDI 20082009 
 Change 
MRDI 
20082009 
CTY 
Change 
Size 
20082009 
Change 
ManOwn 
20082009 
Change 
BoarInd 
20082009 
Change 
Leverage 
20082009 
Change 
Profit 
20082009 
ChangeMRDI  
20092008 1.000       
COUNTRY -.081 1.000      
ChangeSize 
 20092008 .020 -.028* 1.000     
ChangeManOwn 
 20092008 .029 -.063 -.040 1.000    
ChangeBoarInd 
 20092008 .000 -.083 .020 .041 1.000   
ChangeLeverage 
20092008 .000 -.020 .310* -.043 .032 1.000  
ChangeProfit  
20092008 .069 .020 .208* .029 -.080 -.216 1.000 
*highly significant at 1% level, **significant at 5% level, *** moderately significant at 10% level 
 
 
Appendix B.38 Pearson Correlation Change SRDI 20082009 
 Change 
SRDI 
20082009 CTY 
Change 
Size 
20082009 
Change 
ManOwn 
20082009 
Change 
BoarInd 
20082009 
Change 
Leverage 
20082009 
Change 
Profit 
20082009 
ChangeSRDI 
 20092008 1.000       
COUNTRY -.067 1.000      
ChangeSize 
 20092008 -.042 -.028* 1.000     
ChangeManOwn  
20092008 -.003 -.063 -.040 1.000    
ChangeBoarInd 
 20092008 .026 -.083 .020 .041 1.000   
ChangeLeverage  
20092008 -.086 -.020 .310* -.043 .032 1.000  
ChangeProfit  
20092008 .082 .020 .208* .029 -.080 -.216 1.000 
*highly significant at 1% level, **significant at 5% level, *** moderately significant at 10% level 
 
 
Appendix B (1- 38) provides evidence about Pearson correlations connected to 
the additional analysis regressions. The results reveal that the highest correlation 
is less than 0.8 in 2007, 2008, 2009 and pooled data. Given this ‘non-high’ 
correlation in each year’s data, concerns about multicollinearity between 
independent and control variables is lessened for the 2007, 2008, 2009, and 
pooled years data in the additional analysis regressions. 
 
Appendix B (1-38) also provides evidence regarding correlation between 
predictor variables change with five sub-categories of RDI, RDI change and five 
sub-categories of RDI change in the level of significance P = highly significant at 
1% level, significant at 5% level, and moderately  significant at 10% level. The 
directionality of these correlations is almost similar with additional analysis 
regressions coefficients.  
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APPENDIX C:  RDI Change Multiple Regression Analysis: 
 Average Predictor Variables 
 
Appendix C (3 - 8) provides a comparison between results in the Sections 
7.3 and 7.4 results (RDI change regressions) if the predictor variables are 
instead calculated as the average figure across the years for the 
continuous predictor variables. The results are almost similar from main 
chapter analysis in the Sections 7.3 and 7.4 results. The summary is in 
Appendices C.1 for RDI ∆ and C.2 for Sub-RDI ∆ Multiple Regression 
Analysis.  
 
Appendix C.1 RDI ∆ Multiple Regression Analysis: Summary 
RDI Model CTY Average Size 
Average 
ManOwn 
Average 
Boardind 
Average 
Lev 
Average 
Prof 
RDI ∆2007-2009 
 (N = 200) X X X X X X 
RDI ∆2007-2008  
(N = 200) X X X X X X 
RDI ∆2008-2009  
(N = 200) X X X X X X 
Legend: CTY = country; Size = natural log of total assets; ManOwn = managerial 
ownership; BoardInd = board independence; Lev = leverage; Prof = profitability; others 
control variables (auditor and age of business) are exclude in this model because there is 
only negligible change. HS denotes statistically highly significant at 1%; S denotes 
statistically significant at 5%: MS denotes statistically moderately significant at 10%, and 
X means not statistical significant. 
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Appendix C.2 Sub-RDI ∆ Multiple Regression Analysis: Summary 
RDI Model 
(N = 200) CTY 
Average 
Size 
Average 
ManOwn 
Average 
Boardind 
Average 
Lev 
Average 
Prof 
∆2007-2009 
BRDI 
SRDI 
ORDI 
MRDI 
CRDI 
 
X 
X 
S 
X 
MS 
 
X 
S 
S 
HS 
X 
 
X 
MS  
S 
X 
X 
 
S 
X 
X 
X 
MS 
 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
 
MS 
X 
MS 
X 
X 
∆2007-2008  
BRDI 
SRDI 
ORDI 
MRDI 
CRDI 
 
MS 
X 
X 
S 
X 
 
X 
HS 
HS 
HS 
X 
 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
 
X 
X 
X 
X 
S 
 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
 
X 
X 
HS 
X 
X 
∆2008-2009  
BRDI 
SRDI 
ORDI 
MRDI 
CRDI 
 
X 
X 
S 
X 
X 
 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
 
X 
X 
S 
X 
X 
 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
Legend: CTY = country; Size = natural log of total assets; ManOwn = managerial 
ownership; BoardInd = board independence; Lev = leverage; Prof = profitability; Aud = 
auditor; others control variables (auditor and age of business) are exclude in this model 
because there is only negligible change. BRDI = business risk disclosure index; SRDI = 
strategic risk disclosure index; ORDI = operating risk disclosure index; MRDI = market 
risk disclosure index;  CRDI = credit risk disclosure index; HS denotes statistically highly 
significant at 1%; S denotes statistically significant at 5%: MS denotes statistically 
moderately significant at 10%,  and X means not statistical significant. 
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      Appendix C.3 RDI ∆ Multiple Regression Analysis 
 ∆2007-2009 ∆2007-2008 ∆2008-2009 
Adjusted R2 -.006 -.013 -.006 
Durbin Watson 2.097 1.995 1.949 
F statistic .816 .575 .808 
Significance .558 .750 .565 
 Predicted 
sign Coeff T Stat P-value Coeff T Stat P-value Coeff T Stat P-value 
Intercept  .050 1.300 .195 -.016 -.461 .645 .024 1.808 .047 
Country  (+) -.008 -1.452 .148 -.002 -.447 .656 -.005 -.968 .226 
Company Size Average (+) .001 -.319 .750 .007 1.641 .103 .006 .136 .165 
Managerial Ownership Average (-) .055 1.581 .116 .032 .985 .326 .046 .621 .436 
Board Independence Average (+) -.025 -.789 .431 -.017 -.592 .554 .00007 .002 .785 
Leverage Average (+) .008 .402 .688 -.002 -.129 .898 -.046 -.852 .561 
Profitability Average (+) .009 -323 .747 -.012 -.452 .652 -.025 -1.124 .393 
                 *highly significant at 1% level, **significant at 5% level, *** moderately significant at 10% level, n = 200 
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     Appendix C.4 BRDI ∆ Multiple Regression Analysis 
 ∆2007-2009 ∆2007-2008 ∆2008-2009 
Adjusted R2 .023 -.003 -.008 
Durbin Watson 1.951 1.847 2.128 
F statistic 1.774 .902 .730 
Significance .106 .495 .626 
 Predicted 
sign Coeff T Stat P-value Coeff T Stat P-value Coeff T Stat P-value 
Intercept  .111 1.968 .050 .036 .586 .559 .075 1.464 .145 
Country  (+) -.011 -1.365 .174 -.016 -1.824 .070*** .005 .676 .500 
Company Size Average (+) .001 .107 .915 .006 .808 .420 -.005 -.860 .391 
Managerial Ownership Average (-) .010 .200 .841 .029 .514 .608 -.017 -.371 .711 
Board Independence Average (+) -.103 -.2.200 .029** -.051 -1.012 .313 -.052 -1.212 .227 
Leverage Average (+) -.013 -.416 .678 -.013 -.412 .681 .002 .075 .941 
Profitability Average (+) .073 1.743 .083*** .018 .404 .686 .054 1.423 .156 
*highly significant at 1% level, **significant at 5% level, *** moderately significant at 10% level, n = 200 
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Appendix C.5 SRDI ∆ Multiple Regression Analysis 
 ∆2007-2009 ∆2007-2008 ∆2008-2009 
Adjusted R2 .027 .059 .002 
Durbin Watson 2.045 2.275 1.979 
F statistic 1.913 3.080 1.064 
Significance .081 .007 .386 
 Predicted 
sign Coeff T Stat P-value Coeff T Stat P-value Coeff T Stat P-value 
Intercept  -.100 -1.867 .063 -.151 -3.035 .003 .052 1.019 .310 
Country  (+) .000 -0.63 .950 .007 .991 .323 -.008 -1.057 .292 
Company Size Average (+) .015 2.365 .019** .021 3.520 .001* -.006 -.955 .341 
Managerial Ownership Average (-) .088 1.783 .076*** .034 .757 .450 .054 1.151 .251 
Board Independence Average (+) .053 1.185 .237 .038 .913 .362 .015 .356 .722 
Leverage Average (+) .019 .650 .517 -.008 -.287 .774 .026 .954 .341 
Profitability Average (+) -.047 -1.171 .243 -.004 -.117 .907 -.041 -1.099 .273 
*highly significant at 1% level, **significant at 5%, *** moderately significant at 10% level, n = 200 
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Appendix C.6 ORDI ∆ Multiple Regression Analysis 
 ∆2007-2009 ∆2007-2008 ∆2008-2009 
Adjusted R2 .037 .053 .015 
Durbin Watson 2.032 2.056 1.895 
F statistic 2.266 2.873 1.505 
Significance .039 .011 .178 
 Predicted 
sign Coeff T Stat P-value Coeff T Stat P-value Coeff T Stat P-value 
Intercept  -.071 -.835 .405 -.127 -1.820 .070 .056 .754 .452 
Country  (+) -.028 -2.335 .021** -.007 -.742 .459 -.021 -1.992 .048** 
Company Size Average (+) .020 1.994 .048** .026 3.099 .002* -.006 -.626 .532 
Managerial Ownership Average (-) .190 2.427 .016** .039 .613 .541 .151 2.219 .028** 
Board Independence Average (+) -.019 -.267 .789 -.053 -.905 .367 .034 .545 .586 
Leverage Average (+) -.016 -.346 .729 -.028 -.737 .462 .012 .296 .767 
Profitability Average (+) -.109 -1.719 .087*** .-179 -3.433 .001* .069 1.257 .210 
*highly significant at 1% level, **significant at 5% level, *** moderately significant at 10% level,  n = 200 
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Appendix C.7 MRDI ∆ Multiple Regression Analysis 
 ∆2007-2009 ∆2007-2008 ∆2008-2009 
Adjusted R2 .079 .077 -.013 
Durbin Watson 1.783 2.144 1.936 
F statistic 3.830 3.752 .587 
Significance .001 .001 .740 
 Predicted 
sign Coeff T Stat P-value Coeff T Stat P-value Coeff T Stat P-value 
Intercept  .197 3.528 .001 .108 2.149 .033 .089 1.656 .099 
Country  (+) .010 1.257 .210 .018 2.477 .014** -.008 -1.028 .305 
Company Size Average (+) -.030 -4.493 .000* -.021 -3.565 .000* -.009 -1.340 .182 
Managerial Ownership Average (-) .006 .122 .903 .027 .595 .553 -.019 -.389 .698 
Board Independence Average (+) .059 1.279 .203 .050 1.211 .227 .009 .208 .835 
Leverage Average (+) .035 1.187 .237 .043 1.592 .113 -.007 -.244 .807 
Profitability Average (+) .053 1.269 .206 .054 1.447 .149 -.002 -.049 .961 
*highly significant at 1% level, **significant at 5% level, *** moderately significant at 10% level, n = 200 
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Appendix C.8 CRDI ∆ Multiple Regression Analysis 
 ∆2007-2009 ∆2007-2008 ∆2008-2009 
Adjusted R2 .012 -.001 -.012 
Durbin Watson 1.892 1.859 1.740 
F statistic 1.402 .956 .613 
Significance .216 .457 .719 
 Predicted 
sign Coeff T Stat P-value Coeff T Stat P-value Coeff T Stat P-value 
Intercept  .057 .492 .624 .032 .296 .767 .025 .245 .807 
Country  (+) -.029 -1.748 .082*** -.013 -.822 .412 -.016 -1.119 .265 
Company Size Average (+) .014 .994 .321 .010 .798 .426 .003 .285 .776 
Managerial Ownership Average (-) .025 .231 .817 .043 .434 .664 -.019 -.198 .843 
Board Independence Average (+) -.174 -.1.791 .075*** -.186 -2.055 .041** .012 .145 .885 
Leverage Average (+) .055 .877 .382 -.005 -.082 .935 .060 1.087 .278 
Profitability Average (+) -.022 -.248 .804 -.040 -.496 .621 .019 .244 .807 
*highly significant at 1% level, **significant at 5% level, *** moderately significant at 10% level, n = 200 
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The regression results according to appendices C.3 – C.8 are virtually the 
same with results in Sections 7.3 and 7.4. The results reveal that all the 
independent and control variables are not statistically significant between 
any of the years (2007-2009; 2007-2008; 2008-2009). Appendices C.3 – 
C.8 illustrate the predictive power of the model from the regression in the 
2007, 2008 and 2009 and pooled data for risk disclosure categories’ 
change if the predictor variables are calculated in the average figure. Key 
explanatory factors for risk disclosure categories highlighted from 
Appendices C.3 – C.8 are:  
 
• The ‘Country’ variable is significant in ‘operating risk’ (ORDI)  in the 
change between 2007-2009 and 2008-2009, and significant in 
‘market risk’ (MRDI) in the change between 2007-2008.  
• Change of Size is positively significant in ‘strategy risk’ (SRDI) 
,‘operating risk’ (ORDI), and ‘market risk’ (MRDI) ) in the change 
between 2007-2009, and 2007-2008. 
• Managerial ownership change is positively significant for ‘operating 
risk’ (ORDI) in the change between 2007-2009 and 2008-2009. 
• Board independence change is negatively significant in ‘business 
risk’ (BRDI) in the change between 2007-2009, and negatively 
significant in ‘credit risk’ (CRDI) in the change between 2007-2008. . 
• Leverage change is not significant in all the regression. 
• Profitability change is negatively significant for ‘operating risk’ (ORDI) 
in the change between 2007-2008. 
 
Overall, change RDI is not easily predicted perhaps because only small 
changes in RDI over GFC period. 
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APPENDIX D: Sensitivity Analysis in the Additional Regression 
 
 
Appendix D provides the sensitivity analysis in the additional analysis 
regressions in the different measurement of independent and control 
variables. 
 
 
The sensitivity analysis (Appendices D.1 – D.35) for additional analysis 
regression tests the cross-sectional (within each year) associations 
between five sub categories of risk disclosure (business risk, strategy risk, 
operational risk, market risk, credit risk) and the predictor variables. For 
sensitivity analysis, country is measured with the country GDP, 
categorized based on effect of GFC, and categorized based on ex-
colonial, legal system, and board system. Size is measured with the 
different measurement of size by log total revenue. Managerial ownership 
re-measured by categories based on the companies which have ≤ 15% 
and > 15% also ≤ 50% and > 50% managerial ownership. This sensitivity 
analysis also measured board meeting to replace measurement of board 
independent for proxies of corporate governance. 
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Appendix D.1 BRDI Multiple Regression Analysis (Country = GDP Per Capita) 
 2007 2008 2009 Pooled year 
Adjusted R2 .150 .138 .116 .146 
Durbin Watson 1.494 1.819 1.616 1.634 
F statistic 5.385 4.987 4.256 13.849 
Significance .000 .000 .000 .000 
n 200 200 200 600 
 Predicted 
sign Coeff T Stat P-value Coeff T Stat P-value Coeff T Stat P-value Coeff T Stat P-value 
Intercept  .258 2.694 .008 .235 2.474 .014 .322 3.392 .001 .271 4.967 .000 
Country (GDP) (+) .0000002 3.452 .001* .0000002 2.298 .023** .000002 2.556 .011** .0000002 4.680 .000* 
Size  (+) .022 2.246 .026** .028 2.944 .004* .029 3.168 .002* .026 4.885 .000* 
Managerial Ownership (-) -.134 -1.898 .059** -.156 -2.127 .035** -.172 -2.481 .014** -.151 -3.693 .000* 
Board Independence (+) .098 1.638 .103 .128 2.030 .044** -.035 -.583 .561 .066 1.895 .059*** 
Leverage (+) -.046 -.945 .346 -.040 -.995 .321 -.042 -1.076 .283 -.041 -1.737 .083*** 
Profitability (+) .016 .287 .775 .013 .344 .731 .099 1.641 .103 .029 1.062 .289 
Auditor (+) -.040 -1.469 .144 -.034 -1.228 .221 -.029 -1.028 .305 -.035 -2.215 .027** 
Age of Business (+) .000 .664 .507 .000006 .129 .898 .000 -.597 .551 .000005 .197 .844 
*highly significant at 1% level, **significant at 5% level, ***moderately significant at 10% level 
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Appendix D.2 SRDI Multiple Regression Analysis (Country = GDP Per Capita) 
 2007 2008 2009 Pooled year 
Adjusted R2 .155 .163 .078 .132 
Durbin Watson 1.820 1.903 1.882 1.799 
F statistic 5.556 5.833 3.099 12.390 
Significance .000 .000 .003 .000 
n 200 200 200 600 
 Predicted 
sign Coeff T Stat P-value Coeff T Stat P-value Coeff T Stat P-value Coeff T Stat P-value 
Intercept  .228 3.421 .001 .111 1.519 .131 .142 1.831 .069 .149 3.531 .000 
Country (GDP) (+) -.0000002 -3.832 .000* -.0000002 -3.082 .002* -.0000002 -2.516 .013** -.0000002 -5.264 .000* 
Size (+) -.010 -1.449 .149 .014 1.851 .066*** .009 1.185 .238 .005 1.218 .224 
Managerial Ownership (-) -.099 -2.023 .044** -.114 -2.020 .045** -.028 -.495 .621 -.082 -2.582 .010* 
Board Independence (+) .080 1.927 .055** .128 2.636 .009* .067 1.375 .171 .098 3.631 .000* 
Leverage (+) .019 .558 .578 -.005 -.152 .880 .017 .546 .586 .006 .310 .756 
Profitability (+) .093 2.369 .019** .067 2.330 .021** .056 1.123 .263 .061 2.922 .004* 
Auditor (+) -.002 -.127 .899 -.015 -.696 .487 -.012 -.507 .613 -.009 -.694 .488 
Age of Business (+) .000 .353 .724 .000 -1.091 .277 .000001 .035 .972 -.000007 -.342 .732 
*highly significant at 1% level, **significant at 5% level, *** moderately significant at 10% level 
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Appendix D.3 ORDI Multiple Regression Analysis (Country = GDP Per Capita) 
 2007 2008 2009 Pooled year 
Adjusted R2 .045 .041 .034 .054 
Durbin Watson 1.221 1.149 1.192 1.174 
F statistic 2.176 2.056 1.875 5.280 
Significance .031 .042 .066 .000 
n 200 200 200 600 
 Predicted 
sign Coeff T Stat P-value Coeff T Stat P-value Coeff T Stat P-value Coeff T Stat P-value 
Intercept  .742 5.389 .000 .516 3.905 .000 .565 3.939 .000 .605 7.719 .000 
Country (GDP) (+) .00000005 .520 .604 .0000002 1.921 .056*** .0000001 .963 .337 .0000001 1.970 .049** 
Size (+) -.021 -1.491 .138 .000 -.025 .980 -.001 -.104 .917 -.008 -1.002 .317 
Managerial Ownership (-) .059 .586 .559 .048 .471 .638 .156 1.493 .137 .083 1.412 .159 
Board Independence (+) .137 1.595 .112 .061 .693 .489 .016 .177 .860 .070 1.394 .164 
Leverage (+) -.082 -1.179 .240 -.074 -1.327 .186 -.082 -1.408 .161 -.073 -2.146 .032** 
Profitability (+) .010 .128 .898 .096 1.829 .069*** .134 1.463 .145 .074 1.917 .056*** 
Auditor (+) -.097 -2.478 .014** -.029 -.748 .455 -.037 -.880 .380 -.055 -2.392 .017** 
Age of Business (+) -.001 -1.114 .266 -.001 -1.250 .213 -.001 -1.470 .143 -.001 -2.230 .026** 
*highly significant at 1% level, **significant at 5% level, *** moderately significant at 10% level 
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Appendix D.4 MRDI Multiple Regression Analysis (Country = GDP Per Capita) 
 2007 2008 2009 Pooled year 
Adjusted R2 .152 .067 .079 .087 
Durbin Watson 2.350 1.882 1.525 1.774 
F statistic 5.449 2.788 3.134 8.153 
Significance .000 .006 .002 .000 
n 200 200 200 600 
 Predicted 
sign Coeff T Stat P-value Coeff T Stat P-value Coeff T Stat P-value Coeff T Stat P-value 
Intercept  .033 .666 .506 .147 2.280 .024 .178 2.713 .007 .124 3.532 .000 
Country (GDP) (+) -.0000004 -1.071 .285 .0000002 .429 .669 -.0000002 -.557 .579 -.0000002 -.612 .541 
Size (+) .015 2.847 .005* -.005 -.720 .472 -.008 -1.328 .186 .000 .032 .975 
Managerial Ownership (-) -.011 -.310 .757 .008 .155 .877 .027 .564 .574 .003 .101 .920 
Board Independence (+) .027 .852 .396 .080 1.867 .063*** .068 1.653 .100 .059 2.613 .009* 
Leverage (+) .035 1.373 .171 .049 1.806 .072*** .036 1.331 .185 .046 3.047 .002* 
Profitability (+) .040 1.334 .184 .074 2.875 .004* .132 3.158 .002* .076 4.349 .000* 
Auditor (+) -.011 -.802 .424 .000 -.006 .996 .019 .992 .322 .000 .016 .987 
Age of Business (+) .000 1.507 .133 .001 1.848 .066*** .000 1.054 .293 .000 2.523 .012** 
*highly significant at 1% level, **significant at 5% level, *** moderately significant at 10% level 
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Appendix D.5 CRDI Multiple Regression Analysis (Country = GDP Per Capita) 
 2007 2008 2009 Pooled year 
Adjusted R2 .000 -.017 .000 .010 
Durbin Watson 1.711 1.805 1.677 1.742 
F statistic .995 .587 .997 1.750 
Significance .441 .788 .440 .084 
n 200 200 200 600 
 Predicted 
sign Coeff T Stat P-value Coeff T Stat P-value Coeff T Stat P-value Coeff T Stat P-value 
Intercept  .469 2.884 .004 .468 2.888 .004 .326 1.871 .063 .409 4.316 .000 
Country (GDP) (+) -.0000003 -.246 .806 -.0000006 -.564 .573 -.0000001 -.995 .321 -.0000008 -1.207 .228 
Size (+) .001 .065 .949 .018 1.100 .273 .028 1.721 .087*** .017 1.833 .067*** 
Managerial Ownership (-) -.079 -.660 .510 -.055 -.440 .660 .023 .182 .856 -.036 -.507 .612 
Board Independence (+) .106 1.043 .298 -.119 -1.101 .272 -.078 -.713 .477 -.025 -.404 .686 
Leverage (+) .042 .510 .611 -.025 -.367 .714 .000 -.006 .995 -.005 -.113 .910 
Profitability (+) .163 1.692 .092*** .044 .680 .497 .131 1.177 .241 .085 1.807 .071*** 
Auditor (+) -.044 -.943 .347 -.040 -.835 .405 .017 .331 .741 -.021 -.767 .444 
Age of Business (+) -.001 -1.073 .285 -.001 -.828 .409 -.001 -.767 .444 -.001 -1.370 .171 
*highly significant at 1% level, **significant at 5% level, *** moderately significant at 10% level 
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Appendix D.6 BRDI Multiple Regression Analysis (Country = Effect GFC) 
 2007 2008 2009 Pooled year 
Adjusted R2 .097 .116 .086 .115 
Durbin Watson 1.475 1.771 1.598 1.602 
F statistic 3.686 4.258 3.326 10.714 
Significance .001 .000 .001 .000 
n 200 200 200 600 
 Predicted 
sign Coeff T Stat P-value Coeff T Stat P-value Coeff T Stat P-value Coeff T Stat P-value 
Intercept  .333 3.342 .001 .305 3.153 .002 .398 4.157 .000 .340 6.108 .000 
Country (Effect GFC) (+) .009 .361 .718 -.015 -.568 .571 .001 .024 .981 .000 -.032 .974 
Size  (+) .024 2.312 .022** .029 2.974 .003* .029 3.104 .002* .027 4.898 .000* 
Managerial Ownership (-) -.065 -.932 .352 -.111 -1.519 .130 -.136 -1.957 .052*** -.104 -2.571 .010* 
Board Independence (+) .093 1.503 .134 .125 1.954 .052*** -.044 -.724 .470 .060 1.695 .091 
Leverage (+) -.069 -1.397 .164 -.050 -1.237 .218 -.048 -1.231 .220 -.054 -2.238 .026** 
Profitability (+) -.026 -.449 .654 -.004 -.109 .913 .038 .660 .510 -.004 -.136 .892 
Auditor (+) -.062 -2.168 .031** -.054 -1.860 .064*** -.050 -1.766 .079*** -.054 -3.295 .001* 
Age of Business (+) .000 .594 .553 -7.123E-5 -.139 .890 .000 -.654 .514 -.000002 -.059 .953 
*highly significant at 1% level, **significant at 5% level, *** moderately significant at 10% level 
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Appendix D.7 SRDI Multiple Regression Analysis (Country = Effect GFC) 
 2007 2008 2009 Pooled year 
Adjusted R2 .092 .127 .047 .093 
Durbin Watson 1.714 1.865 1.867 1.754 
F statistic 3.523 4.631 2.234 8.715 
Significance .001 .000 .027 .000 
n 200 200 200 600 
 Predicted 
sign Coeff T Stat P-value Coeff T Stat 
P-
value Coeff T Stat P-value Coeff T Stat P-value 
Intercept  .149 2.153 .033 .030 .405 .686 .081 1.032 .303 .076 1.752 .080 
Country (Effect GFC) (+) .013 .694 .488 .024 1.177 .240 .001 .024 .980 .013 1.163 .245 
Size  (+) -.011 -1.488 .138 .013 1.731 .085*** .009 1.175 .242 .005 1.112 .266 
Managerial Ownership (-) -.157 -3.213 .002* -.164 -2.903 .004* -.057 -1.009 .314 -.126 -3.993 .000* 
Board Independence (+) .080 1.840 .067*** .131 2.630 .009* .074 1.501 .135 .101 3.669 .000* 
Leverage (+) .035 1.018 .310 .006 .183 .855 .023 .708 .480 .017 .888 .375 
Profitability (+) .120 2.968 .003* .084 2.902 .004* .105 2.220 .028** .086 4.149 .000* 
Auditor (+) .020 1.027 .306 .008 .343 .732 .005 .236 .813 .012 .918 .359 
Age of Business (+) .000 .618 .537 .000 -.618 .537 .000004 .122 .903 .000004 .181 .857 
*highly significant at 1% level, **significant at 5% level, *** moderately significant at 10% level 
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Appendix D.8 ORDI Multiple Regression Analysis (Country = Effect GFC) 
 2007 2008 2009 Pooled year 
Adjusted R2 .215 .151 .109 .168 
Durbin Watson 1.482 1.232 1.268 1.293 
F statistic 7.826 5.408 4.028 16.127 
Significance .000 .000 .000 .000 
n 200 200 200 600 
 Predicted 
sign Coeff T Stat P-value Coeff T Stat P-value Coeff T Stat P-value Coeff T Stat P-value 
Intercept  .534 4.254 .000 .399 3.193 .002 .450 3.302 .001 .460 6.246 .000 
Country (Effect GFC) (+) .212 6.462 .000* .179 5.372 .000* .149 4.120 .000* .180 9.241 .000* 
Size  (+) -.017 -1.293 .198 .001 .096 .924 .001 .043 .966 -.005 -.744 .457 
Managerial Ownership (-) .028 .319 .750 .027 .287 .774 .128 1.290 .199 .056 1.036 .301 
Board Independence (+) .090 1.153 .250 .038 .461 .646 -.001 -.007 .994 .042 .883 .378 
Leverage (+) -.103 -1.663 .098*** -.084 -1.609 .109 -.079 -1.414 .159 -.081 -2.561 .011** 
Profitability (+) -.063 -.857 .392 .052 1.080 .281 .035 .429 .668 .015 .412 .680 
Auditor (+) -.036 -.991 .323 .012 .320 .750 -.008 -.207 .837 -.010 -.468 .640 
Age of Business (+) .000 .249 .804 .000 -.401 .689 .000 -.675 .500 .000 -.549 .583 
*highly significant at 1% level, **significant at 5% level, *** moderately significant at 10% level 
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Appendix D.9 MRDI Multiple Regression Analysis (Country = Effect GFC) 
 2007 2008 2009 Pooled year 
Adjusted R2 .149 .090 .087 .093 
Durbin Watson 2.343 1.933 1.539 1.787 
F statistic 5.363 3.447 3.373 8.663 
Significance .000 .001 .001 .000 
n 200 200 200 600 
 Predicted 
sign Coeff T Stat P-value Coeff T Stat P-value Coeff T Stat P-value Coeff T Stat P-value 
Intercept  .030 .603 .547 .116 1.808 .072 .141 2.180 .030 .099 2.821 .005 
Country (Effect GFC) (+) -.010 -.763 .446 .038 2.216 .028** .024 1.414 .159 .019 2.013 .045** 
Size  (+) .014 2.765 .006* -.004 -.692 .490 -.008 -1.278 .203 .000 .079 .937 
Managerial Ownership (-) -.021 -.585 .560 -.001 -.030 .976 .014 .289 .773 -.007 -.272 .785 
Board Independence (+) .029 .932 .353 .076 1.789 .075*** .068 1.650 .101 .057 2.526 .012** 
Leverage (+) .039 1.560 .120 .048 1.804 .073*** .038 1.420 .157 .047 3.142 .002* 
Profitability (+) .049 1.669 .097*** .067 2.689 .008* .131 3.360 .001* .074 4.394 .000* 
Auditor (+) -.011 -.740 .460 .010 .539 .590 .029 1.526 .129 .007 .728 .467 
Age of Business (+) .000 1.330 .185 .001 2.240 .026** .000 1.349 .179 .001 2.925 .004* 
*highly significant at 1% level, **significant at 5% level, *** moderately significant at 10% level 
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Appendix D.10 CRDI Multiple Regression Analysis (Country = Effect GFC) 
 2007 2008 2009 Pooled year 
Adjusted R2 .004 -.018 -.005 .008 
Durbin Watson 1.714 1.803 1.683 1.737 
F statistic 1.088 .566 .878 1.631 
Significance .373 .805 .536 .113 
n 200 200 200 600 
 Predicted 
sign Coeff T Stat P-value Coeff T Stat P-value Coeff T Stat P-value Coeff T Stat P-value 
Intercept  .419 2.563 .011 .428 2.626 .009 .285 1.648 .101 .360 3.783 .000 
Country (Effect GFC) (+) .037 .880 .380 .017 .388 .698 -.012 -.272 .786 .018 .726 .468 
Size  (+) .002 .101 .919 .018 1.086 .279 .028 1.709 .089*** .017 1.826 .068*** 
Managerial Ownership (-) -.096 -.836 .404 -.078 -.637 .525 .001 .012 .991 -.062 -.898 .369 
Board Independence (+) .098 .963 .337 -.119 -1.098 .274 -.071 -.644 .520 -.024 -.401 .688 
Leverage (+) .041 .512 .609 -.021 -.306 .760 .004 .053 .957 .001 .022 .983 
Profitability (+) .156 1.644 .102 .050 .787 .432 .180 1.725 .086*** .095 2.083 .038** 
Auditor (+) -.029 -.619 .536 -.028 -.582 .561 .029 .563 .574 -.007 -.261 .795 
Age of Business (+) -.001 -.840 .402 -.001 -.700 .485 -.001 -.772 .441 -.001 -1.130 .259 
*highly significant at 1% level, **significant at 5% level, *** moderately significant at 10% level 
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Appendix D.11 BRDI Multiple Regression Analysis (Country = Ex-Colonial, Legal System, Board System) 
  2007 2008 2009 Pooled year 
Adjusted R2  .184 .141 .133 .183 
Durbin Watson  1.545 1.844 1.657 1.655 
F statistic  6.594 5.074 4.814 17.827 
Significance  .000 .000 .000 .000 
n  200 200 200 600 
 Predicted 
sign Coeff T Stat P-value Coeff T Stat P-value Coeff T Stat P-value Coeff T Stat P-value 
Intercept  .458 4.851 .000 .354 3.706 .000 .466 5.078 .000 .603 17.782 .000 
Country (Ex-Colonial, 
Legal System, Board 
System) 
(+) -.137 -4.505 .000* -.077 -2.423 .016** -.099 -3.233 .001* -.085 -4.810 .000* 
Size  (+) .022 2.291 .023** .028 2.981 .003* .029 3.263 .001* .0000002 6.344 .000* 
Managerial Ownership (-) -.151 -2.180 .030** -.168 -2.260 .025** -.190 -2.739 .007* -.153 -3.780 .000* 
Board Independence (+) .070 1.187 .237 .116 1.838 .068*** -.045 -.763 .447 .059 1.750 .081*** 
Leverage (+) -.027 -.575 .566 -.038 -.935 .351 -.037 -.971 .333 -.038 -1.639 .102 
Profitability (+) .022 .390 .697 .005 .134 .893 .085 1.491 .138 .039 1.539 .124 
Auditor (+) -.023 -.837 .404 -.026 -.894 .372 -.018 -.639 .524 -.032 -2.068 .039** 
Age of Business (+) .001 1.260 .209 .000 .422 .673 -.000006 -.144 .886 .000004 .143 .886 
*highly significant at 1% level, **significant at 5% level, *** moderately significant at 10% level 
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Appendix D.12 SRDI Multiple Regression Analysis (Country = Ex-Colonial, Legal System, Board System) 
 2007 2008 2009 Pooled year 
Adjusted R2 .115 .128 .063 .119 
Durbin Watson 1.744 1.841 1.873 1.765 
F statistic 4.230 4.640 2.684 11.153 
Significance .000 .000 .008 .000 
n 200 200 200 600 
 Predicted 
sign Coeff T Stat P-value Coeff T Stat P-value Coeff T Stat P-value Coeff T Stat P-value 
Intercept  .119 1.747 .082 .029 .389 .698 .049 .646 .519 .081 2.985 .003 
Country (Ex-Colonial, 
Legal System, Board 
System) 
(+) .051 2.328 .021** .030 1.203 .230 .046 1.816 .071*** .051 3.593 .000* 
Size  (+) -.011 -1.482 .140 .013 1.739 .084*** .009 1.143 .254 .0000001 3.232 .001* 
Managerial Ownership (-) -.121 -2.423 .016** -.135 -2.309 .022** -.032 -.556 .579 -.086 -2.678 .008* 
Board Independence (+) .092 2.149 .033** .136 2.736 .007* .075 1.526 .129 .104 3.869 .000* 
Leverage (+) .021 .602 .548 .001 .023 .981 .018 .548 .584 .005 .253 .800 
Profitability (+) .107 2.664 .008* .083 2.844 .005* .083 1.750 .082*** .079 3.917 .000* 
Auditor (+) .001 .042 .967 -.009 -.396 .692 -.010 -.406 .685 -.006 -.462 .644 
Age of Business (+) .000004 .104 .917 .000 -1.072 .285 -.000007 -.183 .855 .000 -1.267 .206 
*highly significant at 1% level, **significant at 5% level, *** moderately significant at 10% level 
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Appendix D.13 ORDI Multiple Regression Analysis (Country = Ex-Colonial, Legal System, Board System) 
 2007 2008 2009 Pooled year 
Adjusted R2 .208 .221 .175 .213 
Durbin Watson 1.382 1.394 1.370 1.370 
F statistic 7.552 8.049 6.289 21.270 
Significance .000 .000 .000 .000 
n 200 200 200 600 
 Predicted 
sign Coeff T Stat P-value Coeff T Stat P-value Coeff T Stat P-value Coeff T Stat P-value 
Intercept  .976 7.747 .000 .811 6.764 .000 .780 6.036 .000 .801 17.610 .000 
Country (Ex-Colonial, 
Legal System, Board 
System) 
(+) -.256 -6.304 .000* -.277 -6.978 .000* -.250 -5.816 .000* -.265 -11.187 .000* 
Size  (+) -.023 -1.790 .075*** -.001 -.079 .937 .000 .017 .987 -.0000001 -1.928 .054*** 
Managerial Ownership (-) -.088 -.960 .338 -.093 -.995 .321 .041 .417 .677 -.057 -1.048 .295 
Board Independence (+) .090 1.138 .257 .028 .353 .725 .008 .094 .925 .042 .922 .357 
Leverage (+) -.011 -.166 .868 -.041 -.816 .415 -.058 -1.071 .285 -.031 -.979 .328 
Profitability (+) .085 1.155 .249 .113 2.435 .016** .217 2.708 .007* .115 3.370 .001* 
Auditor (+) -.025 -.680 .497 .038 1.036 .301 .031 .786 .433 .014 .675 .500 
Age of Business (+) .000 -.231 .817 .000 -.211 .833 .000 -.636 .526 -.000009 -.245 .807 
*highly significant at 1% level, **significant at 5% level, *** moderately significant at 10% level 
 
 
 
 
 
D-15 
 
Appendix D.14 MRDI Multiple Regression Analysis (Country = Ex-Colonial, Legal System, Board System) 
 2007 2008 2009 Pooled year 
Adjusted R2 .162 .083 .078 .097 
Durbin Watson 2.379 1.912 1.524 1.772 
F statistic 5.792 3.251 3.102 9.017 
Significance .000 .002 .003 .000 
n 200 200 200 600 
 Predicted 
sign Coeff T Stat P-value Coeff T Stat P-value Coeff T Stat P-value Coeff T Stat P-value 
Intercept  -.005 -.107 .915 .188 2.910 .004 .171 2.665 .008 .115 5.168 .000 
Country (Ex-Colonial, 
Legal System, Board 
System) 
(+) .030 1.843 .067*** -.040 -1.871 .063*** -.006 -.283 .778 .001 .072 .943 
Size  (+) .015 2.877 .004* -.005 -.745 .457 -.008 -1.318 .189 .0000001 2.544 .011** 
Managerial Ownership (-) -.004 -.110 .913 -.014 -.283 .778 .018 .378 .706 .003 .117 .907 
Board Independence (+) .033 1.043 .298 .076 1.775 .078*** .069 1.686 .093*** .054 2.431 .015** 
Leverage (+) .029 1.164 .246 .055 2.008 .046** .037 1.391 .166 .045 2.924 .004* 
Profitability (+) .036 1.235 .218 .077 3.080 .002* .144 3.626 .000* .077 4.610 .000* 
Auditor (+) -.016 -1.134 .258 .010 .519 .605 .024 1.231 .220 .005 .445 .656 
Age of Business (+) .000 1.244 .215 .001 2.154 .032** .000 1.105 .271 .000 1.860 .063*** 
*highly significant at 1% level, **significant at 5% level, *** moderately significant at 10% level 
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Appendix D.15 CRDI Multiple Regression Analysis (Country = Ex-Colonial, Legal System, Board System) 
 2007 2008 2009 Pooled year 
Adjusted R2 .000 -.017 .004 .006 
Durbin Watson 1.706 1.807 1.688 1.757 
F statistic .999 .580 1.092 1.432 
Significance 438 .793 .370 .180 
n 200 200 200 600 
 Predicted 
sign Coeff T Stat P-value Coeff T Stat P-value Coeff T Stat P-value Coeff T Stat P-value 
Intercept  .472 2.887 .004 .422 2.584 .011 .221 1.300 .195 .478 7.909 .000 
Country (Ex-Colonial, 
Legal System, Board 
System) 
(+) -.016 -.296 .768 .028 .515 .607 .074 1.313 .191 .037 1.173 .241 
Size  (+) .001 .048 .962 .018 1.091 .277 .028 1.698 .091*** .0000001 1.100 .272 
Managerial Ownership (-) -.098 -.818 .415 -.053 -.418 .677 .038 .295 .769 -.036 -.495 .620 
Board Independence (+) .103 1.013 .312 -.114 -1.057 .292 -.071 -.648 .518 -.007 -.119 .905 
Leverage (+) .049 .595 .553 -.025 -.371 .711 -.004 -.056 .955 -.002 -.058 .954 
Profitability (+) .173 1.803 .073*** .048 .754 .452 .139 1.323 .187 .106 2.354 .019** 
Auditor (+) -.036 -.758 .449 -.042 -.856 .393 .008 .156 .876 -.031 -1.102 .271 
Age of Business (+) -.001 -1.005 .316 -.001 -.873 .384 -.001 -.943 .347 -.001 -1.413 .158 
*highly significant at 1% level, **significant at 5% level, *** moderately significant at 10% level 
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Appendix D.16 BRDI Multiple Regression Analysis (Size = LogRevenue) 
 2007 2008 2009 Pooled year 
Adjusted R2 .162 .154 .184 .175 
Durbin Watson 1.575 1.786 1.752 1.664 
F statistic 5.667 5.418 6.499 16.488 
Significance .000 .000 .000 .000 
n 194 195 196 585 
 Predicted 
sign Coeff T Stat P-value Coeff T Stat P-value Coeff T Stat P-value Coeff T Stat P-value 
Intercept  -.112 -.740 .460 -.055 -.375 .708 -.183 -1.193 .234 -.090 -1.065 .287 
Country  (+) .018 1.512 .132 .000 -.015 .988 .013 1.171 .243 .010 1.539 .124 
Size (LogRevenue) (+) .070 4.093 .000* .068 4.297 .000* .088 5.668 .000* .071 8.046 .000* 
Managerial Ownership (-) -.052 -.733 .464 -.065 -.866 .387 -.085 -1.243 .215 -.070 -1.720 .086*** 
Board Independence (+) .114 1.836 .068*** .135 2.085 .038** -.019 -.326 .745 .076 2.163 .031** 
Leverage (+) -.139 -2.461 .015** -.076 -1.844 .067*** -.068 -1.787 .076*** -.088 -3.585 .000* 
Profitability (+) -.131 -1.754 .081*** -.042 -1.094 .275 -.152 -2.160 .032** -.075 -2.505 .013** 
Auditor (+) -.030 -1.009 .314 -.032 -1.054 .293 -.009 -.327 .744 -.023 -1.339 .181 
Age of Business (+) .000 .495 .621 .000 -.317 .751 .000 -1.000 .319 .000 -.462 .644 
*highly significant at 1% level, **significant at 5% level, *** moderately significant at 10% level, some revenue data is missing n 2007 = 194, n 2008 = 195, n 
2009 = 196, n pooled = 585 
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Appendix D.17 SRDI Multiple Regression Analysis (Size = LogRevenue) 
 2007 2008 2009 Pooled year 
Adjusted R2  .087 .122 .069 .106 
Durbin Watson  1.765 1.887 1.909 1.794 
F statistic  3.311 4.356 2.803 9.612 
Significance  .001 .000 .006 .000 
n  194 195 196 585 
 Predicted sign Coeff T Stat P-value Coeff T Stat P-value Coeff T Stat P-value Coeff T Stat P-value 
Intercept  .002 .015 .988 -.071 -.610 .543 -.059 -.454 .650 -.060 -.901 .368 
Country  (+) -.009 -1.118 .265 -.006 -.598 .550 -.010 -1.002 .318 -.008 -1.548 .122 
Size (LogRevenue) (+) .014 1.110 .268 .031 2.515 .013** .029 2.216 .028** .027 3.792 .000* 
Managerial Ownership (-) -.122 -2.410 .017** -.131 -2.218 .028** -.025 -.424 .672 -.092 -2.828 .005* 
Board Independence (+) .070 1.569 .118 .120 2.349 .020** .081 1.621 .107 .097 3.441 .001* 
Leverage (+) .004 .097 .923 -.015 -.458 .647 .010 .312 .756 -.006 -.323 .747 
Profitability (+) .107 1.991 .048** .066 2.146 .033** .061 1.021 .309 .065 2.759 .006* 
Auditor (+) .026 1.211 .227 .003 .115 .909 .007 .269 .788 .013 .958 .339 
Age of Business (+) -.000008 -.242 .809 .000 -1.293 .198 .000 -.431 .667 .000 -1.098 .273 
*highly significant at 1% level, **significant at 5% level, *** moderately significant at 10% level, some revenue data is missing n 2007 = 194, n 2008 = 195, n 
2009 = 196, n pooled = 585 
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Appendix D.18 ORDI Multiple Regression Analysis (Size = LogRevenue) 
 2007 2008 2009 Pooled year 
Adjusted R2 .184 .179 .110 .166 
Durbin Watson 1.413 1.287 1.245 1.272 
F statistic 6.435 6.281 4.012 15.527 
Significance .000 .000 .000 .000 
n 194 195 196 585 
 Predicted 
sign Coeff T Stat P-value Coeff T Stat P-value Coeff T Stat P-value Coeff T Stat P-value 
Intercept  .144 .712 .477 .404 2.117 .036 .466 2.032 .044 .339 2.938 .003 
Country  (+) .091 5.773 .000* .092 5.913 .000* .066 3.955 .000* .083 9.017 .000* 
Size (LogRevenue) (+) .017 .718 .474 -.020 -.998 .320 -.015 -.643 .521 -.008 -.625 .532 
Managerial Ownership (-) -.019 -.202 .840 -.051 -.528 .598 .091 .889 .375 .007 .126 .900 
Board Independence (+) .063 .758 .449 .040 .482 .630 .016 .177 .859 .040 .821 .412 
Leverage (+) -.144 -1.911 .058*** -.056 -1.040 .300 -.056 -.977 .330 -.061 -1.797 .073*** 
Profitability (+) -.123 -1.234 .219 .102 2.029 .044** .174 1.649 .101 .070 1.709 .088*** 
Auditor (+) .003 .074 .941 .023 .598 .550 -.010 -.228 .820 .004 .172 .864 
Age of Business (+) .000 -.171 .865 .000002 .034 .973 .000 -.535 .593 .000 -.497 .619 
*highly significant at 1% level, **significant at 5% level, *** moderately significant at 10% level, some revenue data is missing n 2007 = 194, n 2008 = 195, n 
2009 = 196, n pooled = 585 
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Appendix D.19 MRDI Multiple Regression Analysis (Size = LogRevenue) 
 2007 2008 2009 Pooled year 
Adjusted R2 .101 .084 .069 .084 
Durbin Watson 2.245 1.960 1.477 1.795 
F statistic 3.705 3.210 2.820 7.727 
Significance .000 .002 .006 .000 
n 194 195 196 585 
 Predicted 
sign Coeff T Stat P-value Coeff T Stat P-value Coeff T Stat P-value Coeff T Stat P-value 
Intercept  .001 .008 .994 -.097 -.976 .330 -.073 -.663 .508 -.060 -1.105 .270 
Country (+) -.009 -1.373 .171 .017 2.139 .034** .010 1.236 .218 .006 1.439 .151 
Size (LogRevenue) (+) .021 2.334 .021** .018 1.726 .086*** .015 1.372 .172 .019 3.287 .001* 
Managerial Ownership (-) -.005 -.123 .902 .004 .086 .931 .027 .545 .587 .006 .228 .820 
Board Independence (+) .030 .916 .361 .057 1.313 .191 .067 1.583 .115 .048 2.106 .036** 
Leverage (+) .013 .447 .655 .036 1.300 .195 .031 1.139 .256 .032 1.995 .047** 
Profitability (+) .023 .591 .555 .050 1.896 .060 .102 2.018 .045** .049 2.535 .012** 
Auditor (+) -.011 -.680 .497 .027 1.326 .186 .045 2.187 .030** .019 1.769 .077*** 
Age of Business (+) .000 1.142 .255 .001 1.701 .091 .000 .782 .435 .000 2.079 .038 
*highly significant at 1% level, **significant at 5% level, *** moderately significant at 10% level, some revenue data is missing n 2007 = 194, n 2008 = 195, n 
2009 = 196, n pooled = 585 
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Appendix D.20 CRDI Multiple Regression Analysis (Size = LogRevenue) 
 2007 2008 2009 Pooled year 
Adjusted R2 -.021 -.013 -.012 .003 
Durbin Watson 1.735 1.895 1.703 1.774 
F statistic .506 .680 .721 1.200 
Significance .851 .709 .673 .296 
n 194 195 196 585 
 Predicted sign Coeff T Stat P-value Coeff T Stat P-value Coeff T Stat P-value Coeff T Stat P-value 
Intercept  .322 1.260 .209 .452 1.810 .072 .121 .417 .677 .293 1.988 .047 
Country  (+) .012 .608 .544 .000 .009 .993 -.014 -.663 .508 .000 -.044 .965 
Size (LogRevenue) (+) .017 .574 .567 .021 .782 .435 .053 1.796 .074*** .030 1.961 .050** 
Managerial Ownership (-) -.093 -.780 .437 -.081 -.640 .523 .041 .319 .750 -.048 -.673 .501 
Board Independence (+) .050 .475 .635 -.182 -1.651 .100 -.082 -.733 .465 -.069 -1.119 .264 
Leverage (+) -.017 -.182 .856 -.057 -.803 .423 -.019 -.260 .795 -.040 -.925 .355 
Profitability (+) .072 .571 .569 .028 .419 .676 -.011 -.083 .934 .030 .575 .566 
Auditor (+) -.013 -.265 .791 -.022 -.425 .672 .033 .600 .549 .003 .094 .925 
Age of Business (+) .000 -.949 .344 .000 -.912 .363 .000 -.920 .359 .000 -1.506 .133 
*highly significant at 1% level, **significant at 5% level, *** moderately significant at 10% level, some revenue data is missing n 2007 = 194, n 2008 = 195, n 
2009 = 196, n pooled = 585 
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Appendix D.21 BRDI Multiple Regression Analysis (Managerial Ownership ≤ 15% and > 15%) 
  2007 2008 2009 Pooled year 
Adjusted R2 .120 .110 .080 .120 
Durbin Watson 1.453 1.779 1.618 1.613 
F statistic 4.379 4.082 3.160 11.187 
Significance .000 .000 .002 .000 
n 200 200 200 600 
 Predicted 
sign Coeff T Stat P-value Coeff T Stat P-value Coeff T Stat P-value Coeff T Stat P-value 
Intercept  .268 2.543 .012 .268 2.571 .011 .342 3.302 .001 .290 4.855 .000 
Country  (+) .023 1.913 .057*** .003 .257 .797 .009 .792 .429 .012 1.748 .081*** 
Size  (+) .024 2.395 .018** .029 3.029 .003* .029 3.193 .002* .028 5.017 .000* 
Managerial Ownership 
≤ 15% and > 15% (-) -.055 -1.880 .062*** -.039 -1.300 .195 -.046 -1.555 .122 -.049 -2.947 .003* 
Board Independence (+) .078 1.268 .206 .123 1.911 .057*** -.041 -.671 .503 .056 1.576 .116 
Leverage (+) -.072 -1.473 .143 -.049 -1.201 .231 -.049 -1.243 .215 -.053 -2.231 .026** 
Profitability (+) -.026 -.450 .653 -.005 -.141 .888 .040 .698 .486 -.002 -.093 .926 
Auditor (+) -.046 -1.580 .116 -.046 -1.534 .127 -.039 -1.330 .185 -.043 -2.547 .011** 
Age of Business (+) .000 .713 .477 .000006 .117 .907 .000 -.298 .766 .000009 .300 .765 
*highly significant at 1% level, **significant at 5% level, *** moderately significant at 10% level 
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Appendix D.22 SRDI Multiple Regression Analysis (Managerial Ownership ≤ 15% and > 15%) 
  2007 2008 2009 Pooled year 
Adjusted R2 .077 .102 .057 .087 
Durbin Watson 1.694 1.833 1.868 1.745 
F statistic 3.064 3.820 2.516 8.154 
Significance .003 .000 .013 .000 
n 200 200 200 600 
 Predicted sign Coeff T Stat P-value Coeff T Stat P-value Coeff T Stat P-value Coeff T Stat P-value 
Intercept  .193 2.568 .011 .053 .652 .515 .121 1.435 .153 .113 2.408 .016 
Country  (+) -.009 -1.080 .282 -.004 -.447 .656 -.009 -.941 .348 -.008 -1.429 .153 
Size  (+) -.011 -1.452 .148 .014 1.795 .074*** .009 1.164 .246 .005 1.146 .252 
Managerial 
Ownership  
≤ 15% and > 15% 
(-) -.044 -2.104 .037** -.038 -1.602 .111 -.031 -1.291 .198 -.037 -2.849 .005* 
Board Independence (+) .082 1.871 .063*** .133 2.642 .009* .072 1.470 .143 .104 3.737 .000* 
Leverage (+) .034 .993 .322 .006 .194 .846 .019 .581 .562 .015 .793 .428 
Profitability (+) .123 3.053 .003* .086 2.952 .004* .107 2.328 .021** .090 4.337 .000* 
Auditor (+) .005 .258 .796 -.003 -.149 .882 -.001 -.032 .974 .001 .071 .943 
Age of Business (+) .000 .390 .697 .000 -.641 .523 -.000008 -.189 .850 -.000003 -.164 .870 
*highly significant at 1% level, **significant at 5% level, *** moderately significant at 10% level 
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Appendix D.23 ORDI Multiple Regression Analysis (Managerial Ownership ≤ 15% and > 15%)  
   2007 2008 2009 Pooled year 
Adjusted R2  .190 .171 .104 .164 
Durbin Watson  1.414 1.285 1.258 1.287 
F statistic  6.839 6.130 3.873 15.666 
Significance  .000 .000 .000 .000 
n  200 200 200 600 
 Predicted sign Coeff T Stat P-value Coeff T Stat P-value Coeff T Stat P-value Coeff T Stat P-value 
Intercept  .396 2.891 .004 .226 1.697 .091 .342 2.319 .021 .320 4.015 .000 
Country  (+) .090 5.778 .000* .091 5.781 .000* .065 3.929 .000* .082 9.028 .000* 
Size  (+) -.018 -1.381 .169 .000 .029 .977 .000007 .005 .996 -.006 -.843 .399 
Managerial 
Ownership  
≤ 15% and > 15% 
(-) -.004 -.107 .915 -.007 -.187 .852 .048 1.145 .254 .006 .277 .782 
Board Independence (+) .103 1.293 .198 .049 .594 .553 .011 .131 .896 .054 1.138 .255 
Leverage (+) -.081 -1.278 .203 -.071 -1.381 .169 -.071 -1.258 .210 -.068 -2.128 .034** 
Profitability (+) -.018 -.246 .806 .079 1.658 .099*** .094 1.164 .246 .053 1.496 .135 
Auditor (+) -.022 -.598 .551 .036 .956 .340 .004 .100 .920 .007 .311 .756 
Age of Business (+) .000 .184 .854 .000 -.157 .875 .000 -.711 .478 .000 -.468 .640 
*highly significant at 1% level, **significant at 5% level, *** moderately significant at 10% level 
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Appendix D.24 MRDI Multiple Regression Analysis (Managerial Ownership ≤ 15% and > 15%) 
  2007 2008 2009 Pooled year 
Adjusted R2 .155 .103 .084 .095 
Durbin Watson 2.355 1.950 1.547 1.788 
F statistic 5.564 3.870 3.278 8.818 
Significance .000 .000 .002 .000 
n 200 200 200 600 
 Predicted sign Coeff T Stat P-value Coeff T Stat P-value Coeff T Stat P-value Coeff T Stat P-value 
Intercept  .050 .918 .360 .084 1.228 .221 .134 1.918 .057 .095 2.505 .013 
Country  (+) -.006 -.987 .325 .022 2.669 .008* .010 1.225 .222 .008 1.852 .065*** 
Size  (+) .014 2.774 .006* -.005 -.741 .460 -.008 -1.300 .195 .000009 .029 .977 
Managerial 
Ownership  
≤ 15% and > 15% 
(-) -.013 -.884 .378 -.032 -1.611 .109 -.009 -.433 .665 -.018 -1.671 .095*** 
Board Independence (+) .027 .858 .392 .076 1.806 .072*** .067 1.633 .104 .056 2.482 .013** 
Leverage (+) .036 1.460 .146 .050 1.883 .061*** .037 1.396 .164 .047 3.127 .002* 
Profitability (+) .048 1.659 .099*** .074 3.021 .003* .142 3.703 .000* .080 4.753 .000* 
Auditor (+) -.013 -.893 .373 .017 .886 .377 .031 1.564 .119 .009 .851 .395 
Age of Business (+) .000 1.118 .265 .001 1.983 .049** .000 1.122 .263 .000 2.511 .012** 
*highly significant at 1% level, **significant at 5% level, *** moderately significant at 10% level 
 
 
 
 
 
D-26 
 
Appendix D.25 CRDI Multiple Regression Analysis (Managerial Ownership ≤ 15% and > 15%) 
  2007 2008 2009 Pooled year 
Adjusted R2 .001 -.019 -.003 .008 
Durbin Watson 1.715 1.802 1.686 1.737 
F statistic 1.034 .548 .917 1.566 
Significance .412 .819 .504 .132 
n 200 200 200 600 
 Predicted sign Coeff T Stat P-value Coeff T Stat P-value Coeff T Stat P-value Coeff T Stat P-value 
Intercept  .404 2.299 .023 .426 2.427 .016 .327 1.753 .081 .368 3.586 .000 
Country  (+) .014 .708 .480 .004 .198 .843 -.013 -.600 .549 .002 .207 .836 
Size  (+) .002 .105 .917 .018 1.102 .272 .028 1.696 .092*** .017 1.829 .068*** 
Managerial 
Ownership 
 ≤ 15% and > 15% 
(-) -.040 -.821 .413 -.030 -.597 .551 .000 .004 .997 -.024 -.830 .407 
Board Independence (+) .096 .941 .348 -.118 -1.093 .276 -.072 -.661 .509 -.023 -.384 .701 
Leverage (+) .043 .533 .595 -.020 -.297 .767 .002 .027 .978 .001 .015 .988 
Profitability (+) .164 1.741 .083*** .052 .834 .405 .175 1.709 .089*** .100 2.199 .028** 
Auditor (+) -.030 -.627 .532 -.030 -.597 .551 .021 .401 .689 -.011 -.369 .712 
Age of Business (+) -.001 -.875 .383 -.001 -.727 .468 -.001 -.872 .384 -.001 -1.227 .220 
*highly significant at 1% level, **significant at 5% level, *** moderately significant at 10% level 
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Appendix D.26 BRDI Multiple Regression Analysis (Managerial Ownership ≤ 50% and > 50%) 
  2007 2008 2009 Pooled year 
Adjusted R2 .104 .128 .100 .120 
Durbin Watson 1.519 1.785 1.612 1.621 
F statistic 3.883 4.640 3.757 11.214 
Significance .000 .000 .000 .000 
n 200 200 200 600 
 Predicted 
sign Coeff T Stat P-value Coeff T Stat P-value Coeff T Stat P-value Coeff T Stat P-value 
Intercept  .252 2.374 .019 .285 2.744 .007 .352 3.431 .001 .289 4.842 .000 
Country  (+) .018 1.508 .133 .001 .094 .925 .009 .751 .453 .010 1.416 .157 
Size  (+) .025 2.395 .018** .028 2.926 .004* .029 3.186 .002* .027 4.923 .000* 
Managerial 
Ownership  
≤ 50% and > 50% 
(-) -.018 -.350 .726 -.116 -2.354 .020** -.114 -2.587 .010** -.082 -2.980 .003* 
Board Independence (+) .093 1.510 .133 .129 2.029 .044** -.039 -.647 .518 .065 1.833 .067*** 
Leverage (+) -.063 -1.293 .198 -.042 -1.055 .293 -.038 -.962 .337 -.046 -1.933 .054*** 
Profitability (+) -.029 -.512 .609 -.007 -.186 .853 .037 .664 .507 -.004 -.157 .876 
Auditor (+) -.050 -1.737 .084*** -.053 -1.783 .076*** -.048 -1.657 .099*** -.048 -2.875 .004* 
Age of Business (+) .001 1.195 .234 .000003 .066 .948 .000 -.405 .686 .000 .609 .543 
*highly significant at 1% level, **significant at 5% level, *** moderately significant at 10% level 
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Appendix D.27 SRDI Multiple Regression Analysis (Managerial Ownership ≤ 50% and > 50%) 
  2007 2008 2009 Pooled year 
Adjusted R2 .071 .112 .050 .079 
Durbin Watson 1.684 1.840 1.877 1.746 
F statistic 2.911 4.135 2.299 7.433 
Significance .004 .000 .023 .000 
n 200 200 200 600 
 Predicted 
sign Coeff T Stat P-value Coeff T Stat P-value Coeff T Stat P-value Coeff T Stat P-value 
Intercept  .188 2.493 .014 .064 .786 .433 .113 1.338 .183 .108 2.303 .022 
Country  (+) -.012 -1.490 .138 -.007 -.733 .465 -.011 -1.214 .226 -.010 -1.898 .058*** 
Size  (+) -.011 -1.544 .124 .013 1.688 .093*** .009 1.172 .243 .005 1.116 .265 
Managerial 
Ownership  
≤ 50% and > 50% 
(-) -.067 -1.821 .070*** -.085 -2.184 .030** .011 .294 .769 -.037 -1.687 .092*** 
Board Independence (+) .096 2.194 .029** .138 2.762 .006* .079 1.593 .113 .110 3.968 .000* 
Leverage (+) .042 1.220 .224 .011 .349 .727 .021 .644 .520 .019 1.028 .304 
Profitability (+) .127 3.115 .002* .085 2.912 .004* .104 2.252 .025** .088 4.216 .000* 
Auditor (+) .003 .138 .891 -.009 -.397 .691 -.003 -.147 .883 -.003 -.211 .833 
Age of Business (+) .000 .732 .465 .000 -.607 .544 .000007 .169 .866 .000007 .314 .754 
*highly significant at 1% level, **significant at 5% level, *** moderately significant at 10% level 
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Appendix D.28 ORDI Multiple Regression Analysis (Managerial Ownership ≤ 50% and > 50%) 
  2007 2008 2009 Pooled year 
Adjusted R2 .216 .196 .100 .178 
Durbin Watson 1.506 1.375 1.300 1.359 
F statistic 7.866 7.078 3.776 17.238 
Significance .000 .000 .000 .000 
n 200 200 200 600 
 Predicted sign Coeff T Stat P-value Coeff T Stat P-value Coeff T Stat P-value Coeff T Stat P-value 
Intercept  .418 3.108 .002 .251 1.915 .057 .360 2.430 .016 .339 4.292 .000 
Country  (+) .093 6.214 .000* .093 6.207 .000* .070 4.256 .000* .085 9.602 .000* 
Size  (+) -.021 -1.635 .104 -.001 -.122 .903 .000 -.017 .986 -.007 -1.027 .305 
Managerial 
Ownership 
 ≤ 50% and > 50% 
(-) -.165 -2.530 .012** -.154 -2.465 .015** -.050 -.797 .426 -.118 -3.233 .001* 
Board Independence (+) .110 1.408 .161 .054 .665 .507 -.000007 -.001 .999 .054 1.150 .251 
Leverage (+) -.077 -1.236 .218 -.064 -1.263 .208 -.072 -1.275 .204 -.064 -2.028 .043** 
Profitability (+) .002 .033 .973 .080 1.701 .090*** .100 1.233 .219 .058 1.652 .099*** 
Auditor (+) -.019 -.506 .614 .031 .837 .404 .007 .171 .864 .006 .275 .784 
Age of Business (+) -.000007 -.122 .903 .000 -.520 .603 -.001 -1.136 .257 .000 -1.075 .283 
*highly significant at 1% level, **significant at 5% level, *** moderately significant at 10% level 
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Appendix D.29 MRDI Multiple Regression Analysis (Managerial Ownership ≤ 50% and > 50%) 
  2007 2008 2009 Pooled year 
Adjusted R2 .154 .094 .103 .097 
Durbin Watson 2.376 1.965 1.544 1.806 
F statistic 5.516 3.581 3.853 9.019 
Significance .000 .001 .000 .000 
n 200 200 200 600 
 Predicted 
sign Coeff T Stat P-value Coeff T Stat P-value Coeff T Stat P-value Coeff T Stat P-value 
Intercept  .043 .789 .431 .077 1.110 .269 .122 1.769 .079 .085 2.246 .025 
Country  (+) -.008 -1.291 .198 .018 2.249 .026** .008 .988 .324 .006 1.365 .173 
Size  (+) .015 2.856 .005* -.004 -.666 .506 -.008 -1.270 .205 .001 .175 .861 
Managerial 
Ownership  
≤ 50% and > 50% 
(-) .018 .686 .493 .025 .762 .447 .061 2.058 .041** .036 2.059 .040** 
Board Independence (+) .030 .956 .340 .078 1.836 .068*** .072 1.777 .077*** .058 2.614 .009* 
Leverage (+) .038 1.527 .129 .050 1.866 .064*** .034 1.290 .199 .047 3.145 .002* 
Profitability (+) .044 1.520 .130 .072 2.918 .004* .140 3.695 .000* .077 4.583 .000* 
Auditor (+) -.015 -1.012 .313 .015 .780 .436 .032 1.659 .099*** .008 .749 .454 
Age of Business (+) .000 1.487 .139 .001 2.541 .012** .001 1.628 .105 .001 3.342 .001* 
*highly significant at 1% level, **significant at 5% level, *** moderately significant at 10% level 
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Appendix D.30 CRDI Multiple Regression Analysis (Managerial Ownership ≤ 50% and > 50%) 
  2007 2008 2009 Pooled year 
Adjusted R2 .004 -.020 -.001 .006 
Durbin Watson 1.709 1.796 1.677 1.733 
F statistic 1.093 .506 .967 1.478 
Significance .370 .851 .463 .162 
n 200 200 200 600 
 Predicted 
sign Coeff T Stat P-value Coeff T Stat P-value Coeff T Stat P-value Coeff T Stat P-value 
Intercept  .403 2.302 .022 .420 2.386 .018 .319 1.710 .089 .361 3.521 .000 
Country  (+) .012 .606 .545 .001 .028 .977 -.014 -.663 .508 .000 .034 .973 
Size  (+) .001 .032 .975 .018 1.119 .264 .028 1.709 .089*** .017 1.847 .065*** 
Managerial 
Ownership  
≤ 50% and > 50% 
(-) -.090 -1.060 .291 .015 .184 .854 .049 .619 .537 .002 .040 .968 
Board Independence (+) .110 1.082 .281 -.116 -1.076 .283 -.070 -.640 .523 -.019 -.319 .750 
Leverage (+) .051 .632 .528 -.020 -.292 .770 -.001 -.018 .986 .003 .062 .951 
Profitability (+) .171 1.808 .072*** .050 .801 .424 .174 1.704 .090*** .098 2.148 .032** 
Auditor (+) -.032 -.661 .509 -.032 -.641 .522 .023 .438 .662 -.013 -.442 .659 
Age of Business (+) -.001 -.818 .415 .000 -.558 .577 -.001 -.770 .442 -.001 -1.027 .305 
*highly significant at 1% level, **significant at 5% level, *** moderately significant at 10% level 
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Appendix D.31 BRDI Multiple Regression Analysis (Board Meeting) 
 2007 2008 2009 Pooled year 
Adjusted R2 .191 .154 .168 .185 
Durbin Watson 1.601 1.951 1.888 1.779 
F statistic 6.354 5.120 5.549 16.487 
Significance .000 .000 .000 .000 
n 182 182 181 545 
 Predicted 
sign Coeff T Stat P-value Coeff T Stat P-value Coeff T Stat P-value Coeff T Stat P-value 
Intercept  .191 1.929 .055 .242 2.329 .021 .293 3.029 .003 .245 4.303 .000 
Country  (+) .020 1.697 .091*** .001 .046 .963 .000 -.031 .975 .007 .950 .342 
Company Size (+) .032 3.298 .001* .036 3.840 .000* .032 3.795 .000* .033 6.312 .000* 
Managerial 
Ownership (-) -.121 -1.903 .059*** -.135 -1.899 .059*** -.183 -2.903 .004* -.148 -3.926 .000* 
Board Meeting (+) .009 3.262 .001* .006 1.971 .050** .005 2.244 .026** .006 4.255 .000* 
Leverage (+) -.082 -1.629 .105 -.059 -1.284 .201 -.074 -1.764 .080*** -.066 -2.584 .010* 
Profitability (+) -.022 -.410 .682 .028 .717 .474 .090 1.704 .090*** .030 1.180 .239 
Auditor (+) -.036 -1.328 .186 -.033 -1.153 .251 -.008 -.283 .778 -.026 -1.627 .104 
Age of Business (+) .000 .826 .410 .000 .208 .836 .000 -.436 .664 .000 .487 .627 
*highly significant at 1% level, **significant at 5% level, *** moderately significant at 10% level, some board meeting data is missing n 2007 = 182, n 2008 = 
182, n 2009 = 181, n pooled = 545 
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Appendix D.32 SRDI Multiple Regression Analysis (Board Meeting) 
 2007 2008 2009 Pooled year 
Adjusted R2 .089 .119 .074 .095 
Durbin Watson 1.714 1.712 1.768 1.660 
F statistic 3.203 4.066 2.808 8.146 
Significance .002 .000 .006 .000 
n 182 182 181 545 
 Predicted 
sign Coeff T Stat P-value Coeff T Stat P-value Coeff T Stat P-value Coeff T Stat P-value 
Intercept  .235 2.949 .004 .120 1.358 .176 .141 1.580 .116 .152 3.041 .002 
Country  (+) -.014 -1.487 .139 -.009 -.830 .408 -.016 -1.463 .145 -.012 -2.007 .045** 
Company Size (+) -.006 -.728 .467 .022 2.801 .006* .012 1.541 .125 .011 2.339 .020** 
Managerial 
Ownership (-) -.151 -2.961 .004* -.160 -2.660 .009* -.052 -.896 .372 -.121 -3.652 .000* 
Board Meeting (+) -.003 -1.170 .244 -.003 -1.021 .309 .000005 .024 .981 -.001 -.968 .334 
Leverage (+) .031 .767 .444 -.016 -.399 .691 .033 .848 .398 .013 .589 .556 
Profitability (+) .111 2.547 .012** .068 2.069 .040** .103 2.125 .035** .078 3.497 .001* 
Auditor (+) .001 .061 .951 -.020 -.830 .408 -.009 -.357 .721 -.009 -.677 .499 
Age of Business (+) .000 .582 .561 .000 -.655 .513 .000 .721 .472 .000 .443 .658 
*highly significant at 1% level, **significant at 5% level, *** moderately significant at 10% level, some board meeting data is missing n 2007 = 182, n 2008 = 
182, n 2009 = 181, n pooled = 545 
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Appendix D.33 ORDI Multiple Regression Analysis (Board Meeting) 
 2007 2008 2009 Pooled year 
Adjusted R2 .131 .125 .053 .115 
Durbin Watson 1.424 1.293 1.267 1.289 
F statistic 4.398 4.232 2.270 9.860 
Significance .000 .000 .025 .000 
n 182 182 181 545 
 Predicted 
sign Coeff T Stat P-value Coeff T Stat P-value Coeff T Stat P-value Coeff T Stat P-value 
Intercept  .441 2.960 .004 .235 1.620 .107 .352 2.208 .029 .350 4.064 .000 
Country  (+) .084 4.603 .000* .088 4.960 .000* .058 3.007 .003* .076 7.230 .000* 
Company Size (+) -.012 -.822 .412 .003 .233 .816 .002 .172 .863 -.003 -.377 .706 
Managerial 
Ownership (-) -.056 -.590 .556 -.053 -.539 .590 .080 .764 .446 -.014 -.244 .807 
Board Meeting (+) -.001 -.255 .799 .002 .380 .704 .001 .283 .777 .000 .140 .888 
Leverage (+) -.078 -1.021 .308 -.069 -1.067 .287 -.071 -1.028 .305 -.061 -1.561 .119 
Profitability (+) -.034 -.420 .675 .086 1.580 .116 .108 1.240 .217 .053 1.366 .173 
Auditor (+) -.031 -.761 .447 .034 .842 .401 .004 .101 .919 .000 -.008 .994 
Age of Business (+) .000005 .063 .950 .000 -.226 .822 .000 -.631 .529 .000 -.503 .615 
*highly significant at 1% level, **significant at 5% level, *** moderately significant at 10% level, some board meeting data is missing n 2007 = 182, n 2008 = 
182, n 2009 = 181, n pooled = 545 
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Appendix D.34 MRDI Multiple Regression Analysis (Board Meeting) 
 2007 2008 2009 Pooled year 
Adjusted R2 .134 .054 .070 .066 
Durbin Watson 2.162 1.805 1.436 1.643 
F statistic 4.492 2.291 2.698 5.795 
Significance .000 .023 .008 .000 
n 182 182 181 545 
 Predicted 
sign Coeff T Stat P-value Coeff T Stat P-value Coeff T Stat P-value Coeff T Stat P-value 
Intercept  .052 .893 .373 .090 1.188 .236 .093 1.249 .213 .081 1.978 .048 
Country  (+) -.007 -.973 .332 .021 2.208 .029** .017 1.850 .066*** .011 2.163 .031** 
Company Size (+) .017 3.040 .003* -.001 -.191 .849 -.005 -.828 .409 .003 .701 .483 
Managerial 
Ownership (-) -.018 -.495 .621 -.023 -.437 .662 .005 .101 .920 -.017 -.624 .533 
Board Meeting (+) .000 -.296 .768 .001 .406 .685 .003 1.846 .067*** .002 1.430 .153 
Leverage (+) .024 .808 .420 .038 1.133 .259 .027 .824 .411 .038 2.075 .038** 
Profitability (+) .042 1.326 .186 .076 2.683 .008* .163 3.996 .000* .085 4.639 .000* 
Auditor (+) -.015 -.965 .336 .015 .700 .485 .037 1.783 .076*** .010 .866 .387 
Age of Business (+) .000 .931 .353 .001 1.724 .086*** .000 1.010 .314 .000 2.165 .031** 
*highly significant at 1% level, **significant at 5% level, *** moderately significant at 10% level, some board meeting data is missing n 2007 = 182, n 2008 = 
182, n 2009 = 181, n pooled = 545 
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Appendix D.35 CRDI Multiple Regression Analysis (Board Meeting) 
  2007 2008 2009 Pooled year 
Adjusted R2  .003 -.026 .010 .013 
Durbin Watson  1.604 1.888 1.747 1.749 
F statistic  1.062 .431 1.233 1.900 
Significance  .392 .901 .282 .058 
n  182 182 181 545 
 Predicted 
sign Coeff T Stat P-value Coeff T Stat P-value Coeff T Stat P-value Coeff T Stat P-value 
Intercept  .416 2.295 .023 .445 2.501 .013 .335 1.790 .075 .388 3.744 .000 
Country  (+) .014 .649 .517 .006 .265 .791 -.013 -.590 .556 .002 .191 .848 
Company Size (+) -.005 -.310 .757 .001 .072 .943 .012 .761 .448 .005 .518 .605 
Managerial 
Ownership (-) -.072 -.620 .536 -.045 -.374 .709 .060 .487 .627 -.019 -.278 .781 
Board Meeting (+) .004 .688 .492 .000 -.063 .950 -.003 -.628 .531 .000 -.090 .929 
Leverage (+) .152 1.639 .103 .076 .964 .337 .110 1.356 .177 .101 2.162 .031** 
Profitability (+) .171 1.733 .085*** .040 .601 .549 .171 1.675 .096*** .092 1.974 .049** 
Auditor (+) -.037 -.748 .456 -.039 -.779 .437 .032 .606 .545 -.016 -.544 .586 
Age of Business (+) .000007 .008 .993 .000 .117 .907 .000 .500 .618 .000 .575 .566 
*highly significant at 1% level, **significant at 5% level, *** moderately significant at 10% level, some board meeting data is missing n 2007 = 182, n 2008 = 
182, n 2009 = 181, n pooled = 545 
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From Appendices D.1 – D.35 the results comparison between additional analysis in 
the main and sensitivity analysis measurements for the independent variables 
effect on five major sub RDI are: 
 
• For the main analysis, the ‘country’ variable is statistically significant for 
‘operating risk’ (ORDI) 2007, 2008, 2009, and pooled data, and also significant 
for ‘market risk’ (MRDI) in 2008. 
• Country in the sensitivity analysis re-measured by country GDP is significant in 
‘business risk’ (BRDI) for all years, ‘strategy risk’ (SRDI) for all years, and 
‘operating risk’ (ORDI) only in pooled data. Country in the sensitivity analysis 
re-measured by categorized based on the economic effect of Global Financial 
Crisis (GFC) is significant in ‘operating risk’ (ORDI) for all years, and ‘market 
risk’ (MRDI) in 2008 and pooled data. Country in the sensitivity analysis re-
measured by categorized based on the ex-colonial, legal system, and board 
system is significant in ‘business risk’ (BRDI) for all years, ‘strategy risk’ (SRDI) 
in three of the four regressions (except 2008), and ‘operating risk’ (ORDI) for all 
years. 
• For the main analysis, size is a consistent positive predictor for ‘business risk’ 
(BRDI) for all years, ‘market risk’ (MRDI) for 2007 with positive coefficient (see 
Table 7.1). 
• For sensitivity analysis, Size is a steady positive predictor for “business risk’ 
(BRDI) for all years, ‘strategy risk’ (SRDI) for 2008, 2009, and pooled year, 
‘market risk’ (MRDI) for 2007 and pooled year and ‘credit risk’ (CRDI) in pooled 
year, with positive coefficient. 
• Managerial ownership is negatively significant for ‘strategy risk’ (SRDI) in 2007, 
2008 and pooled data and also statistically significant for ‘business risk’ (ORDI) 
in the pooled data set in the main analysis. 
• Managerial ownership in the sensitivity analysis re-measured by categorized 
based on the companies which have ≤ 15% and > 15% managerial ownership 
is negatively significant in ‘business risk’ (BRDI) in pooled data, and negatively 
significant in ‘strategy risk’ (SRDI) in 2007 and pooled data.  Managerial 
ownership re-measured by categorized companies which have ≤ 50 % and > 
50% managerial ownership is negatively significant in ‘business risk’ (BRDI) in 
three of the four regressions (except 2007), negatively significant in ‘strategy 
risk’ (SRDI) in 2008, negatively significant in ‘operating risk’ (ORDI) in three of 
the four regressions (except 2009), and positively significant in ‘market risk’ 
(MRDI) in 2009 and pooled data.  
• For the main analysis, board independence is positively significant for ‘strategy 
risk’ (SRDI) in 2007,2008 and pooled year; and ‘market risk’ (MRDI) in pooled 
year data (see Table 7.1). 
• For the sensitivity analysis, board meeting is positively significant for ‘business 
risk’ (BRDI) in 2007,2008, 2009 and pooled year . 
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APPENDIX E: Sensitivity Analysis in the Additional Change 
Regression 
 
 
Appendix E provides the sensitivity analysis in the additional change 
analysis regressions in the different measurement of independent and 
control variables. 
 
The first sensitivity analysis (Appendices E.1 – E.3) for additional change 
analysis regression tests the association between the change in the risk 
disclosure and the change of predictor variables between years. In the 
main analysis country is measure by categorized 1 if Indonesia, 2 if 
Australia, 3 if Malaysia, and 4 if Singapore manufacturing listed 
companies. For sensitivity analysis country is measured with the country 
GDP. In main the analysis, size is measure by log total assets. For 
sensitivity analysis, size is replaced with a different measurement of size 
using log total revenue. This sensitivity analysis also measures board 
meeting as substitute measurement of board independent for proxies of 
corporate governance. The other sensitivity analysis for independent 
variables (country re-measured by categorized based on economic effect 
of Global Financial Crisis (GFC) and categorized British colonial with its 
common law and one-tier board system or ex Dutch colonial with its civil 
law approach and two-tiers board system and managerial ownership re-
measured by categories based on the companies which have ≤ 15% and > 
15% also ≤ 50% and > 50% managerial ownership are not analysis in this 
model because there is only negligible change over time. 
 
 
The second sensitivity analysis (Appendices E.4 – D.18) tests the 
association between the change in the five sub categories of risk 
disclosure (business risk, strategy risk, operational risk, market risk, credit 
risk) and the change of predictor variables between years with different 
measurements of independent and control variables.  
 
E-2 
 
Appendix E.1 Change RDI Multiple Regression Analysis (Country = ∆ GDP) 
 ∆2007-2009 ∆2007-2008 ∆2008-2009 
Adjusted R2 -.014 .000 -.009 
Durbin Watson 2.081 2.025 1.899 
F statistic .544 .988 .711 
Significance .774 .435 .641 
n 200 200 200 
 Predicted 
sign Coeff T Stat P-value Coeff T Stat P-value Coeff T Stat P-value 
Intercept  .042 6.610 .000 .025 3.594 .000 .020 2.431 .016 
Country (∆ GDP) (+) .0000002 .366 .715 -.00000001 -.075 .940 .0000003 1.242 .216 
∆Size  (+) -.013 -.411 .682 .000 .014 .989 -.005 -.097 .922 
∆Managerial 
Ownership (-) -.031 -.497 .620 -.116 -2.152 .033** .043 .582 .561 
∆Board 
Independence (+) -.002 -.055 .956 .021 .456 .649 -.004 -.097 .923 
∆Leverage (+) .040 .869 .386 .032 .623 .534 -.046 -.847 .398 
∆Profitability (+) -.031 -1.310 .192 -.014 -.806 .421 -.028 -1.268 .206 
*highly significant at 1% level, **significant at 5% level, *** moderately significant at 10% level 
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  Appendix E.2 Change RDI Multiple Regression Analysis (∆Size LogRevenue) 
 ∆2007-2009 ∆2007-2008 ∆2008-2009 
Adjusted R2 -.004 .005 -.007 
Durbin Watson 2.014 2.004 1.894 
F statistic .857 1.176 .765 
Significance .527 .321 .598 
n 194 194 195 
 Predicted 
sign Coeff T Stat P-value Coeff T Stat P-value Coeff T Stat P-value 
Intercept  .054 3.613 .000 .025 1.842 .067 .018 1.343 .181 
Country  (+) -.006 -1.101 .272 .000 -.130 .896 -.002 -.511 .610 
∆Size 
(LogRevenue) (+) .005 .243 .808 .019 .811 .419 .031 1.298 .196 
∆Managerial 
Ownership (-) -.035 -.549 .584 -.117 -2.141 .034** .052 .691 .491 
∆Board 
Independence (+) -.004 -.108 .914 .019 .393 .695 -.001 -.034 .973 
∆Leverage (+) .043 .925 .356 .026 .490 .625 -.038 -.713 .477 
∆Profitability (+) -.049 -1.707 .090*** -.015 -.908 .365 .006 .215 .830 
*highly significant at 1% level, **significant at 5% level, *** moderately significant at 10% level, some revenue data is missing n 2007-2009 = 194, 
n 2007-2008 = 194, n 2008-2009 = 195 
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  Appendix E.3 Change RDI Multiple Regression Analysis (∆Board Meeting) 
 ∆2007-2009 ∆2007-2008 ∆2008-2009 
Adjusted R2 -.004 .003 .002 
Durbin Watson 2.096 2.020 1.925 
F statistic .871 1.091 1.052 
Significance .517 .370 .394 
n 182 182 183 
 Predicted 
sign Coeff T Stat P-value Coeff T Stat P-value Coeff T Stat P-value 
Intercept  .063 3.814 .000 .020 1.344 .181 .034 2.256 .025 
Country  (+) -.008 -1.466 .145 .001 .157 .875 -.007 -1.426 .156 
∆Company Size (+) -.011 -.325 .745 .005 .156 .877 .016 .324 .747 
∆Managerial 
Ownership (-) -.011 -.180 .857 -.119 -2.189 .030** .045 .586 .559 
∆Board Meeting (+) .001 .773 .441 .000 .122 .903 -.002 -1.162 .247 
∆Leverage (+) .045 .905 .367 .072 1.138 .257 -.047 -.823 .412 
∆Profitability (+) -.027 -1.063 .289 -.014 -.746 .457 -.035 -1.414 .159 
*highly significant at 1% level, **significant at 5% level, *** moderately significant at 10% level, some board meeting data is missing n 2007-2009 
= 182, n 2007-2008 = 182, n 2008-2009 = 183 
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The result for sensitivity analysis from Appendices E.1 – E.3 compared 
with the main analysis reveals that there is no significant difference in the 
significance of change in country, size and change of corporate 
governance related to RDI. Both the main and sensitivity analysis shows 
that change in country is not significant in all three regressions, size also 
is not significant in all the three regressions and change in corporate 
governance is not significant in all the three regressions (see Table 7.7). 
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Appendix E.4 Change BRDI Multiple Regression Analysis (Country = ∆ GDP) 
 ∆2007-2009 ∆2007-2008 ∆2008-2009 
Adjusted R2 -.018 -.009 .026 
Durbin Watson 1.955 1.806 2.087 
F statistic .403 .700 1.883 
Significance .876 .650 .086 
n 200 200 200 
 Predicted 
sign Coeff T Stat P-value Coeff T Stat P-value Coeff T Stat P-value 
Intercept  .039 4.162 .000 .023 1.931 .055 .030 2.346 .020 
Country (∆ GDP) (+) -.00000009 -.132 .895 -.0000004 -1.301 .195 .0000003 .689 .491 
∆Size  (+) .020 .428 .669 .038 .686 .493 -.014 -.191 .849 
∆Managerial 
Ownership (-) -.127 -1.340 .182 -.073 -.787 .432 .104 .930 .353 
∆Board 
Independence (+) -.020 -.349 .727 .106 1.297 .196 -.007 -.117 .907 
∆Leverage (+) -.011 -.160 .873 -.002 -.020 .984 -.097 -1.185 .238 
∆Profitability (+) -.016 -.437 .662 -.020 -.698 .486 -.096 -2.872 .005* 
*highly significant at 1% level, **significant at 5% level, *** moderately significant at 10% level 
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Appendix E.5 Change SRDI Multiple Regression Analysis (Country = ∆ GDP)  
 ∆2007-2009 ∆2007-2008 ∆2008-2009 
Adjusted R2 -.012 .004 -.012 
Durbin Watson 2.011 2.177 1.941 
F statistic .620 1.144 .595 
Significance .714 .338 .734 
n 200 200 200 
 Predicted 
sign Coeff T Stat P-value Coeff T Stat P-value Coeff T Stat P-value 
Intercept  .058 6.496 .000 .042 4.204 .000 .013 1.004 .317 
Country (∆ GDP) (+) .00000005 .076 .939 .0000002 1.031 .304 .00000009 .244 .808 
∆Size  (+) -.039 -.900 .369 -.058 -1.235 .218 -.075 -1.034 .302 
∆Managerial 
Ownership (-) -.092 -1.028 .305 -.121 -1.557 .121 -.012 -.106 .915 
∆Board 
Independence (+) .007 .124 .901 .052 .760 .448 .034 .544 .587 
∆Leverage (+) .020 .301 .764 -.078 -1.033 .303 -.054 -.655 .513 
∆Profitability (+) -.041 -1.198 .233 .023 .958 .339 .047 1.385 .168 
*highly significant at 1% level, **significant at 5% level, *** moderately significant at 10% level 
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Appendix E.6 Change ORDI Multiple Regression Analysis (Country = ∆ GDP) 
 ∆2007-2009 ∆2007-2008 ∆2008-2009 
Adjusted R2 .004 .017 -.022 
Durbin Watson 2.072 2.077 1.844 
F statistic 1.129 1.577 .290 
Significance .347 .156 .941 
n 200 200 200 
 Predicted 
sign Coeff T Stat P-value Coeff T Stat P-value Coeff T Stat P-value 
Intercept  .022 1.544 .124 .007 .528 .598 .001 .049 .961 
Country (∆ GDP) (+) .000002 1.934 .055*** .0000004 1.059 .291 .00000009 .167 .867 
∆Size  (+) .008 .113 .910 .035 .539 .591 .073 .683 .496 
∆Managerial 
Ownership (-) .066 .464 .643 -.072 -.663 .508 .003 .018 .986 
∆Board 
Independence (+) .026 .301 .764 -.060 -.628 .531 -.059 -.636 .526 
∆Leverage (+) .015 .143 .886 .197 1.868 .063*** .018 .147 .883 
∆Profitability (+) -.087 -1.605 .110 -.069 -2.003 .047** -.051 -1.011 .313 
*highly significant at 1% level, **significant at 5% level, *** moderately significant at 10% level 
 
 
 
 
 
 
E-9 
 
Appendix E.7 Change MRDI Multiple Regression Analysis (Country = ∆ GDP) 
 ∆2007-2009 ∆2007-2008 ∆2008-2009 
Adjusted R2 .025 -.002 -.008 
Durbin Watson 1.505 1.925 1.914 
F statistic 1.837 .926 .748 
Significance .094 .477 .612 
n 200 200 200 
 Predicted 
sign Coeff T Stat P-value Coeff T Stat P-value Coeff T Stat P-value 
Intercept  .037 3.976 .000 .026 2.535 .012 .016 1.230 .220 
Country (∆ GDP) (+) -.0000009 -1.233 .219 .00000004 .158 .875 .0000006 1.658 .099*** 
∆Size  (+) -.058 -1.273 .204 -.015 -.323 .747 -.001 -.015 .988 
∆Managerial 
Ownership (-) .087 .922 .358 -.141 -1.764 .079*** .029 .249 .803 
∆Board 
Independence (+) -.061 -1.050 .295 -.089 -1.265 .207 -.015 -.220 .826 
∆Leverage (+) .172 2.522 .012** .093 1.204 .230 .030 .342 .733 
∆Profitability (+) -.013 -.378 .706 -.009 -.377 .707 .023 .660 .510 
*highly significant at 1% level, **significant at 5% level, *** moderately significant at 10% level 
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Appendix E.8 Change CRDI Multiple Regression Analysis (Country = ∆ GDP) 
 ∆2007-2009 ∆2007-2008 ∆2008-2009 
Adjusted R2 -.008 -.003 -.015 
Durbin Watson 1.930 1.870 1.745 
F statistic .728 .911 .520 
Significance .628 .488 .793 
n 200 200 200 
 Predicted 
sign Coeff T Stat P-value Coeff T Stat P-value Coeff T Stat P-value 
Intercept  .045 2.339 .020 .0000009 .000 1.000 .052 2.043 .042 
Country (∆ GDP) (+) .000001 .793 .429 .0000001 .173 .863 .0000006 .874 .383 
∆Size  (+) .015 .157 .875 -.020 -.201 .841 .111 .761 .447 
∆Managerial 
Ownership (-) .106 .547 .585 -.382 -2.291 .023** .075 .328 .743 
∆Board 
Independence (+) .221 1.849 .066*** .014 .097 .923 .041 .324 .746 
∆Leverage (+) .017 .122 .903 .035 .215 .830 -.121 -.729 .467 
∆Profitability (+) -.006 -.077 .939 .006 .114 .909 -.026 -.379 .705 
*highly significant at 1% level, **significant at 5% level, *** moderately significant at 10% level 
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Appendix E.9 Change BRDI Multiple Regression Analysis (∆Size =∆ LogRevenue) 
 ∆2007-2009 ∆2007-2008 ∆2008-2009 
Adjusted R2 -.004 .002 .057 
Durbin Watson 1.930 1.818 2.017 
F statistic .884 1.063 2.960 
Significance .508 .386 .009 
n 194 194 195 
 Predicted 
sign Coeff T Stat P-value Coeff T Stat P-value Coeff T Stat P-value 
Intercept  .064 2.859 .005 .055 2.363 .019 -.008 -.403 .687 
Country  (+) -.010 -1.295 .197 -.016 -1.882 .061*** .012 1.643 .102 
∆Size 
(∆LogRevenue) (+) .011 .369 .712 .002 .058 .954 .102 2.850 .005* 
∆Managerial 
Ownership (-) -.139 -1.431 .154 -.066 -.691 .490 .126 1.133 .259 
∆Board 
Independence (+) -.023 -.388 .698 .107 1.302 .195 -.009 -.140 .889 
∆Leverage (+) -.000004 .000 1.000 -.030 -.335 .738 -.072 -.897 .371 
∆Profitability (+) -.050 -1.147 .253 -.022 -.750 .454 -.015 -.359 .720 
*highly significant at 1% level, **significant at 5% level, *** moderately significant at 10% level, some revenue data is missing n 2007-2009 = 194, n 
2007-2008 = 194, n 2008-2009 = 195 
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Appendix E.10 Change SRDI Multiple Regression Analysis (∆Size =∆ LogRevenue) 
 ∆2007-2009 ∆2007-2008 ∆2008-2009 
Adjusted R2 -.022 .005 -.008 
Durbin Watson 2.050 2.220 1.958 
F statistic .304 1.145 .750 
Significance .935 .338 .610 
n 194 194 195 
 Predicted 
sign Coeff T Stat P-value Coeff T Stat P-value Coeff T Stat P-value 
Intercept  .052 2.391 .018 .025 1.257 .210 .025 1.202 .231 
Country  (+) .002 .255 .799 .009 1.209 .228 -.007 -.930 .354 
∆Size 
(∆LogRevenue) (+) .005 .192 .848 .006 .187 .852 -.013 -.363 .717 
∆Managerial 
Ownership (-) -.101 -1.086 .279 -.130 -1.597 .112 -.005 -.044 .965 
∆Board 
Independence (+) .009 .159 .873 .065 .929 .354 .029 .456 .649 
∆Leverage (+) -.004 -.053 .958 -.078 -1.004 .317 -.087 -1.056 .292 
∆Profitability (+) -.029 -.707 .481 .022 .872 .384 .046 1.078 .282 
*highly significant at 1% level, **significant at 5% level, *** moderately significant at 10% level, some revenue data is missing n 2007-2009 = 194, n 
2007-2008 = 194, n 2008-2009 = 195 
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Appendix E.11 Change ORDI Multiple Regression Analysis (∆Size =∆ LogRevenue) 
 ∆2007-2009 ∆2007-2008 ∆2008-2009 
Adjusted R2 -.006 .023 -.018 
Durbin Watson 1.973 2.000 1.887 
F statistic .807 1.754 .436 
Significance .566 .111 .854 
n 194 194 195 
 Predicted 
sign Coeff T Stat P-value Coeff T Stat P-value Coeff T Stat P-value 
Intercept  .069 2.031 .044 .020 .751 .453 .037 1.224 .223 
Country  (+) -.020 -1.639 .103 -.003 -.357 .721 -.015 -1.400 .163 
∆Size 
(∆LogRevenue) (+) .005 .117 .907 .055 1.195 .234 -.014 -.260 .795 
∆Managerial 
Ownership (-) .072 .491 .624 -.077 -.699 .486 -.022 -.133 .895 
∆Board 
Independence (+) -.001 -.014 .989 -.095 -.997 .320 -.055 -.588 .557 
∆Leverage (+) .036 .342 .732 .204 1.924 .056*** .034 .285 .776 
∆Profitability (+) -.088 -1.353 .178 -.068 -1.989 .048** -.039 -.615 .539 
*highly significant at 1% level, **significant at 5% level, *** moderately significant at 10% level, some revenue data is missing n 2007-2009 = 194, n 
2007-2008 = 194, n 2008-2009 = 195 
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Appendix E.12 Change MRDI Multiple Regression Analysis (∆Size =∆ LogRevenue) 
 ∆2007-2009 ∆2007-2008 ∆2008-2009 
Adjusted R2 .016 .044 -.018 
Durbin Watson 1.480 2.049 1.925 
F statistic 1.532 2.492 .433 
Significance .170 .024 .856 
n 194 194 195 
 Predicted 
sign Coeff T Stat P-value Coeff T Stat P-value Coeff T Stat P-value 
Intercept  .009 .390 .697 -.026 -1.332 .184 .018 .856 .393 
Country  (+) .010 1.213 .227 .020 2.827 .005* -.007 -.918 .360 
∆Size 
(∆LogRevenue) (+) -.012 -.424 .672 .045 1.324 .187 .014 .364 .716 
∆Managerial 
Ownership (-) .101 1.024 .307 -.142 -1.755 .081*** .042 .346 .729 
∆Board 
Independence (+) -.052 -.863 .389 -.093 -1.322 .188 -.004 -.053 .958 
∆Leverage (+) .165 2.343 .020** .099 1.276 .204 .038 .443 .659 
∆Profitability (+) -.021 -.486 .628 -.003 -.126 .900 .045 .999 .319 
*highly significant at 1% level, **significant at 5% level, *** moderately significant at 10% level, some revenue data is missing n 2007-2009 = 194, n 
2007-2008 = 194, n 2008-2009 = 195 
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Appendix E.13 Change CRDI Multiple Regression Analysis (∆Size =∆ LogRevenue) 
 ∆2007-2009 ∆2007-2008 ∆2008-2009 
Adjusted R2 .018 .005 -.017 
Durbin Watson 1.940 1.882 1.718 
F statistic 1.584 1.149 .473 
Significance .154 .336 .827 
n 194 194 195 
 Predicted 
sign Coeff T Stat P-value Coeff T Stat P-value Coeff T Stat P-value 
Intercept  .117 2.550 .012 .027 .644 .520 .094 2.284 .024 
Country  (+) -.030 -1.826 .070*** -.011 -.746 .457 -.021 -1.421 .157 
∆Size 
(∆LogRevenue) (+) .024 .408 .684 -.022 -.304 .761 -.040 -.540 .590 
∆Managerial 
Ownership (-) .076 .385 .701 -.416 -2.428 .016** .084 .362 .718 
∆Board 
Independence (+) .230 1.917 .057*** .015 .099 .921 .061 .476 .635 
∆Leverage (+) .069 .484 .629 .058 .351 .726 -.094 -.564 .574 
∆Profitability (+) -.120 -1.352 .178 -.029 -.549 .583 -.038 -.433 .666 
*highly significant at 1% level, **significant at 5% level, *** moderately significant at 10% level, some revenue data is missing n 2007-2009 = 194, n 
2007-2008 = 194, n 2008-2009 = 195 
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Appendix E.14 Change BRDI Multiple Regression Analysis (∆Board Meeting) 
 ∆2007-2009 ∆2007-2008 ∆2008-2009 
Adjusted R2 -.005 -.010 .032 
Durbin Watson 2.096 1.886 2.039 
F statistic .856 .696 1.990 
Significance .529 .653 .069 
n 182 182 183 
 Predicted 
sign Coeff T Stat P-value Coeff T Stat P-value Coeff T Stat P-value 
Intercept  .082 3.317 .001 .046 1.720 .087 .026 1.152 .251 
Country  (+) -.015 -1.816 .071*** -.013 -1.440 .152 .001 .069 .945 
∆Company Size (+) .008 .167 .867 .016 .293 .770 .042 .567 .572 
∆Managerial 
Ownership (-) -.100 -1.061 .290 -.064 -.675 .501 .113 .987 .325 
∆Board Meeting (+) .001 .511 .610 .003 .833 .406 -.003 -1.100 .273 
∆Leverage (+) .012 .163 .871 .060 .542 .589 -.098 -1.144 .254 
∆Profitability (+) -.001 -.029 .977 -.015 -.460 .646 -.115 -3.105 .002* 
*highly significant at 1% level, **significant at 5% level, *** moderately significant at 10% level, some board meeting data is missing n 2007-2009 = 
182, n 2007-2008 = 182, n 2008-2009 = 183 
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Appendix E.15 Change SRDI Multiple Regression Analysis (∆Board Meeting) 
 ∆2007-2009 ∆2007-2008 ∆2008-2009 
Adjusted R2 -.017 .000 .001 
Durbin Watson 1.934 2.193 1.970 
F statistic .486 .995 1.029 
Significance .818 .431 .408 
n 182 182 183 
 Predicted 
sign Coeff T Stat P-value Coeff T Stat P-value Coeff T Stat P-value 
Intercept  .066 2.792 .006 .025 1.139 .256 .048 2.081 .039 
Country  (+) -.002 -.307 .759 .009 1.191 .235 -.013 -1.691 .093*** 
∆Company Size (+) -.030 -.649 .517 -.042 -.896 .372 -.095 -1.268 .207 
∆Managerial 
Ownership (-) -.073 -.811 .418 -.140 -1.763 .080*** -.009 -.074 .941 
∆Board Meeting (+) .001 .556 .579 -.002 -.544 .587 .000 -.405 .686 
∆Leverage (+) .020 .282 .778 -.050 -.545 .586 -.063 -.726 .469 
∆Profitability (+) -.037 -1.030 .304 .018 .662 .509 .052 1.373 .172 
*highly significant at 1% level, **significant at 5% level, *** moderately significant at 10% level, some board meeting data is missing n 2007-2009 = 
182, n 2007-2008 = 182, n 2008-2009 = 183 
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Appendix E.16 Change ORDI Multiple Regression Analysis (∆Board Meeting) 
 ∆2007-2009 ∆2007-2008 ∆2008-2009 
Adjusted R2 .000 .016 -.015 
Durbin Watson 2.096 2.132 1.906 
F statistic 1.010 1.506 .560 
Significance .421 .179 .762 
n 182 182 183 
 Predicted 
sign Coeff T Stat P-value Coeff T Stat P-value Coeff T Stat P-value 
Intercept  .079 2.012 .046 .019 .622 .535 .044 1.267 .207 
Country  (+) -.023 -1.683 .094*** -.003 -.293 .770 -.017 -1.388 .167 
∆Company Size (+) .018 .238 .812 .071 1.068 .287 .056 .493 .622 
∆Managerial 
Ownership (-) .079 .531 .596 -.082 -.735 .463 -.019 -.110 .912 
∆Board Meeting (+) .002 .373 .710 -.002 -.420 .675 .000 .090 .928 
∆Leverage (+) .030 .258 .797 .253 1.953 .052** .037 .277 .782 
∆Profitability (+) -.095 -1.599 .112 -.078 -2.078 .039 -.038 -.669 .505 
*highly significant at 1% level, **significant at 5% level, *** moderately significant at 10% level, some board meeting data is missing n 2007-2009 = 
182, n 2007-2008 = 182, n 2008-2009 = 183 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
E-19 
 
Appendix E.17 Change MRDI Multiple Regression Analysis (∆Board Meeting) 
 ∆2007-2009 ∆2007-2008 ∆2008-2009 
Adjusted R2 .020 .017 -.017 
Durbin Watson 1.518 1.948 1.835 
F statistic 1.624 1.533 .487 
Significance .143 .170 .818 
n 182 182 183 
 Predicted 
sign Coeff T Stat P-value Coeff T Stat P-value Coeff T Stat P-value 
Intercept  .002 .068 .946 -.022 -.949 .344 .011 .466 .642 
Country  (+) .012 1.402 .163 .020 2.448 .015** -.005 -.581 .562 
∆Company Size (+) -.056 -1.098 .274 -.018 -.380 .704 .041 .516 .607 
∆Managerial 
Ownership (-) .111 1.133 .259 -.145 -1.764 .080*** .038 .310 .757 
∆Board Meeting (+) .002 .757 .450 -.001 -.383 .702 -.002 -.958 .339 
∆Leverage (+) .163 2.119 .036** .092 .967 .335 .042 .458 .648 
∆Profitability (+) -.018 -.455 .649 -.005 -.181 .856 .013 .338 .736 
*highly significant at 1% level, **significant at 5% level, *** moderately significant at 10% level, some board meeting data is missing n 2007-2009 = 
182, n 2007-2008 = 182, n 2008-2009 = 183 
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Appendix E.18 Change CRDI Multiple Regression Analysis (∆Board Meeting) 
 ∆2007-2009 ∆2007-2008 ∆2008-2009 
Adjusted R2 -.018 .002 -.009 
Durbin Watson 1.800 1.982 1.958 
F statistic .465 1.075 .735 
Significance .834 .379 .622 
n 182 182 183 
 Predicted 
sign Coeff T Stat P-value Coeff T Stat P-value Coeff T Stat P-value 
Intercept  .103 2.037 .043 -.004 -.094 .925 .082 1.891 .060 
Country  (+) -.024 -1.377 .170 -.002 -.144 .886 -.018 -1.177 .241 
∆Company Size (+) .049 .491 .624 .049 .500 .617 .090 .637 .525 
∆Managerial 
Ownership (-) .095 .493 .623 -.390 -2.369 .019** .062 .282 .778 
∆Board Meeting (+) -.002 -.396 .692 .001 .194 .846 -.003 -.736 .463 
∆Leverage (+) -.039 -.260 .795 .078 .409 .683 -.194 -1.175 .242 
∆Profitability (+) .000 -.005 .996 .000 .008 .993 -.043 -.602 .548 
*highly significant at 1% level, **significant at 5% level, *** moderately significant at 10% level, some board meeting data is missing n 2007-2009 = 
182, n 2007-2008 = 182, n 2008-2009 = 183 
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Below is the results difference in additional analysis between additional 
main analysis and sensitivity analysis from Appendices E.4 – D.18: 
 
• For the main analysis, change of country is significant in ‘market risk’ 
(MRDI) 2007-2008, moderately significant in ‘operating risk’ (ORDI) 
2007-2009, ‘credit risk’ (CRDI) 2007-2009, and ‘business risk’ (BRDI) 
2007-2008  (see Table 7.9). 
• For the sensitivity analysis, change of country GDP is significant in 
‘operating risk’ (ORDI) 2007-2009 and moderately significant in ‘market 
risk’ (MRDI) 2008-2009. 
• For the main analysis, change of is not significant in all the regression 
(see Table 7.9). 
• For the sensitivity analysis, change of size is only significant in BRDI in 
the change year 2008-2009. 
• For the main analysis, board independence change is moderately 
significant only in change CRDI 2007 - 2008 (see Table 7.9). 
• For the sensitivity analysis, board meeting change is not significant in 
all regressions. 
 
Overall, the result for sensitivity analysis compare with the main analysis 
reveals that there is no significant difference in the significant of change in 
size and change of corporate governance related to RDI. 
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APPENDIX F: Regression after Potential Outliers Removed 
 
Multiple regression analyses can be severely and adversely affected by the failure 
of the data to remain constant with the assumptions that customarily accompany 
regression models. Mahalanobis distance and Cook's distance as diagnostic 
methods are available to help identify certain kinds of failure in outlier data. 
Diagnostics are thus valuable adjuncts to regression analyses. Mahalanobis 
distance and Cook's distance are capable of producing partial plots in the SPSS 
program. This allows for the saving of residuals (Velleman and Welsch 1981). 
From the residual, Mahalanobis value should be < 26.52 (based on eight predictor 
variables), and Cooks value should be < 1 (Ghazali 2005).  
The outlier analysis via mahalanobis and cook distance shows that, seven 
companies are potential outliers1 (for each of the three years), and are thus 
initially dropped from the 600 annual reports sample resulting in a final 579 annual 
reports sample in this appendix analysis. Therefore, Appendix E runs regression 
analysis after dropping the outlier.  
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
1 Seven companies which are potential outliers are: 
1. PT Asia Pacific Fibers Tbk 
2. Coretrack Ltd 
3. Metal Storm Limited 
4. Mikoh Corporation Limitedmikoh Corporation Limited 
5. Champbell Brother Limited 
6. Oci Berhad 
7. Jade Technologies Holdings Ltd.  
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Appendix F.1 Comparative Summary RDI Multiple Regression Analysis 
 
Panel A 
RDI Model 
 
 
CTY 
 
Size 
 
Man 
Own 
 
Board 
Ind 
 
Lev 
 
Prof 
 
Aud 
 
Age 
Bus 
RDI 2007 (N = 200) S 
 
X 
 
S 
 
S 
 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
 
RDI 2008 (N = 200) S 
 
S 
 
S 
 
S 
 
X 
 
S 
 
X 
 
X 
 
RDI 2009 (N = 200) X 
 
S 
 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
 
S 
 
X 
 
X 
 
RDI Pooled (N = 600) HS 
 
HS 
 
HS 
 
HS 
 
X 
 
HS 
 
X 
 
X 
 
 
Panel B 
RDI Model 
(after outliers removed) 
 
 
Cty 
 
Size 
 
Man 
Own 
 
Board 
Ind 
 
Lev 
 
Prof 
 
Aud 
 
Age 
Bus 
RDI 2007 (N = 193) S 
 
X 
 
MS 
 
HS 
 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
 
RDI 2008 (N = 193) S S MS S X 
 
S X 
 
X 
 
RDI 2009 (N = 193) MS MS X 
 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
 
RDI Pooled (N = 579) HS HS S HS X 
 
S X 
 
X 
 
Legend: CTY = country; Size = natural log of total assets; ManOwn = managerial ownership; BoardInd 
= board independence; Lev = leverage; Prof = profitability; Aud = auditor; AgeBus= age of business; 
HS denotes statistically highly significant at 1%; S denotes statistically significant at 5%: MS denotes 
statistically moderately significant at 10%,  and X means not statistical significant. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
F-3 
 
 
 
 
Appendix F.2 Comparative Summary Sub-RDI Multiple Regression Analysis 
Panel A 
Sub-RDI Model 
 
 
CTY 
 
Size 
 
Man 
Own 
 
Board 
Ind 
 
Lev 
 
Prof 
 
Aud 
 
Age 
Bus 
2007 (N = 200) 
BRDI 
SRDI 
ORDI 
MRDI 
CRDI 
 
MS 
X 
HS 
X 
X 
 
S 
X 
X 
HS 
X 
 
X 
HS 
X 
X 
X 
 
X 
S 
X 
X 
X 
 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
 
 
X 
HS 
X 
X 
MS 
 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
 
 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
 
2008 (N = 200) 
BRDI 
SRDI 
ORDI 
MRDI 
CRDI 
 
X 
X 
HS 
S 
X 
 
 
HS 
MS 
X 
X 
X 
 
X 
HS 
X 
X 
X 
 
 
MS 
HS 
X 
MS 
X 
 
 
X 
X 
X 
MS 
X 
 
 
X 
HS 
MS 
HS 
X 
 
 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
 
 
X 
X 
X 
S 
X 
 
2009 (N = 200) 
BRDI 
SRDI 
ORDI 
MRDI 
CRDI 
 
X 
X 
HS 
X 
X 
 
HS 
X 
X 
X 
MS 
 
S 
X 
X 
X 
X 
 
 
X 
X 
X 
MS 
X 
 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
 
 
X 
S 
X 
HS 
MS 
 
 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
 
 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
 
Pooled (N = 600) 
BRDI 
SRDI 
ORDI 
MRDI 
CRDI 
 
X 
X 
HS 
X 
X 
 
HS 
X 
X 
X 
MS 
 
HS 
HS 
   X 
X 
X 
 
 
X 
HS 
X 
HS 
X 
 
S 
X 
S 
HS 
X 
 
 
X 
HS 
X 
HS 
S 
 
 
S 
X 
X 
X 
X 
 
 
X 
X 
X 
HS 
X 
 
Panel B 
Sub-RDI Model: 
(after  outlier 
moved) 
 
 
CTY 
 
Size 
 
Man 
Own 
 
Board 
Ind 
 
Lev 
 
Prof 
 
Aud 
 
Age 
Bus 
2007 (N = 193) 
BRDI 
SRDI 
ORDI 
MRDI 
CRDI 
 
X 
X 
HS 
X 
X 
 
HS 
X 
X 
HS 
X 
 
X 
HS 
X 
X 
X 
 
X 
S 
MS 
X 
X 
 
MS 
X 
MS 
X 
X 
 
X 
HS 
X 
X 
X 
 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
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2008 (N = 193) 
BRDI 
SRDI 
ORDI 
MRDI 
CRDI 
 
X 
X 
HS 
S 
X 
 
HS 
MS 
X 
X 
X 
 
X 
HS 
X 
X 
X 
 
MS 
S 
MS 
X 
X 
 
X 
X 
S 
X 
X 
 
X 
HS 
X 
HS 
MS 
 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
 
X 
X 
X 
MS 
X 
2009 (N = 193) 
BRDI 
SRDI 
ORDI 
MRDI 
CRDI 
 
X 
X 
S 
X 
X 
 
HS 
X 
X 
X 
X 
 
S 
X 
X 
X 
X 
 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
 
X 
S 
X 
HS 
X 
 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
Pooled (N = 579) 
BRDI 
SRDI 
ORDI 
MRDI 
CRDI 
 
MS 
X 
HS 
X 
X 
 
HS 
X 
X 
X 
X 
 
HS 
HS 
X 
X 
X 
 
MS 
HS 
MS 
S 
X 
 
S 
X 
HS 
S 
X 
 
X 
HS 
X 
HS 
S 
 
HS 
X 
X 
X 
X 
 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
 
Legend: CTY = country; Size = natural log of total assets; ManOwn = managerial ownership; 
BoardInd = board independence; Lev = leverage; Prof = profitability; Aud = auditor; AgeBus= 
age of business; BRDI = business risk disclosure index; SRDI = strategic risk disclosure index; 
ORDI = operating risk disclosure index; MRDI = market risk disclosure index;  CRDI = credit risk 
disclosure index; HS denotes statistically highly significant at 1%; S denotes statistically 
significant at 5%: MS denotes statistically moderately significant at 10%,  and X means not 
statistical significant. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
F-5 
 
 
Appendix F.3 Comparative Summary RDI Change Multiple Regression 
Analysis 
 
Panel A 
RDI Model 
 
 
 ∆CTY 
 
∆Size 
 
∆Man 
Own 
 
∆Board 
Ind 
 
∆Lev 
 
∆Prof 
RDI ∆2007-2009 
 (N = 200) 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
 
RDI ∆2007-2008  
(N = 200) 
X 
 
X 
 
S X 
 
X 
 
X 
 
RDI ∆2008-2009  
(N = 200) 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
 
 
Panel B 
RDI Model 
(after outlier 
moved) 
 
 
 ∆CTY 
 
∆Size 
 
∆Man 
Own 
 
∆Board 
Ind 
 
∆Lev 
 
∆Prof 
RDI ∆2007-2009 
 (N = 193) 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
 
RDI ∆2007-2008  
(N = 193) 
X 
 
X 
 
S X 
 
X 
 
X 
 
RDI ∆2008-2009  
(N = 193) 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
 
Legend: ∆CTY = ∆ country; ∆Size = ∆ natural log of total assets; ∆ ManOwn = ∆ 
managerial ownership; ∆ BoardInd = ∆ board independence; ∆Lev = ∆ leverage; ∆ 
Prof = ∆ profitability; others control variables (auditor and age of business) are 
exclude in this model because there is only negligible change. HS denotes 
statistically highly significant at 1%; S denotes statistically significant at 5%: MS 
denotes statistically moderately significant at 10%,  and X means not statistical 
significant. 
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Appendix F.4 Comparative Summary Change Sub-RDI Multiple Regression 
Analysis 
Panel A 
RDI Model  
(N = 200) 
 
 
 ∆CTY 
 
∆Size 
 
∆Man 
Own 
 
∆Board 
Ind 
 
∆Lev 
 
∆Prof 
∆2007-2009 
BRDI 
SRDI 
ORDI 
MRDI 
CRDI 
 
X 
X 
MS 
X 
MS 
 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
 
X 
X 
X 
X 
MS 
 
X 
X 
X 
S 
X 
 
X 
X 
MS 
X 
X 
∆2007-2008  
BRDI 
SRDI 
ORDI 
MRDI 
CRDI 
 
MS 
X 
X 
HS 
X 
 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
 
X 
MS 
X 
S 
S 
 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
 
X 
X 
MS 
X 
X 
 
X 
X 
S 
X 
X 
∆2008-2009  
BRDI 
SRDI 
ORDI 
MRDI 
CRDI 
 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
 
X 
X 
X 
X 
S 
 
Panel B 
RDI Model 
(after outlier 
moved) 
(N = 193) 
 
 ∆CTY 
 
∆Size 
 
∆Man 
Own 
 
∆Board 
Ind 
 
∆Lev 
 
∆Prof 
∆2007-2009 
BRDI 
SRDI 
ORDI 
MRDI 
CRDI 
 
X 
X 
MS 
X 
S 
 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
 
X 
X 
X 
X 
MS 
 
X 
X 
X 
S 
X 
 
X 
X 
S 
X 
X 
∆2007-2008  
BRDI 
SRDI 
ORDI 
MRDI 
CRDI 
 
MS 
X 
X 
HS 
X 
 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
 
X 
X 
X 
S 
S 
 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
 
X 
X 
S 
X 
X 
 
X 
X 
S 
X 
X 
∆2008-2009  
BRDI 
SRDI 
ORDI 
MRDI 
CRDI 
 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
Legend: ∆CTY = ∆ country; ∆Size = ∆ natural log of total assets; ∆ ManOwn = ∆ 
managerial ownership; ∆ BoardInd = ∆ board independence; ∆Lev = ∆ leverage; ∆ 
Prof = ∆ profitability; others control variables (auditor and age of business) are 
exclude in this model because there is only negligible change. BRDI = business 
risk disclosure index; SRDI = strategic risk disclosure index; ORDI = operating risk 
disclosure index; MRDI = market risk disclosure index;  CRDI = credit risk 
disclosure index; HS denotes statistically highly significant at 1%; S denotes 
statistically significant at 5%: MS denotes statistically moderately significant at 
10%,  and X means not statistical significant. 
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Appendix F.5 RDI Multiple Regression Analysis 
  2007 2008 2009 Pooled Data 
Adjusted R2  .141 .134 .033 .113 
Durbin Watson  1.617 1.536 1.499 1.508 
F statistic  4.935 4.728 1.811 10.178 
Significance  .000 .000 .077 .000 
n  193 193 193 579 
 Predicted 
sign 
Coeff T Stat P-value Coeff T Stat P-value Coeff T Stat P-value Coeff T Stat P-value 
Intercept  .225 3.830 .000 .184 2.890 .004 .242 3.583 .000 .211 5.743 .000 
Country  (+) .017 2.514 .013** .016 2.174 .031** .013 1.685 .094*** .016 3.709 .000* 
Company Size (+) .008 1.419 .158 .015 2.478 .014** .012 1.889 .060*** .012 3.434 .001* 
Managerial 
Ownership 
(-) -.069 -1.705 .090*** -.083 -1.787 .076*** -.041 -.889 .375 -.066 -2.555 .011** 
Board Independence (+) .093 2.628 .009* .088 2.228 .027** .015 .370 .711 .068 3.085 .002* 
Leverage (+) -.057 -1.639 .103 -.037 -1.042 .299 .005 .124 .901 -.030 -1.454 .147 
Profitability (+) .050 1.068 .287 .102 2.013 .046** .074 1.479 .141 .066 2.345 .019** 
Auditor (+) -.019 -1.164 .246 -.007 -.395 .694 -.007 -.354 .724 -.010 -.963 .336 
Age of Business (+) .000 .643 .521 -.00005 -.152 .879 .000 -.397 .692 .00001 .074 .941 
*highly significant at 1% level, **significant at 5% level, *** moderately significant at 10% level 
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Appendix F.6 BRDI Multiple Regression Analysis 
  2007 2008 2009 Pooled data 
Adjusted R2  .117 .106 .074 .114 
Durbin Watson  1.450 1.758 1.591 1.589 
F statistic  4.175 3.854 2.912 10.309 
Significance  .000 .000 .004 .000 
n  193 193 193 579 
 Predicted 
sign 
Coeff T Stat P-value Coeff T Stat P-value Coeff T Stat P-value Coeff T Stat P-value 
Intercept  .249 2.311 .022 .271 2.519 .013 .338 3.155 .002 .279 4.526 .000 
Country  (+) .020 1.656 .100 .002 .135 .893 .013 1.055 .293 .012 1.710 .088*** 
Company Size (+) .029 2.712 .007* .031 3.048 .003* .030 3.008 .003* .030 5.143 .000* 
Managerial 
Ownership 
(-) -.083 -1.127 .261 -.106 -1.364 .174 -.145 -1.973 .050** -.112 -2.598 .010* 
Board Independence (+) .105 1.622 .107 .124 1.872 .063*** -.035 -.553 .581 .067 1.822 .069*** 
Leverage (+) -.118 -1.842 .067*** -.070 -1.169 .244 -.018 -.310 .757 -.069 -1.985 .048** 
Profitability (+) -.044 -.519 .604 .038 .443 .658 -.013 -.169 .866 -.013 -.284 .776 
Auditor (+) -.049 -1.628 .105 -.046 -1.490 .138 -.046 -1.522 .130 -.045 -2.588 .010* 
Age of Business (+) .000 .613 .541 .000 -.205 .838 .000 -.598 .551 -.00003 -.095 .924 
*highly significant at 1% level, **significant at 5% level, *** moderately significant at 10 % level 
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Appendix F.7 SRDI Multiple Regression Analysis 
  2007 2008 2009 Pooled data 
Adjusted R2  .113 .147 .051 .103 
Durbin Watson  1.788 1.830 1.858 1.765 
F statistic  4.068 5.139 2.293 9.290 
Significance  .000 .000 .023 .000 
n  193 193 193 579 
 Predicted 
sign 
Coeff T Stat P-value Coeff T Stat P-value Coeff T Stat P-value Coeff T Stat P-value 
Intercept  .185 2.480 .014 .072 .874 .383 .135 1.542 .125 .118 2.475 .014 
Country  (+) -.010 -1.167 .245 -.005 -.488 .626 -.010 -.979 .329 -.008 -1.406 .160 
Company Size (+) -.010 -1.381 .169 .014 1.788 .075*** .006 .768 .443 .004 .988 .324 
Managerial 
Ownership 
(-) -.135 -2.655 .009* -.161 -2.703 .008* -.049 -.819 .414 -.115 -3.459 .001* 
Board Independence (+) .106 2.375 .019** .121 2.378 .018* .067 1.310 .192 .106 3.694 .000* 
Leverage (+) -.002 -.036 .972 -.017 -.375 .708 .049 1.028 .305 .004 .154 .878 
Profitability (+) .218 3.689 .000* .244 3.722 .000* .154 2.360 .019** .187 5.098 .000* 
Auditor (+) .016 .799 .425 .001 .031 .975 -.006 -.263 .792 .005 .390 .697 
Age of Business (+) .00007 .198 .843 .000 -1.265 .208 -.00009 -.208 .835 .000 -.692 .490 
*highly significant at 1% level, **significant at 5% level, *** moderately significant at 10% level 
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Appendix F.8  ORDI Multiple Regression Analysis 
  2007 2008 2009 Pooled data 
Adjusted R2  .215 .181 .109 .180 
Durbin Watson  1.499 1.365 1.343 1.388 
F statistic  7.556 6.301 3.949 16.859 
Significance  .000 .000 .000 .000 
n  193 193 193 579 
 Predicted 
sign 
Coeff T Stat P-value Coeff T Stat P-value Coeff T Stat P-value Coeff T Stat P-value 
Intercept  .401 2.960 .003 .170 1.262 .209 .293 1.933 .055 .281 3.503 .000 
Country  (+) .092 6.009 .000* .090 5.750 .000* .069 4.067 .000* .084 9.182 .000* 
Company Size (+) -.018 -1.373 .172 .009 .691 .490 .003 .251 .802 -.001 -.191 .848 
Managerial 
Ownership 
(-) -.015 -.164 .870 .021 .210 .834 .115 1.098 .273 .037 .666 .506 
Board Independence (+) .135 1.669 .097 .087 1.046 .297 .032 .361 .719 .085 1.758 .079*** 
Leverage (+) -.138 -1.712 .089*** -.160 -2.129 .035** -.132 -1.587 .114 -.140 -3.102 .002* 
Profitability (+) -.038 -.355 .723 -.089 -.827 .410 -.016 -.141 .888 -.059 -.952 .342 
Auditor (+) -.013 -.359 .720 .042 1.101 .272 .025 .592 .554 .018 .811 .418 
Age of Business (+) .000 .200 .842 .00008 .131 .896 .000 -.419 .675 -.00002 -.053 .958 
*highly significant at 1% level, **significant at 5% level, *** moderately significant at 10% level 
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Appendix F.9  MRDI Multiple Regression Analysis 
  2007 2008 2009 Pooled data 
Adjusted R2  .122 .072 .055 .064 
Durbin Watson  2.342 1.985 1.584 1.803 
F statistic  4.332 2.862 2.393 5.929 
Significance  .000 .005 .018 .000 
n  193 193 193 579 
 Predicted 
sign 
Coeff T Stat P-value Coeff T Stat P-value Coeff T Stat P-value Coeff T Stat P-value 
Intercept  .045 .833 .406 .110 1.568 .119 .149 2.059 .041 .106 2.738 .006 
Country  (+) -.007 -1.127 .261 .019 2.334 .021* .009 1.061 .290 .007 1.562 .119 
Company Size (+) .016 2.930 .004* -.006 -.947 .345 -.010 -1.436 .153 .000 -.187 .852 
Managerial 
Ownership 
(-) -.009 -.239 .812 -.040 -.781 .436 .006 .125 .901 -.018 -.662 .508 
Board Independence (+) .036 1.112 .267 .055 1.267 .207 .058 1.353 .178 .049 2.133 .033** 
Leverage (+) .012 .382 .703 .060 1.529 .128 .051 1.296 .197 .046 2.132 .033** 
Profitability (+) .054 1.257 .211 .150 2.687 .008* .167 3.104 .002* .122 4.126 .000* 
Auditor (+) -.013 -.835 .405 .013 .650 .517 .027 1.327 .186 .008 .719 .472 
Age of Business (+) .000 1.079 .282 .001 1.796 .074*** .000 .981 .328 .000 2.262 .024** 
*highly significant at 1% level, **significant at 5% level, *** moderately significant at 10% level 
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Appendix F.10  CRDI Multiple Regression Analysis 
  2007 2008 2009 Pooled data 
Adjusted R2  -.017 -.014 -.002 .005 
Durbin Watson  1.666 1.815 1.685 1.724 
F statistic  .602 .661 .950 1.374 
Significance  .775 .725 .477 .205 
n  193 193 193 579 
 Predicted 
sign 
Coeff T Stat P-value Coeff T Stat P-value Coeff T Stat P-value Coeff T Stat P-value 
Intercept  .434 2.452 .015 .436 2.438 .016 .334 1.744 .083 .386 3.699 .000 
Country  (+) .011 .549 .584 -.001 -.049 .961 -.015 -.709 .479 -.001 -.086 .931 
Company Size (+) -.005 -.298 .766 .012 .716 .475 .021 1.196 .233 .010 1.026 .305 
Managerial 
Ownership 
(-) -.066 -.543 .588 -.019 -.147 .883 .070 .535 .593 -.009 -.118 .906 
Board Independence (+) .071 .674 .501 -.148 -1.338 .183 -.102 -.907 .366 -.053 -.851 .395 
Leverage (+) .078 .738 .462 .030 .296 .768 .119 1.131 .260 .069 1.176 .240 
Profitability (+) .213 1.518 .131 .241 1.694 .092*** .194 1.363 .174 .202 2.522 .012** 
Auditor (+) -.017 -.349 .727 -.010 -.205 .838 .023 .427 .670 .002 .072 .943 
Age of Business (+) .000 -.599 .550 .000 -.622 .535 .000 -.547 .585 .000 -.911 .363 
*highly significant at 1% level, **significant at 5% level, *** moderately significant at 10% level 
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Appendix F.11    Change RDI Multiple Regression Analysis 
  ∆2007-2009 ∆2007-2008 ∆2008-2009 
Adjusted R2  .006 .001 -.019 
Durbin Watson  1.966 2.006 1.854 
F statistic  1.195 1.043 .390 
Significance  .311 .399 .885 
n  193 193 193 
 Predicted 
sign 
Coeff T Stat P-value Coeff T Stat P-value Coeff T Stat P-value 
Intercept  .064 4.155 .000 .027 1.973 .050 .023 1.636 .104 
Country  (+) -.008 -1.404 .162 .000 -.154 .878 -.004 -.856 .393 
∆Company Size (+) -.042 -1.244 .215 -.005 -.146 .884 .011 .212 .832 
∆Managerial 
Ownership 
(-) -.034 -.529 .597 -.114 -2.113 .036** .055 .726 .469 
∆Board Independence (+) -.002 -.055 .956 .022 .464 .643 .002 .053 .958 
∆Leverage (+) .086 1.548 .123 .075 1.160 .248 -.048 -.760 .448 
∆Profitability (+) -.052 -1.395 .165 .010 .252 .801 .001 .024 .981 
*highly significant at 1% level, **significant at 5% level, *** moderately significant at 10% level 
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Appendix F.12  Change BRDI Multiple Regression Analysis 
  ∆2007-2009 ∆2007-2008 ∆2008-2009 
Adjusted R2  .001 .007 -.014 
Durbin Watson  1.888 1.756 2.074 
F statistic  1.035 1.232 .566 
Significance  .404 .292 .757 
n  193 193 193 
 Predicted 
sign 
Coeff T Stat P-value Coeff T Stat P-value Coeff T Stat P-value 
Intercept  .078 3.417 .001 .057 2.471 .014 .006 .271 .787 
∆Country  (+) -.012 -1.518 .131 -.016 -1.940 .054*** .007 .889 .375 
∆Company Size (+) -.046 -.911 .363 .010 .178 .859 .027 .350 .727 
∆Managerial 
Ownership 
(-) -.126 -1.339 .182 -.052 -.557 .578 .129 1.138 .256 
∆Board Independence (+) -.022 -.385 .701 .103 1.259 .210 .006 .088 .930 
∆Leverage (+) .094 1.153 .251 .097 .871 .385 -.088 -.921 .358 
∆Profitability (+) -.043 -.774 .440 .064 .911 .364 -.070 -.920 .359 
*highly significant at 1% level, **significant at 5% level, *** moderately significant at 10% level 
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Appendix F.13  Change SRDI Multiple Regression Analysis 
  ∆2007-2009 ∆2007-2008 ∆2008-2009 
Adjusted R2  -.025 .015 .002 
Durbin Watson  2.046 2.229 1.966 
F statistic  .231 1.479 1.077 
Significance  .966 .188 .378 
n  193 193 193 
 Predicted 
sign 
Coeff T Stat P-value Coeff T Stat P-value Coeff T Stat P-value 
Intercept  .055 2.482 .014 .024 1.238 .217 .035 1.636 .104 
∆Country  (+) .001 .192 .848 .010 1.377 .170 -.010 -1.273 .204 
∆Company Size (+) -.025 -.508 .612 -.042 -.932 .352 -.091 -1.182 .239 
∆Managerial 
Ownership 
(-) -.094 -1.034 .303 -.127 -1.610 .109 -.004 -.032 .974 
∆Board Independence (+) .006 .100 .921 .060 .876 .382 .032 .516 .607 
∆Leverage (+) .013 .158 .875 -.063 -.677 .499 -.056 -.589 .556 
∆Profitability (+) .008 .157 .876 .074 1.251 .212 .115 1.514 .132 
*highly significant at 1% level, **significant at 5% level, *** moderately significant at 10% level 
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Appendix F.14  Change ORDI Multiple Regression Analysis 
  ∆2007-2009 ∆2007-2008 ∆2008-2009 
Adjusted R2  .015 .032 -.018 
Durbin Watson  2.009 2.029 1.887 
F statistic  1.497 2.072 .447 
Significance  .181 .058 .847 
n  193 193 193 
 Predicted 
sign 
Coeff T Stat P-value Coeff T Stat P-value Coeff T Stat P-value 
Intercept  .076 2.181 .030 .028 1.030 .304 .025 .795 .427 
∆Country  (+) -.023 -1.887 .061*** -.006 -.627 .531 -.011 -1.008 .315 
∆Company Size (+) .001 .007 .995 .044 .703 .483 .078 .686 .494 
∆Managerial 
Ownership 
(-) .051 .356 .723 -.088 -.808 .420 -.007 -.043 .965 
∆Board Independence (+) .028 .315 .753 -.055 -.574 .567 -.063 -.677 .499 
∆Leverage (+) -.020 -.158 .874 .256 1.971 .050** -.010 -.067 .947 
∆Profitability (+) -.206 -2.404 .017** -.168 -2.049 .042 .009 .083 .934 
*highly significant at 1% level, **significant at 5% level, *** moderately significant at 10% level 
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Appendix F.15  Change MRDI Multiple Regression Analysis 
  ∆2007-2009 ∆2007-2008 ∆2008-2009 
Adjusted R2  .024 .037 -.022 
Durbin Watson  1.503 2.068 1.875 
F statistic  1.771 2.241 .326 
Significance  .107 .041 .923 
n  193 193 193 
 Predicted 
sign 
Coeff T Stat P-value Coeff T Stat P-value Coeff T Stat P-value 
Intercept  .017 .753 .452 -.026 -1.304 .194 .024 1.041 .299 
∆Country  (+) .009 1.117 .266 .021 2.984 .003* -.009 -1.118 .265 
∆Company Size (+) -.074 -1.443 .151 -.011 -.250 .803 .010 .128 .898 
∆Managerial 
Ownership 
(-) .091 .950 .344 -.150 -1.918 .057*** .039 .325 .745 
∆Board Independence (+) -.057 -.972 .332 -.092 -1.344 .180 -.006 -.086 .932 
∆Leverage (+) .213 2.552 .012** .067 .720 .472 .035 .345 .731 
∆Profitability (+) .004 .074 .941 .012 .210 .834 .011 .134 .894 
*highly significant at 1% level, **significant at 5% level, *** moderately significant at 10% level 
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Appendix F.16  Change CRDI Multiple Regression Analysis 
  ∆2007-2009 ∆2007-2008 ∆2008-2009 
Adjusted R2  .020 .006 -.014 
Durbin Watson  1.928 1.842 1.753 
F statistic  1.649 1.196 .543 
Significance  .136 .310 .775 
n  193 193 193 
 Predicted 
sign 
Coeff T Stat P-value Coeff T Stat P-value Coeff T Stat P-value 
Intercept  .133 2.840 .005 .023 .552 .582 .073 1.657 .099 
∆Country  (+) -.034 -2.050 .042** -.011 -.710 .479 -.015 -.966 .335 
∆Company Size (+) -.070 -.675 .500 -.023 -.236 .814 .134 .848 .398 
∆Managerial 
Ownership 
(-) .093 .482 .631 -.396 -2.369 .019** .077 .332 .740 
∆Board Independence (+) .220 1.840 .067*** .012 .085 .933 .052 .400 .690 
∆Leverage (+) .128 .757 .450 .025 .127 .899 -.155 -.791 .430 
∆Profitability (+) -.140 -1.214 .226 -.118 -.944 .346 -.042 -.267 .790 
 
*highly significant at 1% level, **significant at 5% level, *** moderately significant at 10% level 
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Overall, Appendix F regressions analyses provides evidence that the 
results regressions after dropping the outlier (n = 579) are almost identical 
with the main regression (before dropping the outliers, n = 600). Therefore 
the full sample is used in this study. 
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APPENDIX G: Sensitivity Analysis for Managerial Ownership 
 
 
 Appendix G shows the sensitivity analysis results in managerial 
ownership which is re-measured by:  
a) Categorized as 0 if not present managerial ownership and 1 if present. 
b) Categorized 0 if have ≤ 5% managerial ownership and 1 if have > 5%   
                      managerial ownership.  
c) Categorized 0 if have ≤ 10% managerial ownership and 1 if > 10%    
    managerial ownership.  
d) Categorized 0 if have ≤ 20% managerial ownership and 1 if have >  
    20% managerial ownership. 
e) Categorized 0 if have ≤ 25% managerial ownership and 1 if have >  
    25% managerial ownership. 
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Appendix G.1 Sensitivity Analysis: RDI Multiple Regression Analysis (Managerial Ownership (present or not)) 
  2007 2008 2009 Pooled year 
Adjusted R2  .122 .127 .067 .116 
Durbin Watson  1.652 1.626 1.543 1.554 
F statistic  4.470 4.611 2.776 10.785 
Significance  .000 .000 .006 .000 
n  200 200 200 600 
 Predicted 
sign 
Coeff T Stat P-value Coeff T Stat P-value Coeff T Stat P-value Coeff T Stat P-value 
Intercept  .221 3.646 .000 .171 2.667 .008 .223 3.308 .001 .202 5.448 .000 
Country (+) .014 2.060 .041** .013 1.650 .101 .008 1.062 .290 .012 2.822 .005* 
Company Size (+) .007 1.244 .215 .014 2.425 .016** .013 2.247 .026** .011 3.457 .001* 
Managerial 
Ownership 
(present or not) 
(-) .000 .010 .992 .011 .497 .620 .018 .854 .394 .008 .669 .504 
Board  
Independence 
(+) .081 2.367 .019** .092 2.397 .017** .019 .510 .610 .067 3.147 .002* 
Leverage (+) -.016 -.595 .553 -.016 -.635 .526 -.012 -.478 .633 -.013 -.865 .387 
Profitability (+) .030 .940 .349 .045 2.008 .046** .093 2.596 .010* .047 2.926 .004* 
Auditor (+) -.026 -1.609 .109 -.012 -.671 .503 -.005 -.272 .786 -.015 -1.445 .149 
Age of Business (+) .000 1.325 .187 .000 .665 .507 -.00002 -.077 .939 .000 1.179 .239 
*highly significant at 1% level, **significant at 5% level, *** moderately significant at 10% level 
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Appendix G.2 Sensitivity Analysis: RDI Multiple Regression Analysis (Managerial Ownership ≤ 5% and > 5%) 
  2007 2008 2009 Pooled year 
Adjusted R2  .133 .127 .065 .119 
Durbin Watson  1.639 1.609 1.518 1.542 
F statistic  4.805 4.611 2.735 11.093 
Significance  .000 .000 .007 .000 
n  200 200 200 600 
 Predicted 
sign 
Coeff T Stat P-value Coeff T Stat P-value Coeff T Stat P-value Coeff T Stat P-value 
Intercept  .235 3.948 .000 .181 2.868 .005 .247 3.758 .000 .216 5.956 .000 
Country (+) .017 2.505 .013** .015 2.035 .043** .012 1.553 .122 .015 3.559 .000* 
Company Size (+) .006 1.112 .268 .014 2.372 .019** .012 2.078 .039** .011 3.269 .001* 
Managerial 
Ownership 
≤ 5% and > 5% 
(-) -.023 -1.503 .134 -.008 -.493 .623 -.011 -.655 .513 -.015 -1.611 .108 
Board  
Independence 
(+) .071 2.048 .042** .091 2.336 .021** .014 .379 .705 .062 2.868 .004* 
Leverage (+) -.021 -.773 .441 -.018 -.727 .468 -.015 -.597 .551 -.016 -1.113 .266 
Profitability (+) .032 1.005 .316 .047 2.081 .039** .087 2.450 .015** .047 2.923 .004* 
Auditor (+) -.023 -1.428 .155 -.011 -.585 .559 -.006 -.315 .753 -.013 -1.260 .208 
Age of Business (+) .000 1.032 .303 .000 .496 .621 -.00008 -.251 .802 .000 .783 .434 
*highly significant at 1% level, **significant at 5% level, *** moderately significant at 10% level 
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Appendix G.3 Sensitivity Analysis: RDI Multiple Regression Analysis (Managerial Ownership ≤ 10% and > 10%) 
  2007 2008 2009 Pooled year 
Adjusted R2  .132 .130 .065 .119 
Durbin Watson  1.620 1.609 1.517 1.537 
F statistic  4.766 4.721 2.740 11.137 
Significance  .000 .000 .007 .000 
n  200 200 200 600 
 Predicted 
sign 
Coeff T Stat P-value Coeff T Stat P-value Coeff T Stat P-value Coeff T Stat P-value 
Intercept  .234 3.930 .000 .183 2.919 .004 .248 3.764 .000 .216 5.968 .000 
Country (+) .017 2.500 .013** .016 2.170 .031** .011 1.546 .124 .015 3.582 .000* 
Company Size (+) .006 1.079 .282 .014 2.360 .019** .012 2.107 .036** .011 3.277 .001* 
Managerial 
Ownership 
≤ 10% and > 10% 
(-) -.022 -1.413 .159 -.017 -.990 .323 -.012 -.687 .493 -.017 -1.705 .089*** 
Board  
Independence 
(+) .076 2.210 .028** .090 2.323 .021** .014 .372 .710 .063 2.939 .003* 
Leverage (+) -.021 -.765 .445 -.019 -.770 .442 -.015 -.608 .544 -.016 -1.127 .260 
Profitability (+) .033 1.035 .302 .047 2.106 .037** .088 2.475 .014** .047 2.960 .003* 
Auditor (+) -.025 -1.527 .129 -.011 -.603 .547 -.007 -.364 .716 -.014 -1.380 .168 
Age of Business (+) .000 1.039 .300 .000 .405 .686 -.00008 -.274 .784 .000 .759 .448 
*highly significant at 1% level, **significant at 5% level, *** moderately significant at 10% level 
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Appendix G.4 Sensitivity Analysis: RDI Multiple Regression Analysis (Managerial Ownership ≤ 20% and > 20%) 
  2007 2008 2009 Pooled year 
Adjusted R2  .132 .135 .066 .122 
Durbin Watson  1.639 1.621 1.530 1.551 
F statistic  4.790 4.888 2.769 11.413 
Significance  .000 .000 .006 .000 
n  200 200 200 600 
 Predicted 
sign 
Coeff T Stat P-value Coeff T Stat P-value Coeff T Stat P-value Coeff T Stat P-value 
Intercept  .225 3.819 .000 .176 2.830 .005 .239 3.694 .000 .209 5.820 .000 
Country (+) .016 2.460 .015** .017 2.287 .023** .012 1.588 .114 .015 3.684 .000* 
Company Size (+) .007 1.261 .209 .014 2.443 .015** .013 2.215 .028** .011 3.478 .001* 
Managerial 
Ownership 
≤ 20% and > 20% 
(-) -.025 -1.469 .144 -.027 -1.450 .149 -.016 -.822 .412 -.023 -2.199 .028** 
Board  
Independence 
(+) .074 2.125 .035** .092 2.396 .018** .016 .424 .672 .063 2.980 .003* 
Leverage (+) -.020 -.726 .469 -.017 -.695 .488 -.014 -.550 .583 -.014 -1.007 .314 
Profitability (+) .031 .982 .328 .047 2.129 .035** .092 2.571 .011** .048 3.031 .003* 
Auditor (+) -.023 -1.405 .162 -.010 -.544 .587 -.006 -.311 .756 -.013 -1.256 .210 
Age of Business (+) .000 .951 .343 .00008 .275 .783 -.00009 -.308 .759 .000 .597 .550 
*highly significant at 1% level, **significant at 5% level, *** moderately significant at 10% level 
 
 
 
 
G-6 
 
Appendix G.5 Sensitivity Analysis: RDI Multiple Regression Analysis (Managerial Ownership ≤ 25% and > 25%) 
  2007 2008 2009 Pooled year 
Adjusted R2  .135 .137 .066 .124 
Durbin Watson  1.639 1.620 1.524 1.548 
F statistic  4.892 4.937 2.763 11.590 
Significance  .000 .000 .007 .000 
n  200 200 200 600 
 Predicted 
sign 
Coeff T Stat P-value Coeff T Stat P-value Coeff T Stat P-value Coeff T Stat P-value 
Intercept  .231 3.910 .000 .178 2.863 .005 .241 3.716 .000 .212 5.924 .000 
Country (+) .016 2.397 .017** .016 2.255 .025** .011 1.561 .120 .015 3.612 .000* 
Company Size (+) .007 1.194 .234 .014 2.456 .015** .013 2.224 .027** .011 3.454 .001* 
Managerial 
Ownership 
≤ 25% and > 25% 
(-) -.029 -1.686 .093*** -.031 -1.559 .121 -.016 -.796 .427 -.027 -2.463 .014** 
Board  
Independence 
(+) .075 2.195 .029** .093 2.427 .016** .016 .409 .683 .064 3.016 .003* 
Leverage (+) -.019 -.708 .480 -.016 -.648 .518 -.013 -.530 .597 -.014 -.968 .334 
Profitability (+) .032 1.006 .316 .049 2.194 .029** .091 2.565 .011** .049 3.088 .002* 
Auditor (+) -.024 -1.484 .140 -.011 -.638 .524 -.007 -.376 .708 -.014 -1.397 .163 
Age of Business (+) .000 .893 .373 .00007 .234 .815 -.00009 -.311 .756 .00009 .516 .606 
*highly significant at 1% level, **significant at 5% level, *** moderately significant at 10% level 
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Managerial ownership in the sensitivity analysis (categorized 0 if not 
present managerial ownership and 1 if present) is not significant in all of 
the four regressions (see Appendix G.1). Managerial ownership in the 
sensitivity analysis (categorized 0 if have ≤ 5% managerial ownership and 
1 if have > 5% managerial ownership) is not significant in all of the four 
regressions (see Appendix G.2). Managerial ownership in the sensitivity 
analysis (categorized 0 if have ≤ 10% managerial ownership and 1 if have 
> 10% managerial ownership) is moderate significant only in pooled data 
with negative coefficients (see Appendix G.3). Managerial ownership in 
the sensitivity analysis (categorized 0 if have ≤ 20% managerial 
ownership and 1 if have > 20% managerial ownership) is significant only 
in pooled data with negative coefficients (see Appendix G.4). Managerial 
ownership in the sensitivity analysis (categorized 0 if have ≤ 25% 
managerial ownership and 1 if have > 25% managerial ownership) is 
moderate significant in 2007 and significant in pooled data with negative 
coefficients (see Appendix G.5).  
 
Based on the sensitivity analysis in the categorized of managerial 
ownership based on the percentage of ownership, this thesis conclude 
that the companies which have ≤  15% and > 15% also ≤  50% and > 50% 
managerial ownership are most effects risk disclosure (see Section 6.6). 
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APPENDIX H: RDI Regression with Year Variable 
 
Appendix H shows the multiple regression analysis results use the pooled 
sample and control for years using dummies. 
 
 
Appendix H. 1 RDI Multiple Regression Analysis (Pooled) 
 
  Pooled Data 
Adjusted R2  .149 
Durbin Watson  1.576 
F statistic  12.632 
Significance  0.000* 
n  600 
 Predicted 
sign 
Coeff T Stat P-value 
Intercept  .182 4.988 .000 
Country  (+) .016 3.830 .000* 
Company Size (+) .011 3.303 .001* 
Managerial Ownership (-) -.072 -2.947 .003* 
Board Independence (+) .060 2.844 .005* 
Leverage (+) -.013 -.950 .343 
Profitability (+) .051 3.255 .001* 
Auditor (+) -.013 -1.326 .185 
Age of Business (+) .000004 .240 .811 
Year (+) .019 3.923 .000* 
*highly significant at 1% level, **significant at 5% level, *** moderately significant at 10% level 
 
 
Overall, Appendix H regression analysis provides evidence that the results 
regressions in the pooled sample and control for years using dummies are 
almost identical with the main regression (see Table 6.4). Therefore the 
separate regression year by year is used in this study to overcome the 
problem of repeated measure. 
 
